Angela Carter's (de)philosophising of Western thought.

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Submitted to Swansea University in fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Swansea University

2014

Abstract

What do Plato, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Thomas Hobbes, René Descartes, John Locke, David Hume, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Gilbert Ryle, Immanuel Kant, and the Marquis de Sade have in common? Spanning centuries and – when it comes to Plato – millennia, they are key figures of Western philosophy who have discussed ideas of reality, knowledge, existence, the state of nature, and morality, ideas which are central to Angela Carter's novels. In this thesis, I position Carter as a (de)philosophiser, and argue that she deconstructs the pivotal theories of Western philosophy, while also philosophising on the same concepts, contributing a female voice to this overwhelmingly androcentric discipline. In doing so, I contribute the first in-depth discussion of Carter's philosophical intertextuality to Carter criticism, going beyond Carter's explicit references that, to date, have been acknowledged by Carter scholars; although this is an original topic, the originality of my argument is boosted by my references to the archival material that comprises the Angela Carter Papers Collection.

The thesis is structured according to Carter's engagement with the range of Western thinkers aforementioned, focusing on Plato's impact on *Heroes and Villains* (1969), *The Infernal Desire Machines of Doctor Hoffman* (1972) and *The Passion of New Eve* (1977) in Chapter One, while Chapter Two is dedicated to Carter's analysis of Hobbes and Rousseau's arguments in *Heroes and Villains.* In Chapter Three I discuss Descartes (in relation to *Doctor Hoffman*), Locke (*vis-à-vis Shadow Dance*, 1966, *New Eve*, and *Nights at the Circus*, 1984), and Hume, with reference to *Several Perceptions* (1968) and *Love* (written 1969, published 1971). Wittgenstein and Ryle's impact on *Doctor Hoffman* and Carter's time in Japan are examined in Chapter Four. The fifth and final chapter concentrates on Carter and moral philosophy, paying particular attention to Kant and Sade and discussing *Shadow Dance*, *Several Perceptions*, and *Love*, as well as *Doctor Hoffman* and *The Sadeian Woman* (1979).

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Acknowledgements

When I graduated from my BA (Hons) in 2010, one of the speakers at the ceremony compared undergraduate students to Formula One drivers, saying that a driver's team plays a key role in the success of a driver, just as a student's family is central to a student's achievement. The same metaphor applies to writing a Ph.D. thesis, as a range of people – in my department and College, as well as friends and family – have been instrumental in helping me complete this work. To begin with, I would like to thank the AHRC for funding me for the last three years, as this has allowed me to dedicate my time to academic studies and to gain experience that I otherwise may have missed out on. The staff at the British Library, where the Angela Carter Papers Collection is archived, have also been incredibly helpful. Thanks also to Emily Blewitt, for helping me with the proof-reading stage. There are a number of people at Swansea University whom I need to acknowledge, both staff and students. The RIAH and APECS staff have been fundamental to supporting postgraduate students in the College, and on a more personal level, Daniel Mattingly and Hannah Sams have been there for moral support and cups of tea – or, I should say, hot chocolate. A number of staff members have given me support as well, including Professor Liz Herbert-McAvoy and Dr Roberta Magnani, as well as Dr Fritz-Gregor Herrmann for giving me advice on Plato, and Dr Mario Von Der Ruhr for helping me get to grips with Wittgenstein. Thanks to Dr Richard Robinson as well, my second supervisor, for feedback on earlier chapters of this thesis. I would also like to thank Helen Snaith, a fellow Carter Ph.D. candidate, colleague, and friend, for her help and support over the last three years. In terms of my institution, the most important person to thank is Dr Sarah Gamble, my supervisor, not just for her academic guidance but for her moral support, and for introducing me to Angela Carter in the first place! More broadly, thanks to Lisa Appignanesi and Dr Charlotte Crofts for their advice, as well as the support from a range of other Ph.D. candidates and Swansea University undergraduate students, all courtesy of Twitter. Thank you to Professor Caroline Franklin and Professor Lucie Armitt for examining my thesis, and for their help with perfecting it.

On a more personal note, my friends have been incredibly supportive of my studies, and have probably learnt a lot more about Angela Carter than they ever wanted to in the process. I haven't got the words to thank them enough, but thanks to Johanna Dellay, Romi George, Emma Meek, and Kirsty Rowles for being there and helping me to take my mind off work. I would also like to thank my Dad and grandparents (past and present) for supporting me with my studies, as well as my Mother, for giving an Angela Carter novel a try and for continually challenging me to develop my feminist viewpoint. Last, but by no means least, thanks to my husband Paul King for his endless support. Words cannot express how much I appreciate the help he has given me throughout all my studies. Thank you for helping all of me.

Introduction: Let's Get Philosophical

> I do think fiction should be asking the great, unanswerable, adolescent questions.
> (Carter in Evans 1992: unpaginated)

> Philosophy enables us to speak plausibly of everything.
> (Carter 1962-63 Journal MS88899/1/88: unpaginated)

Angela Carter (1940-92) is renowned for her intertextuality – the wealth of allusions to and citations from a plethora of texts, from William Shakespeare's *Hamlet* to Edgar Allan Poe's 'The Fall of the House of Usher' and André Breton's *Manifestoes of Surrealism*, that characterise her work. These influences span a range of disciplines, from literature, film, and art, to popular culture. Carter's 'dizzying intertextuality' (Britzolakis 1997: 50) is, therefore, a main feature of Carter scholarship. Early discussions of Carter's work, for instance – such as the succession of monographs in the late 1990s by Sarah Gamble (1997), Alison Lee (1997), Linden Peach (1998),[1] and Aidan Day (1998) – broadly examine Carter's intertextuality, and emphasise the range of Carter's interests rather than penetrate beneath the surface of specific citations and allusions. Over time, critical discussions of Carter's writing have become more specialised, analysing the influence of particular writers, movements, and genres, upon her work. For example, Rebecca Munford's edited collection *Re-Visiting Angela Carter: Texts, Contexts, Intertexts* (2006) is dedicated (as the title indicates) to providing more in-depth discussions of Carter's intertextuality, including chapters on Jean-Luc Godard, surrealism, Shakespeare, Charles Dickens, and Edgar Allan Poe, amongst others.[2] As Munford says in the Introduction, the aim of her volume 'is to open up new dialogues about Carter's imaginative procedures and writing strategies by offering concerted and sustained readings of some of her specific influences and intertexts', rather than to provide 'an exhaustive account' of all of her interests (Munford 2006: 13).

The more recent *Angela Carter: New Critical Readings* (2012), edited by Sonya Andermahr and Lawrence Phillips, also puts an emphasis on Carter's intertextuality, saying that the 'collection goes a long way towards fulfilling [Alison] Easton's "wish list"' (Andermahr and Phillips 2012: 2). In her New Casebooks collection of essays (2000), Easton urges future scholars to delve deeper into Carter's interests and influences including her time in Japan, her view of the 1960s, her portrayal of class, and the relevance of 'twentieth-century philosophers' for her writing (Easton 2000: 16). In this light, Andermahr and Phillips's

[1] The Second Edition of Peach's work (2009) is cited in the bibliography.
[2] See Gamble, Watz-Fruchart, Sanders, Duggan, and Wisker (all 2006) respectively.

volume is divided into three sections – Genre and the Canon, Philosophies, and Mythologies – and includes chapters on surrealism, once again, as well as Carter's "Moral Relativism", the Pre-Raphaelites, and schizophrenia.[3]

In line with this move towards concentrating on specific intertexts or influences on Carter's writing, this thesis is dedicated to examining the impact Western philosophy has on Carter's work, paying particular attention to her novels as well as to her polemical essay *The Sadeian Woman: An Exercise in Cultural History* (1979). From just a surface reading of her novels it is clear that Carter is engaging with a range of Western philosophers, as she explicitly names or cites a number of thinkers in the novels themselves as well as in epigraphs. *Several Perceptions* (1968), for instance, opens with an epigraph attributed to David Hume; a quotation from Ludwig Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* (1953) is used as an epigraph to *The Infernal Desire Machines of Doctor Hoffman* (hereafter *Doctor Hoffman*) (1972); and the epigraph to *The Passion of New Eve* (hereafter *New Eve*) (1977) is John Locke's claim that 'In the beginning all the world was *America*' (Locke 1988: 301 – original emphasis). Carter also name-drops a number of philosophers, including Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Lewis Mumford, Teilhard de Chardin, Max Weber, and Émile Durkheim (in *Heroes and Villains*, 1969), Plato and Friedrich Nietzsche (in *New Eve*), as well as Arthur Schopenhauer in her final novel (Carter 2006d: 130), *Wise Children* (1991). She mentions a number of thinkers in interview and in her journalism as well, such as Thomas Hobbes and Michel Foucault.[4] As I will go on to unpick in more detail in the following chapters, Carter's novels are littered with quotations from a number of philosophical texts as well as from critical discussions of these works, while she also embeds allusions to specific philosophical arguments or examples into her writing.

But what does this investment in Western philosophy have to say about Carter? What was it that she found appealing about this discipline, and how does it inform her writing? In an Omnibus documentary filmed shortly before her death, Carter says:

> I do think fiction should be asking the great, unanswerable, adolescent questions. Why are we set upon this planet? For what purpose? And I know that my old fiction doesn't look as if it's asking these questions precisely, but I am asking myself versions of questions that I think are even more basic, like: how do you know we *are* here? Who *do* we think we are? These questions obsess me and perplex me, and I do think we can find our way amongst them towards some sort of reason. (Carter in Evans 1992: unpaginated – original emphasis)

[3] See Phillips, Müller-Wood, Watz, Garner, and Hentgès (all 2012).

[4] See, for instance, Carter in interview with Les Bedford (1977) for a discussion of Hobbes, or her interview with Helen Cagney Watts (1985) in relation to her reading of Foucault.

Carter, then, is interested in the "big" questions, and strives to grapple with ideas related to reality, existence, and identity – amongst others – in her work. My contention is that she tackles these 'great, unanswerable, adolescent questions' with reference to her philosophical reading, and is engaging with what has been said before on the topics that 'perplex' her. Thus, her work is interrogatory as she uses her writing as a platform for thinking about philosophical problems, and she does not answer the questions she raises – they are, as she says, 'unanswerable'. As she wrote in a letter to Elaine Jordan, 'I write to *ask* questions, to argue with myself, not to provide answers' (Carter undated 1972 Journal MS88899/1/84: unpaginated – original emphasis). Likewise, in interview with John Haffenden, Carter explains that:

> I set myself a number of tasks each time I write a story or start to plan a long piece of fiction. I also ask myself a number of questions, but it's like answering questions in an exam: there are no right answers. There is a selection of answers which could all be adequate to some degree, there are no answers which are unequivocally correct. (Carter to Haffenden 1984: 34-35)

Thus, while Carter acknowledges that the questions she raises can be answered, she recognises that some answers are more 'adequate' than others and claims that they do not have absolute, universal answers. This question-raising enterprise defines philosophy. Bryan Magee, for instance, states that the 'possession of a nagging question without any clear understanding of how to look for the answer is [...] where philosophy begins' (Magee 1978: 25), whilst A. C. Grayling says:

> one can describe philosophy as the attempt to make clear, and if possible to answer, a range of fundamental and puzzling questions which arise when, in a general and inclusive way, we try to understand ourselves and the universe we inhabit. Among many other things these questions concern existence and reality, knowledge and belief, reason and reasoning, truth, meaning, and value both ethical and aesthetic. (Grayling 1988: 13)

In this sense, Carter can be defined as a philosopher – she consciously raises 'fundamental and puzzling questions' about 'the universe we inhabit', and works towards having a firmer understanding of concerns that Grayling lists – reality, existence, knowledge, truth, and ethics. What's more, in relation to David Pears's argument (*vis-à-vis* Wittgenstein) that 'to be a philosopher is to philosophize, and the function of a philosophical book is to help people to philosophize for themselves' (Pears 1971: 124), I would argue that Carter is writing philosophical books, but in a fictional format. She writes 'speculative fiction' – 'the fiction of

asking "what if?"' (Carter to Katsavos 1994: 11) – and encourages her readers to question the same ideas as she does and to, as Pears notes, 'philosophize for themselves'.

I am not the first to position Carter as a philosopher, with Andermahr and Phillips claiming that 'as a philosophical thinker and writer, [Carter] engaged in an ad hoc but serious project of philosophical raiding and revisionism' (Andermahr and Phillips 2012: 3). They go on to explain that 'although Carter was not a trained philosopher [...] and did not study philosophy in any systematic way, she was nevertheless an avid, if eclectic, reader of philosophy' (Andermahr and Phillips 2012: 5). They dedicate a sub-section of their edited collection to 'Philosophies' on this basis, with chapters on surrealism and the Pre-Raphaelites, Carter's depiction of nature, Sigmund Freud – Carter says that 'philosophy is to psychology what alchemy is to chemistry' (Carter 1962-63 Journal MS88899/1/88: unpaginated) – and her discussion of violence and morality, particularly focusing on Martin Heidegger's *Introduction to Metaphysics* (1935). Before this publication, though, Carter's engagement with philosophical thought was by no means a marked feature of Carter criticism, with most discussions of Carter and philosophy failing to go beyond citing Carter's philosophical epigraphs or her explicit mentions of particular thinkers. The most significant exceptions to this include Eva C. Karpinksi's article 'Signifying Passions: Angela Carter's *Heroes and Villains* as a Dystopian Romance' (2000), which provides a more detailed analysis of Carter's reading of Rousseau in *Heroes and Villains*, as well as Andrzej Gąsiorek's *Post-War British Fiction: Realism and After* (1995), which briefly discusses the relevance of Plato in Carter's work in a more nuanced and comprehensive way than other investigations.

That said, to date there has not been a detailed discussion of Carter's engagement with Western thought and of her response to the thinkers and theories that comprise this field of study, or with philosophy more broadly. In this light, this thesis examines the influence a range of Western thinkers have on Carter and how she interacts with their ideas in her work. I am particularly interested in the chronology of Carter's philosophical research – which issues Carter was concerned with and when – her response to philosophical arguments, and how she treats the philosophers in question, as well as the discipline of philosophy more generally. I argue that particular texts or philosophical concepts are central to certain novels or time-periods, while other philosophers or philosophical arguments have a much broader impact on Carter's work, spanning a wider range of her writing.

Thesis Structure and Content

While the majority of critical discussions on Carter to date, particularly the monographs, are arranged chronologically according to Carter's work, the structure of my thesis breaks away from this norm, in line with two recent publications – Maggie Tonkin's *Angela Carter and Decadence: Critical Fictions/Fictional Critiques* (2012) and Munford's *Decadent Daughters and Monstrous Mothers: Angela Carter and European Gothic* (2013). While Tonkin and Munford have arranged their work thematically, my thesis is structured according to Carter's interaction with particular philosophers, philosophical movements, or areas of Western thought. In Chapter One I discuss Carter's engagement with the ancient Greek thinker Plato (c. 427-347 BC), focusing on Carter's response to his *Republic* in *Heroes and Villains*, *Doctor Hoffman*, and *New Eve*. The second chapter investigates Carter's reading of Hobbes (1588-1679) and Rousseau (1712-78), paying particular attention to how they inform *Heroes and Villains*, of which Carter said, 'It's Hobbes fighting with Rousseau, that novel, really' (Carter to Bedford 1977: unpaginated). René Descartes (1596-1650), Locke (1632-1704), and Hume (1711-76) are discussed in Chapter Three, where I argue that they are key philosophical intertexts for Carter in relation to her fascination with where knowledge comes from. The main focuses of this chapter are *Doctor Hoffman* (for Descartes), *New Eve* (for Locke), and *Several Perceptions* and *Love* (written in 1969, published in 1971) for Hume, but I also touch on *Shadow Dance* (1966) and *Nights at the Circus* (1984) *vis-à-vis* Locke. The fourth chapter discusses the impact that two more contemporary thinkers – Wittgenstein (1889-1951) and Gilbert Ryle (1900-76) – had on *Doctor Hoffman*, and examines the influence that Wittgenstein in particular had on Carter when she arrived in Japan in 1969. While the first four chapters are centred on Carter's reading of specific philosophers, my fifth and final chapter discusses a specific aspect of Carter's philosophy – morality – particularly focusing on Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), and the Marquis de Sade (1740-1814). My analysis of Kant corresponds to the 'Bristol Trilogy' (O'Day 2007: 44) novels of *Shadow Dance*, *Several Perceptions*, and *Love*, while the section on Sade discusses *The Sadeian Woman* as well as *Doctor Hoffman*. While the other four chapters are also thematic, with the Rousseau and Hobbes chapter questioning ideas of the state of nature and epistemology (the theory of knowledge) for instance, the fifth chapter puts its main focus on Carter's work on moral philosophy in order to draw out her concerns regarding moral dilemmas and the relationship between the law and morality.

The bulk of my thesis, therefore, is concentrated on three of Carter's speculative novels – *Heroes and Villains*, *Doctor Hoffman*, and *New Eve*; the earlier Bristol trilogy

novels – especially *Several Perceptions* and *Love*, but also *Shadow Dance* – are discussed in Chapters Three and Five. Taking into account my analysis of *The Sadeian Woman*, this means that my discussion of Carter's engagement with Western philosophy is predominantly targeted at her work from 1969-79, while her earlier work is examined, but to a lesser degree. While I provide a minimal analysis of Carter's later work in the form of *Nights at the Circus*, her final novel *Wise Children* is not discussed. Although Carter defines *Nights at the Circus* as well as *Doctor Hoffman* and *New Eve* as her 'metaphysical novels' (Carter 1969-70 Journal MS88899/1/93: unpaginated) – a definition I discuss in more detail and question in the light of its exclusion of *Heroes and Villains* in Chapter One – on the whole, Carter's unpublished manuscripts suggest that her research on the thinkers included in this thesis trails off at the end of the 1970s. This is not to say that they are all irrelevant to Carter's later fiction. As Mine Özyurt Kılıç notes, Fevvers, the winged heroine of *Nights at the Circus*, 'recalls the Platonic concept of love described in *Phaedrus*', a concept which 'resonates [...] through the novel' (Kılıç 2006: unpaginated); in the *Phaedrus* Socrates argues that the soul, 'when perfect and fully winged she soars upward, and is the ruler of the universe; while the imperfect soul loses her feathers' (Plato 1871m: 580). In interview with Helen Cagney Watts, Carter discusses how Fevvers was based on Guillaume Apollinaire's argument that Sade's Juliette 'represents the woman whose advent he anticipated, a figure of whom minds have as yet no conception, who is rising out of mankind, who will have wings and who will renew the world' (Apollinaire in Cagney Watts 1985: 169), saying this is 'a very equivocal and rather silly thing of Apollinaire to say' (Carter to Cagney Watts 1985: 169). As well as acknowledging Sade's influence on her discussion of 'sexuality and power' in *Nights at the Circus* in this interview, Carter says that the female prison depicted in this novel 'was influenced by something of Foucault's', although she goes on to say that Sade had 'more impact' (Carter to Cagney Watts 1985: 162).

Thus, while *Nights at the Circus* is shaped by Carter's philosophical research, this research – on Plato and Sade, for instance – had a much stronger influence on her previous work. While a discussion of Foucault's work on criminality and sexuality would be fruitful in relation to *Nights at the Circus*, and would tie in well with my discussion of Sade and sexual deviance in Chapter Five, a discussion of Foucault falls beyond the boundary of this thesis. My lack of discussion of *Nights at the Circus* and *Wise Children* – especially the latter – also reflects the chronology of Carter's philosophical reading. The archived material reveals that Carter was researching a range of philosophical texts from the early 1960s to the late 1970s, and that this was heightened when Carter was in Japan from 1969-72, as discussed in later

chapters, while in the 1980s Carter's research was much more theatrical and anthropological, in line with her final two novels. Her reading from the 1980s onwards includes research on Claude Lévi-Strauss[5], *The Book of Clowns* by George Speaight, V. Dioszegi's edited collection *Popular Beliefs and Folklore Tradition in Siberia*, and *Hollywood: The Dream Factory* by Hortense Powdermaker (Carter 1979 Journal MS88899/1/97: unpaginated; Carter 1983-88 Journal MS88899/1/98: unpaginated). While I would argue that all of Carter's work can be defined as philosophical as it is characterised by question-raising, her engagement with the thinkers I discuss in this thesis – and, in fact, with most philosophers – corresponds to Carter's writing from the 1960s and 1970s.

The philosophical structure of my thesis facilitates an analysis of how and when each of the thinkers I focus on influenced Carter, and includes a range of philosophical ideas – such as knowledge, existence, reality, morality, the state of nature – from a variety of different perspectives and time periods, spanning from Plato's ancient Greek thought to Wittgenstein and Ryle, two contemporaries (or near contemporaries) of Carter's, as well as a number of seventeenth and eighteenth-century thinkers. Thus, while there are more thinkers excluded from this thesis than included, the philosophers I discuss have been selected in order to do justice to the breadth and depth of Carter's philosophical endeavours. Some thinkers are included because of the strength of their impact on a particular novel – Plato for *New Eve*, Rousseau and Hobbes for *Heroes and Villains*, and Wittgenstein for *Doctor Hoffman* – as I discuss in the respective chapters, while other thinkers – particularly Sade – are included because of their enduring impact on Carter's writing. Figures such as Descartes, Hume, Locke, Kant, and Ryle, have been chosen because a particular idea or theory of theirs makes a marked impression on Carter. Of course, some of these reasons overlap, as Plato's imagination of an ideal *Republic* resonates throughout *Heroes and Villains* and *Doctor Hoffman* as well, and Locke and Hume are central to *New Eve* and *Several Perceptions* respectively, as quotations from these thinkers function as epigraphs to these two novels, although Locke and Hume's influence, as I argue in Chapter Three, goes beyond these two texts.

One thing that all of these thinkers have in common is that the criticism on Carter's engagement with each of them is disproportionate to the impact they had on her work. While some of these thinkers have been acknowledged, to varying degrees, as having some relevance, such as Plato, Rousseau, Descartes, Locke, Hume, and Wittgenstein, others –

[5] She was a keen reader of Lévi-Strauss in the late 1960s and for much of the 1970s as well.

particularly Ryle and Kant – have been overlooked in terms of their influence on *Doctor Hoffman* and the Bristol trilogy novels respectively. Sade, on the other hand, is the one figure for whom the accusation of a lack of critical attention does not apply – instead, his impact on Carter has generated a wealth of material. On the whole, though, Sade's impact on Carter has been discussed regarding his pornographic work, and has, to date, overlooked Carter's philosophical engagement with him, a gap which I begin to fill in Chapter Five. Rather than carrying out a more detailed literature review here, in each of the following chapters I situate my analysis within the context of existing scholarship on the topic(s) or thinker(s) I am discussing and specify what my contribution to the field is.

As I have noted, this thesis does not discuss every Western philosopher who influenced Carter – if I did this, I would not be able to do much more than list which texts Carter read and when, an approach that would mask the complexities of Carter's engagement with Western philosophers. To give a brief indication of some of the thinkers I consider to be fruitful for future discussions on this area of Carter's intertextuality: Mumford, Chardin, Weber, and Durkheim all warrant further analysis, particularly in relation to *Heroes and Villains*, where Carter names these figures (Carter 1972: 7; 62); Nietzsche, especially since Zero has a 'plaster bust' of him on his desk in *New Eve* (Carter 2009b: 87); the references to phenomenological thought in *Doctor Hoffman* in relation to Edmund Husserl, G. W. F. Hegel, and Heidegger, as well as the allusion to Heraclitus's theory of universal flux[6] in this novel when the peep-show proprietor says 'nothing [...] is ever completed; it only changes' (Carter 2010: 113). More broadly, Carter's interest in existentialism, especially her reading of Jean-Paul Sartre, is worthy of further discussion, as well as her research on thinkers such as Aristotle, Foucault (as alluded to above in relation to *Nights at the Circus*), and the Frankfurt School philosophy theorised by Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, and Walter Benjamin.

Although my thesis is limited to Carter's interaction with Western philosophy, her extensive research on Eastern thought – especially Chinese philosophy – while she was in Japan, which is particularly pertinent in *Doctor Hoffman*, would also be a productive area of future research; Carter made voluminous notes on Fung Yu-lan's *The History of Chinese Philosophy Volume I: The Period of the Philosophers*, translated by Derk Bodde, and Joseph Needham's *Science and Civilisation in China Volume 4: Physics and Physical Technology*

[6] See *Heraclitus: The Cosmic Fragments* (1954).

during this time (Carter 1969-70 Journal MS88899/1/93: unpaginated).[7] My focus on Carter's novels and polemical essay also means that Carter's short stories are not analysed in any depth in this thesis. As my brief discussions of 'The Merchant of Shadows' and 'The Ghost Ships: A Christmas Story' (both from the posthumously published *American Ghosts and Old World Wonders* collection, 1993) in Chapters One and Three suggest, these short stories, as well as stories from earlier collections, would be ripe for future discussions in relation to Western philosophical influences. Another avenue to examine further is Sade's impact on *The Bloody Chamber and Other Stories* (1979). Sade's influence on these stories is well-documented, as Carter wrote these short stories at the same time as she was writing *The Sadeian Woman*, and both texts were published in the same year;[8] thus, a discussion of Sade's philosophical – rather than pornographic – influence on these stories would be fruitful. Moreover, as I argue in Chapter Four, Wittgenstein made a significant impact on Carter's Japanese writing, which I mainly discuss in relation to *Doctor Hoffman*. Wittgenstein's influence on *Fireworks: Nine Profane Pieces* (1974) – a collection of short stories based in and/or inspired by Carter's time in Japan – is another area to pursue.

Into the Archive: The Angela Carter Papers Collection

While the originality of my thesis stems from a close textual analysis of the mostly uncharted territory of Carter's engagement with a range of Western philosophers in her novels and *The Sadeian Woman*, the originality of my contribution to Carter criticism is reinforced by my discussion of the contents of the Angela Carter Papers Collection, an archive of Carter's research notes, plans and rough drafts for her work, as well as diary entries. The archival material is a relatively new resource for Carter scholars and is a key source for this thesis – and for future criticism on Carter more generally – as it provides a new insight into Carter's research and the limitlessness of her intertextuality. Carter's plans often explicitly reveal the ideas she was engaging and grappling with in her fiction, a point I expand on in later chapters, and offer a substantial although not necessarily exhaustive account of her research trajectory, including notes and quotations from the texts she read, lists of books she has read on the closing pages of her early notebooks, as well as comments on films she has seen and lists of books she intends to read. In the early journals in particular, Carter provides full bibliographical details of the texts she researches, specifying for instance that she read G. D.

[7] For other references to Chinese philosophy in the archived material see: Carter undated Journal MS88899/1/110: 68 and Carter undated Journal MS88899/1/111: unpaginated.
[8] For discussions of Sade and *The Bloody Chamber* see: Duncker 1984, Simpson 2006, and Atwood 2007.

H. Cole's translation of Rousseau's *The Social Contract* (Carter 1968-69 Journal MS88899/1/92: unpaginated) and G. E. M. Anscombe's translation of Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* (Carter 1969-70 Journal MS88999/1/93: unpaginated). As many of the texts I deal with in this thesis have been translated into English – those of Plato, Rousseau, Descartes, Wittgenstein, Kant, and Sade – I have used the same translation as Carter when possible. For some thinkers, though, Carter does not give this information, as is the case with Plato and Kant.

The manuscripts provide quantifiable evidence of Carter's research interests, and the abundance of notes on Wittgenstein and Sade in particular testify to their status as two important philosophical influences on Carter's work, as discussed in Chapters Four and Five. That said, voluminous notes are not the only criterion for arguing that a thinker made an impact on Carter. It would be problematic to argue that the more Carter wrote on a philosopher the greater their influence was and therefore that the thinkers she writes the least on (or does not make notes on at all) made little or no impact on her: this would imply that the only way to engage with something is to make notes on it and overlooks Carter's private reflections about her writing and research. What's more, it is more than likely that the Angela Carter Papers Collection does not include all the notes Carter ever made – she may have destroyed some notes, others could have been lost, and Carter has defaced some of her material, as some of her work has been rigorously crossed out or drawn over, or has pictures glued on top of it, especially in her early journals. Thus, while Carter's notes on all of the thinkers included in my thesis evidence her engagement with their ideas, I would not argue that Wittgenstein and Sade are more important solely on the basis of the wealth of notes Carter makes on them; the archived material needs to be discussed in relation to Carter's published work, and although Carter's notes on Plato and Kant are sparse in relation to those on Wittgenstein and Sade, Plato and Kant nevertheless make a marked impact on her work, as I discuss in Chapters One and Five respectively.

As well as bearing in mind that the manuscripts are not completely representative of Carter's research, the archived material poses a number of other problems. For instance, while Carter's journals from the early to mid-1960s mostly take the form of a diary, and contain personal reflections as well as research notes and plans, as time progresses the diary aspect of the journals deteriorates and the notebooks reflect her work more than her private life. This has a number of implications for the critic. On a practical note, the specific dates that Carter provides in the earlier journals make it easier to pinpoint what Carter read and when, usually to the month but sometimes – particularly in the notebooks of the early 1960s –

to the day. For instance, according to her diaries, on 6 June 1963 Carter made a note of the 'Aristotelian "3 laws of thought"', writing:

> 1. Law of Identity
> Everything is what it is.
> 2. The Law of Contradiction
> A thing cannot both be and not be so and so.
> 3. The Law of Excluded Middle
> A thing either is or is not so and so. (Carter 1962-63 Journal MS88899/1/88: unpaginated)

Less specifically, she makes notes on Sartre, particularly Iris Murdoch's *Sartre: Romantic Rationalist* (1953), between March and May 1963 (Carter 1962-63 Journal MS88899/1/88: unpaginated).

While this means that details related to when Carter read something and in what order can usually be ascertained from her early journals, in her later journals both of these abilities are compromised. The dates become more and more vague as time progresses, making it hard to specify the precise year Carter read something on some occasions, although most of the time it is possible to give a rough time (the late 1970s, for example) as to when she was researching a particular thinker. In a journal that covers late 1973 to 1976, for instance, Carter writes 'somewhere about here, 1976 begins' (Carter 1973 Journal MS88899/1/95: unpaginated). Most of Carter's journals are characterised by her starting notes on one topic on the right-hand pages of the book and on another on the left pages, and when the lack of dates is a factor as well, chronicling Carter's research becomes problematic. The British Library catalogue reflects the issue of dates when it comes to this archived material as well. Some of the entries are undated, others have dates such as '1962-63?' to signify uncertainty, while others just give the date when Carter started making notes in the notebook, and do not show the range of dates the journal actually spans. Reading the journal itself often reveals the dates it covers; the MS88899/1/95 notebook is dated 1973 in the library catalogue but spans 1973-76, while MS88899/1/110 is undated, but is a book of notes related to the planning stages of *Doctor Hoffman*, so corresponds to Carter's time in Japan. While I have dated Carter's journals as accurately as possible in this thesis, these issues need to be taken into account.

Although the earlier journals are more specifically dated, this does not mean that they are unquestionably accurate, and chronologically, Carter's journals become more self-conscious, less personal, and, I would argue, more self-aware of the possibility that they will be consulted by future scholars as time progresses, in line with Carter's growing critical

acclaim. As I have already noted, Carter inserts 'somewhere about here, 1976 begins' (Carter 1973 Journal MS88899/1/95: unpaginated) in one of her journals, but this raises the question as to why she felt the need to retrospectively make this addition. This could be a note to herself, to add some kind of structure to the notebook, or a signpost for the reader, as if to suggest that she is helping out – albeit vaguely – future researchers. The self-awareness of the journals manifests itself on a number of other occasions. As part of her plans for *Doctor Hoffman*, for instance, Carter makes a list of thinkers to research including Locke, Hume, Descartes, Plato, Hegel, Heraclitus, and Sade, but later adds the parenthetical comment '(as it turned out, I only read de Sade; and HOFFMAN was finished at the end of March, 1971)' (Carter undated Journal MS88899/1/110: 186).

I discuss this in more detail in Chapter Three, but for now I just want to focus on Carter's use of metacommentary, which forces the reader to question the authenticity of the archived material. The implication of this is that Carter is guiding the reader away from discussing the impact that other thinkers have on *Doctor Hoffman*, and signalling Sade's influence on the novel. Carter also references her other notebooks in her journals. In a notepad dedicated to planning *New Eve*, for example, Carter writes 'see Hoffman notebook p.10 – immobile denizens of the garden' (Carter 1973 Journal MS88899/1/102: 25), raising the question: is this a note for herself, or for future commentators? In a different journal, she explicitly shows an awareness that her research notes are not private texts. She writes: 'I want to be liberated from the burden of wanting to love. (You probably understand what I mean by this). I added that note for Andrew, who used to read my notebook' (Carter 1972 Journal MS88899/1/94: 26). As each sentence is written with a different coloured pen, it suggests that the later sentences were added on later dates. Thus, although the archive provides a treasure trove of material for Carter critics, the reliability and self-consciousness of her notes needs to be taken into consideration. While the journals give a previously unseen insight into Carter's research, they are manipulated and suggest she is bearing in mind the possibility that her notes will be read by a future audience. Is this what motivated Carter to deface some of her material? Did she do this because she did not want some material to be part of her body of work and thus subject to scrutiny? If so, when did she self-vandalise it – shortly after writing it, because she thought it was of a poor quality, or did she return to it at a later date? Carter's notes, like her novels, raise more questions than answers.

Androcentricity and Bulldozing

While the reliability of Carter's archived material needs to be accounted for, the fact that Carter had a wide-ranging and prolonged interest in Western philosophy cannot be questioned. Notes on the thinkers I focus on in this thesis – Plato, Hobbes, Rousseau, Descartes, Locke, Hume, Wittgenstein, Ryle, Kant, and Sade – as well as other thinkers such as Aristotle, Mumford, Durkheim, Nietzsche, Sartre, Foucault, Horkheimer, and Adorno pepper her journals. As this list of names highlights, philosophy is a male-dominated discipline: 'for centuries the practice of philosophy has been overwhelmingly the prerogative of men' (Griffiths and Whitford 1988: 1). I would argue that this androcentricity is central to Carter's engagement with philosophical thought. In her literary manifesto 'Notes from the Front Line' (1983), Carter identifies herself as a 'feminist writer' and discusses the patriarchal construction of the society she grew up in, noting 'how that social fiction of my "femininity" was created, by means outside my control, and palmed off on me as the real thing' (Carter 1998b: 37-38). 'This investigation of the social fictions that regulate our lives', Carter goes on to say, 'is what I've concerned myself with consciously since that time' (Carter 1998b: 38); her reading of and response to a range of male thinkers is central to her deconstruction of Western philosophy, which provides the foundation of Western civilisation.

A number of critics have discussed Carter's intertextual antics in the form of a feminist deconstruction of the male-domination of Western civilisation. Munford argues that Carter's 'textual liaisons are very often grounded in male-centred literary and cultural frameworks' (Munford 2006: 12), Susanne Gruss positions Carter as 'an untiring demythologizer of the (male) Western canon and its historical and theoretical contexts' (Gruss 2012: 44), and Lee says that Carter 'converses with, and finds her own language in, the face of a Western literary tradition of largely male voices' (Lee 1997: xi). The fact that 'the deconstruction and rewriting of the master narratives of the Western world' is 'central to Carter's *oeuvre*' (Easton 2000: 8) also underpins Munford and Tonkin's recent monographs. Munford is 'concerned with analysing her [Carter's] textual engagements with a male-authored strand of European Gothic' (Munford 2013: x), and Tonkin argues that 'what may at first appear to be fetishism in Carter's work is demonstrably a fictionalized critique of the misogynistic aspects of literary Decadence that continue to reverberate in Western culture' (Tonkin 2012: 25). While I focus on a sub-section of Carter's research that has been overlooked to date, my discussion of Carter's engagement with Western philosophy fits into this wider framework of Carter's deconstruction of a male-dominated society. This is not to say that Western male thought is homogeneous in its argument, though. Disagreement is a

key characteristic of Western thought, and of philosophy more broadly; 'philosophers by no means speak with a single voice, and do not even agree among themselves about what they understand philosophy to be' (Griffiths and Whitford 1988: 1-2). Nevertheless, the ideas discussed by Western thinkers – reality, morality, existence, the state of nature, and so on – have predominantly been examined by male figures; however dissimilar, these are male discourses, and they shape Western society. This is what Carter challenges in her writing, adding a female voice to the discussion.

Given Carter's indebtedness to deflating the male canon of Western philosophy, her engagement with female philosophers is notably sparse in both her published work and research notes. To date, I have found no evidence to suggest that Carter researched – or intended to research – thinkers such as Luce Irigaray, Hélène Cixous, or Julia Kristeva, although there is a wealth of criticism that discusses Carter's work through the lens of these prominent feminist philosophers, with Gerardine Meaney's *(Un)Like Subjects: Women, Theory, Fiction* (1993) being one of the main examples. In fact, Simone de Beauvoir is the only female thinker that Carter explicitly alludes to in her writing, and is prominent in her research notes as well. In *Love*, the philosophy tutor's wife is reading *The Second Sex* (Carter 2006b: 18), and as part of her research for *The Sadeian Woman* and her plans for *Nights at the Circus*, Carter read and made notes on Beauvoir's essay 'Must We Burn Sade?' (Carter 1973 Journal MS88899/1/95: unpaginated). With the exception of Beauvoir, then, Carter's engagement with philosophical thought is male-dominated, and while this reflects the androcentricity of the discipline, her lack of discussion of her contemporary female thinkers also heightens Carter's deconstruction of the established male tradition of Western philosophy and its foundational role in Western society. *Vis-à-vis* Carter, Susan Rubin Suleiman discusses this endeavour to engage with and overturn male ideologies as a 'double allegiance' (Suleiman 1990: 162), an allegiance:

> on the one hand, to the formal experiments and some of the cultural aspirations of the historical male avant-gardes; on the other hand, to the feminist critique of dominant sexual ideologies, including those of the very same avant-gardes. (Suleiman 1990: 162-163)

This idea provides the framework for Anna Watz Fruchart's analysis of Carter's critique of surrealism in *Shadow Dance*, with Watz Fruchart arguing that Carter 'opts neither for an uncritical endorsement nor a flat rejection of surrealist ideology' (Watz Fruchart 2006: 22).

Like Watz Fruchart, I apply Suleiman's concept of a 'double allegiance' to my thesis, and contend that Carter participates in philosophical debates and challenges arguments put

forward by her male philosophical predecessors, but while Carter neither endorses nor rejects the philosophies she engages with, most of the ideas she discusses are subjected to parody. In *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1690)[9] – a text that Carter initially researched in the early 1960s which had an enduring impact on her writing, as I discuss in Chapter Three – Locke compares philosophy and the search for knowledge with building, and states that 'the Commonwealth of Learning, is not at this time without Master-Builders, whose mighty Designs, in advancing the Sciences, will leave lasting Monuments to the Admiration of Posterity' (Locke 2008: 6). Thus, there are some figures – Master-Builders – who have provided the foundations for philosophical discussions, foundations, as Locke says, that are long-lasting. Locke continues:

> 'tis Ambition enough to be employed as an Under-Labourer in clearing Ground a little, and removing some of the Rubbish, that lies in the way to Knowledge; which certainly had been very much more advanced in the World, if the Endeavours of ingenious and industrious Men had not been much cumbred [sic] with the learned but frivolous use of uncouth, affected, or unintelligible Terms. (Locke 2008: 6)

As well as highlighting the androcentricity of philosophy and the need to scrutinise what the forefathers of philosophy have argued and to make philosophical discussions more accessible, Locke acknowledges that some of what has been said before constitutes 'Rubbish'; he positions himself as a labourer clearing away the debris in the search for 'the true Knowledge of Things' (Locke 2008: 6).

If Locke regards his male predecessors to be Master-Builders and sees himself as an Under-Labourer, I would argue that Carter is a bulldozer; she is destroying what has been said before by the Master-Builders (bearing in mind the gendered connotations of this term) and thus destabilising the foundations of Western philosophy. While in 'Notes from the Front Line' Carter famously says she is in 'the demythologising business' (Carter 1998b: 38) as she is exposing the self-constructedness of the myths that bind societies together, this thesis – as indicated by my title – positions Carter as a (de)philosophiser of Western thought. I argue that she deconstructs the philosophical arguments and notions that provide the foundations of Western civilisation and simultaneously philosophises on these ideas, raising questions about reality, existence, morality, knowledge, and the state of nature, an enterprise fuelled by her feminism and her demolition of male-dominated canons.

[9] Locke's text first appeared in 1689 but was dated 1690 (Phemister 2008: xi).

I begin my discussion of Carter's (de)philosophising business by examining Carter's engagement with Plato, who is considered to be the first 'Master-Builder' in Western thought; his ideas, like those of many of his descendants, are bulldozed by Carter. I then turn to Rousseau and Hobbes in Chapter Two, before focusing on Descartes, Locke, and Hume in the third chapter, and discussing Wittgenstein and Ryle's impact on *Doctor Hoffman* in Chapter Four. In the final chapter I turn my attention to Kant and Sade, the latter of whom I argue represents the culmination of Carter's (de)philosophising of Western thought.

Chapter One – Plato: Utopias and Universals, Similes and Cinemas

> The safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato.
> (Whitehead 1929: 53)

> [T]he father of lies, Plato.
> (Carter 1998b: 39)

> You were the living image of the entire Platonic shadow show.
> (Carter 2009b: 107)

The ancient Greek philosopher Plato (c. 427-347 BC) is, alongside his teacher Socrates, credited with being a founding father of Western philosophy. Since Socrates did not write anything, and as Plato's works – particularly the early dialogues – allocate Socrates a speaking part, Plato's philosophy combines and blurs the ideas of him and his mentor, particularly at the beginning of his career. Plato's *oeuvre* covers a wide range of topics including ethics, love, education, politics, poetry, epistemology, and metaphysics, that provide the foundations for Western philosophy, which comprises 'a series of footnotes to Plato' (Whitehead 1929: 53). This makes him a prime target for Angela Carter; by unsettling Platonic thought, Carter can disrupt what has been built on this cornerstone in the following two millennia. Carter situates Plato as a "founding father" of Western thought, and holds him accountable for women being regarded as inferior. In her literary manifesto 'Notes from the Front Line' (1983), she says:

> the emergence of the women's movement, and all that implies, is both symptom and product of the unravelling of the culture based on Judaeo-Christianity [sic], [and] a bit of Greek transcendentalism via the father of lies, Plato, and all the other bits and pieces. (Carter 1998b: 39)

She argues that Plato's influence on Western cultural values hinders female liberation and needs to be erased in order to achieve equality; for Carter, as Platonic thought is untangled, women's societal position improves. Carter also alludes to the inherent androcentrism surrounding Plato and his descendants here; he is the 'father' of the tradition that Carter attacks, who has passed on a line of thought that denigrates women – she 'locates the origin of all that is wrong with Western culture with Plato' (Dimovitz 2005: 19).

One of Plato's best-known works is his *Republic*,[1] in which he imagines an ideal society governed by a Philosopher Ruler. Plato's conception of the workings of his utopian

[1] I do not provide dates for any Platonic dialogues because there is no definitive chronological order for them. Following an attempt to chronicle Plato's work, they have been vaguely grouped into categories of 'early', 'middle' and 'late' dialogues, about which there is, as Richard Kraut notes, 'a broad consensus' (Kraut 1992: 4).

civilisation, including how the society is divided into different classes, and how the Philosopher Ruler reaches his – I use 'his' deliberately here, and go on to discuss this – enlightened position, forms the superstructure for the philosophical and speculative discussions that pervade Western thought, which Carter contemplates in her writing. Due to this work, Plato is credited with planning the original ideal society, as the '*Republic* is often cited as the first serious utopian work'; it sparked Thomas More's work on this topic, which 'rendered utopianism a full-fledged mode of thought and discourse' (Segal 2012: 50). In the *Republic*, Plato considers how this perfect society is structured, and by imagining the ideal Philosopher Ruler, discusses what makes the highest form of knowledge, what could compromise the idyllic community, and what constitutes "reality". In this chapter I discuss Carter's parody of Plato's presiding position over Western thought and its impact on women, and her response to his view of a utopian society with its ideal (male) Philosopher Ruler who has knowledge of the Forms – absolute, transcendental knowledge that can only be accessed by elite thinkers. I limit my analysis to three of Carter's speculative novels: *Heroes and Villains* (1969), *The Infernal Desire Machines of Doctor Hoffman* (1972), and *The Passion of New Eve* (1977). Before explaining why I have selected these three texts, let me justify my categorisation of these novels as 'speculative'.

Gerardine Meaney similarly argues that this triptych constitutes Carter's 'speculative fiction' (Meaney 1993: 85), but Carter envisaged a 'trilogy of "speculative novels"' beginning with *Doctor Hoffman* and ending with *Nights at the Circus* (1984), excluding *Heroes and Villains* from this category (Sage 1977: 53). At the end of a journal that spans 1969-72, she says:

> if I look at it rationally, HOFFMAN represents a complete change of pace and mood and everything. Okay. That's five novels – a sequence that ends with LOVE; the 3 Bristol novels, with a fantasy sandwiched between each one, HOFFMAN is the first serious novel – a sequence of, for want of a better word, metaphysical novels. "The Great Hermaphrodite", which is about sexuality and ends on a note of, however bizarre, affirmation. (Surrealist sociology.) Three novels in this sequence, which will ultimately have the general heading: "The Manifesto for Year One". Unless that is the title of no. 3? I do rather think it might be; indeed, the philosophic assassins come in here, I think. Okay. HOFFMAN is a quest; "The Great HERMAPHRODITE" is a confession; "The Manifesto for Year One" is a puzzle. (Carter 1969-70 Journal MS88899/1/93: unpaginated – original capitalisation)

For Carter, *Doctor Hoffman* marks a shift in her work, a speculative shift that also characterises *New Eve* (which had the working title 'The Great Hermaphrodite'), and *Nights at the Circus* (which was initially called 'The Manifesto for Year One'); *Heroes and Villains*

is defined as one of her 'fantasy' works instead. Knowing specifically when Carter made this claim is impossible; although she writes this at the end of a journal kept from 1969-72, her journals are not filled chronologically – this could have been written before, during, or after *Doctor Hoffman*. It is possible that as her plans for the second and third instalments of the trilogy changed, so did her claim of viewing them as a 'sequence'. Nevertheless, *Heroes and Villains* is excluded from her trio of 'metaphysical novels', but I, like some other Carter critics, take issue with this. In interview with Anna Katsavos, Carter defines 'speculative fiction' as 'the fiction of asking "what if?"' (Carter to Katsavos 1994: 11), a definition which applies to *Heroes and Villains*. In this post-apocalyptic text, I will go on to argue, Carter questions Plato's idea of a utopian society, particularly in relation to the roles he allocates to women, imagining what would happen if Plato's utopian construction was used as a blueprint for a real community. While it is a 'fantasy' novel, it allows Carter to debate philosophical arguments and their implications, which I discuss in this chapter and in the following chapter on Thomas Hobbes and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. I would therefore agree with Elaine Jordan, who lists four 'longer "speculative" fictions', including the three in Carter's trilogy and its predecessor, *Heroes and Villains*, and provisionally positions *Heroes and Villains* as a 'lead-in' to the other three (Jordan 2007: 208).[2]

To date, critical discussions of Carter's engagement with Plato focus on Carter's four speculative novels, particularly *Heroes and Villains*, *Doctor Hoffman*, and *New Eve*, and mainly concentrate on Carter's reaction to the *Republic*. For instance, both Eva C. Karpinski and Meaney provide a limited analysis of how Carter depicts the class divisions in Plato's *Republic* in *Heroes and Villains*, while mainly focusing on Rousseau's influence (Karpinski 2000: unpaginated; Meaney 1993: 109). Similarly, Linden Peach reads *Doctor Hoffman* in line with this Platonic dialogue, although this reading only merits a mere two sentences of his discussion (Peach 2009: 89). Andrzej Gąsiorek also discusses this novel chiefly in relation to the *Republic*, but briefly expands into other Platonic texts such as *Phaedrus*, *Laws* and *Ion* (Gąsiorek 1995: 128-131). There have been a few Platonic readings of *New Eve* too, but in relation to Plato's *Symposium* rather than the *Republic*. These include Heather Johnson (2000) – although her interpretation is largely filtered through a Bakhtinian reading of the grotesque – and Maria Del Mar Perez-Gil, who briefly cites Plato, with her primary emphasis

[2] Elisabeth Mahoney similarly applies the generic term 'speculative' to *Heroes and Villains*, explaining that 'speculative fiction flaunts its in-between status: it challenges the conventional relationship between the distinct and discrete categories of "real" and "fantastic" and, particularly in utopian, dystopian and science fiction, uses estrangement (of time and/or place) to critique the "real" *through* the fantastic' (Mahoney 1997: 74).

being Carl Jung.[3] Moreover, Scott A. Dimovitz explores *Doctor Hoffman*, *New Eve*, and *Nights at the Circus* in relation to the figure of the androgyne in Plato's *Symposium*, primarily in relation to Carter's engagement with surrealist thought (Dimovitz 2005: 22-25).

Although these discussions of Plato are limited, their focus does correspond to Carter's reading of and references to this thinker. Most of Carter's allusions to Plato – in both her published and unpublished work – correspond to the *Republic*, although Carter's understanding of Plato's Forms is also informed by the *Phaedo*. The other key Platonic text for Carter is his *Symposium*, which, alongside the *Republic*, is central to *New Eve*. In *Doctor Hoffman*, Carter alludes to the idyllic forms by referencing 'the Platonic perfection of moonlight' (Carter 2010: 62), but in *New Eve* Carter explicitly invokes both the *Republic* and the *Symposium*; she mentions 'the entire Platonic shadow show' (Carter 2009b: 107), which, as I will go on to discuss in detail, is a reference to Plato's Simile of the Cave in the *Republic*, and compares Eve(lyn) and Tristessa to 'the great Platonic hermaphrodite' (Carter 2009b: 145), a figure imagined by Aristophanes in the *Symposium*. What's more, in *New Eve* Leilah directly cites the *Symposium* and mentions Plato by name, saying that her 'function' is '"to interpret and convey messages to the gods from men and to men from the gods, prayers and sacrifices from the one and commands and rewards from the other." That's how Plato, for one, defined us' (Carter 2009b: 170).[4]

Likewise, Carter's unpublished research notes on Plato refer to the idealistic society of the *Republic*, to ideas of the Forms, and to the hermaphroditic figure in the *Symposium*, and repeatedly reference the above quotation about being a messenger mediating between 'men' and gods. Her notes on Plato are not extensive or particularly detailed, in contrast to other thinkers I discuss in this thesis, and they are not confined to research for a specific novel; instead, mentions of Plato's ideas are interspersed throughout her journals from the late 1960s to the mid-late 1970s. One notable feature is that her notes repeatedly question Plato's utopian state. For instance, she writes about 'Inventing the World' and says that 'fictional worlds are worlds invented for *pleasure*' before correcting this by adding 'Not true' and on a new line, 'Plato' (Carter 1972 Journal MS88899/1/101: unpaginated). Carter also discusses a Japanese city in relation to Plato's *Republic*, saying 'this city was not built to prefigure the city of heaven; nor was it built around a market place, like Plato's city' (Loose

[3] Dani Cavallaro also recognises the importance of Plato's *Symposium* by quoting from the dialogue directly, but does not investigate this in detail (Cavallaro 2011: 77).

[4] Carter's journals do not specify what translation of Plato's works she consulted – while this is a direct quotation from many editions, Benjamin Jowett's translation that I reference reads: 'interprets and conveys to the gods the prayers and sacrifices of men, and to men the commands and rewards of the gods' (Plato 1871l: 519).

page in Carter undated Journal MS88899/1/80: 2). In *The Sadeian Woman* (1979), Carter discusses the Marquis de Sade's (1740-1814) idealistic imagining of the Sodality of the Friends of Crime in *Juliette* (1797) in these terms, saying 'like all Utopias, its literary and political origin is the Republic of Plato, which the Sodality curiously resembles in its inflexibility and elitism' (Carter 2009: 104).

In her plans for *New Eve*, Carter mentions Plato's Cave simile in the *Republic*, saying, of Mother's cave at the end of the novel, that 'it is Plato's cave; evolution flashed on the walls, on a film?' (Carter 1973 Journal MS88899/1/95: unpaginated). Amongst her notes for this novel in another journal, Carter summarises and examines Plato's notion of Forms, the ultimate form of knowledge, also known as Ideas. She writes – mentioning the *Phaedo* although the Forms are discussed in other Platonic works including the *Republic* and *Timaeus*:

> *Plato* believed there is knowledge that is *not* derived from sense impressions, that there are latent in our memories the forms or moulds of the Ideas, of the realities, which the soul knew before its descent here below. True knowledge consists in fitting the imprints of the higher reality of which the things below are reflections. The *Phaedo* develops the argument that all sensible objects are referable to certain types of which they are likenesses. We have not seen or learned the types in this life; but we saw them before our life began and the knowledge of them is innate in our memories. All earthly things are confused copies of Ideas once seen by the souls – ideas like justice, temperance etc. So Plato's "memory" is pure metaphysics. (Carter 1973 Journal MS88899/1/102: 35 – original emphasis)

Discussions of these transcendental Forms, which philosophers can access while everyone else can just see 'reflections' on earth, are central to my analysis of *New Eve*.

Carter's reference to the hermaphrodite in the *Symposium*, which she uses to describe Eve(lyn) and Tristessa's sexual encounter in *New Eve*, has actually been recycled. In 'Fictions Written in a Certain City: Victims of Circumstance', which is part of a folder of notes made in Japan, she uses the same words – 'great Platonic hermaphrodite'. She writes: 'rain splashed down on the painted faces of the female men as they turned their stately tragic heads to watch us go by on our way to a bed with black lace curtains where we ourselves would create the great Platonic hermaphrodite' (Carter undated Journal MS88899/1/80: 8-9). The messenger quotation that Leilah cites in *New Eve*, though, reappears in a number of journals in an extended form:

> And what is the function of such a being? To interpret and convey messages to the gods from men and to men from the gods, prayers and sacrifices from the one and commands and rewards from the other. Being of an intermediate nature,

> a spirit bridges the gap between them and prevents the world from splitting into 2 separate halves. Through this class of being come all divination and the supernatural skill of priests in sacrifices and rites and spells and every kind of magic and wizardry. (Carter undated 1972 Journal MS88899/1/84: unpaginated; Carter 1973 Journal MS88899/1/102: 21 and 47; Carter undated Journal MS88899/1/110: 8)

While Leilah cites the first half of this passage in *New Eve*, Carter's unpublished notes show that she deliberated about which character she wanted to say this, and actually had the quotation in mind while planning *Doctor Hoffman*. The undated journal cited above (MS88899/1/110) is a book of plans for *Doctor Hoffman*, while the 1973 notepad contains notes for *New Eve*, with Carter writing this quotation under plans for Leilah *as well as* Tristessa.

Although this initial overview of Carter's engagement with Plato only provides a surface account of which aspects of Platonic thought Carter found appealing, noting which texts of his she referred to and when, and therefore which Platonic dialogues and themes are relevant for which novels, a number of conclusions can be drawn from this. Firstly, the *Republic* and the *Symposium* are the two most important Platonic dialogues for Carter, conforming to the focus of Carter criticism to date. Themes of Plato's ideal state and his idea of ultimate knowledge – the Forms – are particularly pertinent, and Carter's knowledge of the Forms demonstrates a wider reading of Plato, encompassing the *Phaedo* as well. While these ideas – including the Cave simile – are the most important themes from the *Republic*, the hermaphrodite figure and the intermediary messenger are the two paramount ideas from the *Symposium*. There is, however, a notable omission in Carter's journals – none of her notes on Plato coincide with or relate to plans for *Heroes and Villains*, corresponding mainly to *New Eve* instead, and to *Doctor Hoffman* to a much lesser degree. I find this puzzling, and regard Plato's *Republic* – particularly how he imagined his ideal society to be structured – to be a key concern for Carter's depiction of the Professors in this novel.

This chapter predominantly focuses on Carter's reaction to Plato's *Republic*, concentrating on how different elements of this text – including the role of the philosopher, the structure of the ideal society, and the idea of the Forms, particularly in relation to Plato's Simile of the Cave – are depicted in *Heroes and Villains*, *Doctor Hoffman*, and *New Eve*, the three novels where Carter's engagement with Plato is, I argue, most apparent. This means that while I acknowledge the importance of other Platonic works for Carter – particularly the pertinence of the *Symposium* for *New Eve* – I do not discuss this in more detail, paying attention to the Cave simile in the *Republic* instead, which, as I go on to argue, structures this

novel. I start by discussing the workings of Plato's utopian society and his theory of the Forms and examine Carter's deconstruction of these ideas in 'Notes from the Front Line', *Heroes and Villains*, and *Doctor Hoffman*. In the following section I trace the importance of the Simile of the Cave in *New Eve*, particularly focusing on Carter's response to Plato's concept of reality.

Plato's Ideal *Republic*: Poets and Philosopher Rulers

In the *Republic*, Plato imagines how his utopian idea of a civil society would work, specifying how its classes are structured, how it is ruled, and how the residents are educated and kept in order. Plato's proposals regarding the education system in his ideal state revolutionarily rewrite and challenge the educational values of his contemporary Greek society, particularly in relation to poetry; Carter's claim that Plato embodies the 'father of lies' corresponds to this aspect of the *Republic*, and has damaging repercussions for Plato. Plato determines how the Guardians of his ideal state – the Ruling class – will be educated, but this involves a complete overhaul of the societal role of poetry. In Plato's day, poetry was 'a central feature in the life of the community' (Murray 1996: 15), as 'Greek poets had a crucial role in the creation and transmission of social values' because of the traditional belief that they 'were inspired directly by the gods' (Asmis 1992: 339). The *Republic* recognises the function poetry has for moulding citizens and providing moral guidelines, but implements a censorship on the poetry permitted in the state on this basis. The narrator, Socrates, maintains that 'literature may be either true or false' and states that 'we begin by telling children stories which, though not wholly destitute of truth, are in the main fictitious' (Plato 1871o: 200-201). Desmond Lee's translation clarifies that the Greek word 'pseudos', translated here as 'false', can also mean 'lies' or 'fiction' (Lee 2003: 387, note 2) – thus, in essence, poetry instils myths, which encourage listeners to behave in a certain way, or have particular beliefs. This state censorship means that works by poets such as Homer and Hesiod – who were central to Greek education in Plato's time – will be banished, because they are not factually accurate (Plato 1871o: 201-202). Poetry is degraded in other Platonic texts as well; in the *Timaeus* poets are referred to as 'a tribe of imitators' (Plato 1871p: 516), and a similar concern to 'let no one be deluded by poets or mythologers into a mistaken belief' is voiced in *Laws* (Plato 1871x: 451).

But because the narrator of the *Republic* acknowledges the mythmaking power poetry has to input ideologies and mould citizens, he intends to use this to his advantage in his ideal state. Plato plans to instil a new myth onto the residents of his state regarding their genesis,

consciously aligning this tactic with falsehoods poets previously constructed: it will be 'an old Phoenician tale of what has often occurred before now in other places' (Plato 1871o: 242). Plato imagines a Guardian class which defends the rest of society in times of war, but goes on to subdivide the Guardian class into Rulers and Auxiliaries. The Rulers, or 'perfect guardian[s]', abide by the interests of the state and govern, and 'must be [...] philosopher[s]' (Plato 1871o: 337) – it is essential for them to have knowledge of the immutable Forms. The Auxiliaries, also referred to as Soldiers, are 'allies of the principles of the rulers' (Plato 1871o: 242) who protect the state; they act as the police force enforcing the Ruler's laws. In the Guardian class, the Rulers are selected after a series of trials, and are then appointed as authoritative figures in the state, whilst the remaining candidates become Auxiliaries. As Plato's student Aristotle points out, Plato does not go into much detail regarding the remaining citizens of the state (Aristotle 1995i: 2006), but members of this third sector – numerically and hierarchically – are generally referred to as Workers who produce the provisions for the community, and are subject to the Guardians' dominion. In order to maintain this rigid order, Plato concocts a new myth. This metaphorical 'tale' says that the Rulers are made of gold, the Auxiliaries of silver, and the rest – the Workers – of brass or iron, and if, for instance, a brass child is born to gold or silver parents, 'nature orders a transposition of ranks' (Plato 1871o: 243). Although social mobility is permitted in Plato's provisional system, the strict divisions have to be preserved – a myth is put in place to achieve this.

Carter's accusation that Plato is 'the father of lies' who has infected Judeo-Christian culture with a series of falsehoods, or myths, corresponds to this aspect of the *Republic*, and one could argue that Carter's literary agenda – which is put forward in 'Notes from the Front Line' and frequently cited – is indebted to undoing Plato's influence on Western civilisations. Here, she argues that Western social structures are constructed upon 'lies' and myths, and asserts that her aim is to expose and eradicate these in her work, claiming – as is often quoted – 'I'm in the demythologising business' (Carter 1998b: 38). She defines myths and folklore as 'extraordinary lies designed to make people unfree' and refers to her 'femininity' as a 'social fiction', saying it 'was created, by means outside my control, and palmed off on me as the real thing' (Carter 1998b: 38). As Carter positions Plato as the initiator of this tradition, this reading of 'Notes from the Front Line' alters the critical interpretation of her manifesto – Carter's 'demythologising business' is targeted at breaking down Plato's influence over the Western world; she is, then, both demythologising and (de)philosophising.

In this sense, Carter has placed Plato in the role of the poet, which he both denigrates and appropriates to serve his own purposes – she regards Plato as a disseminator of the fictions he condemns, and derogatorily portrays him as a generator of generations of falsehoods. While Carter strives to untangle these lies, this portrayal of Plato also parodies his paradoxical position in the *Republic* – Plato bans poetry that lies or is fictitious, but then constructs a lie to ensure that his rigid, elitist class system is maintained and respected. Carter's Platonic discussion of the need to demythologise and expose lies highlights the irony of Plato's view and use of poetry – he is a liar, and, like the mythmaking poets that he prohibits from his *Republic*, Judeo-Christian society would be better off if he was censored out of it. Plato's detrimental impact on his descendants is further exacerbated by Carter's repetitious claim that the past 'is a vast repository of outmoded lies, where you can check out what lies used to be à la mode and find the old lies on which new lies have been based' (Carter 1998b: 41) – Carter sees Western society as constructed out of and built upon myths, due to Plato. In interview with Helen Cagney Watts in 1984, Carter applies this argument to the UK government saying, 'remember as Plato said, "It's all lies", and who would not say the Britain they were describing in the Conservative Party Conference was not a complete fantasy!' (Carter to Cagney Watts 1985: 172). She compares British politicians to mythmaking poets who, like Plato in the *Republic*, are imagining a utopian conservative state, thus denigrating the Tory party to the status of Plato's lying poets.

As well as targeting her work towards a demythologisation of Plato's lies, Carter's *oeuvre* demonstrates her resistance towards universals, overturning ideas of absolute distinctions or generalisations. Alison Lee sums this up, saying that Carter 'is suspicious of anything that presents itself as a universal answer to any question' (Lee 1997: x). This puts Carter at odds with Plato, as "absolute" and "immutable" are the defining features of Plato's Forms – otherwise known as Ideas – which he regards to be the highest form of knowledge. The Forms are accessed via the intellect of philosophers, and reveal the true and 'eternal nature in which is no variableness from generation and corruption' (Plato 1871o: 317). In the *Republic*, for instance, Plato says that there are many objects or particulars which can be described as 'beautiful' or 'good', and argues that 'there is an absolute beauty and an absolute good, and so of other things to which the word "many" is applied; they may be brought under a single idea, which is called the essence of each' (Plato 1871o: 342). So while individual objects can be seen as beautiful, the Form is an abstract idea encapsulating the *essence of beauty*, or *beauty in itself*; this essential quality is present in a particular object, as it partakes

in the Form. For Plato, there are Forms for moral qualities such as justice or equality, as well as for concrete objects, like a bed or table.

As Nicholas P. White claims, 'the overriding motivation of Plato's theory of knowledge is the firm belief [...] in facts about the world which are in some vague and difficult but important sense independent of the judgments of any particular human beings or groups of human beings' (White 1976: 217). Forms such as 'justice, beauty and the like exist independently of and prior to all the just actions and just persons, all the beautiful objects and beautiful persons you can find in the sensible world', and constitute the 'realm of invariable generalities' (Burnyeat to Magee 1987: 22-23). Forms are independent from the everyday world and are eternal and absolute, whereas particulars – ordinary objects – are perceived by the senses, and are seen to be unstable and subject to change, and therefore inferior. But while Plato worships the notion of 'imminent universals' (Murdoch 1977: 46), Carter celebrates relativity and deconstructs the idea of universals, particularly in relation to gendered experiences. In interview with John Haffenden, she says:

> in my work I keep on saying, in what I think is the nicest way, that women are people too, and that everything is relative – you see the world differently from different places. You cannot make any statements which are universally true, especially perhaps in the context of Britain. Everything is determined by different circumstances, and the circumstances of women are different from those of men. (Carter to Haffenden 1984: 38)

Thus, whereas Plato celebrates universal truths, Carter interprets them as myths, or 'false universals' (Carter 2009: 6), demonstrating a resistance towards and a subsequent deconstruction of Plato's theory of the Forms. But like Plato, who imagines a utopian society and uses this space to negatively comment on his contemporary Greece, Carter often uses fantasy settings to demythologise Plato and to, as she says, make 'a conscious critique of the culture I was born to' (Carter to Sage 1977: 56) – a culture engrained, as she says in 'Notes from the Front Line', with Platonic thought. Mirroring Plato, Carter suggests that 'one of the functions of fiction is to ask questions that can't be asked in any other way – is through constructing imaginary worlds in which ideas can be discussed' (Carter 1998: 35). The irony is that Carter's 'imaginary worlds' – particularly those depicted in *Heroes and Villains* and *Doctor Hoffman*, and in the futuristic apocalyptic America in *New Eve* – scrutinise Plato's ideas, and demythologise his lies.

One element of Carter's critique of Plato is her depiction of the figure of the poet, a figure that Plato both denigrates and appropriates, and the figure that Carter aligns Plato with by labelling him the 'father of lies'. Both the eponymous character in *Doctor Hoffman* and

Zero in *New Eve* are characterised as poets. Zero has eight wives, one eye, and one leg, but is impotent and ironically depicted as 'Masculinity incarnate' (Carter 2009b: 101). He is introduced as 'Zero the poet'– a bard who performs his works but has 'almost abandoned verbalisation as a means of communication' (Carter 2009b: 82). He:

> stood on a rock and bayed his poetry over the desert; once upon a time he'd written it down but he'd grown disgusted with words and their ineradicable human content long ago and now all his poems were howled and danced. (Carter 2009b: 82)

Thus, in line with Carter's degradation of Plato to the status of his detested poets, Zero's position as a poet is hyperbolically satirical. Zero's "poetry" is highly imitative: his wives have to dress up in costumes for the recitals, and 'Zero would take the centre of the stage [...] [and] dance out the violation and death of Tristessa [an actress he blames for his impotence], followed by the subsequent apotheosis of Zero' (Carter 2009b: 100). Plato distinguishes between narrative and imitative poetry as part of the plans for his state-censorship, regarding the latter as particularly harmful to the Guardians because the reciter has to perform: Plato thinks that 'they ought not to practise or imitate [...] and, if they imitate at all, they should imitate the characters which are suitable to their profession' (Plato 1871o: 220) – they should not lie by performing a role inconsistent with their status. Plato goes on to say that all imitators (poets and artists, for instance) are 'thrice removed from the truth' (Plato 1871o: 439), and uses the example of an artist painting a bed to illustrate this; the Form of the bed 'is made by God', the bed made by a carpenter is 'a particular bed [...] [with] only some semblance of existence', and the painter portrays a bed based on the carpenter's distorted view of reality (Plato 1871o: 437) – poets, likewise, are separated from the higher forms of reality.

By depicting Zero as an imitative poet, Carter exaggerates the constructedness and falsity of the myths Zero has created to control his harem, particularly focusing on the repercussions for his wives. Their indoctrination includes believing his myth 'that sexual intercourse with him guaranteed their continuing health and strength' (Carter 2009b: 85), as he has brainwashed them to depend on his sperm, which he says contains the elixir of life. Carter is critical of the wives' complicity in Zero's fantasies, as she points out that 'their obedience ruled him' as 'his myth depended on their conviction; a god-head, however shabby, needs believers to maintain his credibility [...] by himself, he would have been nothing' (Carter 2009b: 96). This ties into Carter's claim that the unravelling of Plato's 'lies' is intrinsic to advances in gender equality; Zero is a descendant of Plato, whose myths/lies

hold his wives in a submissive position, although Carter also recognises that women – in the form of Zero's harem – are accountable for obediently participating in this tradition and not seeking to challenge the prevailing myths. The "father" aspect of Zero's role of a Platonic poet-mythologiser is parodied though, as Zero's sterility prevents his myths from being passed on to and by future generations – his patriarchal, colonial dream to 'repopulate the suddenly barren continent, now empty of all but the tribe of Zero' does not become a reality, as he is unable to 'restore the procreativity to his virility' (Carter 2009b: 95). So, more than being 'a blatant parody of masculinity' (Gamble 2009: 154) – an assessment of Zero voiced by Sarah Gamble amongst numerous other critics – Zero acts as a parody of Plato's poets, and, like Plato, ironically takes on the role of poet, which is detrimental for his wives.

Another poet in Carter's *oeuvre*, Doctor Hoffman, has started a Reality War in an unspecified South American city by beaming apparitional images into the metropolis, causing the residents to question what is real and what is not, as his 'synthetic reconstructions' are 'too lifelike' (Carter 2010: 12-13). He is, in the narrator Desiderio's words, 'waging a massive campaign against human reason' (Carter 2010: 3). The Doctor faces opposition in the form of the Minister of Determination, who is compared to a 'witch-doctor' (Carter 2010: 21) on a mission to detect which images are real and which are simulations, and to eradicate the fake – although some of his ammunition identifies what is real and ironically demolishes the real rather than the simulations. The opposition between the Minister and the Doctor, whose 'primary difference is a philosophical one' (Carter 2010: 33), lends itself to multiple interpretations. Lee, for instance, argues that 'as an allegorical conflict, this could be characterized in a number of ways as a dispute between the pleasure principle and the reality principle, idealism and empiricism, Dionysus and Apollo, anti-Enlightenment and Enlightenment, and any number of other binary oppositions' (Lee 1997: 61).

One of these 'binary oppositions' is the 'ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry' that characterises Plato's work, particularly the *Republic* (Plato 1871o: 449); as Desiderio notes, the contest between the Minister and the Doctor 'was a battle between an encyclopedist and a poet' (Carter 2010: 21). Peach similarly recognises that 'Carter appears to be recalling Plato's *Republic* – Hoffman is after all a poet – and the banishment of the poets from the Athenian city-state' (Peach 2009: 89). This is a flawed reading, as rather than completely banning poetry Plato proposed to prohibit poetry that could 'do cumulative psychological harm' (Murdoch 1977: 5). In a similar vein, Desiderio reports that the 'distortions' Doctor Hoffman imposes on the city have a 'cumulative psychological effect' on its residents (Carter 2010: 15). Gąsiorek puts forward a more comprehensive discussion of

Carter's 'response to Plato's negative view of the poets in the *Republic*' in *Doctor Hoffman*, comparing the Minister to 'a kind of Philosopher-King' (Gąsiorek 1995: 128) – the Ruler of Plato's ideal state. In this sense, the rational Minister is trying to censor the city and protect it from Doctor Hoffman's simulations because of the potentially damaging impact they could have on the state's citizens.

Carter's interaction with Plato's *Republic* in *Doctor Hoffman* is more complicated than a straightforward conflict between a Philosopher Ruler – the Minister – and a poet in the form of Doctor Hoffman. Two key related themes in Carter's novel and the *Republic* are reality and knowledge, and a closer reading of how these ideas are depicted in *Doctor Hoffman* in comparison to Plato's dialogue suggests that Doctor Hoffman is blurring the binary division between poetry and philosophy, while also illuminating Carter's parody of the need for higher forms of knowledge and reality, such as the Forms. As the aim of the *Republic* is to produce the ideal Philosopher Ruler, throughout the dialogue ideas of "knowledge" and "ignorance" are discussed and defined, and "opinion" is seen to be in an intermediate position between these two extremes. Plato explains his ideas metaphorically using the notion of sight. He says that few people 'are able to attain the sight of absolute beauty' (Plato 1871o: 310) as the Forms are only visible to elite philosophers. Such Forms are invisible to the majority – the general public; they are 'incapable of seeing or loving absolute beauty' (Plato 1871o: 310). Whereas philosophers can see the Forms and are knowledgeable, the majority can only see particulars and merely recognise relative beauty rather than absolute beauty – Plato argues that the majority have *opinion*, while the philosophers have *knowledge*. He says:

> those who see the many beautiful, and who yet neither see, nor can be taught to see, absolute beauty; who see the many just, and not absolute justice, and the like, - such persons may be said to have opinion but not knowledge [...] but those who see the absolute and eternal and immutable may be said to know, and not to have opinion only. (Plato 1871o: 315)

While knowledge corresponds to the Forms and opinion is associated with everyday objects and particulars, ignorance corresponds to what does not exist at all (Plato 1871o: 313).

Plato uses three related similes to illustrate his epistemological theory and the quest for enlightenment: the Similes of the Sun, the Divided Line, and the Cave. These three analogies respectively build on each other, but for the purposes of my discussion of *Doctor Hoffman*, I just focus on the first two similes here. The Sun simile builds on the sight imagery that is central to Plato's idea of knowledge, and portrays the distinction between the many

visible particulars and the eternal intelligible Forms, emphasising that 'the many [...] are seen but not known, and the ideas are known but not seen' (Plato 1871o: 342); as Carter puts it, 'Plato said that particulars are perceivable but not thinkable while ideas are thinkable but not perceivable' (Carter 1969-70 Journal MS88899/1/93: unpaginated). The Sun enables sight in the visible, everyday world, and corresponds to the Form of the Good – the source of knowledge and truth that reigns 'supreme in the realm of thought' (Annas 1981: 245). As 'the sun is not only the author of visibility in all visible things, but of generation and nourishment and growth', the Good is 'not only the author of knowledge [...] but of their being and essence' – it creates 'all things known' (Plato 1871o: 344). So, just as sight is impaired when there is limited light, when the soul is not in the realm of the Forms and is 'turning towards the twilight of generation and destruction, then she has opinion only, and goes blinking about [...] and seems to have no intelligence' (Plato 1871o: 344).

The Simile of the Divided Line is 'a sequel to the Sun simile' (Lee 2003: 235) and corresponds to a line divided into two, with one half representing knowledge/the intelligible realm, and the other depicting opinion/the visible realm; as Lee clarifies, although Plato uses the sight metaphor, the visible realm, also known as the 'physical world', refers to 'the world perceived by our senses' in general (Lee 2003: 237). Both halves of the Line are split in two once again, so in total the Line has four portions, which will be referred to as A, B, C, and D. The lower half of the Line, consisting of C and D, represents opinion. Section D corresponds to images, meaning 'in the first place, shadows, and in the second place, reflections in water and in solid, smooth and polished bodies' (Plato 1871o: 345). Moving up the Line, C, the second half of this realm, refers to belief and is associated with physical objects, including 'ourselves and the animals, and everything in nature and everything in art' (Plato 1871o: 345). So a book would belong to section C, but a reflection or shadow of a book – perceiving it using a mirror, or seeing a shadow of it on the wall – would fall under D. The higher half of the Line denotes the superior intelligible realm, and is composed of sections A and B. Broadly, B corresponds to the understanding of mathematics, while A relates to intelligence, or dialectic. Just as section C refers to a higher knowledge and level of reality than seeing the same object in shadowy conditions in D, the same can be said for A and B. Within section B, mathematical images are used to resemble 'the absolute square and the absolute diameter, and so on' (Plato 1871o: 346) – the Forms represented by A.

Thus, the Divided Line simile depicts the progress through four stages related to illusory shadows, belief (physical objects), mathematical understanding, and finally intelligence and knowledge of the Forms. The first two depict the physical world and the

realm of visibility, while the latter two make up the higher intelligible realm. In *Doctor Hoffman*, Carter portrays the disruption the title character causes as not only blurring the distinction between sections C and D, but also collapsing the division between the two halves of the line that depict the visible and intelligible realms. The Minister's aim to restore order is parodied, as is his status as a Platonic Philosopher Ruler, who, in Plato's *Republic* resides in section A, at the pinnacle of the Line in the world of intelligibility. Desiderio refers to Doctor Hoffman's continually metamorphosing apparitions as 'mirages' and, more frequently, 'shadows' (Carter 2010: 3; 9; 28), associating them with section D of the Divided Line – describing them as 'shadows' corresponds to the Cave simile, where shadows on a cave wall illustrate this part of the Line. Thanks to Doctor Hoffman's antics, most of the city's residents are unable to distinguish between the illusory images and the actual physical objects or people, which in Platonic terms means that the Doctor has eradicated the division between sections C and D, which Desiderio compares to being 'trapped in some downward-drooping convoluted spiral of unreality' (Carter 2010: 15).

Desiderio claims that Doctor Hoffman is blurring the distinction between the two halves of the Line representing the visible and intelligible realms: 'Hoffman, scientist as he was, utilized his formidable knowledge only to render the invisible visible, even though it certainly seemed to us that his ultimate plan was to rule the world' (Carter 2010: 21). By saying that the Doctor is making the 'invisible visible', Carter depicts the disturbance he causes in Platonic terms – sight is a metaphor for knowledge and reality, and by causing the residents to question their senses, the Doctor is also hampering their knowledge and encouraging them to redefine reality – it is a 'Reality War', after all (Carter 2010: 24). By striving to extinguish Doctor Hoffman's revenants, the Minister wants to annihilate section D of the Line; however, since some of his weapons eradicate the physical objects rather than their illusory counterparts, he is in the process of obliterating section C, too. The Minister's assertion that 'determinate' and 'finite' are central to his 'criterion of reality' (Carter 2010: 19-20) positions him in the higher intelligible half of the Divided Line, but while he represents 'reason, law, structure, restraint and philosophy' (Peach 2009: 89), he does not embody Plato's Philosopher Ruler, or, as Gąsiorek suggests, 'a kind of Philosopher-King' (Gąsiorek 1995: 128). The Minister 'rejected the transcendental' and has therefore, according to Desiderio, 'clipped his own wings' (Carter 2010: 25). Thus, he does not reside in section A and celebrate the Forms, unlike Plato's ideal philosopher. Rather, as a rational thinker and 'the most ascetic of logicians' (Carter 2010: 19) who claims that 'metaphysics are no concern of mine' (Carter 2010: 34), the Minister corresponds to section B of the Line simile.

Instead, the neutral Desiderio praises the Platonic notion of the Forms; he 'could not see what there might be wrong with knowledge in itself, no matter what the price' (Carter 2010: 25), and 'very much admired the Ancient Egyptians, because they searched for, arrived at and perfected an aesthetically entirely satisfactory pose [...] which had been universally approved [...] [and] they stayed in it for two thousand years' (Carter 2010: 4). Desiderio's appreciation of stability and order is not immutable – when he kills Doctor Hoffman and destroys the reality modifying machines he voices 'regret' because 'now all changes would henceforth be, as they had been before, absolutely predictable' (Carter 2010: 264). Therefore, as well as engaging with the conflict between poetry and philosophy in Plato's *Republic*, Carter problematises such binary divisions by blurring the sections of the Divided Line, thereby illustrating how Platonic ideas of reality are central to notions of order and showing how chaos ensues if this is challenged. By separating the Minister from the Forms and therefore preventing him from identifying with the Philosopher Ruler, Carter parodies Plato's leading figure. Fundamentally, the Philosopher Ruler is supposed to censor harmful poets and celebrate absolute, essential knowledge, but by Desiderio instead of the Minister fulfilling both of these requirements, Carter scrambles Plato's arguments in the *Republic* and questions definitions of reality and knowledge.

A parody of Plato's *Republic* is also central to *Heroes and Villains*, Carter's earlier speculative novel. In this text, however, Carter focuses on the structure of Plato's ideal state, provides a damning response to the place women are given in this regime, and critiques his definition of the Philosopher Ruler by allocating the novel's female protagonist Marianne a version of this role. *Heroes and Villains* portrays a post-apocalyptic landscape divided into two main communities – Professors and Barbarians – and a third group of Out People. The Professors live in a compound fenced with barbed-wire and bordered by 'watch towers manned with machine guns' (Carter 1972: 3). They survived the nuclear war because their status as Professors meant that they – along with their families – had access to underground bunkers. This elitist privilege means that they believe they are 'the only ones left who could resurrect the gone world in a gentler shape, and try to keep destruction outside, this time' (Carter 1972: 8). The scholars, but particularly Marianne's father, the Professor of History, whom Carter portrays as a representative of the Professors as a whole and almost as their leader as he has 'read more books than any other Professor in the community' (Carter 1972: 8), are guided by sociological literature as well as by key texts in the field of political philosophy, including, I argue, the *Republic*. Marianne's father, an 'authentic, "white", enlightenment philosopher figure' (Yoshioka 2006: 73), has an expansive library including

works by Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Thomas Hobbes, Claude Lévi-Strauss, Max Weber, Émile Durkheim and Teilhard de Chardin, all of whom are either referred to by name or cited in the novel (Carter 1972: 10; 62-63). But Marianne's recollection of 'the melancholy whimsy of Professors gathered together over their after-dinner, home-brewed blackberry brandy when they would discuss apocalypses, utopias and so on' (Carter 1972: 93) shows that her father's interests – as well as the interests of the Professors more generally – are broader than this, with their discussions and debates covering the same topics as Plato's *Republic*. While Plato's dialogue provides an imaginary blueprint of a utopian society, I contend that Carter's Professors have based their resurrected civilisation on the *Republic*, using the circumstances of the apocalypse as an opportunity to make Plato's fantasy a reality. In this sense, one of the speculative 'what if?' questions that Carter raises in this novel is: what would happen if Plato's theory was put into practice? Carter's appropriation of the *Republic* in a dystopian setting in *Heroes and Villains* enables her to assess Plato's utopia and exploit its limitations, particularly in relation to the role Plato gives to women in his fantasy state.

Plato's societal reorganisation divides the populace into three groups: Rulers, Auxiliaries, and Workers. This is based on Plato's advocacy of the meritocratic notion that all citizens should perform the singular role 'for which he was fitted by nature' (Plato 1871o: 197), known as the 'Principle of Specialization' (Annas 1981: 73). The Professors' compound is structured according to three analogous groups of Professors, Soldiers, and Workers, who respectively correspond to the Rulers, Auxiliaries, and Plato's third class in his utopian society. Karpinski recognises this resemblance, saying that 'like Plato's *Republic* [...] [the Professors' community] is hierarchically structured, with Professors, Soldiers, and Workers forming hereditary castes. It is a military regime with strict discipline, where the Professors are busy with their books, the Soldiers with policing, and the Workers with tending the farmland' (Karpinski 2000: unpaginated). Karpinski does not examine this relationship any further, as Rousseau is her primary focus.

Building on this, as well as making sure that the class divisions remain intact, the Guardians have to ensure that their state is secure, and 'select a spot whence they can best prevent insurrection, if any prove refractory within, and also defend themselves against enemies' (Plato 1871o: 243). The Guardians thwart civil conflicts within the community and protect the city from invasions from external parties. Plato refers to these outsiders as 'barbarians' and, as M. I. Finley clarifies, the ancient Greeks classified:

> everyone who did not speak Greek as his native tongue, into a single category of "barbarian", a man whose speech was unintelligible and sounded like "bar-bar-

> bar". Barbarians were not only unintelligible; they were, many Greeks came to believe, inferior by nature – the highly civilised Egyptians and Persians alongside the Scythians and Thracians. (Finley 1991: 18)

In *Heroes and Villains*, the Professors' enclosure is similarly fortified so as to protect their community and its produce from invasions, and like the Guardians, the Professors and Soldiers call the supposedly savage outsiders "Barbarians". The Professors do not naively use this term just to signify that the Barbarians are foreign, in line with its use in ancient Greece to refer to someone who was not Greek; they use the word in its derogatory sense, embodying their belief that the Barbarians are unintelligible, uncultured, and inferior. The patrolled border functions to keep 'those on the outside from getting inside and those on the inside from getting out' (Carter 1972: 127) – to stop the Barbarians from invading and to ensure that no one crosses the margins without permission, because of the threat the wild Barbarians pose. The elite Professors regard the Barbarians to be subordinate to them, believing that they 'survived at first by accident and continue to survive only by tenacity' (Carter 1972: 11), thus overlooking the fact that they are adapting to the post-apocalyptic world, an argument I will develop in relation to Rousseau and Hobbes in the following chapter.

Just as Plato plans for the Rulers to construct myths to maintain the societal structure, the Professors' community circulate lies about the Barbarians in order to guarantee that the outsiders are feared. Marianne's nurse tells her that she has to be a 'good little girl' on the basis that Barbarians are cannibals with an appetite for young girls, saying 'they wrap little girls in clay [...] bake them in the fire and gobble them up with salt. They relish tender little girls' (Carter 1972: 2). The protagonist is also told that 'they slit the bellies of the women after they've raped them and sew up cats inside', although Marianne thinks this is 'most unlikely' (Carter 1972: 10). Thus, the Professors use the same mythological strategy as Plato's Rulers in the *Republic*, but Marianne's questioning of these beliefs highlights the transparency of such acts of deception, suggesting that Plato's tactic is not fool-proof and that his ideal society is prone to cracking if adopted in the real world.

Carter's depiction of the Soldiers reinforces her challenge to Plato's ideal society. Marianne's father says that 'the Soldiers are delegated to police us and protect us but they are developing an autonomous power of their own' (Carter 1972: 9), suggesting that Plato's division between Rulers and Auxiliaries cannot be maintained in the Professors' compound, as the distinction between Professors and Soldiers is beginning to dissolve. In *Doctor Hoffman*, Desiderio similarly comments on being 'terrified to realize how much the autonomous power of the police had grown' in the Republican state (Carter 2010: 66). The

Soldiers in *Heroes and Villains* also fail to protect the enclosure from the Barbarians due to a lackadaisical effort to keep the compound safe: 'men at the sentry post were playing cards so they did not see the visitors in time; two Soldiers, paying the price of lack of discipline, were shot. Then all was chaos' (Carter 1972: 4). Their negligence has caused the expected levels of order and discipline advocated in the *Republic* to falter, and shows that the Soldiers/Auxiliaries are not fulfilling the function that they, according to Plato, were born to provide. In fact, Plato's *Laws* acknowledge the problem of a laid-back approach to security if a territory is fortified by walls, as it is anticipated that this method of defence is:

> apt to produce a certain effeminacy in the minds of the inhabitants: inviting men to run thither instead of repelling their enemies, and leading them to imagine that their safety is due not to their keeping guard day and night, but that when they are protected by walls and gates, then they may sleep in safety. (Plato 1871x: 294)

This reading has emasculatory implications for the Soldiers, and reinforces their deficiency as protectors of the city, as according to both the *Republic* and *Laws* – the latter of which puts forward a more realistic idea of a perfect society – they are guilty of not meeting the expectations of the state and of putting the compound in danger.

Plato also emphasises the need for the Guardians – the Rulers and Auxiliaries – to live communally, forbidding them from having private property and material wealth, and thus encouraging a united Guardian class (Plato 1871o: 244). This communality does not only apply to housing and material goods, as it encompasses family life as well: Plato abolishes the notion of family amongst the Guardians in an attempt to eradicate the distractions it could provide. Instead, he establishes mating festivals where 'the best of either sex should be united with the best as often as possible, and the inferior with the inferior' (Plato 1871o: 290). This eugenic regime aims for the Guardians to be 'kept pure' (Plato 1871o: 291), so the offspring of the superior parents enter a state nursery, whereas the children of inferior parents are demoted, and deformed children are 'conceal[ed] in some mysterious, unknown place' (Plato 1871o: 291). Plato's intention is for parents to be unaware of who their biological children are, so each infant born in the state in a certain period is seen as their child, regardless of genetics.

In line with the *Republic*, the Professors' compound is characterised by 'hereditary castes' (Carter 1972: 10), and there is evidence to suggest that the society eats together, or at least has meals at the same time, as it is specified that 'the village sat down to supper' (Carter 1972: 16). Unity at meal times, though, is where the resemblance between Plato's Guardians

and Carter's equivalent Professors and Soldiers ends in terms of communality. In contrast with the *Republic*, the Professors have not abolished family units as families live together, and they have personal property – Marianne 'marked all her possessions with her name' (Carter 1972: 3). In the *Laws*, Plato's last work, he offers a more practical and attainable version of his ideal society, referred to as the 'second best' state (Plato 1871x: 258). Here, he recognises that his fantasy of communal living put forward in the *Republic* is unobtainable in practice, so reinstates private property and families (Plato 1871x: 258-259). Communal meals are the exception though, with 'common tables' remaining intact in the second-rate state depicted in *Laws* (Plato 1871x: 353). It seems as though the Professors have come to the same conclusion as Plato, regarding absolute communality to be impractical, and, in line with the *Laws*, they have opted to just hold on to the shared meals aspect of this ideal. In contrast, Marianne discovers that the Barbarian community is characterised by 'small family groups [who] lived in such close contact the children were held almost in common' (Carter 1972: 44).

Thus, whereas the Professors have succumbed to some of the proposals Plato puts forward in the *Laws*, the Barbarians are, in this respect, closer to Plato's ideal aim for unity depicted in the *Republic*, with communal families 'almost' being a feature of their nomadic lifestyle. This mocks the supposedly civilised Professors; they see themselves as superior to the "uncultivated" Barbarians, but in terms of communality, the outsiders are in fact closer to the ideal. The same argument applies to *Doctor Hoffman*: on his travels Desiderio periodically lives with a primitive tribe of River People who represent the opposite of the civilised world endorsed by the city's Minister. Desiderio reports that 'the whole family habitually ate together round a round table in the main cabin', notes that everyone eats from a 'common bowl' (Carter 2010: 80) and says that 'to a considerable extent the tribe held all its goods in common and tended to think of itself as a scattered but unified family' (Carter 2010: 82). Once again, Plato's ideal is achieved in a rural, natural habitat rather than in a civilised environment constructed in honour of the *Republic*.

As Plato abolishes the notion of family in the *Republic* and then reinstates it in the *Laws*, the two dialogues present the role of women in society differently. By portraying a female protagonist's negotiation of the Platonic compound in *Heroes and Villains*, Carter questions what a woman's place in the community is for Plato, highlighting her 'consistent interest' in 'the position of women in literature, in history, and in the world' (Lee 1997: ix). Because 'women are classified by Plato, as they were by the culture in which he lived, as an important subsection of property' (Okin 1977: 349), the abolition of private property and the

prohibition of wives coincides for the Guardians in the *Republic*. This dialogue portrays the search for a Philosopher-King – a male Ruler – and regards families, particularly children and wives, as distractions. Nevertheless, by liberating women from the family unit Plato also broadens the horizons for women in his ideal state; in a communal society, Plato advocates that Guardian women should have the same duties, and therefore the same education and training, as men, claiming that the reproductive difference of 'women bearing and men begetting' is redundant (Plato 1871o: 284). While he compares such distinctions to being as absurd as saying there is 'an opposition in nature between bald men and hairy men', the dialogue still concludes that women are the inferior sex, claiming that in 'all' male pursuits – associated with 'the administration of a State' – 'a woman is only a lesser man' (Plato 1871o: 284-285).

While Plato legislates for both sexes to have the same education and to have the same opportunities as Guardians, this is ultimately done in order to rear high-quality male offspring within the eugenic regime. As only the best become Philosopher Rulers, this position is not open to women, who are seen as inadequate in contrast to their male counterparts. Unsurprisingly, Plato has come under attack for his views on women. An assessment of feminist readings of Plato is not my aim here,[5] and it is sufficient to point out Julia Annas's observation that Plato makes few references to women in work, and that he does not account for the female experience of communal living (Annas 1976: 312), as he constructs laws from a male perspective. In the *Laws*, the re-establishment of the family is concurrent with women relapsing to traditional wifely roles, as marriage and procreation are compulsory. Couples are paired according to partnerships that will be 'most beneficial to the state', and while men have some choice as to who their wife will be, women are betrothed by male family members; 'betrothal by a mother shall be valid' only if the woman's father, grandfather, and brother are dead (Plato 1871x: 289-290). In line with the *Republic*, though, Plato gives women the same opportunities as men in terms of education and training, but this is only because he considers it to be a waste of half a states' resources otherwise; woman will only be utilised by the military 'if there appear any need to make use of her' (Plato 1871x: 300).

Building on Aidan Day's comment that the Professors' compound is governed by 'totalitarian discipline' with a 'feudal *and* patriarchal' structure (Day 1998: 45 – original emphasis), Carter's portrayal of the scholarly community in *Heroes and Villains* reflects many of these Platonic issues of sex and class, and in some ways exaggerates the

[5] For discussions of Plato's depiction of women see: Okin (1977), Spelman (1988 and 1988b), and Vlastos (1989).

androcentricity of Plato's Guardians. In line with the Rulers, the Professors are a male group, and pre-war universities are defined as male domains. Marianne's father says:

> before the war, there were places called Universities where men did nothing but read books and conduct experiments. These men had certain privileges, though mostly unstated ones; but all the same, some Professors were allowed in the deep shelters with their families, during the war. (Carter 1972: 8)

Thus, men are the educated citizens whose elite status gives them the opportunity to survive the nuclear war in safety with their families. Post-apocalypse, a sex divide is still intact: Marianne's father is a bibliomaniacal Professor who 'stayed in his study with his books, such was his privilege', whereas 'her mother, the other Professor women in the tower and the Workers were very busy. They cooked succulent food and pressed best clothes' (Carter 1972: 3). There are Professors on the one hand – male scholars – and their wives on the other, who fulfil domestic tasks and are categorised as 'Professor women'. The Soldiers are unanimously male as well, with the tradition being that 'every Professor's eldest son became a cadet among the Soldiers' (Carter 1972: 10), including Marianne's brother. Whereas it is customary for Marianne's male sibling to have a military career, the patrilineal expectation for Marianne is for her to marry someone appropriate within her caste, as illustrated by her father's interest in her marital intentions.

So while Plato's *Republic* legislates for equality between the sexes but falls short of this by saying that women are inferior, thus inferentially implying that the Rulers (and Soldiers) are male because they are best equipped for these roles within the 'Principle of Specialization' that Plato endorses, Carter exaggerates this inequality in *Heroes and Villains*, and does not suggest that the laws of the state allow 'Professor women' to fulfil the same roles as their erudite husbands. In line with the Professors' abandonment of the *Republic*'s emphasis on communality – with the possible exception of eating arrangements – which aligns their compound with the second-rate state imagined in the *Laws* instead, the women are not held in common by the Professors either, reinforcing the connection between the Professors and Plato's realistic *Laws* rather than his idyllic *Republic*.

But while Plato at least *legislates* for sexual equality for the women in the *Guardian* class of his *Republic*, what about the Workers? As Annas notes, Plato's 'extraordinary measures to create unity apply only to the Guardian class' (Annas 1981: 178) – property, family, and private wealth are not forbidden for the Workers. Aside from this distinction, Plato does not specify much about his third class of Workers, merely saying that they farm and are subject to the Guardians' rule. The lack of detail means that, as Susan Moller Okin

points out, 'no mention is made of the women of the inferior classes' in the *Republic* (Okin 1977: 359). Carter's depiction of the Workers in the Professors' enclosure also illustrates an engagement with this aspect of the *Republic*. The Professors' enclave is 'primarily a community of farmers' (Carter 1972: 8), in alignment with the agricultural work that defines Plato's third class. But similarly to Plato's depiction of his ideal state, Carter does not provide much more information about the Workers, with precedence being given to the Professors and secondarily to the Soldiers. As noted above, some Workers fulfil domestic duties with the 'Professor women', and others till the land and make hay, but the only member of this caste that Carter provides any detail about, and the only one to have a specified occupation, is Marianne's nurse, a 'Worker woman' (Carter 1972: 2).

Thus, whereas Plato has been criticised for overlooking women in his lowest class, Carter inverts this in *Heroes and Villains* by focusing – albeit minimally – on Marianne's female nurse. Based on this character, the Workers have absorbed the myths about the Barbarians that the Professors have spread, as the nurse tells Marianne about the outsiders' child-eating antics and their methods for raping women. In terms of class, though, Carter does not overturn Plato's *Republic*: the Workers remain the most insignificant caste in relation to the amount of space dedicated to discussing their role in the enclosure, drawing attention to the 'intellectual and political elitism' (Santas 2010: 146) that characterises Plato's utopian vision. This Platonic reading of the Professors' domain reinforces Peach's argument that the Professors' society is structured 'according to male rules and male logic' (Peach 2009: 79) because the perimeter is 'manned with machine guns' (Carter 1972: 3); as the Professors have mimicked the organisation of Plato's *Republic* in their attempt to rebuild a civil society, resorting to some aspects of the *Laws* when the ideal is too unrealistic to copy, their community is intrinsically patriarchal. The description of the boundary being 'manned' could be interpreted literally – the Soldiers *are* a male group – but Carter exaggerates this aspect of the *Republic*, emphasising the inequality that Plato upholds.

Nevertheless, Marianne *is* educated: her father teaches her literacy, 'a little history and social theory' (Carter 1972: 26), contrasting her brother's military upbringing. No details are given of the other children's educations in the Professors' enclosure, but in order for the Professors to survive as a group of scholars, one would assume that Marianne is not the only child to be schooled. Thus, does she, like other Professor's daughters, receive the same education as the male offspring who do not become Soldiers? Are the first-born sons educated *as well* as having military training? While these questions cannot be answered, it is clear that Marianne is not trained in combat, demonstrating that there is a division between

the sexes. Likewise, in the *Laws* it is compulsory for boys to be prepared for a career in the army, while the girls can participate 'if they do not object'; while Plato goes on to recognise that girls 'ought to know the use of arms' (Plato 1871x: 307), this training is optional rather than mandatory. Carter's depiction of Marianne's upbringing suggests that military training is unavailable to her, exacerbating Plato's division between the sexes. But if Marianne's education is representative of the schooling that all women in the Professors' community receive, this suggests that the divide between Professors and Professor women is established later on, perhaps after marriage, implying that if Marianne never left the compound, a life as a domestic Professor woman would have been her destiny. This mirrors the *Republic*, in which women are trained to a certain extent but ultimately cannot reach the same level as men, whether that is the position of Philosopher Ruler, or a role where there are better suited male competitors who outdo the "inferior" women. Like the women in the *Republic* then, it seems as though Marianne's role is expected to be that of a learned breeder.

But by making Marianne the sole representative of the Professor's children in terms of schooling, Carter illustrates that Marianne, her female protagonist, is the only character in the Professors' compound who actually *learns*. During her time in the enclosure, Marianne questions the validity of the tuition she receives from her father. She acknowledges that his 'dictionaries contained innumerable incomprehensible words', words which 'had ceased to describe facts and now stood only for ideas or memories' (Carter 1972: 7); the Professors' pre-apocalyptic knowledge is now redundant. She also purges the compound of her father's books and his clock, signifiers of order and the Old World, further emphasising their uselessness. Contrary to her father's lessons, via her first-hand experience of the Barbarians, she learns that they are educated – albeit thanks to a renegade Professor's tutorship – but not 'according to their [the Professors'] requirements' (Carter 1972: 123). Moreover, she wants to tell her father about the 'true nature' of the Barbarians' social structure (Carter 1972: 53). The Professors, represented by Marianne's father, are losing their sense of sight – his 'lashless eyes were bleared with shortness of sight; soon he would go blind' (Carter 1972: 8). In relation to Plato, who uses sight as a metaphor for knowledge to illustrate a philosopher's enlightenment, the Professors are *not* philosophers: they cannot see, and their knowledge literally corresponds to ignorance, defined by Plato as what is 'absolutely non-existent' (Plato 1871o: 311). The Professors' knowledge became ignorance, and 'ceased to describe facts' (Carter 1972: 7), in line with the nuclear war. This ironically means that none of the Professors are candidates for the role of the Philosopher-King, despite the fact that they have

modelled their societal structure on Plato's *Republic*, taking inspiration from the *Laws* when the *Republic*'s suggestions are unobtainable.

In a further parody of Plato's *Republic* (and the *Laws*), Marianne emerges as the character who can see most clearly, with her 'sharp, cold eyes' (Carter 1972: 1); she is on the philosophical quest for enlightenment and discovers what the Barbarians are *really* like by living with them, making her a potential Philosopher-Queen. But while Plato's idea of a Philosopher Ruler has knowledge of the Forms – eternal and absolute knowledge – Marianne rejects this, as illustrated by her drowning of her father's 'immortal' clock (Carter 1972: 1). Her quest for knowledge constitutes an understanding of change, as unlike her father, she appreciates the need to adjust to the post-apocalyptic landscape and recognises that knowledge is not immutable; these are some of the ideas I go on to develop further in the following chapter on Rousseau and Hobbes. But Plato's *Republic* is also particularly pertinent in another of Carter's novels – *The Passion of New Eve* – the text to which I now turn, which is also characterised by a derision of the Forms.

Plato's *Republic* and *The Passion of New Eve*: Shadowy Caves and Cinemas

Following her critique of the structure of Plato's utopian *Republic* in both *Heroes and Villains* and *Doctor Hoffman*, which parody the role of the Philosopher Ruler and mock Plato's status as the 'father of lies', in her subsequent novel, *New Eve*, Carter's interaction with Plato remains intact. In this latter text, however, Carter particularly focuses on the quest idea evoked by Plato, and his concepts of different levels of reality, ranging from the lowest level – shadows – to the highest: the universal Forms. She also explicitly moves beyond engaging with the *Republic*, citing images and concepts from Plato's *Symposium* as well, although I do not discuss the latter here. This novel, her 'most anti-essentialist text' (Britzolakis 1997: 50), debunks absolute Forms related to sex and gender by questioning what it means to be "real", "natural", or "authentic", and scrutinises the role Hollywood has for perpetuating ideas of perfection, particularly – but not exclusively – for women. In this light, Carter retrospectively refers to *New Eve* as an 'anti-mythic novel' and 'a feminist tract about the social creation of femininity, amongst other things' (Carter 1998b: 38), later saying that she intended it to be 'a deeply, deeply serious piece of fiction about gender identity, about our relation to the dream factory, our relation to Hollywood, our relation to imagery' (Carter in Evans 1992: unpaginated). Critical discussions of Carter's demolition of essentialist notions of gender in favour of constructivist views are commonplace in relation to *New Eve*, and throughout her *oeuvre*, particularly in relation to gender performativity and

Judith Butler's claim that 'genders can be neither true nor false, neither real nor apparent, neither original nor derived' (Butler 2002: 180).[6] Carter's portrayal of gender is summed up by Dimovitz's argument that 'much of Carter's work often seems like the fictional application of Simone de Beauvoir's famous proclamation, "One is not born, but rather becomes, a woman"' (Dimovitz 2005: 21).[7] The originality of my argument is my contention that these discussions have a Platonic foundation which Carter specifically engages with. In particular, I contend that Plato's Simile of the Cave is a central intertext for *New Eve* as it structures the narrative.

The Simile of the Cave is 'a more graphic presentation' of the other two allegories (Lee 2003: 240) – the Sun and the Divided Line – highlighting the journey towards higher forms of knowledge and reality that the philosopher-in-training is on a quest to reach. The Simile begins by depicting 'human beings living in a sort of underground den'; 'they have been here from their childhood, and have their legs and necks chained so that they cannot move, and can only see before them' (Plato 1871o: 348). Behind the prisoners there is a fire, 'and between the fire and the prisoners there is [...] a low wall built along the way, like the screen which marionette players have before them, over which they show the puppets' (Plato 1871o: 348). There are men passing along this wall carrying objects, such as 'figures of men and animals' (Plato 1871o: 348), which are visible above the wall, and some of these men are talking. Since the hostages can only see in front of them, they are limited to seeing only the shadows of themselves, of the other captives, and of the objects being carried; they think the shadows are "real", as shadows constitute their only notion of reality. Thus, if the people behind them speak, they think that the sound comes from the shadows. At this point in the simile, Plato portrays the cave dwellers as being restricted to section D of the Divided Line. To proceed to C, a prisoner has to be freed in order to see the actual objects rather than just their shadows. Being unchained results in the realisation 'that what he saw before was an illusion, but that now he is approaching real being and has a truer sight and vision of more real things' (Plato 1871o: 349) – sight imagery is once again central to Plato's representation of enlightenment. This transition is not straightforward. Initially, the released prisoner will 'turn his neck round and walk and look at the light, he will suffer sharp pains; the glare will distress him, and he will be unable to see the realities of which in his former state he had seen the shadows' (Plato 1871o: 349). The unshackled captive will therefore struggle to name the

[6] For an introductory discussion of Carter and Butler see Palmer 1997: 24-27, and for analyses of *New Eve* and Butler see Day 1998: 125 and Squier 1995.
[7] See also Gamble 1997: 119-129 and Johnson 2000.

objects he now perceives, because he is accustomed to the shadows, and will also be unable to look directly at the light of the fire. These two stages in the cave therefore correspond to the lower half of the Divided Line representing the physical world – sections D and C.

In order to advance to the upper half of the line and climb the epistemological scale into the intelligible realm of sections A and B, the released prisoner 'is reluctantly dragged up a steep and rugged ascent, and held fast and forced into the presence of the sun', with the Sun representing the higher Forms (Plato 1871o: 349). At first, the light of the sun will dazzle his eyes, so he 'will not be able to see any of the realities which are now affirmed to be the truth' because he needs 'to get accustomed to the sight of the upper world' (Plato 1871o: 349). His sight will gradually progress from seeing shadows, to objects, to the light from the moon and stars, then the night sky itself, and then the light of the sun, and 'last he will be able to see the sun' itself (Plato 1871o: 349-350), illustrating the quest to reach the Form of the Good. Thus, the journey out of the cave can be seen as 'Plato's most optimistic and beautiful picture of the power of philosophy to free and enlighten' (Annas 1981: 253). Nevertheless, Plato imagines that when this enlightened escapee contemplates his prior knowledge – the knowledge he thought he had in the cave which the prisoners are still restricted to – that he would 'pity them [...] [and] would rather suffer anything than live after their manner' (Plato 1871o: 350). Plato envisages that if this philosopher was to return to the cave he would have difficulty adjusting once again to the darkness, signifying the lower level of reality. The other prisoners would think that he was blind, and believe 'that there was no use in even thinking of ascending' (Plato 1871o: 350-351). While the hostages have no knowledge and privilege sight, the philosopher has reached the intelligible Forms and thinks that the senses are inferior; the philosopher dismisses 'the world we experience as being on the level of a shadow or a dream' (Annas 1981: 263). But Plato's Simile specifies that the philosopher is compelled to return to the underground den and rule: because the philosopher has 'seen the beautiful and just and good in their truth', Plato believes that once they readjust to the visible realm of the cave, they 'will see ten thousand times better than those in the den' (Plato 1871o: 354), and can therefore govern effectively.

Plato's hierarchical depiction of reality in the Cave Simile permeates throughout Carter's body of work, but is particularly central to *New Eve*, and, as I have already discussed, *Doctor Hoffman*. Even in an article on culinary class differences called 'An Omelette and a Glass of Wine and Other Dishes' (1984), Carter critiques the restaurateur Alice Waters through a dismissive reference to Plato: 'behind Ms Waters's wincingly exquisite cuisine lies some post-hippy Platonism to do with the real and the phoney' (Carter

1998c: 99). Carter's engagement with surrealist thought is also connected to Plato, with Carter saying in 'The Alchemy of the Word' (1978) that 'over the surrealists, or, rather, around them lie the long shadows of Plato, amongst whom they moved as if they were made of flesh' (Carter 1998d: 508). She goes on to acknowledge that 'surrealist art is, in the deepest sense, philosophical – that is, art created in the terms of certain premisses [sic] about reality' (Carter 1998d: 508), strengthening the Platonic influence. This interest in the distinction between 'the real and the phoney' and 'the long shadows of Plato' plays out in *New Eve* via Carter's depiction of the screen siren Tristessa and the narrator Eve(lyn)'s journey. This journey is literal – the novel follows Eve(lyn)'s move from London to New York and his/her pilgrimage across the United States of America to Hollywood – as well as sexual; on his travels Evelyn (a male by birth) becomes Eve, as an Earth Goddess called Mother forces him/her to undergo a sex change against his will.

Tristessa is central to Eve(lyn)'s journey, with the novel beginning with Eve(lyn) watching a film at the cinema starring the famous actress and moving towards the narrator's acquaintance with the movie star herself, who is revealed to be a female impersonator: 'what Eve's narrative has steadily been moving towards from its inception is the moment when Tristessa's real identity is unveiled' (Gamble 2009: 149). As the first explicit mention of Plato in *New Eve* suggests, Tristessa's "reality" as a film star corresponds to the realm of shadows and images in Plato's cave. Eve(lyn) narrates:

> you were an illusion in a void. You were the living image of the entire Platonic shadow show, an illusion that could fill my own emptiness with marvellous, imaginary things as long as, just as long as, the movie lasted, and then all would vanish. (Carter 2009b: 107)

As a film star, Tristessa is 'an illusion', an 'image', and 'imaginary', and embodies the 'shadow show' in Plato's cave. As a chimerical cave-dweller, she only exists as a shadow – like in the Simile of the Cave where the prisoners believe the shadows are real until shown otherwise, Tristessa's existence begins and ends as a screen siren. When the film finishes, Tristessa's unsubstantial reality disappears: in the same way, if the fire went out in Plato's cave, the shadows would no longer be visible. Carter therefore uses the realm of the cinema as an application of Plato's Cave, comparing Tristessa's 'luminous presence' on the screen (Carter 2009b: 1) to Plato's shadows. This cinematic interpretation of Plato's Cave has been discussed by scholars of Plato as well as within film studies. In his annotated translation of the *Republic*, for instance, F. M. Cornford proposes that 'a modern Plato would compare his Cave to an underground cinema [...] the film itself is only an image of the "real" things and

events in the world outside the cinema' (Cornford 1941: 223, note 1). Likewise, in *Philosophy goes to the Movies: An Introduction to Philosophy,* Christopher Falzon says that 'the modern cinema is uncannily reminiscent of Plato's cave' because in cinemas, like in the cave, 'we sit in a darkened space, transfixed by images removed from the real world' (Falzon 2002: 4). Carter explicitly makes the connection between Plato's cave and the cinema in her plans for *New Eve*, noting that Mother's cave at the end of the novel 'is Plato's cave; evolution flashed on the walls, on a film?' (Carter 1973 Journal MS88899/1/95: unpaginated).

While Carter's manuscripts suggest that a shadowy cave inspired by Plato is the location for the *end* of the novel – something I will go on to discuss in more detail – *New Eve* also *begins* in this location, with Eve(lyn) watching a film starring Tristessa in a 'crowded cinema' in London (Carter 2009b: 1). S/he recalls that the 'film stock was old and scratched' and says that the 'surfaces that preserved your appearance were already wearing away' (Carter 2009b: 1). The opening depiction of Tristessa is littered with discussions about her semblance of reality, but this is portrayed via Eve(lyn)'s retrospective perspective – with the knowledge that Tristessa is in fact male. S/he exclaims: 'all you signified was false! Your existence was only notional; you were a piece of pure mystification', and says that 'Tristessa could make only the most perfunctory gestures towards real life' (Carter 2009b: 2-3). While Eve(lyn) hints that Tristessa's appearance – particularly her gendered appearance – cannot be trusted, saying 'Tristessa. Enigma. Illusion. Woman? Ah!' (Carter 2009b: 2), Eve(lyn) recognises that s/he was attracted to Tristessa *because* she belongs to the realm of fantasy: 'I only loved her because she was not of this world' (Carter 2009b: 4). The film reel therefore makes Tristessa an embodiment of Plato's shadow show, but its deterioration is symbolic of Tristessa's illusory, flickering reality.

Carter states that she created Tristessa 'in order to say some quite specific things about the cultural production of femininity [...] there is quite a careful and elaborate discussion of femininity as a commodity, of Hollywood producing illusions as tangible commodities' (Carter to Haffenden 1984: 36). In this light, Tristessa has been discussed by a range of critics in terms of the role of cinema, and by extension, Hollywood, 'where the United States perpetrated itself as a universal dream and put the dream into mass production' (Carter 1998e: 385). Laura Mulvey, for instance, claims that 'it is hard to think of any more succinct summing-up of the paradox of cinema and its projection of fantasy and illusion on to the female body than the opening of *The Passion of New Eve*' (Mulvey 2007: 243). Gamble also discusses this scene, saying that 'the cinema screen functions as the point at which

fantasy and reality intersect', and goes on to note that the role of Hollywood is 'analagous [sic]' to the desire machines used by Doctor Hoffman (Gamble 1997: 120). My Platonic reading of Tristessa in relation to Plato's Cave adds another level to this discussion of Carter's critique of Hollywood in this novel and beyond, as it reinforces Tristessa's role as an insubstantial shadow while also triggering the *expectation* that a higher level of reality is to be obtained by the spectator, Eve(lyn).

Tristessa's illusory *image*, as Lindsey Tucker points out, 'appears in every [...] geographical space in the novel' (Tucker 1998: 16). In the apocalyptic New York, for instance, Eve(lyn) says that 'there was a little cult revival here, too, of Tristessa's films' (Carter 2009b: 11). A defaced poster of Tristessa in the role of Madeline Usher adorns Zero's walls and is 'used as a target for the throwing of knives' (Carter 2009b: 88). Moreover, Mother, the Earth Goddess who performs the sex-change operation on Eve(lyn) in the underground desert town of Beulah, uses 'the whole oeuvre' (Carter 2009b: 68) of Tristessa's films to encourage Eve to imitate Tristessa's perfect performance of femininity – she is 'The most beautiful woman in the world' (Carter 2009b: 2) – and to cause Evelyn to have a 'change in ontological status' (Carter 2009b: 68). Eve(lyn) recalls that these films 'spun out a thread of illusory reality before my dazed eyes' and showed him/her 'your marvellous imitation of feeling' (Carter 2009b: 68). S/he remarks:

> I do not know if Mother wanted me to model my new womanhood upon your tenebrous delinquescence [sic] and so relegate me always to the shadowed half being of reflected light; but now I know that Mother knew your extraordinary secret, I suspect some other, subtler reason. (Carter 2009b: 68)

While Eve(lyn) retrospectively believes that Mother used Tristessa's films *because* of the exaggerated performativity of the screen siren's gender, the cinematic depiction of the film star here strengthens the relevance of Plato's Cave imagery. The 'illusory reality' of the films and Eve(lyn)'s 'dazed eyes' tie in to the experience of the prisoner in the cave, and by comparing Tristessa – and by extension Eve (if she imitates Tristessa) – to the 'shadowed half being of reflected light', Carter limits Tristessa's reality to that of the shadows in Plato's Cave, and aligns Eve(lyn)'s knowledge with that of the cave-dweller who is yet to begin the quest for enlightenment. Thus, the repeated references to Tristessa's *image* – being viewed on posters or screens rather than in person – emphasise Tristessa's enduring status as a Platonic shadow, while also prolonging this stage of Eve(lyn)'s – and therefore the reader's – knowledge of the film star and his/her delayed progression out of the cave/cinema.

What's more, the locations which are dominated by Tristessa's image – New York, Beulah, Zero's ranch – are depicted in filmic terms, in line with the association of London with the cinema, literalising Lucie Armitt's claim that the novel takes the form of a 'road-movie' (Armitt 1996: 172). In New York, for example, Eve(lyn) talks about 'the shadows that pursued me through the city' where s/he was 'in my ring-side seat. The movie ran towards its last reel' (Carter 2009b: 11). Zero's desk is 'looted from a Hollywood producer's desert hideaway' (Carter 2009b: 86), positioning him as a film director. Beulah, though, is depicted as both a cave *and* a cinema: it is described as 'the deepest cave' where the surfaces are 'unnatural, slippery, ersatz, treacherous, false-looking' (Carter 2009b: 55; 53), while in the plans for the novel Carter imagines the operating theatre in this speleological location to be 'an inter-uterine place, soft, still, warm, symmetrical, hung with red plush curtains like the Academy Cinema' (Carter 1973 Journal MS88899/1/102: 60). While the prevalence of the cinema can be read as simply exaggerating Carter's parody of the media institution of Hollywood, Carter's discussion of how films work and celebration of this form of media is intertwined with her denigration of the Cave simile.

At the beginning of the novel, Eve(lyn) claims that Tristessa 'would always be so beautiful as long as celluloid remained in complicity with the phenomenon of persistence of vision' (Carter 2009b: 1), using a phrase that, as Alison Lee notes, is used in reference to the film star for the rest of the text and recurs throughout *Doctor Hoffman*[8] – 'persistence of vision' (Lee 1997: 82). While this phrase recalls the sight imagery that dominates Plato's discussion of acquiring philosophical knowledge, it is in fact a quotation from C. W. Ceram's *Archaeology of the Cinema* (1965) which Carter researched in 1966-67: 'cinematography is technically based on the phenomenon of persistence of vision – the capacity of the retina of the eye to retain the impression of an object for the fraction of a second after its disappearance' (Carter 1966-68 Journal MS88899/1/91: unpaginated; Ceram 1965: 24). The permeation of this refrain through *New Eve* as well as *Doctor Hoffman* – two novels about reality – encapsulates the ability to see something that is not there, or is not real, in line with Plato's Cave: Tristessa 'had been the dream itself made flesh though the flesh I knew her in was not flesh itself but only a moving picture of flesh, real but not substantial' (Carter 2009b: 4). The fact that Carter repeatedly aligns Tristessa with the idea of the 'persistence of vision' reinforces her illusory existence as a film actress.

[8] See, for example, Carter 2010: 122; 126; 221; 245.

Likewise, in Carter's aptly titled short story 'The Merchant of Shadows', published posthumously in *American Ghosts and Old World Wonders* (1993), Carter discusses how a film reel works. Like *New Eve*, this short story is set in Hollywood, and it follows a similar quest narrative to the earlier novel, with the anonymous narrator travelling from London to California as part of her/his research on the "late" film director Heinrich von Mannheim. Both texts also feature female impersonators as screen sirens, with Mannheim's widow being coined the 'Star of Stars' and the 'Spirit of the Cinema' (Carter 2006e: 365) and being revealed to be Mannheim in disguise rather than Mannheim's wife: by staging his death, he '*became* her, became a better she than she herself had ever been, and wanted to share [...] the secret of his greatest hit' (Carter 2006e: 375 – original emphasis). The protagonist describes himself as 'a student of Light and Illusion. That is, of cinema' (Carter 2006e: 363), and, in line with *New Eve*, the plot is told in cinematic terms; when the screen icon dies the narrator 'half-expected to see the words, THE END, come up on the curtains' (Carter 2006e: 374 – original capitalisation).

The connection between being a 'merchant of shadows' (Carter 2006e: 373) and a film director suggests that Carter still has Plato's Cave in mind in this short story written a decade later, but the fact that the narrator hopes that his roommate will 'remind me there was more to flesh than light and illusion, but she shook her head' (Carter 2006e: 375) implies that there is nothing real inside the cave *or* outside it – beyond Hollywood – meaning that there are not different levels of reality. The narrator's explicit reference to Athanasius Kircher's *Ars Magna Lucis et Umbrae* – he calls the cinema 'the Great Art of Light and Shade' (Carter 2006e: 364) – reinforces Plato's influence.[12] As the protagonist notes, Kircher used, and potentially invented, magic lanterns, which project images onto the wall of a dim room using reflection. Unsurprisingly, Kircher's creation has been likened to Plato's Cave, and is regarded as a literal interpretation of the simile. As Marina Warner observes, 'the novel device of projecting images [...] lent itself as a rich metaphor of consciousness, transforming Plato's shadowy cave into a modern instrument' (Warner 2006: 141). Warner also notes that 'magic lanterns [...] became the forerunners of entertainment media based on image projections, including the cinema' (Warner 2006: 138). In *Doctor Hoffman*, Desiderio similarly compares what he sees in the 'peep-show cum cinematograph' to a 'shadow show' in which the audience watch 'projected' images; the show 'offered moving views in three dimensions and those who visited it were impressed by the lifelikeness of what they saw'

[12] He says the writer's name is Athanias Kircher (Carter 2006e: 364).

(Carter 2010: 24). Furthermore, the space in which the peep-shows are watched is described as resembling a 'warm, dim cave' (Carter 2010: 43).

Thus, Carter's fascination with the workings of the cinema in terms of the 'persistence of vision' that it relies upon and how it works by projecting images is interwoven with her cinematic analysis of Plato's Cave. As illustrated by the focus on Tristessa and Mannheim's "widow", Carter primarily targets the constructedness of femininity in this light. In interview with Cagney Watts, Carter explains that 'Tristessa is a male projection of femininity, that's why she's doomed, her life is completely based on false premises. This character only had the notion of his idea of a woman before he set out to become one' (Carter to Cagney Watts 1985: 165). The shadow or 'projection' is therefore *man*-made – an artificial construct based on male ideals, or Forms. But Carter sets out to diminish these universals Forms. As Eve(lyn) reflects at the beginning of the novel:

> I think it was Rilke who so lamented the inadequacy of our symbolism – regretted so bitterly we cannot, unlike the (was it?) Ancient Greeks, find adequate external symbols for the life within us – yes, that's the quotation. But, no. He was wrong. Our external symbols must always express the life within us with absolute precision; how could they do otherwise, since that life has generated them? Therefore we must not blame our poor symbols if they take forms that seem trivial to us, or absurd, for the symbols themselves have no control over their own fleshly manifestations, however paltry they may be; the nature of our life alone has determined their forms.
>
> A critique of these symbols is a critique of our lives. (Carter 2009b: 2)

These 'external symbols' celebrated by the 'Ancient Greeks' are an allusion to Plato's notion of absolute Forms, which are patterns, or universal signifiers, for our lives. Eve(lyn) questions this theory and inverts its suppositions; for him/her, *our lives generate* the external symbols – Forms/symbols are *not* original prototypes that are copied or emulated, as Plato asserts. The novel constitutes a 'critique of these symbols' – and discusses how their 'forms' are determined, highlighting the Platonic influence – and by doing so puts forward a 'critique of our lives', indicating a link between the universal and the particular. Carter attacks the general public – referred to as 'we' and 'our' – for establishing such Forms or 'external symbols', calling for them to be demolished. Carter eradicates the distinction between the different levels of reality that are central to Platonic thought, suggesting that there are no "higher" Forms to strive towards. Eve(lyn) recognises, for instance, that 'although I was a woman, I was now also passing for a woman, but, then, many women born spend their whole lives in just such imitations' (Carter 2009b: 97), erasing ideas of Forms, particularly in terms

of sex: for Carter, 'the whole notion of the "natural" is an invention of culture, anyway' (Carter 1998g: 125), meaning that there is no such thing as "real" men and women.

Following Plato's Cave trajectory though, Eve(lyn) encounters Tristessa herself, moving from section D to C of the Divided Line; rather than seeing the actress as a shadow on a screen, s/he meets her face-to-face. Just as the prisoner's progress from shadows to the objects themselves happens within the cave, Eve(lyn) meets Tristessa in a cave environment – amongst Tristessa's waxwork collection called 'THE HALL OF THE IMMORTALS' (Carter 2009b: 116 – original capitalisation). This display consists of replicas of 'all the unfortunate dead of Hollywood' including Marilyn Monroe, James Dean, and Jean Harlow, which 'were executed with great fidelity in the detail' (Carter 2009b: 114), with the cave once again being imagined in relation to the cinema. The space is depicted as a shadowy cave, as 'a greenish, mysterious light that cast enormous shadows filled the room' which 'was a blaze of candlelight and the figures looked more life-like than ever, as if we had stumbled into a cave where all these fabulous beings had retired' (Carter 2009b: 114). Carter says that 'The Hall of the Immortals [...] was supposed to be indicating something quite specific about the nature of illusion and of personality which Hollywood did and does invent' (Carter to Haffenden 1984: 36), and uses this location to also show that there is no difference between the shadow and the "real" object – between Tristessa on the screen and Tristessa in "real" life, putting forward a distorted version of Plato's Cave simile. Upon encountering what s/he thinks is Tristessa's corpse, Eve(lyn) declares:

> her prone frame was a little longer than I remembered but otherwise so like her own reflection on the screen it took my breath away; that spectacular wraith might have been only the invention of all our imaginations and yet, all the time, she had been real. (Carter 2009b: 115)

Eve(lyn) initially sees only a minor difference between Tristessa's shadow and her actual self, and goes on to depict the actress in cinematic terms saying 'it was as if all Tristessa's movies were being projected all at once on that pale, reclining figure' so her image was 'endlessly recycled in a technological eternity' (Carter 2009b: 116). For Eve(lyn), Tristessa and her illusory image are one and the same thing: she 'was like nothing so much as her own shadow, worn away to its present state of tangible insubstantiality because, perhaps, so many layers of appearances had been stripped from it by the camera' (Carter 2009b: 119). Thus, Tristessa's reality does not extend beyond the cinematic, cave-like world of illusion, because she is no more than a media invention – the film camera has erased the Platonic difference between the shadow and the supposedly "real" thing. Her performance of

femininity is nevertheless utterly convincing, as her melancholic presentation of female suffering is 'mimicked with such persuasiveness they had achieved a more perfect degree of authenticity than any she might have undergone in real life' (Carter 2009b: 119). For Carter, therefore, everything is artificial and there is nothing real, contra Plato.

Eve(lyn)'s next step constitutes the discovery that Tristessa is biologically male. In line with the prisoner's journey out of the cave into the outside world which he is initially 'dazzled' by and 'will require to get accustomed to' (Plato 1871o: 349), Eve(lyn) is bewildered by this revelation to begin with. S/he 'involuntarily darted forward and then fell back, covering my eyes, for I could hardly believe what I saw' (Carter 2009b: 124). Eve(lyn)'s 'exemplary confusion' is embodied by the fluid pronouns s/he uses in relation to Tristessa, saying 'I crept up to him and kissed her pitiful, bare feet' (Carter 2009b: 125). Nevertheless, in line with the progression to the next stage of the Cave simile which corresponds to section B of the Divided Line – mathematical understanding and reason – Eve(lyn) adjusts to Tristessa's new version of reality and recognises how the film star's act was put together and how this reflects Tristessa's notion of the ideal Form of Woman. Eve(lyn) regards Tristessa as 'the perfect man's woman' because 'she incarnates most completely the secret aspirations of man', and goes on to raise the question: 'how could a real woman ever have been so much a woman as you?' (Carter 2009b: 125). Eve(lyn) also acknowledges that Tristessa made herself 'an object' but that 'this object was, itself, an idea': 'Tristessa had no function in this world except as an idea of himself; no ontological status, only an iconographic one' (Carter 2009b: 126). Thus, although Eve(lyn) has seen Tristessa outside the cinema environment and knows the "truth" behind her Hollywood disguise, s/he has not reached a higher understanding of reality. Instead, Eve(lyn) interprets Tristessa as an 'anti-being' who challenges the notion of reality altogether (Carter 2009b: 126).

Once again, this poses a simultaneous challenge to Plato and Hollywood. Hollywood's construction of ideal femininity is put in the spotlight, as Eve(lyn) wonders – *vis-à-vis* Tristessa's success as a screen siren – 'who else might have been in on the gross deception, what movie moguls, what make-up artists, what drama coaches – who had sealed their lips at this ironic joke played on the world?' (Carter 2009b: 141). Eve(lyn)'s physique is similarly based on 'a blueprint taken from a consensus agreement on the physical nature of an ideal woman drawn up from a protracted study of the media' (Carter 2009b: 75), and his/her "essence" is restructured – or attempted to be restructured – using Tristessa's films. At the same time, Plato's quest narrative embodied by the Cave simile is rewritten, as although Eve(lyn) follows the same trajectory as the philosopher in this analogy so far, seeing shadows

(Tristessa's image), the objects in the cave themselves (Tristessa, still in disguise), and objects outside the cave and how they reflect the Forms (Tristessa's revelation), this process does not correspond to a journey towards higher levels of reality, as, within Carter's world, there is not a reality "scale".

Tristessa and Eve(lyn) then travel through the desert and consummate their relationship, enabling Eve(lyn) to see beyond Tristessa's external performance of femininity. While Eve(lyn) claims 'I'd know your skull on Golgotha, Tristessa, although you seem to have a hundred faces' (Carter 2009b: 145), showing that s/he sees a Tristessa who is separate from her acting persona, s/he has to imagine Tristessa's skeleton to do so, wearing away her external appearance altogether. This is said after Tristessa and Eve(lyn) conceive their child and make 'the great Platonic hermaphrodite' (Carter 2009b: 145), a figure from Aristophanes's speech in Plato's *Symposium* embodying heteronormative sexuality. Aristophanes claims that there used to be hermaphroditic human beings who were too powerful and were therefore cut in half to make two human beings – one male and one female. He argues that the notion of love corresponds to wanting to find our literal other half: 'so ancient is the desire of one another which is implanted in us, reuniting our original nature, making one of two [...] each of us when separated is but the indenture of a man [...] and he is always looking for his other half' (Plato 1871l: 507). 'Even then', reflects Eve(lyn), 'I saw fragments of old movies playing like summer lightning on the lucid planes of his face, the shadow show upon the bare bones beneath' (Carter 2009b: 145). Thus, even this level of intimacy cannot stop Eve(lyn) from associating Tristessa with an image, as a canvas for a Platonic shadow show. Tristessa is either an image or a deceased fragment – a skull; Tristessa has no identity between these two extremes.

Unsurprisingly, the findings of Eve(lyn)'s quest contrast with those of Plato's enlightened philosopher. S/he resolves that:

> masculine and feminine are correlatives which involve one another. I am sure of that – the quality and its negation are locked in necessity. But what the nature of masculine and the nature of feminine might be, whether they involve male and female, if they have anything to do with Tristessa's so long neglected apparatus or my own factory fresh incision and engine-turned breasts, that I do not know. Though I have been both man and woman, still I do not know the answer to these questions. Still they bewilder me.
>
> I have not reached the end of the maze yet. I descend lower, descend lower. I must go further. (Carter 2009b: 146)

Thus, s/he regards issues of sex and gender to be enigmatic, but still thinks that these questions have a singular 'answer', in line with Plato's Forms. While, like Plato's

philosopher, Eve(lyn) returns to a cave at the end of the novel, s/he does not do so with the understanding that universal ideas are the highest form of knowledge and with absolute notions of Man and Woman. Rather, as Day notes – without reference to Plato – 'the differences between men and women constructed by culture have no essential, no natural ground. Men and women can be constructed differently from how they have been. And that is all – or everything – that Eve discovers in the cave of origins' (Day 1998: 128). This illustrates Carter's claim that 'I write to *ask* questions, to argue with myself, not to provide answers' (Carter undated 1972 Journal MS88899/1/84: unpaginated – original emphasis).[9] In this sense, Carter's work reflects Plato's early dialogues which display Socrates's style of interrogation, known as the Socratic method. Plato's earlier works are 'aporetic' as 'exploratory questions were raised but left hanging in the air without answers' (Reeves 2004: vi). As M. Francis Reeves continues, 'Socrates was tentative and uncertain. He raises more questions than answers. He looked at all sides of the issues and never gave a final answer' (Reeves 2004: vi). Likewise, Carter's 'texts are deliberately aporetic' (Gąsiorek 1995: 135) as they avoid conclusive answers, as illustrated by the conclusion of *New Eve*. To add to Gąsiorek's reading, I would argue that Carter plays Socrates and Plato against each other, using the Socratic method in her novel to avoid reaching Plato's idea of universal answers – Forms.

In opposition to Plato, the cave at the end of *New Eve* does not depict a grasp of eternal Forms at the *end* of a pilgrimage; instead, the 'system of caves' (Carter 2009b: 177) in which Mother resides represents a beginning, as everything is rewinding – a 'foal leaps back into its mother's womb' (Carter 2009b: 181). The conclusion of the novel signifies cyclicity, with Eve(lyn) saying 'I am inching my way towards the beginning and the end of time' (Carter 2009b: 181). This aspect of the narrative has been critically acknowledged, with Lee, for example, noting that 'the novel questions the whole notion of the journey as progression from one place to another because neither beginnings nor endings are determinate' (Lee 1997: 78). But the circularity of the plot is also part of Carter's critique of Plato's Cave simile – Carter specifically refers to Mother's cave as 'Plato's Cave' in her research notes, and imagines the evolutionary images moving on the walls 'like a film?' (Carter 1973 Journal MS88899/1/95: unpaginated). Like Plato's simile, which begins and ends in the cave, Carter's narrative follows the same trajectory, with Eve(lyn)'s journey starting in a cinema

[9] While this notebook is catalogued as being a 1972 journal at the British Library, the contents of the manuscript correspond to a variety of dates, ranging from 1972 to the mid-late 1980s.

watching Tristessa in what Eve(lyn) later refers to as a 'Platonic shadow show' (Carter 2009b: 107).

But while Plato's philosopher returns to the cave to rule over the troglodytes because he has been enlightened by the Forms, Eve(lyn) does not have this knowledge; in fact, Eve(lyn) has discovered that absolute, universal Forms do not exist. Plato goes on to imagine that his philosopher will readjust to the shadowy cave and 'will know what the images are, and of what they are images, because you have seen the beautiful and just and good in their truth' – the Forms (Plato 1871o: 354); he will be able to distinguish between the different levels of reality. Like Plato's Philosopher Ruler, upon Eve(lyn)'s return s/he perceives images, but most notably, s/he sees a photograph – 'a glossy publicity still of Tristessa at the height of her beauty', which s/he tears up into four fragments in anger in the light of Tristessa's murder (Carter 2009b: 178). In contrast to Plato's analogy, Eve(lyn) does not see this representation of Tristessa and compare it to the "real" Tristessa, because there is no difference. Eve(lyn) recognises that 'the habit of being a visual fallacy was too strong for him [Tristessa] to break; appearance, only, had refined itself to become the principle of his life' (Carter 2009b: 143).

As Gamble notes, this 'raises questions concerning whether such a thing as the "real" exists at all' (Gamble 1997: 120). Eve(lyn)'s quest therefore inverts and rewrites the enlightenment journey of Plato's philosopher in the Simile of the Cave. While Carter adheres to the circularity of Plato's Cave analogy by depicting Eve(lyn) as leaving the cinematic cave at the beginning of the novel and returning to Mother's cave at the end, Carter uses this cyclicity *against* Plato. Within Carter's novel, where 'the destination of all journeys is their beginning' (Carter 2009b: 182), there is no final destination; Carter 'is unable to offer much beyond the implication that the cycle will begin again' (Phillips 2012: 100-101). In this sense, the cyclicity erases the stages of progression that structure the Cave simile and the Simile of the Divided Line, as Carter's version of the Philosopher Ruler and adaptation of the Simile of the Cave use circularity to show that there are not different levels of reality – to show that there is not a peak of knowledge. This poses a challenge to Plato's theory of the Forms and discussion of knowledge throughout his work, although Carter mainly targets his *Republic*.

This analysis of Eve(lyn)'s narration of his/her relationship with Tristessa through the lens of the Simile of the Cave in Plato's *Republic* has drawn out the foundation for many critical discussions of *New Eve*. To date, work on this novel has focused on themes of gender performativity, reality, and the role of cinema/Hollywood. Likewise, Carter's fascination with origins and her conflation of beginnings and endings has been the focus of some critical

attention, particularly in relation to the Garden of Eden – Mother says that 'the garden in which Adam was born lies between my thighs' (Carter 2009b: 60) – and America, as highlighted by the novel's epigraph: 'In the beginning all the world was *America*' (original emphasis), which I discuss in Chapter Three. By situating Eve(lyn)'s quest in line with the journey of enlightenment imagined by Plato, and illustrating how *New Eve*'s structure mirrors that of the Cave analogy, I have shown that previous discussions of reality, the cinema, and origins in the novel stem from Carter's engagement with this aspect of Plato's *Republic*, particularly as Carter uses the cinema as a version of Plato's cave. As well as providing the infrastructure for the novel, *New Eve* – like other works in Carter's *oeuvre* but particularly *Doctor Hoffman* and *Heroes and Villains* – challenges Platonic thought, by arguing against his notion of the Forms. As noted though, Carter's interaction with Plato in *New Eve* goes beyond the *Republic*, encompassing his *Symposium* as well, which is an area that needs further discussion. In the three novels examined in this chapter – *New Eve*, *Doctor Hoffman*, and *Heroes and Villains* – Carter parodies Plato's idea of the Philosopher Ruler, challenges his theory of the Forms, and highlights the problems of his utopian society being used in practice, positioning Plato as a poet, the 'father of lies' who has had a damaging impact on Western thought. While my discussion of the Professors' compound in *Heroes and Villains* in this chapter focuses on the scholars' adoption of the structure of Plato's ideal society and satirises Plato's emphasis on unity and order, in the following chapter I discuss this post-apocalyptic novel in relation to Carter's engagement with two other thinkers – Hobbes and Rousseau – illustrating that Carter's parody of the Professors' knowledge is influenced by these philosophers as well. In this sense, the Professors embody Carter's attack on Western philosophy, mocking the ideas of Plato as well as Hobbes and Rousseau.

Chapter Two – Hobbes and Rousseau: Surviving the Apocalypse in *Heroes and Villains*[1]

> These people, people who are sitting there in their bunkers, are the ones whose imaginations are too impoverished to imagine what the world is going to be like afterwards.
> (Carter to Appignanesi 1987: unpaginated)

> It was touch and go for a minute there.
> (Carter 1998: 34)

> When I was a little girl, we played at heroes and villains but now I don't know which is which any more, nor who is who.
> (Carter 1972: 125)

The idea of an impending apocalypse was very real in the 1960s, with the Cold War – particularly the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 – threatening to end civilisation. Angela Carter acknowledges this, saying that her 'generation [...] grew up with the reality of nuclear weapons'; she 'was five when the Bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, and [...] came of age roughly with the Cuban Missile Crisis' (Carter 1998: 34). She notes that the 'late sixties' were characterised by 'living through the margin of the Vietnam War' and regards the Cuban Missile Crisis, another significant chapter of the Cold War, as 'one of the great watersheds, certainly of my life' (Carter 1998: 34). *Heroes and Villains*, a post-nuclear war novel published in 1969, voices Carter's concern about what would happen if an apocalypse occurred. In Sarah Gamble's words, in this text Carter 'imaginatively explores how life would have been had the brinkmanship practiced by Russia and America in 1962 actually toppled the world over the edge into nuclear catastrophe' (Gamble 2009: 86). Building on my discussion of Plato in the previous chapter, I argue that Carter's research into the work of Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-78) in the late 1960s shapes her argument in *Heroes and Villains*, raising questions surrounding the knowledge and skills needed to survive an apocalypse, and interrogating the difference between the natural and civil states – between the uncivilised and civilised.

Carter's reading of Hobbes and Rousseau in particular is a key feature of her research for *Heroes and Villains*, and is explicitly flagged up in the novel. When Marianne contemplates the possibility of her father going blind, for instance, she realises she 'would

[1] The first half of this chapter stems from my forthcoming chapter in *Faces of the Apocalypse: Change and Adaptability at the End* published by Inter-Disciplinary Press, a chapter called 'Angela Carter, Thomas Hobbes, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Surviving the Apocalypse in *Heroes and Villains*'.

have to read his books aloud to him. Rousseau, for example' (Carter 1972: 8). Her father also claims that 'Rousseau spoke of a noble savage but this is a time of ignoble savages' (Carter 1972: 10). The 'noble savage', as I will go on to discuss in more detail, is a key idea in Rousseau's *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality* (1754), also known as his *Second Discourse*. As well as mentioning the 'noble savage', Carter directly quotes from this treatise. As Gerardine Meaney notes: Marianne says that Jewel's brother Precious looked 'just as if he had come from the hands of original nature, an animal weaker than some and less agile than others, but, taking him all round, the most advantageously organized of any' (Carter 1972: 65; Meaney 1993: 110), which is, as Meaney recognises, an extract from the First Part of Rousseau's *Second Discourse*.[2] While specific references to Rousseau continue to permeate the novel, Hobbes is never directly named in the text. Donally, however, in relation to his aim to construct 'a new religion' and maintain 'some kind of commonwealth', 'riffled through a book sprouting with markers and found his place' (Carter 1972: 63). He then reads from Hobbes's *Leviathan* (written between 1648 and 1651): 'the passion to be reckoned upon is fear; whereof there be two very general objects: one, the power of spirits invisible, the other, the power of those men they shall therein offend' (Carter 1972: 63; Hobbes 1996: 94). Marianne goes on to tell Donally that her 'father had that book [...] only he didn't like it much' (Carter 1972: 63).

According to Carter's unpublished manuscripts, this area of her philosophical research is mainly confined to 1968-69, although brief mentions of Rousseau do occasionally reappear in the 1970s. In the initial planning stages of *Heroes and Villains*, Carter made a reading list that consisted of four entries, in the following order: *Le Morte d'Arthur* (a Romance tale about King Arthur by Sir Thomas Malory), Claude Lévi-Strauss's *Structural Anthropology*, *Impressions of Africa* (a novel turned play by Raymond Roussel), and then, quite simply, 'Thomas Hobbes' (Carter 1968-69 Journal MS88899/1/92: unpaginated). She then progressed to the work of Rousseau, beginning with *The Social Contract* (1762) and including his *Confessions*, which was published posthumously in 1781 (Carter 1968-69 Journal MS88899/1/92: unpaginated)[3] and the *Second Discourse*. While Carter's reading of

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[2] I have not found any information about the edition or translation of the *Second Discourse* that Carter consulted. All of my references to Rousseau's *Second Discourse* are from the 2004 Dover Publications edition; while I acknowledge that this is a different translation to Carter's, this does not affect the content of my argument.

[3] According to her 1968-69 journal, Carter used G. D. H. Cole's translation of *The Social Contract* (Carter 1968-69 Journal MS88899/1/92: unpaginated). I have used G. D. H. Cole's 1973 Everyman's Library edition and translation of *The Social Contract and Discourses*. The Publisher specifies that this is a revised version of a previous edition, which has merely reorganised Rousseau's work into chronological order, and retains Cole's

Rousseau covers a range of his work, Carter's knowledge of Hobbes is predominantly restricted to one text – *Leviathan*. Before researching *Leviathan*,[4] however, Carter consulted J. W. N. Watkins's 1965 work *Hobbes's System of Ideas* (Carter 1968-69 Journal MS88899/1/92: unpaginated), which gave her a broader (albeit potentially subjective) understanding of Hobbesian thought. As the ideas put forward in *Leviathan* were previously discussed in *The Elements of Law Natural and Politic* (1640) and *De Cive* (1642), Carter's focus on *Leviathan* does not mean that her understanding of Hobbes is limited; *Leviathan* (like *De Cive*) contains Hobbes's developed arguments about issues concerning the state of nature – what humanity is like before or without civilisation.

Criticism on *Heroes and Villains* in relation to Rousseau by far outweighs any discussion of Hobbes's influence. Meaney, Aidan Day, Linden Peach, Alison Lee, Chiharu Yoshioka (2006), Susanne Gruss (2009), Eva C. Karpinski, and Elaine Jordan examine this novel *vis-à-vis* Rousseau to varying degrees, but none of them even mention Hobbes. In fact, few critics have commented on the relevance of Hobbes for Carter, with Gamble only acknowledging in passing that Donally, the doctor, philosopher, and tutor in *Heroes and Villains*, is 'inspired by his reading of Thomas Hobbes's *Leviathan*' (Gamble 2012: 28). In relation to Rousseau, most critics allude to the notion of the 'noble savage' from his *Second Discourse*. Whilst most commentary relating to Carter and Rousseau is focused on the *Second Discourse*, both Karpinski and Meaney have initiated a broader reaction to this aspect of Carter's philosophical intertextuality. Meaney investigates 'Carter's reading and rewriting of Rousseau in *Heroes and Villains*' in line with *The Social Contract* as well as the *Second Discourse* (Meaney 1993: 13), and Karpinski says that Carter goes further than interrogating these two texts, and goes on to read *Heroes and Villains* alongside Rousseau's *Emile, or On Education* (1762). The relevance of Rousseau's *First Discourse*, the *Discourse on the Sciences and the Arts* (1750), has received limited attention.

My discussion of *Heroes and Villains* in this chapter starts with two premises. Firstly, I argue that Carter's engagement with Hobbes's *Leviathan* and a range of Rousseauian texts including the *Second Discourse*, *Emile*, *The Social Contract*, and the *First Discourse* provides Carter with a philosophical blueprint for parodying the Professors' knowledge. While *Heroes and Villains* has been analysed through the lens of the *Second Discourse*, the emphasis has been on the presentation of the natural versus civil state rather than knowledge

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1955 Introduction with a few changes, only correcting minor errors. It therefore seems likely that Carter consulted a very similar, if not identical, translation to the one I reference.

[4] In the bibliography of *The Sadeian Woman*, Carter lists C. B. Macpherson's 1968 Penguin edition of Hobbes's *Leviathan* (Carter 2009: 180).

and survival. Neither the *First Discourse* nor *Emile* have been examined in detail in relation to Carter, with Karpinski's article containing the only discussion of *Emile* to date. Karpinski focuses on the theme of 'dystopian romance' and argues that 'Carter in particular attempts an ironic reversal of Rousseau's fantasy of femininity contained in the chapters he devotes to the education of Sophie, Emile's perfect mate' (Karpinksi 2000: unpaginated). Rather than concentrating on gender, this chapter maintains that the *First Discourse* and *Emile* reinforce Carter's reading of Rousseau and her depiction of post-apocalyptic survival. Carter's statement that '*Heroes and Villains* is a discussion of the theories of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and strangely enough it finds them wanting' is the springboard for this analysis (Carter to Haffenden 1985: 95). While previous criticism on this topic has almost entirely focused on the natural versus civil state distinction, Carter's use of the plural 'theories' is indicative of a wider understanding and engagement with Rousseau. I contend that Carter's *epistemological* commentary of the post-apocalyptic Professors does not find Rousseau 'wanting'; in fact, the Professors embody many of the ideals that Rousseau warns against, thus reinforcing the educational framework that he recommends.

Secondly, I argue that in order to engage with Carter's discussion of the natural state in *Heroes and Villains* in comparison with the civil state, equal attention needs to be paid to Rousseau *and* Hobbes – to date, the latter has been overlooked. As Carter told Les Bedford: 'I read Hobbes as background for it [*Heroes and Villains*] – the savage man, the natural man[5] – and Rousseau is also in it. It's Hobbes fighting with Rousseau, that novel, really' (Carter to Bedford 1977: unpaginated). I assess Carter's portrayal of the fight between Hobbes and Rousseau in relation to the post-apocalyptic state of nature portrayed in *Heroes and Villains*, but suggest that the binary between Hobbes and Rousseau that Carter suggests here is not so clear-cut, as Hobbes and Rousseau's theories overlap. Overall, in opposition to Scott A. Dimovitz who says that *Heroes and Villains* 'never moves beyond a general and vague critique of structural anthropology and Rousseau' (Dimovitz 2005: 15), I aim to show that Carter's interaction with Rousseau is much more comprehensive and informed than current criticism suggests, and contend that Dimovitz's assessment is very much mistaken, particularly in the light of Carter's Hobbesian research. While I acknowledge that Carter's research on Hobbes and Rousseau extends beyond *Heroes and Villains*, and is relevant for discussions of other texts, particularly *The Infernal Desire Machines of Doctor Hoffman* (1972) and *The Sadeian Woman* (1979), I dedicate this chapter to an in-depth analysis of

[5] Like most thinkers writing about primitive humanity, both Hobbes and Rousseau use 'man' or 'men' to refer to the human race as a whole, signifying the androcentrism of such literature.

Heroes and Villains because this is where Carter's direct engagement with these thinkers is most prevalent. My analysis of Sade in Chapter Five reignites my examination of Hobbes and Rousseau, as I go on to argue that Sade's breadth of philosophical knowledge – including these two political theorists – rekindles Carter's earlier research on the state of nature.

Academia after an Apocalypse – It's all Academic

The division between Professors and Barbarians in *Heroes and Villains* serves as a springboard for discussing the relevance of an academic education after an apocalypse, when the primary focus is the long-term survival of a community. As well as reflecting Carter's current concerns about nuclear threats posed by the Cold War, the historical context of *Heroes and Villains* also situates the novel alongside the origins of 'survivalism'. This movement is characterised by people – called 'survivalists' or 'doomsday preppers' – who prepare for disasters or emergencies, including extreme weather conditions, produce shortages, or "expected" apocalypses, by building or utilising underground shelters and aiming for self-sufficiency in times of crisis. Saundra J. Reinke argues that 'survivalism emerged in the United States in the 1960s as a consequence of the Cold War' (Reinke 2012: 797), although it is more accurate to say that survivalism was more visible at this time, as it is during other times of apocalyptic crisis. As Michael S. Lief and H. Mitchell Caldwell note, 'as the Cold War came to a close and the fear of an impending nuclear war waned, so, too, did the number of survivalists' (Lief and Mitchell Caldwell 2006: 119). Thus, I contend that *Heroes and Villains* can be read as a survival guide, a fictional and political response to the context of the Cold War, and the simultaneous popularity of survivalism. The catalyst for this discussion is the protagonist's – Marianne's – transition from her native community of Professors to the hostile world of the Barbarians; from a society in which, as the name suggests, education and the preservation of pre-apocalyptic knowledge are key concerns, to a landscape in which survival is paramount, in the face of high infant mortality rates and the need to cure diseases. Marianne's journey raises questions such as: Are academic qualifications useful after an apocalypse? What skills are needed to survive? Is it better to be a Professor or a Barbarian? This section argues that Carter's engagement with Hobbes and Rousseau is central to these discussions in *Heroes and Villains*, and situates its argument in relation to contemporary trends in Higher Education, particularly in the United Kingdom.

In *What Are Universities For?* (2012) Stefan Collini raises the titular question, investigating the contemporary function of Higher Education Institutions. Carter is, I argue, discussing a similar problem in *Heroes and Villains* by engaging with the contrast between

the Professors and Barbarians. Carter's personal experience of her university education in Bristol demonstrates a damning resistance towards her English Literature degree, a resistance predominantly targeted at F. R. Leavis's notion of the canon. Leavis established an elitist and narrow canon in *The Great Tradition* (1948), primarily including George Eliot, Henry James, and Joseph Conrad. Carter's opposition to such elitism is made clear in conversation with Ian McEwan, when she says that she deliberately chose to specialise in medieval literature at university because it was 'a field where the Leavisites did not reach' (Carter to McEwan 1984: 43). She uses Leavis as a metonym for the problems she experienced in academia in terms of limitations and restrictions, claiming that her 'intellectual apprenticeship' in the 1960s allowed her to '[respond] to a way of interpreting the world that suited my own instincts far more than the Leavisite version I was being given at university' (Carter 1988: 211). Her mocking presentation of academia in *Heroes and Villains* – in the form of the Professors' reliance on what is depicted as redundant academic knowledge and a disdain for practical skills – ventriloquises Carter's concern for surviving after an apocalypse. But Carter is a learned author whose 'œuvre is characterized by its extraordinary range of literary and cultural references' (Munford 2006: 1) who admits that her fiction provides 'a kind of literary criticism' (Carter to Haffenden 1985: 79). *Heroes and Villains* is no exception to the extensive intertextuality that typifies her writing; this 'dizzying intertextuality' (Britzolakis 1997: 50) and the simultaneous challenge to the usefulness of such scholarship in the novel creates a paradox: by questioning the utility of erudition and academic knowledge in a post-apocalyptic environment, the implication is that Carter is also reflecting on her own chances of surviving an apocalyptic event.

The Professors encapsulate Carter's parodical portrayal of academia. They are an elitist community and believe that they survived the nuclear war because their ancestors had access to underground bunkers. As Marianne's father informs her:

> before the war, there were places called Universities where men did nothing but read books and conduct experiments. These men had certain privileges, though mostly unstated ones; but all the same, some Professors were allowed in the deep shelters with their families, during the war. (Carter 1972: 8)

As an institution, therefore, "Universities" are redundant – they no longer exist. Marianne's father has to define this concept to her. The main focus of Carter's satire is Marianne's father, the Professor of History, who 'had read more books than any other Professor in the community' (Carter 1972: 8). He is primarily responsible for Marianne's education, which consists of literature and literacy, social theory, and history, in line with his research interests.

As a connoisseur of political philosophy and social theory, he preserves a 'library of old books' (Carter 1972: 7) in the post-apocalyptic climate. This collection is vast, including works by Plato, as argued in Chapter One, as well as Lewis Mumford, Teilhard de Chardin, Claude Lévi-Strauss, Max Weber, and Émile Durkheim (Carter 1972: 7; 62) and Hobbes and Rousseau. His current research project – 'a book on the archaeology of social theory' – is in progress, but with the exception of Marianne it will be un-read, and 'she might not understand it' (Carter 1972: 8). The impact factor of his work is therefore minimal at best; most likely its impact is non-existent. The father's short-sightedness and impending blindness, as well as the fact that Marianne burns his books after his death, symbolise the futility of academic learning in this environment. As a group, the Professors are male and anonymous; their identity is restricted to their academic discipline (the Professor of History, for instance), enabling Carter to generalise the problems they exhibit in relation to university education.

Critics including Lee have put forward arguments along these lines, saying that 'the art of the Professors is knowledge of the past, although what they seek to preserve is already anachronistic' (Lee 1997: 54). But by discussing notions of knowledge and survival in *Heroes and Villains* through the lens of Hobbes and Rousseau, the levels of Carter's parody of the Professors, particularly Marianne's father, are illuminated: like Carter, I use this paternal figure as my primary target. Examined through a Hobbesian and Rousseauian lens, the top Professor is shown to be an armchair philosopher who has misread Rousseau's *Second Discourse*, to falsely believe that he and his colleagues are elite, to be in possession of imagined rather than factual knowledge, and to be providing a worthless education for his daughter. Such a reading also draws out the significance of his role as the Professor of *History*.

Rousseau's *Emile* depicts the tutor, Jean-Jacques, narrating the ideal education for his pupil, Emile. Jean-Jacques advocates that enjoyment is central to learning, and emphasises the importance of having useful skills, criticising conventional methods of education for providing irrelevant knowledge. The narrator claims that although being literate is important, 'reading is the plague of childhood', on the basis that 'the child who reads does not think, he only reads; he is not informing himself, he learns words' (Rousseau 1979: 116; 168). For Jean-Jacques, reading *per se* does not lead to knowledge, as it 'teach[es] us to use the reason of others' rather than to think for oneself (Rousseau 1979: 125). While he banishes *all* books until Emile is a teenager, Rousseau primarily criticises *historical* literature in his ideal educational handbook. He says that 'by an error even more ridiculous they [children] are

made to study history. One imagines that history is within their reach because it is only a collection of facts' (Rousseau 1979: 110). Historical records are problematic, in Rousseau's opinion, because they are biased and selective, and sometimes conflate fact with fiction; Rousseau's argument is that historical documents are not factually accurate.

Hobbes puts forward a similar argument in *Leviathan*. He remarks that it is necessary 'for any man that aspires to true knowledge, to examine the definitions of former authors; and either to correct them, where they are negligently set down; or to make them himself' (Hobbes 1996: 24). Like Rousseau, he champions thinking and the discovery of one's own understanding rather than readily accepting the words, or definitions, of others. Hobbes argues that absent or incorrect definitions constitute 'the first abuse' of speech, and claims that 'all false and senseless tenets' (Hobbes 1996: 24) follow from faulty definitions. For Hobbes, 'reasoning from the authority of books [...] is not knowledge, but faith' (Hobbes 1996: 442) as:

> words are wise men's counters, they do but reckon by them: but they are the money of fools, that value them by the authority of an Aristotle, a Cicero, or a Thomas, or any other doctor whatsoever, if but a man. (Hobbes 1996: 24)

He also takes issue with historical records in relation to their lack of validity and reliability, criticising historians for writing inadequate and fictional accounts of figures such as Alexander the Great or Julius Caesar (Hobbes 1996: 44). Hobbes aligns history with imagination and memory rather than fact. He argues that imagination is '*decaying sense*' (Hobbes 1996: 11 – original emphasis), as it provides an obscured image of the real object. An imagined apple is hazy in comparison to the real apple that was observed before you closed your eyes, or before the apple was taken out of sight, for instance. On the other hand, if something is imagined it is decaying, if it is 'fading, old, and past, it is called *memory*' (Hobbes 1996: 12 – original emphasis). Tense is therefore central to Hobbesian epistemology. He says that 'the *present* only has a being in nature; things *past* have a being in the memory only, but things *to come* have no being at all; the *future* being but a fiction of the mind' (Hobbes 1996: 18 – original emphasis). Furthermore, *vis-à-vis* the desire to attain or provide knowledge, Hobbes argues that 'no discourse whatsoever, can end in absolute knowledge of fact, past, or to come. For, as for the knowledge of fact, it is originally, sense; and ever after, memory. And for the knowledge of consequence [...] it is not absolute, but conditional' (Hobbes 1996: 42).

Hobbes is also derisive about his academic education, condemning Oxford University, where he 'acquired the lifelong distaste for universities' (Gaskin 1996: xi). Similarly to

Carter, he complains that philosophical study is limited in such institutions, saying 'since the authority of Aristotle is only current there, that study is not properly philosophy, (the nature whereof dependeth not on authors,) but *Aristotelity*' (Hobbes 1996: 446 – original emphasis). While Carter is critical about Leavis taking over her literature course, Hobbes challenges Aristotle's domination over his philosophical studies. Nevertheless, education is important for Hobbes, who says that it is 'manifest, that the instruction of the people, dependeth wholly, on the *right* teaching of youth in the universities' (Hobbes 1996: 228 – emphasis mine). Like Carter, Hobbes was writing in reaction to war: in his case, the English Civil War, which began in 1642. In *Behemoth*, a historical discussion of the Civil War (written in 1668 but published posthumously), Hobbes argues that education is crucial for instilling obedience and thus maintaining civil peace (Hobbes 1990: 58), but having the 'right' education is key. By attacking her Leavisite education in her non-fiction and parodying the Professors in *Heroes and Villains*, Carter strives to comment on and/or reform the educational institutions she experienced, like Hobbes. However, she utilises Hobbesian and Rousseauian discussions of knowledge as part of her mockery of the Professors' erudition to illuminate their limited chances of survival. Thus, where discussions of knowledge are concerned, Hobbes and Rousseau's theories complement rather than conflict with each other, suggesting that the fight that Carter creates between them in *Heroes and Villains* – 'it's Hobbes fighting with Rousseau' – does not hold for this topic. I discuss the accuracy of Carter's battle analogy in the context Carter used it – in relation to 'the savage man, the natural man' – in the next section.

Carter's depiction of the Professors, particularly the Professor of History, conforms to both Hobbesian and Rousseauian discussions of education, especially the study of history. Carter reveals in the second sentence of the novel that Marianne's father specialises in history, and this is by no means a minor detail. It epitomises Carter's critique of the Professors being stuck in the past and not surviving in the present climate; 'he reconstructed the past; that was his profession' (Carter 1972: 8). Marianne's father holds onto books, family heirlooms, and a clock, which Marianne recognises to be redundant and discards after his death. He not only strives to keep concepts such as 'one million' and 'city' (Carter 1972: 7) alive, but also 'University'; contrary to Rousseau and Hobbes's advice, by establishing history and reading as key components of Marianne's post-apocalyptic syllabus and encouraging her to keep these terms in use, he negates the present post-nuclear war circumstances.

In Rousseauian terms, the emphasis on literature in her schooling ironically suggests that Marianne is not actually *learning*, but rather absorbing the ideas of others. The Professors' reliance on historical documents could also explain the causes of the nuclear war, and/or the reasons why they are unable to recover successfully from it. Rousseau argues that 'all our histories begin where they ought to finish. We have a very precise history of peoples who are destroying themselves; what we lack is the history of peoples who are thriving' (Rousseau 1979: 238). Thus, there are few documents that the Professors could refer to that have the potential to teach the Professors how to rebuild rather than self-destruct, as wars and battles inspire historical texts rather than times of peace. The Professors' ignorance of Rousseau's educational advice suggests that they would overlook a helpful survival guide should one exist. The Professors' quest for knowledge, therefore, ironically reveals their ignorance.

The portrayal of the Professors' knowledge, or lack thereof, also conforms to Hobbes's discussion of "memory" and to the importance he places on establishing one's own definitions. It is clear that Carter was intrigued by the Hobbesian theory of language as when she began researching Hobbes by reading Watkins's *Hobbes's System of Ideas*, she made detailed notes on Watkins's chapter on 'Language', before consulting *Leviathan* itself. The majority of her notes on *Leviathan* surround two main themes – the state of nature and language; language and knowledge are intertwined for much of Hobbes's text (Carter 1968-69 Journal MS88899/1/92: unpaginated). Hobbes says 'in the right definition of names, lies the first use of speech; which is the acquisition of science' (Hobbes 1996: 24), which Carter writes in her research journals, having taken this quotation from *Leviathan* directly (Carter 1968-69 Journal MS88899/1/92: unpaginated). In *Heroes and Villains*, if Marianne does not understand a term her father refers her to his dictionaries. She recognises that the 'dictionaries contained innumerable incomprehensible words' – conforming to Hobbes's notion of wrong or absent definitions – and that 'these words had ceased to describe *facts* and now stood only for ideas or *memories*' (Carter 1972: 7 – emphasis mine), while her father holds on to such pre-apocalyptic ideals. The knowledge that her father, the history Professor, regards as factual and absolute, therefore, merely constitutes Hobbes's notion of "memory" for his daughter, exemplifying the fact that the Professors are stuck in the past, and that this prevents them from applying their understanding to the present, and by implication, in the future. As Carter told Lisa Appignanesi, 'these people, people who are sitting there in their bunkers, are the ones whose *imaginations* are too impoverished to *imagine* what the world is going to be like afterwards' (Carter to Appignanesi 1987:

unpaginated – emphasis mine). In this sense, their knowledge is quite literally "decaying", in Hobbesian terms.

Thus, the Professors have what Hobbes refers to as 'false and senseless tenets' due to their abidance to pre-war literature, and are guilty of taking 'their instruction from the authority of books, and not from their own meditation' (Hobbes 1996: 24), establishing them as ignorant rather than knowledgeable. Marianne, as a Professor's daughter, becomes an exception to this, as she observes the Barbarians at first hand, rather than relying on second-hand false representations of "savages" in works by Hobbes and Rousseau that constitute the primary source of information regarding the Professors' "knowledge" about the outsiders. When she resides with them, Marianne 'wished she could tell her father about the true nature of the Barbarians and discuss with him the sociology of the tribe' (Carter 1972: 53), emphasising the ignorance of the Professors and reinforcing Hobbes's argument about the problems of relying on authorities. Thus, rather than being 'wise men's counters', words are 'the money of fools' for the Professors, as they faithfully accept what others have previously said and do not assess the validity of these definitions when the circumstances change or, therefore, update the definitions (Hobbes 1996: 24).

Not only is Marianne's father's status as the Professor of History parodied, but his specialisms in social theory and political philosophy are also shown to be suspect, particularly his expertise in Rousseauian thought. In the *Second Discourse* Rousseau aims 'to point out, in the progress of things, that moment, when, right taking place of violence, nature became subject to law' (Rousseau 2004: 1-2). He specifies that his thoughts 'are not to be taken for historical truths', saying this theory is 'hypothetical' and 'mere conjecture' (Rousseau 2004: 2; 26). Rousseau's fundamental argument is that 'nothing can be more gentle than he in his primitive state, when placed by nature at an equal distance from the stupidity of brutes, and the pernicious good sense of civilized man' (Rousseau 2004: 32). As John Hope Mason states, 'the principal feature of this theory was that man is naturally good' (Mason 1979: 7). This led to Rousseau becoming synonymous with the phrase "noble savage", with the entry for this term in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, for example, establishing an association with him. However, as numerous critics including Peter Gay note, 'this notorious phrase does not appear in his writings' (Gay 1987: viii).

Ter Ellingson's *The Myth of the Noble Savage* traces the origin of the ongoing association of the "noble savage" with Rousseau in the light of this common misconception, noting that the *Oxford English Dictionary* attributes the term "Noble Savage" to Rousseau, which seems to confirm the assumption that Rousseau invented this expression (Ellingson

2001: 2-3). As noted, most work on Carter and Rousseau concentrates on the figure of the "noble savage" in *Heroes and Villains*, with Lee briefly discussing this aspect of Carter's work under the subheading 'The Fall of the Noble Savage' (Lee 1997: 54-56). Lee, alongside the rest of the critics who have considered Carter's reading of Rousseau, has failed to identify probably the most crucial aspect of Carter's repeated references to Rousseau in line with the "noble savage": that 'he did not coin, and never used, that evocative phrase' (Gay 1987: 1). Ellingson establishes Rousseau's connection with this term as a 'myth', and provides an extensive list of critics who have casually remarked that Rousseau coined or utilised the saying, condemning them for their poor scholarly practice:

> none of these authors apparently feels any need to support the claim of Rousseau's authorship with a citation; it is simply, unquestionably true, presumably one of those public-domain bits of information for which the citation is an implicit "Everyone knows...". (Ellingson 2001: 2)

Ellingson goes on to note that this 'invented tradition is not only wrong but long since known to be wrong', and says this 'confronts us with a particularly problematic current in the history of anthropology' (Ellingson 2001: 3).

I would argue that Carter's portrayal of Marianne's father has this tradition of misreading and misinterpreting Rousseau's work in mind. Marianne's father's declaration that Rousseau 'spoke of a noble savage' (Carter 1972: 10) degrades the reputation of his research. He is continuing the deceptive tradition that Rousseau coined or used this term, and is, like Ellingson's list of critics, guilty of assuming so. The Professors pride themselves on their intellectual abilities and privileges gained from their university education, but Marianne's father's scholarly practice and epistemological status are parodied, since Carter deliberately attributes the use of this famous phrase to, supposedly, the *most knowledgeable* Professor. The ironic implication of the History Professor's use of this phrase is that the book he is writing, as well as not being read or understood, could potentially be invalid, as his academic credentials are satirically overturned. While the knowledge the Professors have has already been shown to be worthless in the current environment, it is, moreover, incorrect. Of course, the alternative interpretation of this is that *Carter* has misread Rousseau, which, if accepted, would have repercussions for Carter's status as an erudite writer. I would dismiss this reading, as the consequences of the Professor of History making this error conform to Carter's wider critique of the Professors' education and scholarly ability, and add a nuanced mockery to his already redundant research.

Rousseau's critique of speculative knowledge is also applicable to *Heroes and Villains*. In the *Second Discourse* he argues that:

> though it may be the peculiar happiness of Socrates and other geniuses of his stamp, to reason themselves into virtue, the human species would long ago have ceased to exist, had it depended entirely for its preservation on the reasonings of the individuals that compose it. (Rousseau 2004: 22)

Carter voices this argument in her portrayal of the declining Professors; they are too dependent on reason, and would need to utilise practical branches of knowledge as well, in order to thrive. This aspect of Carter's epistemological commentary is strengthened by her references to Jonathan Swift's *Gulliver's Travels* (1726) in *Heroes and Villains*. Numerous Carter critics have discussed or identified allusions to *Gulliver's Travels* throughout her *oeuvre*, including Karpinski, Lorna Sage (2007), and Anna Hunt, but not in relation to Rousseau. Swift's novel has been linked to Rousseauian thought by George Armstrong Kelly (Kelly 2001: 11) and Frank Palmeri, who sees similarities between the *Second Discourse* and *Emile* with *Gulliver's Travels* (Palmeri 2003: 153). In Swift's narrative, Laputa is a flying island with a monarchical government, in which the inhabitants have a high regard for mathematics and music. As Lemuel Gulliver observes:

> although they are dexterous enough upon a piece of paper in the management of the rule, the pencil and the divider, yet in the common actions and behaviour of life, I have not seen a more clumsy, awkward, and unhandy people, nor so slow and perplexed in their conceptions upon all other subjects, except those of mathematics and music. (Swift 2010: 181-182)

Those incompetent in mathematics and music are seen as ignorant and inferior, and are subsequently disregarded. The Laputans are portrayed as being too absorbed in their abstract speculations to apply their knowledge to the real world, which corresponds to my epistemological reading of the Professors. The Yahoos, on the other hand, are primitive humanlike animals who are kept as slaves by the orderly equine community of Houyhnhnms, and are seen to be incapable of reason and government.

Towards the end of *Heroes and Villains* Marianne tells Jewel, the Barbarian who "rescues" her from the Professors, that 'the Barbarians are Yahoos but the Professors are Laputans' (Carter 1972: 123). By aligning the Barbarians with the Yahoos, Carter parodies the Professors' knowledge but also indicates that Jewel has not 'been educated according to their [the Professors/Laputans'] requirements'; he has received an 'excellent though unorthodox education' (Carter 1972: 123). The high regard for history and literacy in the

Professors' compound results in Jewel's knowledge being seen as subordinate, as his education lacks these components. Instead, Donally, the renegade Professor, has taught him 'caution. And genetics, metaphysics, some conjuring tricks and a few quotations from old books in dead languages' (Carter 1972: 125). Rousseau criticises this antiquated aspect of the Professors/Laputans' education in both his *First Discourse* and *Emile*. In the *First Discourse* Rousseau argues that 'our souls have become corrupted in proportion as our sciences and our arts have advanced toward perfection' (Rousseau 1987: 5). He attacks the contemporary education system, stressing that:

> from our earliest years a foolish education adorns our mind and corrupts our judgment. Everywhere I see immense establishments where youths are brought up at great expense to learn everything but their duties. Your children will not know their own language, but will speak others which are nowhere in use. (Rousseau 1987: 16)

In the later *Emile*, Rousseau once again voices a disapproval of the custom to teach children 'in the dead languages' (Rousseau 1979: 109).

Carter voices Rousseau's concerns in *Heroes and Villains* by highlighting that the Professors' educational establishments are flawed and outdated. Marianne's education is futile, because she is being taught words 'which are nowhere in use', as illustrated by the now defunct dictionaries. Both Marianne and Jewel receive training 'in the dead languages' from Professors – Marianne from her father, and Jewel from Donally; both are taught according to a syllabus which is pointless in terms of survival. Marianne's ethnographic experience of the Barbarians further highlights this issue, while also emphasising the problems of relying on literature for authoritative knowledge. Jewel's use of the word 'intellectual' and reference to the adder as '*Viperus berus*' spark her questioning of the reliability of the books her father relies upon (Carter 1972: 19; 28). Jewel 'talked like a half-educated man and this surprised her [Marianne] very much since she had thought the Barbarians possessed no education at all' (Carter 1972: 26). These are revelatory findings for the Professor's daughter, who compares Jewel to the portrayal of savage tribes in the books she has read, and finds the two instances incompatible, thus challenging the quality and applicability of her "knowledge" and "education". Marianne tries to decode Jewel and equate him with the understanding of the Barbarians she "gained" from the Professors; like his name, 'he was a curiously shaped, attractive stone; he was an object which drew her' (Carter 1972: 82). Marianne tells Jewel that he is 'the most remarkable thing I ever saw in all my life. Not even in pictures had I seen anything like you, nor read your description in books' (Carter 1972: 137). Thus, her

theoretical knowledge of the Barbarians does not work in practice: Marianne 'had read such cool words in the books in her father's study and looked there at line diagrams of segmented forms stuck with arrows tipped with frozen words in dead languages' (Carter 1972: 82-83). These 'frozen words', Marianne discovers, have no meaning in the world of the "real" Barbarians.

Carter's Rousseauian critique of the Professors' education system becomes still more ironic in light of Rousseau's concluding comment in the *First Discourse*. Here, Rousseau argues that although the arts and sciences have 'added nothing', 'corrupted our mores', and 'damaged the purity of taste', such knowledge should not be completely rejected, but left to those with natural genius, including, according to Rousseau, Francis Bacon, Isaac Newton and René Descartes (Rousseau 1987: 19-20). He postulates that:

> if a few men must be permitted to devote themselves to the study of the sciences and the arts, it should only be those who feel the strength to venture forth alone in their footsteps and to overtake them. It is for this small number to raise monuments to the glory of the human mind. (Rousseau 1987: 20)

As Leo Strauss says, 'science is bad, not absolutely, but only for the people or for society; it is good, and even necessary, for the few among whom Rousseau counts himself' (Strauss 1972: 265). Carter's parodical portrayal of the Professors is exaggerated by the fact that these academics classify themselves as part of this elite order; the Professors believe they are 'the only ones left who could resurrect the gone world in a gentler shape' (Carter 1972: 8). And, as Rousseau notes in the *Second Discourse*, an absolute reliance on speculative thinkers, or armchair philosophers, curbs rather than aids survival; the Professors in *Heroes and Villains* epitomise this argument.

If Carter's survival guide implies, in relation to the Professors, that university qualifications are obsolete after an apocalypse – they are, in the pejorative sense of the term, "academic" – then her presentation of the nomadic Barbarians and the Professors' failings allows her to discuss the benefits of practical skills. Rousseau champions applicable knowledge, favouring skills which are useful and relevant to the real world. In *Emile* he rejects speculative work saying: 'this is armchair philosophy; but I appeal to experience' (Rousseau 1979: 166). The Professors are guilty of committing 'armchair philosophy' as their knowledge cannot be applied to the current post-apocalyptic climate. As Marianne's father says of the Barbarians:

> their grandfathers survived outside the shelters, somehow; they survived at first by accident and continue to survive only by tenacity. They hunt, maraud

> and prey on us for the things they need and can't make themselves and never realize we are necessary to them. When they finally destroy us, if they finally destroy us, they'll destroy their own means of living so I do not think they will destroy us. (Carter 1972: 11)

The Professors fail to recognise that the outsiders have adapted to the post-apocalyptic landscape and are acclimatising to the new living conditions, instead regarding the reason behind the Barbarians' survival to be merely chance. Thus, adapting to the changed environment and having the practical skills to do so is a central discussion in Carter's post-apocalyptic survival manual.

In this light, Rousseau argues that it is vital for education to go beyond the classroom, questioning whether anyone can 'conceive of a method more senseless than raising a child as though he never had to leave his room' (Rousseau 1979: 42). On this basis, the first book that Emile is permitted to read, and the only book he is allowed to read for some time, is Daniel Defoe's *Robinson Crusoe* (1719), at the age of 12-13. For Jean-Jacques, it 'provides the most felicitous treatise on natural education' (Rousseau 1979: 184) because Crusoe is alone on an island and has to provide for himself in order to survive, which are traits that he wants Emile to emulate. Jean-Jacques believes that this text will encourage Emile to 'want to know all that is useful' (Rousseau 1979: 185). Bernie Carr's *The Prepper's Pocket Guide: 101 Easy Things you can do to Ready your Home for a Disaster* (2011) similarly highlights the need to adjust, but to the post-disaster landscape, warning that there is a 'sheer amount of information [...] to learn' (Carr 2011: 17).

Carter discusses ideas of practical knowledge in her depiction of the post-apocalyptic climate in *Heroes and Villains* in these terms. Marianne's schooling takes place in a confined space: not only does she reside and receive her education in 'a white tower made of steel and concrete' (Carter 1972: 1), symbolic of elitism in terms of its height as it presides over the landscape; but she is also imprisoned in the compound, which has a wire netting border and 'watch towers manned with machine guns' (Carter 1972: 3), as well as a barbed-wire wall and another wire fence which Marianne is banned from crossing. This layered incarceration signifies the limits of Marianne's education and its lack of applicability to the hostile world beyond the border; the Professors quite literally have 'Ivory Tower Syndrome', as their knowledge is detached from current affairs beyond their confines, and they educate their children in this manner. While Marianne questions the usefulness of her intellectual capabilities when she is in the Professors' enclave and under her father's instruction, the full extent of the curriculum's failings are illustrated when Marianne encounters Jewel, and leaves the Professors' compound for good, when she discovers that the Barbarians are more

educated than she was taught to believe. Moreover, while the Barbarians can navigate their hostile surroundings, Marianne becomes disoriented and has hallucinations beyond the security of the enclave, encouraging Jewel to mock her and say, 'no wonder they had to put the Professors in shelters, when they can't even find their way through a wood. If I wasn't with you you'd walk round and round in circles' (Carter 1972: 25), highlighting the limits of Marianne's abilities in contrast to Jewel's practical survival skills. In Carr's terms, the Professors have committed one of the 'common preparedness mistakes' of 'not acquiring skills' (Carr 2011: 28-29) and have brought up the younger generation – mainly represented by Marianne – to follow suit.

Carter's depiction of Donally also engages with the disjunction between intellectual knowledge and practical skills. Donally is an accomplished academic who, unlike the rest of the Professors, wants to put his theoretical knowledge into practice. When Marianne interrogates him and asks, 'why didn't you stay where you belonged, editing texts or doing research?' his response is: 'I wanted to see the world' (Carter 1972: 62). To do so, he relocates to the wilderness – with his books in tow – with the intention of using the post-apocalyptic circumstances to rebuild a Hobbesian inspired commonwealth – I will discuss this in more detail in the next section. Donally *allegedly* has a doctoral degree; he gives Marianne a 'white visiting card on which was beautifully engraved, in Gothic script, DR F. R. DONALLY, PH D' (Carter 1972: 50 – original capitalisation). However, the Professors' qualifications and Donally's Ph.D. have no status or meaning in the post-war era, indicating the continuation of Carter's discussion about the value of an academic education. The fact that Donally's initials are F. R. is also significant, hinting that this could be a contribution to her attack on Leavis.

Nevertheless, Donally encourages the Barbarians to adopt agricultural knowledge, wanting them to 'settle and plant gardens' (Carter 1972: 126), a practical skill that he deems central to long-term survival. Carr similarly advises the potential doomsday prepper to 'learn new survival skills to become more self-sufficient' (Carr 2011: 29). In fact, this is the only useful survival skill that the Professors are shown to possess, as they are 'self-supporting at the simplest level' (Carter 1972: 2). The Professors' self-sufficiency, however, motivates the Barbarians to invade and parasitically take advantage of their produce. This allows the Barbarians to focus on other aspects of survival, depicting a disadvantage of following Carr's 'prepping' advice and striving for self-sufficiency, and suggesting that this is not necessarily a productive skill to possess in their circumstances. The novel ends with Marianne taking over as tribal leader following Donally's departure and supposed death, and does not specify

whether Marianne also aims for the Barbarians to be self-sufficient, or whether this is achieved. Carter does not, therefore, provide a finite answer as to whether agricultural knowledge is useful in the post-nuclear war world, although she suggests that on a short-term basis, being self-sufficient is a hindrance rather than an advantage, as it entices others towards one's land.

Useful medicinal knowledge is a fundamental component of survival in *Heroes and Villains*, as an abstract understanding of physiology and causal relations is imperative within the Professors' enclave. The Professors accumulate drugs and medical supplies in exchange for their agricultural surplus, and when Marianne's pet rabbit dies, for instance, the Professor of Biology carries out an autopsy straight away: they are 'a community so rational that [...] they cut it open to find out why' (Carter 1972: 77). Carter ridicules such behaviour, as the academic understanding gained from the post-mortem is not used to boost the Professors' population or to help the survival of others. Their population is in decline because of high suicide rates – it is not uncommon for them to kill themselves 'when they reached a certain age and felt the approach of senility and loss of wits' (Carter 1972: 9). As Lee notes, 'the intellectual elite are a dying breed, and their knowledge, because it cannot be disseminated in the larger world, will die with them' (Lee 1997: 54).

Hobbes's distinction between history, defined as memory, and the only other category of knowledge, which 'is called *science*; and is *conditional*' and 'is the knowledge required in a philosopher' (Hobbes 1996: 54 – original emphasis), reinforces this aspect of *Heroes and Villains*. These types of knowledge are also discussed in terms of a differentiation between prudence and sapience. The former 'is a genuine form of knowledge, yet it is always knowledge of particulars; it is a knowledge of how things have worked out in the past and what *has* happened, not of how they *must* work out nor of what *must* happen'; sapience conforms to the latter clause – what 'must' happen – is 'based on science', and 'is hypothetical, general, and infallible' (Ryan 1996: 212-213 – original emphasis). Prudence, or history, predicts what will happen in the future based on past events, whereas sapience corresponds to a scientific determination of cause and effect. The academics in *Heroes and Villains* are ironically depicted as having both types of knowledge. They have a knowledge of the past – memory – which both humans and animals possess (Hobbes 1996: 18), although Carter makes it clear that their historical proficiency is obsolete, and curbing their survival. The relevance of their scientific reasoning is also dubious, as an understanding of cause and effect, as illustrated by the dissection of the rabbit, is shown to be futile, as they do not transfer this knowledge to prolonging their community's survival.

The Barbarian population is similarly in decline, but in this case due to high infant mortality rates, with many of the children suffering from conditions such as ringworm or rickets. In opposition to the Professors, the Barbarians lack biological training and equipment, as well as medication, although they do have primitive yet effective remedies for some ailments, such as snakebite. When Marianne gets bitten, Jewel 'took his sharp knife and cut the wound then put his mouth against it, sucked out the poison, spat and continued to suck' (Carter 1972: 28). However, they are desperately in need of cures for diseases such as gangrene, for which they do not have an antidote. After kidnapping/rescuing Marianne, it does not take long for Jewel to ask her, 'did they ever teach you medicine?' (Carter 1972: 26), highlighting the usefulness and necessity of such knowledge for the outsiders. Marianne tells Jewel that she has no medical knowledge as her education is restricted to subjects in the arts and humanities. Jewel's response signifies that such knowledge is no longer useful; 'that won't help my brother, then, who's ill [with gangrene]' (Carter 1972: 26). Thus, Marianne's education has no function beyond the world of the Professors/Laputans, although it does not have a use in her home territory, either. Only useful knowledge is appreciated in the Barbarian landscape. This argument is reinforced when Marianne informs Jewel that her father's function was thinking, and he derogatorily asks if her father was 'a preserved brain' (Carter 1972: 57). Jewel's implication that the brain belongs in formaldehyde conveys the notion that speculative work is futile, and that the Professor's reasoning is anachronistic. Carter's portrayal of medicinal knowledge therefore illustrates that *both* theoretical and practical expertise are needed for long-term survival. While she implies that the Barbarians' primitive methods of healthcare need to combine with the Professors' knowledge and equipment in order for the two societies to survive and rebuild, the ambiguous conclusion does not suggest – in relation to education, knowledge, and skills – that a profitable blend of Professors and Barbarians can be achieved. With Marianne, a *Professor's daughter* uneducated in the field of medicine, enigmatically left as the leader of the Barbarians at the end of the novel, it seems that the Barbarians will merely carry on as they did under Donally's monarchy, as Marianne does not offer any new, *useful* skills.

This raises the question: what constitutes *useful* in this post-nuclear war landscape? Overall, Carter's novel suggests that academic qualifications are mostly redundant after an apocalypse, and indicates that adapting to new conditions is a priority. The exception is that a theoretical understanding of biology is useful if used practically, something that cannot be said for the Professors. Thus, in line with Rousseau and Hobbes, Carter highlights the importance of having practical survival skills that are applicable to current living conditions,

an argument epitomised by her parody of the Professor of History who encapsulates both Hobbes and Rousseau's discussions of living in the present rather than the past, and having knowledge that goes beyond the classroom, that has an impact beyond the ivory tower and is not 'armchair philosophy'. This reading of *Heroes and Villains* through the lens of Carter's interaction with Hobbes's and Rousseau's epistemological arguments has implications for discussions of contemporary Higher Education Institutions (HEIs); while I mainly use British (and American) examples, the ideas correspond to wider trends.

In *What Are Universities For?* Collini outlines debates surrounding the purposes and functions of Higher Education and states that 'these debates fall into a particularly dispiriting pattern, which might be parodied as the conflict between the "useful" and the "useless"' (Collini 2012: 39). The "utility" of academic qualifications is a fundamental factor for twenty-first-century universities, and is reflected in the current academic job market as well as in research funding opportunities. Collini notes that university spending has become more focused on research as opposed to teaching, saying that 'the science budget has now soared into the billions, dwarfing the amounts spent on the humanities and social sciences' (Collini 2012: 32). This division between the sciences and subjects within the arts and humanities is reflected in the funding provided by the seven British Research Councils; their combined budget is '£3 billion, but only around 3% of this goes to the Arts and Humanities Research Council', the AHRC (Collini 2012: 32).[6] Eleonora Belfiore discusses such financial issues in terms of the value and utility of science degrees, their applicability to industry, and how this is reflected financially, saying, 'perceptions of their [humanities degrees'] presumed "uselessness" therefore have clear repercussions on issues around the funding available for research in this field' (Belfiore 2013: 30).

Collini similarly notes that 'public funding of higher education is now heavily concentrated on supporting science, medicine, and technology, and these departments account for an overwhelmingly large proportion of any individual university's operating budget' (Collini 2012: 32). Funding in the arts, on the other hand, is plummeting, with the Arts Council England (ACE) having their 'funding cut by a further £11.6m before 2015' (BBC 2012: unpaginated). The notion of "usefulness", however, is now central to research within the arts and humanities. "Impact" has become a buzzword within this branch of academia,

[6] The other 6 Research Councils are: the Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council (BBSRC); the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC); the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC); the Medical Research Council (MRC); The UK Research Councils Natural Environment Research Council (NERC); and the Science and Technology Facilities Council (STFC). See the Research Councils UK website for more details.

with the AHRC funding projects on the basis of how they apply to the world beyond university institutions. The Research Excellence Framework (REF) – a system that assesses British universities in terms of the quality of research – similarly includes "impact" as one criterion, providing, in Belfiore's words, 'more evidence of the entrenchment of "utility" in formal evaluative mechanisms for the higher educational sector' (Belfiore 2013: 31). This stark division between the sciences and the arts is exacerbated by the opportunities available in the current academic job market.

These ideas of "usefulness" and "impact" are central to *Heroes and Villains* as well, with Carter's depiction of knowledge – read through the lens of Hobbesian and Rousseauian epistemology – emphasising notions of practicality and adaptability, and of education needing to be relevant to current conditions and applicable to the "real" world. That said, Carter's novel does not conform to the crude arts versus sciences divide. While Marianne's father's specialisms in history, social theory and political philosophy are Carter's main target, her critique of academia is not limited to these (or related) disciplines, as evidenced by her depiction of the redundancy of the autopsy carried out by the Professor of Biology. Instead, as Collini argues:

> it is not the subject-matter itself that determines whether something is, at a particular moment, classed as "useful" or "useless" [...] Rather, it is a question of whether enquiry into that subject is being undertaken under the sign of limitlessness – that is to say, not just, as with the development of all knowledge, subject to the testing of hypotheses or the revision of errors, but where the open-ended quest for understanding has primacy over any application or intermediate outcome. (Collini 2012: 55)

While *Heroes and Villains* supports Collini's claim that disciplines are not "useful" or "useless" *per se*, Carter's depiction of post-apocalyptic survival suggests that an 'application or intermediate outcome' is superior to an 'open-ended quest for understanding' or 'armchair philosophy', inverting Collini's definition. In line with both Hobbes and Rousseau, Carter emphasises the importance of useful, applicable, current skills and knowledge. The Professors' knowledge is "useful" *vis-à-vis* Collini's definition, but quickly becomes "useless" when a fight for survival, which requires applicable knowledge, is at stake. Thus, rather than attacking specific subjects, Carter attacks knowledge that is not useful, knowledge that does not correspond to the current landscape, knowledge that, in short, curbs survival – agreeing with Hobbes and Rousseau's work on education and their definitions of knowledge in terms of finding things out for oneself and not relying on historical, outdated authorities.

Collini claims that some sectors regard universities 'as engines of technological advance and economic prosperity' whilst 'elsewhere they are attacked for being "self-indulgent", "backward-looking", and "elitist"' (Collini 2012: 3). Carter's portrayal of academia in *Heroes and Villains* clearly reflects the latter definition, with the Professors conforming perfectly to the three derogatory adjectives that characterise this view. The notion of university knowledge being stuck in the past rather than looking to the future is particularly pertinent for the history Professor. In line with contemporary Higher Education research and funding, though, an understanding of biology and medicine is favoured in Carter's post-apocalyptic environment, as long as the knowledge is not merely theoretical and can be used in practice, as Rousseau asserts throughout his work but particularly in his educational treatise *Emile*.

Collini's argument that a characteristic of the modern university is 'that it furthers some form of advanced scholarship or research whose character is not wholly dictated by the need to solve immediate practical problems' (Collini 2012: 7), is therefore problematic in a post-apocalyptic context, where, Carter suggests via Hobbes and Rousseau, applicable survival skills rather than scholarly knowledge have a function. The implications of this argument are that qualifications within the arts and humanities are less useful than knowledge in the sciences. To raise Belfiore's question:

> if the arts and humanities cannot be found to be "useful" in the narrowly pragmatic and instrumental sense in which the natural sciences can be (e.g., they cannot cure cancer, help predict the occurrence of tsunamis, reduce carbon omissions, or result in lucrative patents), then, what is their *value*? [...] Is "utility" (in the form of impact) the only (or even the best) measure for *value*? (Belfiore 2013: 31 – original emphasis)

In Carter's novel, written in the context of the Cold War, the 'narrowly pragmatic' definition of 'utility' applies, at least until the chances of long-term survival are stable, as her interaction with Hobbes and Rousseau leads to the conclusion that practicality is key. As an erudite writer herself, whose expertise and interests mirror those of the Professors, this is an ironic standpoint for Carter, suggesting that she is reflecting on her own chances of post-apocalyptic survival. Due to the intertextual nature of Carter's writing, her target audience is well-read; as she says, she 'expect[s] people to look things up' (Carter to Kenyon 1992: 26). This situates her intended readers – those who 'look things up' – as "Professors", or suggests that they may identify with the Professors more than with their Barbarian counterparts. The implication is that Carter is encouraging them to contemplate the applicability of their own

skills and knowledge and learn from her fictional survival guide, which is strengthened by her engagement with Hobbes and Rousseau. She reiterates the importance of adapting to the radically changed environment via her depiction of the backward-looking, near-blind Professor of History, who conforms to Hobbes and Rousseau's critique of this subject area, and parodies Marianne's education using the same arguments as these two thinkers in terms of applicable skills and the idea of knowledge as "memory", and assesses the effectiveness of definitions and the words of authorities. Like Rousseau, Carter thinks it is 'senseless' for education to be limited to the classroom, or the ivory tower (Rousseau 1979: 42), arguing that speculative knowledge is damaging in terms of survival.

The Civil State versus the State of Nature: Professors and Barbarians[7]

The preceding discussion illustrates some similarities between Hobbesian philosophy and Rousseau's work and Carter's agreement with many of their epistemological arguments about the education system, what knowledge constitutes, and how knowledge should be used in the context of surviving after an apocalypse. When it comes to Carter's engagement with Rousseauian and Hobbesian ideas of the distinction between the civil and natural states though, she scrutinises the conflict between the two conditions and Hobbes and Rousseau's differing theories. She claims that *Heroes and Villains* constitutes 'Hobbes fighting with Rousseau' (Carter to Bedford 1977: unpaginated), and that it finds Rousseau's theories 'wanting' (Carter to Haffenden 1985: 95). Before moving on to a discussion of Hobbes and Rousseau in this light, I will define what I mean by the state of nature and the civil state, and align this definition with how Carter sets up the opposition between the natural and civil states in *Heroes and Villains*.

Whereas civilised societies are characterised as having a justice system with legislation and a government that maintains order, as well as advanced knowledge, the state of nature lacks many of these qualities: it is pre-political or apolitical, and regarded as primitive, particularly from outsiders with a civilised perspective. The state of nature is, therefore, a multifarious term with, as Arthur O. Lovejoy explains, 'at least three easily distinguishable senses' (Lovejoy 1948: 14-15). The term can have a:

> merely chronological signification and refer to the primeval condition of man, whatever its characteristics. In the terminology of political theory it means the

[7] This sub-section is derived from my paper 'The Day the Earth Still Stood: Blurring the Boundary between the State of Nature and the Civil State in Angela Carter's *Heroes and Villains*', published in *Borders: Proceedings of the Arts and Humanities Postgraduate Conference, Swansea University* (2013). See Yeandle 2013.

> status of human individuals or groups who in their relations to one another are not subject to the authority of any government. Finally, it may be used – and in the eighteenth century was often used – in what may be called a cultural sense, to designate the state in which the arts and sciences – civilization in its non-political elements – had made least progress. (Lovejoy 1948: 15)

Thus, ideas of the civil state versus the natural state are usually hierarchical and dichotomous, establishing the former as being more developed and having cultured knowledge, laws, law enforcers (a government and/or police force), and order, and the latter as being younger and inchoate, and lacking the signifiers of civilisation.

In broad terms, Carter portrays the division between the Professors and Barbarians in *Heroes and Villains* in binary terms, with these two communities respectively representing the civil state and the state of nature. As I established in the previous section and in my earlier chapter on Plato, the Professors value erudition and strive to live in an ordered world, employing Soldiers to maintain stability. They think that the Barbarians are savage because they seem to lack such qualities, and associate them with the primitive natural state. Carter establishes this dualism spatially, creating a literal border between the two worlds; she separates the Professors and the Barbarians, portraying a division between the civil state and natural state. The patrolled wall, reinforced by barbed-wire, and an outer fence that cannot be crossed except by the Soldiers for trade purposes, demarcates the boundary line between the two territories, establishing an antithetical relationship between them. In this light, Carter told Appignanesi that she 'was envisaging [...] a world divided between the people who'd been in the shelters and the people who hadn't' (Carter to Appignanesi 1987: unpaginated), illustrating that the contrast between the two communities also sets up an inside versus outside distinction; the civilised Professors are safe inside their enclosure, while the Barbarians are striving to survive in the vast, hostile landscape outside. The polarised depiction of the two is voiced by Marianne's father, who tells his daughter that 'there is nowhere else to go and chaos is the opposite pole of boredom' (Carter 1972: 11) – the ordered world of the Professors is tedious for Marianne, who finds the Barbarians appealing; 'she liked the wild, quatrosyllabic lilt of the word, "Barbarian"' (Carter 1972: 4).

This spatial boundary between the Professors and Barbarians does not remain intact. The Barbarians intermittently invade the Professors' enclosure to steal produce and rape and kill the inhabitants, while Marianne temporarily crosses the border to escape the May Day festivities, and to satisfy her curiosity about the outsiders. Just as Marianne's permanent relocation to the Barbarian wilderness fuels Carter's discussion of knowledge and post-

apocalyptic survival by creating a first-hand insight into both camps through the inquisitive protagonist's eyes, this aspect of the plot also functions to destabilise the distinction between the Professors and Barbarians and thus to blur the boundary between the civil state and the state of nature, unsettling the binary system. This enables Carter to question whether the difference between civilisation and the natural state is in fact oppositional, and to interrogate theories of the two states and question whether Hobbes's or Rousseau's concept of the natural state is more accurate, if either. Before moving on to discussing Carter's scrutiny of the differentiation between the civil state and the natural condition and Hobbes and Rousseau's views on this, I will outline the key features of their theories.

Hobbes's concept of the state of nature conforms to the hierarchical dualistic distinction set up so far; he argues that the natural state lacks systems and qualities that the civil state possesses, such as education, order, government, and legislation. While Hobbes's depiction of what he calls the 'Natural Condition of Mankind' (Hobbes 1996: 82) is put forward most famously in *Leviathan*, this theory appears in his first original[8] doctrine *The Elements of Law Natural and Politic*, and is 'developed or modified' in a number of his later works, including *De Cive* and *Leviathan* (Gaskin 1994: xliii).[9] He voices the binary division between the two states most explicitly in *De Cive*, where he says that out of the civil state:

> no man is sure of the fruit of his labours; in it, all men are [...] out of it, there is a dominion of passions, war, fear, poverty, slovenliness, solitude, barbarism, ignorance, cruelty; in it, the dominion of reason, peace, security, riches, decency, society, elegancy, sciences, and benevolence. (Hobbes 1991: 222)

The opposition that Hobbes imagines conforms to the binary division between inside and outside that Carter portrays in *Heroes and Villains*. But Hobbes's antithesis between the passions and reason also distinguishes the Barbarians from the Professors, at least in the minds of the scholars; the Professors' patrolled compound serves to keep 'unreason at bay outside' (Carter 1972: 77). The fact that the Professors, in the civil state, demonstrate traits from the natural state, such as fear, solitude, and ignorance, reinforces Carter's parody of the supposedly cultured and civilised academics, suggesting that the nuclear war has compromised the binary distinction between the two states, as there is now some form of overlap. (I discussed the Professors' ignorance in the previous section, and go on to talk about fear; their isolation in a sealed off enclosure exemplifies their solitude).

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[8] Hobbes's first publication was a translation of Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War* (1629).

[9] *The Elements of Law Natural and Politic* is now often printed as two separate volumes, *Human Nature* and *De Corpore Politico*.

Hobbes does not just regard the natural condition as inferior though, famously arguing that it is a *savage* state. In the Preface to *De Cive* he says: 'I demonstrate, in the first place, that the state of men without civil society, which state we may properly call the state of nature, is nothing else but a *mere war of all against all*' (Hobbes 1991: 101 – emphasis mine). He makes the same point in *Leviathan*, saying 'that during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe [without a legal system or commonwealth], they are in that condition which is called war; and such a war, as is of every man, against every man [...] All other time is PEACE' (Hobbes 1996: 84 – original capitalisation), establishing a clear war versus peace dichotomy, too. A synopsis of Hobbes's view of the natural state is provided in the next paragraph in *Leviathan*:

> In such condition, there is no place for industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious building; no instruments of moving, and removing such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short. (Hobbes 1996: 84)

Once again, some of these features apply to the Professors, furthering Carter's parody of their civility and the blurring between the two states. Their knowledge of the arts is redundant and suspect; they live in 'continual fear' and are in 'danger of violent death' thanks to the Barbarian invasions. Their navigational abilities are limited, as illustrated by Marianne's lack of a sense of direction when she escapes her native compound, which notably contrasts the Barbarian Jewel's functioning internal compass.

In 1968 Carter researched this area of Hobbesian thought as preparation for *Heroes and Villains*, and made a note of both of the above quotations from *Leviathan* in her notepad (Carter 1968-69 Journal MS88899/1/92: unpaginated). Her understanding of Hobbes's pessimistic and brutal view of the natural human condition is also recycled in her journalism, where the term 'Hobbesian' is synonymous with 'savage'. In 'Robert Darnton: The Great Cat Massacre' (1984), for example, she says that 'Darnton is irresistibly engaging in the company of Mother Goose, and the savage brutality of the world described in the fairytale, where incest, sodomy, rape, bestiality, [and] cannibalism are commonplaces' and claims that Darnton is describing 'a Hobbesian world' (Carter 1998i: 475). The adjective 'Hobbesian' is used in a similar context in her review of H. P. Lovecraft's horror writing called 'The Hidden Child' (1975). Here she claims that 'childhood is the world before the knowledge of good and evil. A Hobbesian and terrible place' (Carter 1998k: 447).

While Hobbes argues that there is an absolute distinction between civilisation and the natural state and regards the latter as a bloodthirsty and barbaric condition, Rousseau has a more positive view of the state of nature – as epitomised by the false association between him and the term 'noble savage' – and theorises that there is a gradual progression from the natural state to the civil state, imagining a continuum rather than a binary division. The crux of Rousseau's view on the state of nature is succinctly summarised in a letter he wrote to the French Statesman Guillaume-Chrétien de Lamoignon de Malesherbes in 1762, where he claims that 'man is naturally good and that it is from these institutions alone that men become wicked' (Rousseau 1995: 575). But, as Lovejoy argues, to say that the *Second Discourse* is 'essentially a glorification of the state of nature, and that its influence tended wholly or chiefly to promote "primitivism," is one of the most persistent of historical errors' (Lovejoy 1948: 14), because in this text Rousseau portrays the natural state as evolving through four distinct stages before civilisation is reached; Lovejoy's work on the four stages is central to my analysis. As Rousseau imagines a long process of transition rather than a binary opposition, it is problematic to simply refer to the pre-political, non-civil state as the 'state of nature' – Rousseau *usually* refers to the first phase of the natural condition as the pure 'state of nature', as Lovejoy points out (Lovejoy 1948: 16).

According to Rousseau, in the first phase the human species was physically superior to humans in the civil state; they lived according to instinct rather than reason, and their 'wants [were] completely supplied' because their only goal was self-preservation (Rousseau 2004: 4). In this situation, the human genus is on the same level as the rest of the animal kingdom, and has 'an innate abhorrence to see beings suffer that resemble him [...] that the beasts themselves sometimes give evident signs of' (Rousseau 2004: 20). As Lovejoy notes, 'man was originally a non-moral but good-natured brute' (Lovejoy 1948: 21). This stage ends with a fight to survive – a shortage of produce arises, as well as competition from other animals to reach the same food sources. For Rousseau, what separates humans from other animals is the potential to change or the 'faculty of improvement' (Rousseau 2004: 10), referred to as the notion of 'perfectibility'. This enables the human species to acquire the skills *needed to survive*; for instance, inventing a hook and line to fish with, making bows and arrows for hunting, and learning how to preserve fire (Rousseau 2004: 28), signifying the moment when an 'emergence from the state of nature began' (Lovejoy 1948: 24). The second phase constitutes this process of acquiring necessary survival skills.

The third stage of Rousseau's theory corresponds to the 'culmination of this process' of improvement (Lovejoy 1948: 29). For Rousseau, 'this period of the development of the

human faculties, holding a just mean between the indolence of the primitive state, and the petulant activity of self-love, must have been the *happiest and most durable epoch*' (Rousseau 2004: 33 – emphasis mine). He reiterates that he regards this third stage to be the most ideal phase of human evolution, saying it was 'best for man', and uses 'the example of the savages, most of whom have been found in this condition [...] to confirm that mankind was formed ever to remain in it' (Rousseau 2004: 33). He argues that 'nothing could have drawn him out of it but some fatal accident, which, for the public good, should never have happened' and says that 'all ulterior improvements have been so many steps, in appearance towards the perfection of individuals, but in fact towards the decrepitness of the species' (Rousseau 2004: 33). This demonstrates that, contrary to popular belief, Rousseau 'did not idealize primitive man' (Mason 1979: 7), as it is the third stage of the natural state, when humans have a 'sense of morality', laws, and more severe 'necessary punishments' for rule-breaking (Rousseau 2004: 33), that Rousseau explicitly favours. However, as Lovejoy points out, 'Rousseau's account even of his third stage is far less idyllic' (Lovejoy 1948: 31), as Rousseau refers to it as 'a just mean' (Rousseau 2004: 33).

In Rousseau's opinion, this phase came to an end to the detriment of humanity. For Rousseau, 'metallurgy and agriculture were the two arts whose invention produced this great revolution' (Rousseau 2004: 34); exercising both of these arts guarantees progression into the civil state. Wealth became important, leading to a distinction between the rich and the poor, which 'rendered man avaricious, wicked and ambitious' (Rousseau 2004: 37). As a result, 'infant society became a scene of the most horrible warfare' and to remedy this, the rich created a political, civil state which 'subjected the rest of mankind to perpetual labour, servitude, and misery' (Rousseau 2004: 37-39). The *Second Discourse*, therefore, as Lovejoy notes, 'represents a movement rather away from than towards primitivism' (Lovejoy 1948: 16). What is notable is that Rousseau's fourth stage of the natural state, when humanity is on the brink of civilisation, closely resembles Hobbes's depiction of the natural human condition as a whole; 'we have in this part of the *Discourse* little more than a replica of the state of nature pictured in the *Leviathan*' (Lovejoy 1948: 33). The difference is that while Rousseau's portrayal of 'a scene of the most horrible warfare' (Rousseau 2004: 37) is an advanced version of the state of nature, Hobbes's depiction of the natural state as a state of war encompasses the natural condition in its entirety; 'Rousseau differed from Hobbes', as Lovejoy points out, 'merely in holding that this condition was not primitive' (Lovejoy 1948: 33).

Carter's depiction of the distinction between the state of nature and the civil state, therefore, conforms to Rousseau more than Hobbes, as, typically, she resists an absolute binary opposition, and sees the differences in terms of a spectrum instead. The trouble Marianne experiences when it comes to pinpointing where the Barbarians are on the continuum between the two states illustrates this. Not long after arriving at the Barbarians' current base, she observes Jen, Mrs Green's granddaughter, wearing 'a tunic of long-haired fur that made her look like a little Ancient Briton', and she 'contemplated the archaic child and wondered if her clothing were proof of the speed with which the Barbarians were sinking backwards or evidence of their adaptation to new conditions' (Carter 1972: 43). Thus, she regards the Barbarians to be in a transitional position somewhere between the two extremes of the accomplished civil state and the natural condition, and progressing or regressing towards one of these poles. If the Barbarians are degenerating to a state of nature, this *could* be optimistic in relation to Rousseau's *Second Discourse* – depending on what stage they are at – but disastrous *vis-à-vis* Hobbes. But in line with Rousseau, she envisages a spectrum rather than a strict binary division. This brings Carter's claim that she finds Rousseau's theories 'wanting' into question: by blurring the distinction between the Professors and Barbarians and regarding ideas of the civil state versus the natural state to be staggered on a spectrum rather than polar opposites, Carter shows an allegiance with Rousseau while simultaneously flagging up the limitations of Hobbes's dualistic view – she actually finds Hobbes 'wanting' on this count.

Marianne's stay with the Barbarians also gives Carter the opportunity to further problematise the Hobbesian notion of a universal state of nature, reinforcing her alignment with Rousseau's theory of a civility spectrum, as Marianne, like other members of the Barbarian camp, regards the 'state of nature' to be relative rather than absolute. For instance, she acknowledges variation *within* the Barbarian camp *vis-à-vis* Donally's son, Jewel, and Jewel's brother, Precious. Donally's son – known as the half-wit – is treated like a pet and pelted with stones against the 'romantic' backdrop of the Barbarian landscape (Carter 1972: 64), challenging, as I go on to discuss in more detail, Marianne's idealistic expectations of Barbarian life. Marianne then sees Jewel's brother Precious in the river, juxtaposing Donally's son and Precious by setting up an opposition between them.

In Rousseauian terms, Marianne sees Precious as exemplifying 'natural man' in the pure, initial state of nature. She says he looked 'just as if he had come from the hands of original nature, an animal weaker than some and less agile than others, but, taking him all round, the most advantageously organized of any' (Carter 1972: 65), describing his physical

appearance by citing Rousseau's words from the *Second Discourse*. He is wearing hardly any clothes, and 'had not finished growing' (Carter 1972: 65). Thus, Precious is seen as resembling 'pure essence of man in his most innocent state, more nearly related to the river than to herself' (Carter 1972: 65), which, as Meaney notes, is paradoxical (Meaney 1993: 110). When Marianne realises that Jewel is the Barbarian invader who murdered her brother a decade earlier, she says 'you were much younger, then [...] and looked more like Precious than yourself' (Carter 1972: 79), indicating that Jewel has progressed from this state. She also recalls that on that occasion Jewel 'looked a perfect savage' (Carter 1972: 95), implying that this description fits Marianne's interpretation of Precious. Nonetheless, Precious's characterisation of the 'perfect savage' who is 'pure essence of man' clashes with Marianne's encounter with the rest of the Barbarians, particularly Jewel, who is more advanced than she anticipated. As well as there being different degrees of 'natural man' amongst the Barbarians, Marianne also refers to another, alternative state of nature beyond the Barbarian base. In reference to Donally's pending deportation, for instance, she says that 'the wild beasts might eat him and do our job for us, in the natural state' (Carter 1972: 129). She therefore recognises that the 'state of nature' is not a ubiquitous term used to signify all apolitical or primitive conditions. This wording highlights Marianne's awareness that the Barbarians are not in 'the natural state' in the sense of Rousseau's first stage, as she regards there to be a less advanced state than the one she inhabits with the Barbarians.

While, following Hobbes's theory, this could be interpreted as Marianne thinking that the Barbarians are in the civil state instead, given the choice of only two options, this reading does not conform to the blurring of binaries in the novel in favour of continuums, and overlooks the Out People. The Out People are mutated as a result of nuclear radiation, and comprise the more rudimentary state to which Marianne refers. Following Marianne's grievous realisation that the infant Barbarians suffer from 'deficiency diseases' (Carter 1972: 45), Mrs Green highlights that she is better off with them than in the company of the disfigured outlaws. She says, 'you should see the way the Out People live, if living you call it. Huddled in holes in the ground, nursing their sores. They poison their arrows by dipping the heads in their sores, it's well known' (Carter 1972: 45), thus setting up a hierarchy in which the Barbarians are superior to the Out People. Jewel also compares the Out People to wild cats, saying:

> cats and Out People are the worst, worse than wolves. Cats drop down from the boughs if you startle a den; they drop on your shoulders and rip you and rip your eyes, if they get the chance. My brother got his arm ripped. Then it festers. Some muck in their saliva, cats. (Carter 1972: 28)

Both the Barbarians and the Out People, therefore, signify the 'state of nature' in the broad sense, with Marianne, Mrs Green, and Jewel all regarding the Out People to be inferior, and less developed than the Barbarians. If this is the case, the Out People should conform to Rousseau's idea of the state of nature in its pure sense more than the Barbarians, as the Out People are nearer to this end of the continuum. Carter brings the implications of the Out People's status into question.

By aligning the Out People with wild cats and 'savage beasts' – Jewel tells Marianne that she cannot stay in the transitory space between the Professors' compound and the Barbarians' current base because 'you've got nothing to eat and there's peril of Out People, isn't there, to say nothing of savage beasts' (Carter 1972: 24) – Carter examines the differences between the natural and civil states, between the wild and captivity, assessing which is preferable. As Rousseau similarly discusses human evolution in terms of domesticity, and becoming accustomed to a comfortable, sedentary life rather than living in the wild, this enables Carter to evaluate Rousseau's theories in relation to the Out People, the Barbarians, and the Professors. At the beginning of the *Second Discourse*, when Rousseau is depicting primitive humans in a positive light in terms of their physicality, he says:

> the horse, the cat, the bull, nay the ass itself, have generally a higher stature, and always a more robust constitution, more vigour, more strength and courage in their forests than in our houses; they lose half these advantages by becoming domestic animals; it looks as if all our attention to treat them kindly, and to feed them well, served only to bastardize them. It is thus with man himself. In proportion as he becomes sociable and a slave to others, he becomes weak, fearful, mean-spirited, and his soft and effeminate way of living at once completes the enervation of his strength and of his courage. (Rousseau 2004: 8)

He argues that wild animals and humans in the pre-civilised state are physically better off, braver, and nicer than pets and humans who leave the natural state; for Rousseau, domestic animals negatively resemble the corruption of the civilised human species.

Carter's depiction of the Professors and Barbarians makes a similar point, a point she also makes in an article called 'At the Zoo' (1976). In 'At the Zoo' Carter imagines the mandrills of Regent's Park realising 'how much better off we are here than in the wild!' because they have 'nice food, regular meals, no predators, no snakes, free medical care, [and] roofs over our heads' (Carter 1998j: 298). They recognise that 'after all this time, we couldn't really cope with the wild, again, could we?' (Carter 1998j: 298). Carter's discussion of animals becoming accustomed to captivity corresponds to her contemplation of human

nature, and how people can survive beyond the confines of civilisation; 'At the Zoo' is, as Anja Müller-Wood points out, 'a study of the human condition' (Müller-Wood 2012: 109). The same ideas are examined in *Heroes and Villains* through the figure of Marianne's father. He tells his daughter that:

> there were no wild beasts in the woods, before the war [...] in those days, Marianne, people kept wild beasts such as lions and tigers in cages and looked at them for information. Who would have thought they would take to our climate so kindly, when the fire came and let them out? (Carter 1972: 8-9)

While Marianne's father recognises that the lions and tigers have adapted – or are successfully adapting – to the post-apocalyptic context, the opposite is the case for the Professors. Instead, sealed in their enclosure, they resemble animals in captivity, who, like the Regent's Park mandrills, acknowledge the perks of this position in terms of safety and a life of leisure. In Rousseauian terms, this means that the Professors are 'weak', 'effeminate' and 'bastardize[d]', adding to Carter's satire (Rousseau 2004: 8). But while Carter concludes 'At the Zoo' by envisaging that the mandrills 'console themselves, perhaps. And, perhaps, weep' (Carter 1998j: 298), there is no indication that the Professors are consoling themselves about living in captivity, and being confined in the compound – quite the opposite. Like the mandrills, the Professors would be unable to survive in the current natural habitat, but in contrast to the zoo-dwelling primates, they do not regret this, or mourn their loss of liberty.

Jewel's differentiation between house cats and wild cats furthers this discussion. He aligns the disease-spreading wild cats to Out People, and contrasts them to pre-nuclear war felines, saying cats 'used to sit by firesides and purr, didn't they, they was well known for that' (Carter 1972: 28). Marianne tells Jewel that 'all cats did that before the war [...] now only Professor cats know their place' before referring to her nurse's 'house cat' as a 'nice cat' (Carter 1972: 28-29). This wild cat versus domestic cat dichotomy illustrates a distinction between the civilised and natural states, but blurs Hobbes's absolute binary division as the wild cats are synonymous with the Out People and the house cats resemble the domesticated Professors – but what about the Barbarians? This allows Carter to highlight the limitations of dualistic options. According to this formula the Out People should correspond to Rousseau's pure state of nature when humans were at their physical peak, but Carter disrupts this association. While Rousseau argues that 'Nature behaves towards all animals left to her care with a predilection' (Rousseau 2004: 7-8), contra Rousseau, the Out People are deformed outcasts; they signify the problems of civilisation and advances of science, as their mutations are the result of nuclear weapons. The Out People therefore contradict and parody Rousseau's

idea of the initial stage of the natural state. What is more, they use weaponry such as the bow and arrow, which is an indicator of the second phase of Rousseau's theory, although they 'focused unwisely on the front of the line' and 'were by no means cunning' (Carter 1972: 110), which adds further difficulty to pinpointing what stage of development they are at.

Although Carter's cat analogy conforms to Rousseau's staggered version of the state of nature in that it brings into question where the Barbarians are by aligning wild cats with Out People and house cats with Professors, Carter's depiction of the Out People finds Rousseau's theory 'wanting' as they simultaneously represent both the natural and unnatural human race, and illuminate problems of both the natural state and an advanced civil state. The fact that Marianne's father has an unspecified disfigurement (unless it is related to his short-sightedness?) further questions the divisions between the groups; he tells Marianne that her 'mother was a remarkable woman' because 'she married me in spite of my deformity' (Carter 1972: 11).

The zoo imagery and the cat metaphor also question how to interpret the Barbarians in relation to theories of the natural and civil states, particularly in relation to Hobbes and Rousseau. While the Professors are negatively affiliated with house cats and animals in captivity, the debilitating health conditions that prevail outside this compound raise questions as to whether captivity or the wilderness is better – whether the state of nature or civil state is preferable. As the dualistic cat analogy suggests, the Barbarians are somewhere between the two extremes of the natural state and civil state – they are neither wild cats nor domesticated felines. Marianne's uncertainty as to whether the Barbarians are 'sinking backwards' or adapting 'to new conditions' (Carter 1972: 43) reinforces their intermediate position. Establishing where the Barbarians are on this spectrum will determine how Carter envisages them in Rousseauian terms, and thus whether progressing or regressing – if either – is preferable.

Marianne's interaction with the Barbarians challenges her glorified expectations of the state of nature – 'whatever romantic attraction the idea of the Barbarians might have held for her as she sat by herself in the white tower, when her father was alive, had entirely evaporated' (Carter 1972: 52). Marianne's romanticised view of the Barbarians is overturned, and many critics interpret this, quite rightly, in Rousseauian terms. Day, for instance, argues that Marianne's encounter with 'real' Barbarians leads her to discover 'the misconceptions of Rousseau's idealisations' (Day 1998: 47). The fact that Carter acknowledges Rousseau's influence on *Heroes and Villains* and states that this novel is the vehicle for her analysis of Rousseauian theories, however, has been the subject of many dubious critical interpretations.

Gemma López claims that Carter 'toys with Rousseau's myth of the noble savage, which coincides with the uncivilised – natural – setting into which Marianne is suddenly propelled' (López 2007: 84). Both Day and López, therefore, fall into the trap of unproblematically associating Rousseau with a utopian view of the natural state and the 'noble savage' idea, and do not recognise that Rousseau's idea of the state of nature is more complicated than this. Peach similarly contends that:

> the social structure of the Barbarians also challenges Rousseau's myth of the noble savage [...] whilst Rousseau envisaged natural man as an isolate, Marianne, the product of "civilisation", is the outsider while the "natural" people are social with a valued family structure. (Peach 2009: 82)

Like López, Peach makes the mistake of blurring Rousseau's staggered presentation of the state of nature, and associating the Barbarians with the primary stage of Rousseau's theory. The isolated 'natural man' mentioned by Peach refers to this initial state, but the 'social', 'natural people', 'with a valued family structure' correspond to Rousseau's third, favoured condition. As Marianne's research reveals, the Barbarian society is made up of 'small family groups' who live together in transitory homes (Carter 1972: 44). Marianne also reports that:

> women prepared furs by various primitive methods, scraping away the flesh from the pelts with small knives. Others embroidered cloth with designs of cocks, roses, suns, cakes, knives, snakes and acorns [...] some old men were engaged in carving cups and platters from wood. Others had their hands up to the elbows in clay, for pottery. (Carter 1972: 44)

Such behaviour demonstrates that the Barbarians in no way correspond to the initial state of nature, as they are more advanced than this. Thus, Carter's challenge to Rousseau does not lie in her depiction of the Barbarians having a social structure; it lies in the fact that, as a tribal community, they depict the third stage of humanity that, for Rousseau, is 'best for man' (Rousseau 2004: 33). Like Rousseau's tertiary stage – that he believed 'mankind was formed ever to remain in' (Rousseau 2004: 33) – the Barbarians are a social group who have a system whereby breaking the rules results in punishment. By recognising that the state of nature is not an all-encompassing position and realising that the Barbarians are nearer to the civil state than the Out People are in terms of societal progress, Marianne herself acknowledges the significance of the Barbarians' transitional position. As Meaney more accurately states, 'to talk of the Barbarians in terms of the *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality* is to talk of them as already poised on the threshold of civilization' (Meaney 1993: 110), but she does not develop this point and discuss the complexities of Carter's representation of their tribal life. By portraying the Barbarians at this third stage – on the

brink of the fourth phase which is the next stepping-stone before civilisation – Carter can put Rousseau's theory to the test, asking: is this *actually* the best situation for humans to live in? Or would the Barbarians be better off if they progressed further and grouped into a civil community? Carter's parodical depiction of the Professors, whose knowledge is useless in the post-apocalyptic climate and whose population is in decline due to frequent suicides, suggests not, but her portrayal of the Barbarians, despite their adaptation, is no more indicative of posterity; malnourishment and skin disorders prevail in the Barbarian landscape, so it is doubtful that they will continue to survive if they remain in the state they are in.

There are frequent indications that Donally is encouraging the Barbarians to develop further and embrace the fourth phase of Rousseau's theory – the stage that also embodies Hobbes's view of the natural state. While Rousseau says that agriculture and metallurgy are recipes for disaster and that 'it is iron and corn, which have civilized men, and ruined mankind' (Rousseau 2004: 34), Donally is trying to encourage the Barbarians to grow their own produce, and thus enter the fourth stage. When he is on the brink of exile, for instance, he pleas, 'what will you do if I go away? Will you continue to rob and plunder or do you propose to settle and plant gardens?' (Carter 1972: 126), as the Barbarians currently rely on the Professors' cultivation of 'corn, flax, vegetables and fruit' (Carter 1972: 2). Donally also suggests that without this agricultural progression Jewel will be 'an idiot slave of nature' and will 'never be free' (Carter 1972: 131). He focuses on crop reproduction rather than metallurgy because the post-apocalyptic wasteland they live in contains remnants of metallurgical practice which the Barbarians parasitically use: 'the Barbarian world is not natural and native, but is a Necropolis "built" upon the ruins of the city' (Yoshioka 2006: 72). Mrs Green heats water in 'a black iron pot' (Carter 1972: 65), and there are 'rusting iron bars' across the windows of the Barbarians' shelter (Carter 1972: 45). Jewel also steals bullets from the Professors, further reinforcing that such material still has some kind of purpose. Donally is trying to rebuild a civilisation following the nuclear war, but as a follower of Hobbes rather than Rousseau, he regards this reconstruction to be essential rather than detrimental. Nevertheless, according to Rousseau's trajectory in the *Second Discourse*, approaching a civil state has disastrous consequences. The ambiguity of Carter's conclusion, with Marianne left as the fearsome 'tiger lady' in charge of the remaining Barbarians, does not specify whether Donally's successor also encourages the Barbarians to be agronomical; her intention to rule them 'with a rod of iron' (Carter 1972: 150) signals danger in relation to Rousseau's *Second Discourse*. As well as aligning her with a Hobbesian sovereign like

Donally, as I go on to discuss, it has the dual symbolism of signifying that progress towards Rousseau's fourth stage is being made, by holding on to metallurgy.

I now turn to Carter's depiction of the role of leader. One defining feature of the civil state in contrast to the state of nature is that there is a ruler of some kind, and Hobbes's and Rousseau's theories are no exception to this. In *The Social Contract* – the text that shows that Rousseau 'did not condemn all organized society, and [...] believed that there was one society, one yet to be constructed, that was infinitely preferable to pre-political conditions' (Gay 1987: xvi) – Rousseau imagines a civil state which has been created because there were too many 'obstacles' for surviving in the natural state; 'the human race would perish unless it changed its manner of existence' (Rousseau 1973: 190). He argues that a 'social contract provides the solution' to this, which 'will defend and protect with the whole common force the person and goods of each associate, and in which each, while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as free as before' (Rousseau 1973: 191). In this civil state, the citizen loses their natural liberty – the freedom they had in the state of nature – but 'gains [...] civil liberty and the proprietorship of all he possesses' (Rousseau 1973: 196). All inhabitants participate in the sovereign power and vote according to the general will – the common interests of the public. A key figure within this civil state is a legislator, who 'occupies in every respect an extraordinary position in the State [...] which is neither magistracy, nor Sovereignty' (Rousseau 1973: 214); this 'quasi-divine figure [...] manages to instantiate the general will in a single person' (Matravers 1998: xiii).

In *Leviathan*, Hobbes also sees the civil state as a stable alternative to the state of nature and, like Rousseau and Carter, sees society as a construct. Hobbes says that the agreement 'of man, is by covenant only, which is artificial' (Hobbes 1996: 113). In contrast to Rousseau, Hobbes argues that the only way to successfully leave the natural state is for the species 'to confer all their power and strength upon one man, or upon one assembly of men, that may reduce all their wills, by plurality of voices, unto one will [...] this done, the multitude so united in one person, is called a COMMONWEALTH' (Hobbes 1996: 114 – original capitalisation). Hobbes's civil state, therefore, is governed by one, male, sovereign leader, who, amongst other things, is responsible 'for the preserving of peace and security' (Hobbes 1996: 118), prescribing rules that determine what the subjects can do and enjoy, 'the right of judicature' (Hobbes 1996: 119), rewarding or punishing the subservient members of the commonwealth, and, similarly to Plato's *Republic*, he introduces and oversees state censorship.

As Donally's citation from *Leviathan* embodies – 'The passion to be reckoned upon is fear; whereof there be two very general objects: one, the power of spirits invisible, the other, the power of those men they shall therein offend' (Carter 1972: 63; Hobbes 1996: 94) – fear is central to the Hobbesian civil state. Hobbes's sovereign uses fear to govern the subjects, and to prevent them from violating the regulations of the commonwealth; he 'relies heavily on his subjects' fear of the return of the state of nature to motivate them to keep their covenant of obedience' since 'fear is the motive to rely on' (Ryan 1996: 225). Thus, contra Rousseau, Hobbes favours an absolute monarchy and 'justifies the exercise of virtual dictatorship by the sovereign power' (Gaskin 1996: xxxvi), putting forward a theory of 'pure despotism' (Cole 1973: xx). In Hobbes's civil state, fear is prevalent and the citizens are characterised by 'passive obedience: the people is bound, by the contract, to obey its ruler, no matter whether he govern well or ill' (Cole 1973: xix).

Donally's leadership conforms to Hobbes's sovereign ruler rather than to Rousseau's legislator in *The Social Contract* who represents the general will of the community. He refers to 'fear' as the 'ruling passion' and, in line with Hobbes's description of the sovereign, says, 'I can provoke an ecstasy of dread by raising my little finger but then, I've worked hard and bided my time' (Carter 1972: 50-51). Fear is used to keep the Barbarians in line and to avoid the collapse of the civilisation Donally is trying to sustain. Fear is central to the Barbarians' appearance, as their performance of savage brutality is part of their survival technique – it enables them to take advantage of the Professors' crops. When Marianne meets Jewel, for instance, it is revealed that their braided, decorated hair and painted faces are deliberately adorned to instil fear, unbeknownst to the Professors – 'it makes us more frightening' (Carter 1972: 24). As Marianne recognises, 'fear is their major weapon, so they need to get themselves up to look like nothing on earth, not men at all' (Carter 1972: 65) – they put on a conscious performance of savage bestiality to scare the Professors.

Marianne, too, is encouraged to use fear to retain power over the Barbarians. While they find her horrifying to begin with (which is reinforced by the myth that Professor women have vagina dentata), Jewel acknowledges that he is 'very frightened' of Marianne (Carter 1972: 56), the Barbarians greet her with hand gestures that are 'intended to ward off the evil eye' (Carter 1972: 31), and Donally tells her 'you'll have to remain terrifying, you know; otherwise, what hope is there for you?' (Carter 1972: 50). When Marianne declares that she will take on the mythopoeic role of leader/sovereign at the end of the novel, she indicates that she will also employ fear to aid her reign over the Barbarians, following Donally's Hobbesian-inspired lead. She echoes Donally, saying 'they won't get rid of me as easily as

that. I shall stay here and frighten them so much they'll do every single thing I say' (Carter 1972: 150). Thus, she is an object of fear rather than a subject of fear; before putting on the symbolic wedding dress as requested by Donally as part of his invented wedding ritual, it is revealed that, anti-Hobbes, 'her ruling passion was always anger rather than fear and she turned into a mute, furious doll which allowed itself to be totally engulfed' (Carter 1972: 69). The dress itself, as 'a memento of the Death, or Self-Destruction of Civilization' (Yoshioka 2006: 72), is 'an image of terror' (Carter 1972: 68); the dress encourages the Barbarians to submit to Donally's reign, thus avoiding the collapse of the reconstructed civilisation he is trying to sustain. While, according to Marianne, her father 'didn't like it [*Leviathan*] much', Donally responds: 'doubtless he hoped for the best [...] he didn't have to create a power structure and fortify it by any means at his disposal. He was sustained by ritual and tradition; both of which I must invent' (Carter 1972: 63). Her father's disinclination towards *Leviathan* and Donally's explanation of this imply that Donally has a pessimistic, Hobbesian outlook towards the natural state, and anticipates that without creating a 'power structure', a regression to a state of war would be imminent – as, for Hobbes, war and peace are polar opposites aligned with the natural state and the civil state respectively. Donally's words suggest that Marianne's father has a more optimistic outlook, and does not envisage his still intact and working civil state as degenerate – "still intact" and "working" in Marianne's father's opinion.

As Donally's reading from *Leviathan* indicates, Hobbes distinguishes between two types of fear: 'one, the power of spirits invisible, the other, the power of those men they shall therein offend' (Carter 1972: 63; Hobbes 1996: 94). The former refers to religion and is 'the greater power' and 'is in every man' – in both the state of nature and in the civil state (Hobbes 1996: 94). The latter encompasses fear in the political sense – fear of the sovereign leader. It 'is commonly the greater fear' and arises with the birth of the commonwealth 'because in the condition of mere nature, the inequality of power is not discerned, but by the event of battle' (Hobbes 1996: 94). In the pre-civilised world, Hobbes argues, 'nothing can strengthen a covenant of peace agreed on, against the temptations of avarice, ambition, lust, or other strong desire, but the fear of that invisible power' (Hobbes 1996: 94). Fear of religion, therefore, is associated with both the state of nature and civilisation, and is the only fear in the natural state; the second, political fear, goes hand-in-hand with the establishment of the commonwealth and is embodied by the sovereign leader. Taking on the role of sovereign leader, Donally recognises the power of religious fear in the civil state:

> it seemed to me that the collapse of civilization in the form that intellectuals such as ourselves understood it might be as good a time as any for crafting a new religion. [...] Religion is a device for instituting the sense of a privileged group, you understand; many are called but few are chosen and, coaxed from incoherence, we shall leave the indecent condition of barbarism and aspire towards that of the honest savage, maintaining some kind of commonwealth. (Carter 1972: 63)

Thus, in line with Hobbes, Donally strives to inculcate both categories of fear given the post-apocalyptic opportunity. He thinks that his religion will fuel the progress from 'the indecent condition of barbarism' to 'some kind of commonwealth'. It seems that Donally's goals are tinged with Rousseauian thought too, though. His aim for 'some kind' of civil state, specifically referred to as a 'commonwealth' in line with Hobbes's *Leviathan*, depicts the inhabitants in similar terms to Rousseau's idea of a 'noble savage' – he 'aspire[s] towards that [condition] of the honest savage'. While, like Hobbes, Donally associates the natural state with 'barbarism', he hints at a gradual progression from the savage state to a commonwealth, contra Hobbes; the 'honest savage' embodies a state further advanced than the brutish natural state, but not quite a fully-functioning commonwealth, thus encompassing an intermediate position.

Hobbes's argument that 'the seed of *religion*, is also only in man' (Hobbes 1996: 71 – original emphasis) – that religion is a social construction, and that its seeds grow differently according to how they are manipulated in each society – led to *Leviathan* receiving a damning reception; because Hobbes's ideas were unorthodox, he was charged for 'facilitat[ing] atheistical views' (Gaskin 1994: xxxiii). In 1683, four years after Hobbes's death, Oxford University called for its copies of *Leviathan* and *De Cive* to be incinerated, calling them 'damnable', 'heretical' and 'blasphemous' (Gaskin 1996: xi). Carter similarly demolishes master narratives and canonical beliefs and discusses religion as a social construct by, for instance, depicting Donally's invention of a new belief system. She told Appignanesi that atheism 'is the most honourable course a human person can take in the face of religion' (Carter to Appignanesi 1987: unpaginated), a belief that resurfaces in much of her work, of which *Heroes and Villains* is just one example.[10] Like Hobbes, Donally uses religion – the '*fear* of power invisible, feigned by the mind, or imagined from tales publicly allowed' (Hobbes 1996: 37 – original emphasis) – to strengthen his commonwealth, as religion is, for him, a 'social necessity' (Carter 1972: 51). His invented religion 'use[s] most

[10] Carter's controversial television programme *The Holy Family Album* also portrays Carter's atheistic views – see Crofts (2003) for an extensive discussion of the programme's reception. I revisit Carter's atheism in my discussion of Sade in Chapter Five.

of the forms of the Church of England' as Donally finds them 'infinitely adaptable' (Carter 1972: 63); he adopts a snake as a religious symbol to worship and inaugurates Marianne as a 'holy image' (Carter 1972: 50).

By aligning Donally with Hobbes, Carter voices her iconoclastic views of religion, putting forward a similarly defamatory view of religion to Hobbes: she provides a damning critique of the relationship between religion and the law, admonishes the idea of being punished for not having the desired religious views, and highlights the constructedness of belief systems. Donally's installation of a snake as an icon of reverence epitomises Carter's damning portrayal of religion. He 'keeps *Viperus berus* in a box out of social necessity and now and then he persuades them all [the Barbarians] to worship it' (Carter 1972: 29). Following Donally's religion, some of the Barbarians have been tattooed with snakes around their wrists. Donally encourages the Barbarians to worship the serpent out of *fear*, and, as represented by Jewel, the Barbarians have not fallen for Donally's indoctrination. Jewel and Donally have debates about religion, but Jewel tells Marianne: 'I don't believe in it at all but I always let him win in the end for he has his poison chest, see, and I'm cautious of his poisons' (Carter 1972: 29). Jewel pretends to believe and is complicit with the expectations of the religion because of Donally's toxin collection. Jewel also indifferently recognises the symbolism of the serpent, saying 'if you've got to worship something, why not the snake' in light of its circularity – a symbol of eternity – and the fact that it 'lives on air and soil', and can defend itself with venom (Carter 1972: 30). Rather than worshipping the snake, he merely acknowledges *why* Donally made this choice. Thus, Donally's goal for the Barbarians to regard the snake as a symbol of idolatry is unsuccessful – the seeds of religion are not growing under his rule. The snake that Donally wants to be worshipped is revealed to be a 'dead snake, and stuffed', as Jewel 'took it from its cage and cut it open so the sawdust spilled out in front of everybody before he burned it' (Carter 1972: 133). The stuffed snake epitomises Carter's iconoclasm, as, like Hobbes, she parodies icons of worship and exposes the fabrication of belief systems.

Hobbes's distinction between divine worship, civil worship, and scandalous worship, adds another dimension to Carter's portrayal of religion in *Heroes and Villains*, critiquing Donally's application of Hobbesian theory in practice. Divine worship is 'the worship we exhibit to that which we think to be God, whatsoever the words, ceremonies, gestures or other actions be', whereas 'civil worship' corresponds to 'the worship we exhibit to those we esteem to be but men, as to kings, and men in authority' (Hobbes 1996: 431). While Hobbes acknowledges the function of religious fear, he adds that if a leader forces someone to

worship 'by the terror of death, or other great corporal punishment, it is not idolatry' (Hobbes 1996: 433). Rather than showing obedience to the leader and worshipping the sovereign as a God, performing and conforming to religious rituals shows that the follower 'is desirous to save himself from death, or from a miserable life; and that which is not a sign of internal honour, is no worship; and therefore no idolatry' (Hobbes 1996: 434). Rather than demonstrating divine or civil worship, Jewel "worships" out of fear, fitting Hobbes's definition of 'scandalous worship' – 'fear of death, or other grievous punishment' (Hobbes 1996: 436). Thus, although Carter agrees with Hobbes *vis-à-vis* the construction of religion, her portrayal of Donally as Hobbes's sovereign leader highlights the problems of a dictatorship that uses fear and religion to encourage social conformity and unity. Donally has failed to instigate idolatry and has instead initiated scandalous worship, indicating that despite his efforts, Donally is not feared as a leader *per se,* but because of the potential circumstances of not obeying.

Donally is also inculcating notions of justice and punishment as part of his role as the Hobbesian sovereign; 'punishment is a known consequence of the violation of the laws, in every commonwealth' (Hobbes 1996: 195). Donally chooses whipping as his form of discipline, with Precious being sentenced to flagellation for not patrolling diligently enough. Although Jewel is the flogger, he admits that he would not have punished his brother from his 'own free will' (Carter 1972: 123); Donally – as the sovereign leader trying to sustain a Hobbesian civil state – is a dictator who has extracted autonomy from his followers. For this 'performance of justice' (Carter 1972: 112) Jewel dons a robe and mask, and the act is watched by an audience of fellow tribe members, highlighting the construction of civil society. Marianne notes that while enacting the role of flagellator, Jewel becomes 'mechanical' and 'was nothing but the idea of that power which men fear to offend' (Carter 1972: 113), embodying Hobbes's idea of political fear, 'the power of those men they shall therein offend' (Carter 1972: 63; Hobbes 1996: 94). Jewel only takes on this role briefly, as Donally wrote the script for this performance and enacts this part more regularly. Hobbes depicts the commonwealth as 'an artificial man; though of greater stature and strength [...] in which, the *sovereignty* is an artificial *soul*, as giving life and motion to the whole body' (Hobbes 1996: 7 – original emphasis). He sees the body in mechanical terms, saying 'for what is the *heart*, but a *spring*; and the *nerves*, but so many *springs*; and the *joints*, but so many *wheels*, giving motion to the whole body, such as was intended by the artificer?' (Hobbes 1996: 7 – original emphasis); Carter makes a note of this quotation in her journal but cites Watkins's *Hobbes's System of Ideas* rather than *Leviathan* (Carter 1968-69 Journal

MS88899/1/92: unpaginated; Watkins 1965: 104). In this sense, Donally can be seen as Jewel's engineer, who, by introducing laws and acts of punishment, is working towards making Jewel his successor – to 'give you a future' and 'make you a politician and [...] become the King of all the Yahoos and all the Professors, too' (Carter 1972: 125-126). Rather than Jewel becoming 'the Tiger Man' (Carter 1972: 146), a female sovereign Marianne takes over. She problematically plans to take on Donally's scripted role of 'tiger lady' and preside over the Barbarians, and like Donally, intends to use fear to keep the followers in line (Carter 1972: 150).

The ambiguity of the end of *Heroes and Villains* adds to the conflation of the natural and civil states, as the Barbarians are left in an intermediate position on the continuum. The Barbarians remain in Rousseau's third stage under Marianne's Hobbesian-inspired rule, but there is a possibility that they will progress further towards the civil state. The breakdown of binary systems means that Carter's claim that *Heroes and Villains* is 'Hobbes fighting with Rousseau' is not as straightforward as it may appear on the surface. Although Carter broadly engages with Hobbes and Rousseau's oppositional views of the 'pure' state of nature, her depiction of how the Professors, Barbarians, and Out People are distinguished conforms to Rousseau's theory of a spectrum between the civil and natural states rather than to Hobbes's notion of a binary division. Therefore, while she asserts that the novel highlights the shortcomings of Rousseau's work, it also finds the foundations of Hobbes's theory 'wanting', while questioning how perfect Rousseau's third stage in the *Second Discourse* is. Carter's argument that she finds Rousseau's theories 'wanting' is debatable for a second reason: her depiction of knowledge and post-apocalyptic survival in the novel does not highlight deficiencies in Rousseau's work. Instead, the fundamental importance both Rousseau and Hobbes place on having relevant, current knowledge, which is useful and discovered for oneself, is endorsed by Carter, as the Professors' lack of these qualities is the subject of her parody. Pitting Hobbes and Rousseau against each other does not therefore work; their theories on knowledge and education have a lot in common and overlap in many ways, and the same can be said regarding their perceptions of the civil "versus" natural state, with Rousseau's fourth stage in the *Second Discourse* resembling Hobbes's state of nature.

Thus, while Carter sets up absolute divisions and order in *Heroes and Villains*, and retrospectively comments that the novel constitutes a battle between Hobbes and Rousseau, I would argue that the fight between them should not be seen as a head-on collision. Just as the binaries in *Heroes and Villains* are blurred, so are the theories of Rousseau and Hobbes, conforming to Marianne's claim that 'when I was a little girl, we played at heroes and villains

but now I don't know which is which any more, nor who is who' (Carter 1972: 125). This sentiment also applies to Hobbes and Rousseau – Carter engages with the midpoint in Rousseau's theory and the non-existent grey area between the state of nature and the civil state in Hobbes's work, and in doing so challenges both of their views, while also agreeing with elements of both of their ideas – particularly what they have to say about education and knowledge. While Carter's theorising on the natural state is central to *Heroes and Villains*, her interest in this topic endures beyond this text; Carter returns to these ideas in *Doctor Hoffman* and *The Sadeian Woman* in relation to Sade and his similarly intertextual discussion of these topics, which is partly guided by Rousseau and Hobbes, as I examine in Chapter Five. The state of nature is also central to John Locke's *The Second Treatise of Government*, the text which provides the epigraph for *The Passion of New Eve*; I discuss Locke in the next chapter in this light, while also analysing his theory of knowledge and the influences of two other thinkers on Carter's work: René Descartes and David Hume.

Chapter Three – Descartes, Locke, and Hume: The Cogito, Blank Slates, and Causation

> Where's this old "Cogito Ergo Sum" now?
> (Carter 1962-63 Journal MS88899/1/88: unpaginated)

> The newcomers had no more than scribbled their signatures on the blank page of the continent that was, as it lay under the snow, no whiter nor more pure than their intentions.
> (Carter 2006h: 376)

> He had contravened the laws of cause and effect, as the philosopher Hume suggested was possible.
> (Carter 1970: 21)

So far, I have established that Rousseau and Hobbes were key influences on Carter in the late 1960s and argued that Plato's impact on Carter spans her career but is particularly pertinent at the end of the 1960s and throughout the following decade. In this chapter, I turn my attention to Carter's earlier philosophical research, focusing on three thinkers she first encountered in the early 1960s – René Descartes (1596-1650), John Locke (1632-1704), and David Hume (1711-76). As well as discussing Carter's initial response to these philosophers and their arguments, I trace the impact they each had on Carter's later career; while Carter's work on this trio was concurrent to begin with, she later focuses on them individually, concentrating on particular ideas of each thinker.

Carter's initial reading of Descartes, Locke, and Hume corresponds to late 1962-May 1963, coinciding with her first term as an undergraduate at the University of Bristol, where she studied English Literature. During this period, Carter made notes on Descartes's *A Discourse on the Method of Correctly Conducting One's Reason and Seeking Truth in the Sciences* (1637), Locke's *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1690), and Hume's *A Treatise of Human Nature* (1739-40),[1] in this order (Carter 1962-63 Journal MS88899/1/88: unpaginated). Carter's journals at this time take more of a diary form, with her notes on Descartes corresponding to November and December 1962 and Hume to May 1963; her reading of Locke is vague in terms of exact dates, but falls somewhere between March and May 1963, before Hume (Carter 1962-63 Journal MS88899/1/88: unpaginated). I would argue that Carter's chronological reading of these three texts is significant: these thinkers are central to debates surrounding rationalism versus empiricism – discussions concerning

[1] Hume's *Treatise* was written as three books, entitled 'Of the Understanding', 'Of the Passions' and 'Of Morals' respectively; the first two books were published anonymously in 1739, and the third book followed a year later (Johnson 1995: 1; Penelhum 1992: 3).

whether knowledge is innate or learnt through experience – and they each build upon the arguments of their predecessors. For instance, while Descartes is a proponent of innate ideas, Locke argues against innate knowledge in his *Essay*, positioning himself in opposition to thinkers *like* Descartes, although he does not specify exactly who his adversaries are, merely referring to them as 'some Men': 'it is an established Opinion amongst some Men, That there are in the Understanding certain *innate Principles*; some primary Notions [...] Characters, as it were stamped upon the Mind of Man, which the Soul receives in its very first Being' (Locke 2008: 17 – original emphasis). Some critics have assigned 'Descartes as the opponent who is attacked in the *Essay*' (Yolton 1956: 26), while others have claimed 'it is certainly not against Descartes' (Gibson 1931: 43). Nevertheless, it is clear that Locke and Descartes have oppositional views on innate knowledge, whether Locke is explicitly attacking Descartes or not. Subsequently, Hume adds to Locke's empiricist argument that knowledge is acquired *a posteriori* – from experience – raising, as I will go on to discuss, the previously unasked question 'why a cause is always necessary' (Hume 2009: 71).

While a detailed overview of Descartes, Locke, and Hume's theories is not my purpose here, Carter's chronological reading of these works suggests a prior knowledge about the relationship between these three thinkers, as well as an interest in the rationalism versus empiricism debate – an interest in how knowledge is learned. Bearing in mind Carter's deconstruction of essentialist notions of gender and argument that gender is a social construct – discussed in relation to Plato in Chapter One – her research on Descartes, Locke and Hume's theories of knowledge acquisition is hardly surprising: her reading of and later questioning of their arguments means that she is contributing to the long-standing debate surrounding where knowledge comes from and how identities are formed. That said, it is worth noting that although rationalist and empiricist thought are often discussed in terms of a 'conflict between two supposedly hostile armies', the binary division is not this straightforward (Cottingham 1988: 2). Empiricism is generally associated with Locke and Hume as well as George Berkeley (1685-1753) 'on the one side', who base 'their philosophies on the foundation of sensory experience', while rationalism is represented by Descartes as well as Baruch Spinoza (1632-77) and Gottfried Leibniz (1646-1716), who, as John Cottingham continues, 'were seen as attempting to construct their philosophical systems purely a priori' – based on reason (Cottingham 1988: 2). Cottingham argues that it would be 'fundamentally misguided' to 'separate out these interweaving strands into two wholly distinct structures labelled "rationalism" and "empiricism"' (Cottingham 1988: 3), because neither Descartes, Spinoza nor Leibniz 'described himself as "rationalist"' (Cottingham 1988:

1); the philosophers on "both" sides of this debate influenced each other; and none of the three rationalists 'tried to dispense with sensory experience entirely' – rather, 'they shared a belief that it was possible, by the use of reason, to gain a superior kind of knowledge to that derived from the senses' (Cottingham 1988: 4).

While I acknowledge the overlap between rationalist and empiricist thought in relation to my discussion of Descartes, Locke, and Hume, Carter's reading of and response to these thinkers is focused on their broader arguments surrounding innate knowledge versus knowledge learned from experience. In the light of Carter's advocacy of constructivism and disdain for essentialism, it will come as no surprise that she is more in favour of Hume's (and Locke's) empirical arguments while she denigrates Descartes's rational standpoint. For instance, in the 1962-63 journal, she writes a poem beginning with the line 'Piss off, Descartes', encapsulating her derogation of Cartesian thought (Carter 1962-63 Journal MS88899/1/88: unpaginated). In sharp contrast, her response to Hume's *Treatise* is complimentary: 'I am shattered by Hume; he is tremendous' (Carter 1962-63 Journal MS88899/1/88: unpaginated).

This chapter examines Carter's engagement with Descartes, Locke, and Hume in turn, looking at how each of these thinkers – whom she initially encountered 3-4 years before the publication of her first novel in 1966 – influenced her later writing. I discuss how Carter's reading of Locke's *Essay* as well as his *Two Treatises of Government* (1690)[2] had an impact on a range of her works, from *Shadow Dance* (1966) to *Nights at the Circus* (1984) and 'The Ghost Ships: A Christmas Story', which was published posthumously in *American Ghosts and Old World Wonders* (1993), not forgetting *The Passion of New Eve* (1977), which opens with an epigraph from *The Second Treatise of Government*: 'In the beginning all the world was *America*' (Locke 1988: 301 – original emphasis). Carter also demonstrates her reading of Hume via an epigraph, as a quotation from his *Treatise* opens *Several Perceptions* (1968), a novel which takes its title from Hume as well: 'The mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively make their appearance; pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations' (Hume 2009: 194). As well as discussing Carter's engagement with Hume in *Several Perceptions*, I argue that Hume is also a key intertext for another novel in the Bristol trilogy – *Love* (written in 1969, published in 1971). Adhering to chronology, though, I begin by examining Carter's denigration of Descartes's philosophy,

[2] Although *Two Treatises of Government* is generally regarded as being published in 1690, there is debate surrounding this issue. See Peter Laslett's Introduction to *Two Treatises* (Laslett 1988: 3-133).

which ricochets throughout her *oeuvre* but makes a particular impact on *The Infernal Desire Machines of Doctor Hoffman* (1972).

Descartes: The Cogito, Doubt, and Desires

Carter's treatment of philosophy in her *oeuvre* can generally be defined as satirical and derogatory, but this denigration is particularly hyperbolic when it comes to her damning view of the French thinker Descartes. The seed for her vilification of Descartes was sown in the winter of 1962 while researching his *Discourse on the Method*, of which Carter wrote: 'who can take him seriously after this?' (Carter 1962-63 Journal MS88899/1/88: unpaginated). She goes on to note, 'I keep hearing steps in the hall and hoping it's a visitor for me but it never is, so here I am with Descartes, whom I loathe' (Carter 1962-63 Journal MS88899/1/88: unpaginated). This contempt for Descartes is eloquently articulated in a poem:

> Piss off, Descartes
> When you touch that particular nerve
> I am blasted from existence
> Calling into a new dimension
> Where you and I blaze with a cleansing fire –
> And are CONSUMED
> Where's this old "Cogito Ergo Sum" now?
> I do not exist therefore I am
> In the orgiastic moment which is
> ETERNITY. (Carter 1962-63 Journal MS88899/1/88: unpaginated – original capitalisation)

Thus, Carter's repudiation of Descartes is targeted at the well-known foundational principle of Cartesian philosophy – 'I think, therefore I am' – which has been regarded as 'the most celebrated philosophical dictum of all time' (Cottingham 1992: 1). For Descartes, the certainty of his own existence 'could not be shaken by any of the most extravagant suppositions of the sceptics', so the rational 'truth' that '*I am thinking therefore I exist*' was accepted 'without scruple, as the first principle of the philosophy I was seeking' (Descartes 2006: 28 – original emphasis).[3] In the Latin translation of the *Discourse* in 1644, this famous doctrine was translated as 'Cogito ergo sum'; Descartes's *The Principles of Philosophy* (1644), which he wrote in Latin, also uses these words (Cottingham 1986: 35). As Michael Moriarty notes, Descartes's 'discovery of his own existence' is now 'known traditionally as the Cogito' (Moriarty 2008: xxvi). While in English the Cogito is often translated as 'I think,

[3] My references for Descartes's *A Discourse on the Method of Correctly Conducting One's Reason and Seeking Truth in the Sciences* are from Ian Maclean's 2006 translation. In the bibliography at the end of her 1962-63 journal, Carter lists an edition of this work by A. C. P. Snowman (Carter 1962-63 Journal MS88899/1/88: unpaginated); I do not know any further information about this edition.

therefore I am' or 'I think, therefore I exist', many Cartesian scholars point out that it would be more accurate to translate it as 'I am thinking', following Ian Maclean's translation that I have used.[4] I consciously use the 'I think' translation in the following discussion as this is the format that Carter consistently uses in her vilification of Descartes, whether it is 'I think, therefore I am' or 'I think, therefore I exist'.

While I will go on to discuss Carter's poetic attack on Descartes in detail, for now I just want to draw attention to the fact that in this poem she is questioning the validity of the Cogito, asking 'Where's this old "Cogito Ergo Sum" now?' and negating it by asserting 'I do not exist therefore I am' in the moment of orgasm (Carter 1962-63 Journal MS88899/1/88: unpaginated). This marks the inception of Carter's repeated rewriting of Descartes's Cogito, which is a recurring feature of her later novels. On each occasion, Carter challenges or substitutes the verb 'think'. This trend is apparent in her first novel *Shadow Dance*: Morris momentarily 'felt thin, spectral and translucent, a figment of somebody else's imagination. He bit purposefully on a carious molar until the pain convinced him he was alive. I hurt, therefore I am. I ought to go to the dentist, therefore I am' (Carter 1995: 107). This tactic is recycled in Carter's work from 1969-79, where reinterpretations or challenges to the Cogito are particularly rife. In *Heroes and Villains* (1969) for instance, the final slogan Donally inscribes on the wall is 'I THINK, THEREFORE I EXIST; BUT IF I TAKE TIME OFF FROM THINKING, WHAT THEN?' (Carter 1972: 98 – original capitalisation). This mirrors Descartes's claim in his *Meditations of First Philosophy* (1641) that 'I am, I exist, this is certain [...] for as long as I am thinking; for perhaps if I were to cease from all thinking it might also come to pass that I might immediately cease altogether to exist' (Descartes 2008: 19), suggesting that Carter read this Cartesian text as well. Carter's subsequent novel *Doctor Hoffman* establishes 'I DESIRE THEREFORE I EXIST' as 'the Doctor's version of the cogito' (Carter 2010: 252 – original capitalisation), and, in line with *Shadow Dance*, Desiderio thinks that the Minister's modification of the 'Cartesian cogito' is 'I am in pain, therefore I exist' (Carter 2010: 18). Similarly, in *The Sadeian Woman* (1979) Carter renders '*I fuck therefore I am*' as the Sadeian variant (Carter 2009: 29 – original emphasis). Her journals are also littered with adaptations or rejections of the Cartesian Cogito. In one of her Japanese notebooks, for instance, Carter writes, 'I know I am alive because I buy things. I buy, therefore I exist' (Carter undated 'Tokyo: Inventory of an Imaginary City' in Journal

[4] John Cottingham says 'when these words occur in Descartes' discussion of the certainty of his existence, [the English translation] should employ the so-called continuous present – "I am thinking" – rather than the simple present, "I think"' (Cottingham 1986: 36).

MS88899/1/80: 9). Likewise, in 1969-70, Carter ponders: 'perhaps I should say: "I am not the thing I am" or "Cogito non ergo sum,"' and makes a note to read (or re-read) Descartes's work (Carter 1969-70 Journal MS88899/1/93: unpaginated).

In fact, Carter's unpublished manuscripts from 1972 reveal that she envisaged three of her novels as 'versions of the Cogito': *Doctor Hoffman*, *New Eve*, and *Nights at the Circus* (Carter 1972 Journal MS88899/1/94: 67). She writes that 'A man's sense of the world defines his fate – his, "I.... Therefore..."' and lists how the Cogito structures this "trilogy" using the '∴' symbol: 'Hoffman: I desire [therefore] I exist', 'Hermaphrodite: I love [therefore] I exist', and 'Manifesto: I rebel [therefore] I exist' (Carter 1972 Journal MS88899/1/94: 67). It is noteworthy that Carter makes this reflection before completing *New Eve*, referred to here as 'Hermaphrodite' in reference to one of the novel's working titles 'The Great Hermaphrodite', and more than ten years before the publication of *Nights at the Circus*, provisionally entitled 'The Manifesto for Year One'. Thus, on the one hand, the reliability of Carter's intentions as she progressed work on these two novels has to be taken into account; on the other, her assessment of her 1972 novel *Doctor Hoffman* in terms of Descartes's Cogito can be seen as more valid, based on the time she made this claim. *Doctor Hoffman* is the main focus of this section, as Carter's engagement with Descartes is most substantial in this novel.[5]

The fact that Carter researched and planned *Doctor Hoffman* in Japan is a contributing factor to her questioning of Cartesian thought, and to her deconstruction of Western philosophy more broadly. In a piece called 'Tokyo' – which she wrote in Japan – she writes:

> this is a great country for appearances and it is often hard to tell what is real and what is not. (And, as generations of Zen oracles have pointed out, it doesn't matter much, anyway. Well, of course, it matters to a European, burdened with 2,500 years of logic, one plus one equalling two etc. etc. etc. And sometimes I sit here in Tokyo and feel, with an inexpressible pang, that I am watching them all receding into history... goodbye, Plato; au revoir, Descartes; auf wiedersehn [sic], Hegel, you did swell...). (Carter undated 1969-74 'Tokyo' in Journal MS88899/1/81: 2)

Carter's time in Japan therefore corresponds to an escape from Western thought, and, as *Doctor Hoffman* suggests, this gave her the opportunity to question the foundations of Western philosophy from an outsider's perspective. The incapacity to 'tell what is real and what is not' that Carter says is a defining feature of Japan is central to *Doctor Hoffman* as well, as it is a novel about a Reality War. Carter's 'Tokyo' piece implies that this inability is

[5] Carter's claim that 'I love [therefore] I exist' is the Cogito for *New Eve* fits with her engagement with Plato's *Symposium* that I touched on in Chapter One; the topic of the symposium is 'the great and glorious god, Love' (Plato 1871l: 494).

liberating, with Europeans being 'burdened with 2,500 years of logic' that the Japanese do not have to carry. The time frame of two and a half millennia – as well as her reference to saying goodbye to Plato – aligns this burden with this ancient Greek philosopher, adding to my discussion in Chapter One: 'the unravelling of the culture based on Judaeo-Christianity [sic], [and] a bit of Greek transcendentalism via the father of lies, Plato' (Carter 1998b: 39) does not need to be unravelled in Japan, a country free from Judeo-Christian culture. As Carter said of Japanese citizens in an interview with Ronald Bell:

> the Judeo-Christian tradition was built into me at some point. I've consciously rejected it, but I've obviously retained some of it on an unconscious level. And it isn't in them! And I think this makes an immense difference. It makes them happier. (Carter to Bell 1973: 25)

For Carter, an escape from Descartes and Plato in Japan is regarded as a healthier and happier alternative to living in Western society under the influence of such thinkers.

After reading Descartes's *Discourse* in 1962 and – as Carter's reference to the Cogito in *Heroes and Villains* suggests – consulting his *Meditations* at some point during this decade, she returned to Cartesian philosophy in Japan. In an undated journal containing extensive plans for *Doctor Hoffman*, for instance, Carter recognises that 'without a verb "to be" – [therefore] the Cartesian "Cogito" ceases to have any relevance' (Carter undated Journal MS88899/1/110: 1-3). Carter's depiction of the primitive River People in *Doctor Hoffman*, whose speech 'posed philosophical as well as linguistic problems', plays with this idea: Desiderio recognises that their language does not have 'a precise equivalent for the verb "to be", so the kernel was struck straight out of the Cartesian nut and one was left only with the naked, unarguable fact of existence' (Carter 2010: 78). In the same notebook she also makes another note of the 'I desire therefore I am' formation of the Cogito (Carter undated Journal MS88899/1/110: 66) and notes her intention 'to read' Descartes, Locke and Hume, as well as Plato and Sade, amongst others, as research for this project (Carter undated Journal MS88899/1/110: 186). She later returned to this section to make the parenthetical addition, 'as it turned out, I only read de Sade; and HOFFMAN was finished at the end of March, 1971' (Carter undated Journal MS88899/1/110: 186), although, of course, specifying when she added this is impossible. While the reliability of Carter's claims in her journals is debatable, particularly in the light of the increasing self-consciousness that parallels her boost of popularity and critical acclaim, her *plan* to read (or re-read) Descartes, Locke, and Hume is nevertheless significant. Whether she returned to their work or not, the intention demonstrates

an awareness – based on her research in 1962 – that their ideas are relevant for *Doctor Hoffman*, a 'rigorously philosophical' novel (Smith 2010: xii).

To date, there has been some criticism written on Descartes's influence on Carter, which, in line with this section, mostly concentrates on *Doctor Hoffman* and the Cogito. In relation to the River People, for instance, Scott A. Dimovitz says that the 'lack of the verb *to be* offers the same phenomenological challenge to Occidental Cartesian *ontology* as the phenomenological critiques offered by Heidegger and Sartre' (Dimovitz 2005: 17 – original emphasis). Alison Lee also considers the themes of identity and existence in this context arguing – *vis-à-vis* the River People once again – that Desiderio's 'reference to René Descartes in this context raises questions about just what it means "to be" and whether "I think, therefore I am" is an appropriate answer, given Desiderio's contention that he is not even the "I" of his own story' (Lee 1997: 73). She also states that '"I think, therefore I am," is the answer to Descartes's pondering identity and that Desiderio seems to take on different identities throughout the novel', thus displaying 'one of the novel's important thematic concerns' (Lee 1997: 71).

Elaine Jordan and Aidan Day, however, go beyond the Cogito and acknowledge that Carter's attack on Descartes is more than a repeated substitution of the verb 'think'. Jordan begins 'The Dangerous Edge' with two epigraphs that connect *Doctor Hoffman* to Descartes, the first of which is from Descartes's *Discourse*:

> and through all the nine years which followed I did nothing but wander here and there in the world, trying to be spectator rather than actor in all the comedies which were being played there; and reflecting particularly in each matter on what might render it doubtful and give occasion for error, I rooted out from my mind, during this time, all the errors which had introduced themselves into it hitherto... trying to discover the falseness or uncertainty of the propositions I examined, not with weak guesses, but with clear and assured reasonings, I found none so doubtful that I could not draw from it some sufficiently certain conclusion, even if this might not be other than that the proposition contained nothing certain. (Jordan 2007: 201)[6]

She aligns this passage with a second quotation, spoken by Desiderio: 'the habit of sardonic contemplation is the hardest habit of all to break' (Jordan 2007: 201; Carter 2010: 240). Jordan draws out the broader themes of existence, identity and knowledge for Carter and Descartes, highlighting Descartes's obsession with truth and certainty, and his rejection of error. She also makes a connection between Desiderio and Descartes's speculations and

[6] Jordan has used a different (unspecified) translation of Descartes's *Discourse*, but the citation corresponds to Descartes 2006: 25.

cynicisms although she does not discuss this in detail. Day, on the other hand, discusses Carter's engagement with Cartesian dualism – the separation between the mind and the body. For Descartes, 'man is a compound of two distinct substances – *res cogitans*, unextended thinking substance, or mind, and *res extensa*, extended corporeal substance, or body' (Cottingham 1986: 119 – original emphasis). As Bryan Magee notes, 'this dualism, this assumption of a twofold division throughout the whole of reality, has become all-pervading in our thought, including our philosophy and our science. Yet, contrary to what most Western men and women probably suppose, it is a view of reality peculiar to the West and, what is more, peculiar to it in only the last three or four centuries' (Magee 1978: 77). Day argues that 'in her portrayal of the Count and his shadow Carter unravels the Cartesian dualism of transcendent subject and inert object, self and other, to show that selfhood so defined can only ever seek fulfilment according to a logic of self-annihilation' (Day 1998: 95). With reference to Carter's unpublished Japanese manuscripts, I would add that she recognises an escape from Cartesian dualism in Japan, particularly as she writes 'au revoir, Descartes'.

While my discussion of Carter's denigration of Cartesian thought agrees with the mostly thematic analyses of Dimovitz, Lee, Jordan and Day, I argue that in *Doctor Hoffman* Carter demonstrates a greater understanding and interaction with other aspects of Descartes's philosophy. In the light of Day's work on Carter and Cartesian dualism, my analysis mainly focuses on other, undiscussed aspects of Carter's interaction with Descartes. Although Carter's explicit engagement with Descartes primarily focuses on his Cogito, which enables her to destabilise the foundational doctrine of his philosophy and undermine his famous meditational method, I argue that in *Doctor Hoffman* Carter consciously seeks to collapse other Cartesian ideals, adding to the disintegration of his philosophy. I build on Jordan's suggestion that there are similarities between Descartes and Desiderio, discussing how this resemblance is depicted in *Doctor Hoffman* via Carter's use of the first-person narrative voice – after the epigraph, Jordan does not discuss Descartes's influence on Carter. I also suggest that *Doctor Hoffman* demonstrates a wider reading of Descartes than has previously been acknowledged, encompassing the *Meditations* as well. What's more, I contend that in this novel Carter returns to the argument she put forward in her 1962 poem 'Piss off, Descartes', which is where I start my discussion.

'Piss off, Descartes' encapsulates Carter's resistance towards the importance of rationality in Cartesian thought. She asserts that human existence should not be categorised and defined only in relation to the mind, the conventionally male realm of being within the theory of Cartesian dualism, and discusses the notion of eternity in relation to bodily

pleasures and the moment of orgasm, illustrating that passion and desire are necessary components for a theory of ontology. The importance of rational thought is also scrutinised in *Doctor Hoffman*, as epitomised by Desiderio's name – which foregrounds desire rather than reason – as well as the desirous rewrite of the Cogito as 'I DESIRE THEREFORE I EXIST' (Carter 2010: 252 – original capitalisation), and the Wittgensteinian exclamation 'DON'T THINK, LOOK' (Carter 2010: 22 – original capitalisation).[7] Although Desiderio identifies himself as 'one of the invisible struts of reason which had helped to prop it [the city] up for so long', he goes on to note that 'it seemed inevitable it would soon collapse' (Carter 2010: 40), reiterating the redundancy of rationality. Carter's early poem shows a rejection and reversal of the Cogito, and uses the example of the 'orgiastic moment' to ask 'Where's this old "Cogito Ergo Sum" now?' (Carter 1962-63 Journal MS88899/1/88: unpaginated). Carter returns to the idea of the timelessness of the 'orgiastic moment' in *Doctor Hoffman*. Doctor Hoffman's friend and colleague Mendoza puts forward the theory that the orgasm 'took place in neither past, present nor future but precipitated an exponential polychromatic fusion of all three' (Carter 2010: 119), thus erasing the notion of linear time during the moment of orgasm. Hoffman adopts this idea and embeds it into his work: he uses eroto-energy (the energy released during sexual activities) to create simulations which, Desiderio reflects, 'modified the nature of reality' to the extent that he has 'made great cracks in the hitherto immutable surface of the time and space equation' (Carter 2010: 11-12) and made it possible to exist 'outside the formal rules of time and place' (Carter 2010: 196). Thus, Carter's initial, hyperbolically condemning, response to Descartes in her 1962 poem is reawakened in *Doctor Hoffman*, but the novel form enables Carter to develop her denigration of this thinker.

In many ways, Desiderio's account of the chaotic Reality War reflects Descartes's quest for truth in both the *Discourse* and his *Meditations*. As well as the alliterative resemblance between their names, Desiderio's account of the war is written in the first person, like Descartes's texts. Descartes begins the *Discourse* by discussing the false knowledge he has, which he attributes in part to his education, saying he 'learned not to believe too firmly in anything that only example and custom had persuaded me of. So it was that I freed myself gradually from many of the errors that can obscure the natural light of our minds' (Descartes 2006: 11). He designs a method to enable him 'to distinguish the true from the false' (Descartes 2006: 11), consisting of four laws, beginning with the rule 'never to accept anything as true that I did not *incontrovertibly* know to be so [...] and to include

[7] I discuss this allusion to *Philosophical Investigations* (Wittgenstein 1967: 31e) in the following chapter *vis-à-vis* Wittgenstein's impact on the novel.

nothing in my judgements other than that which presented itself to my mind so *clearly* and *distinctly*, that I would have no occasion to doubt it' (Descartes 2006: 17 – original emphasis). Descartes's rejection of prior "knowledge" and the methodology he puts in place provides the catalyst for establishing the foundations of his philosophy. He states, 'while I was trying to think of all things being false in this way, it was necessarily the case that I, who was thinking them, had to be something' leading to the Cogito: '*I am thinking therefore I exist*' (Descartes 2006: 28 – original emphasis). He argues that 'from the very fact that I thought of doubting the truth of other things, it followed *incontrovertibly* and certainly that I myself existed, whereas, if I had merely ceased thinking, I would have no reason to believe that I existed, even if everything else I had ever imagined had been true' (Descartes 2006: 29 – original emphasis).

Building on Lee's argument that Desiderio's shifting identity questions the Cartesian Cogito (Lee 1997: 71-73) – he starts off as the Minister of Determination's secretary, but throughout the novel he 'pose[s] as an Inspector of Veracity' (Carter 2010: 39), becomes Kiku when living with the River People, and masquerades as the peep-show proprietor's nephew – Desiderio's account of the Reality War also resembles Descartes's work by being a first-person narrative which discusses the role of doubt in the knowledge of one's existence. For Bernard Williams, the 'first-person and epistemological emphasis has been the principal influence of Descartes' (Williams in Magee 1987: 94), which, I argue, Carter engages with by going beyond the famous Cogito. The instability and unreliability of Desiderio's memoir is emphasised at the beginning of the novel, with – as Ali Smith recognises (Smith 2010: vii) – the Introduction opening with Desiderio's claim that 'I remember everything' (Carter 2010: 3) and the first chapter beginning with him saying 'I cannot remember exactly how it began' (Carter 2010: 9). While Desiderio's account positions him as being less affected by the simulated images than the rest of the South American city's residents – his 'first reaction to incipient delirium' was 'boredom' (Carter 2010: 11) – he acknowledges that Doctor Hoffman caused him not only to reconsider the definition of "reality" but to question the existence of himself. He says that 'the Minister was the only person I knew who claimed he did not, even once, experience this sense of immanence' caused by the Doctor's disturbance of established knowledge and the rules of space and time (Carter 2010: 17), inferentially implying that Desiderio has been unsettled by the Reality War to some extent.

Like Descartes, Desiderio endorses rationality, and puts forward a theory to distinguish between the "real" and "unreal". He:

> decided the revenants were objects – perhaps personified ideas – which could think but did not exist. This seemed the only hypothesis which might explain my own case for I acknowledged them – I *saw* them; they screamed and whickered at me – and yet I did not believe in them. (Carter 2010: 12 – original emphasis)

His theory that the apparitions can 'think' but 'not exist' differentiates them from Descartes's account of his certainty of his own existence, where thinking and existence go hand-in-hand. The fact that Desiderio bases his theory of the revenants' existence on his senses – he '*saw* them' – is also indicative of the limitations of rationality and of Desiderio's reliance on *a posteriori* knowledge, aligning him with the empiricists. In his *Discourse*, however, Descartes puts forward a method for distinguishing between 'real human beings' and machines that convincingly mimic human actions (Descartes 2006: 46), which is applicable to Desiderio's need to tell the difference between real human beings and Doctor Hoffman's 'synthetic reconstructions' (Carter 2010: 12). For Descartes, there are two ways of determining whether a human is real or a machine. Firstly, a machine 'would never be able to use words or other signs by composing them as we do to declare our thoughts to others'; secondly, 'although such machines might do many things as well or even better than any of us, they would inevitably fail to do some others, by which we would discover that they did not act consciously' (Descartes 2006: 46). Desiderio's account does not dwell on whether the ability to communicate is demonstrated by Hoffman's illusions, but he does consider conscious thought. But Descartes's argument that mechanical humans do not act consciously contradicts Desiderio's assessment that the apparitions can think, although he says they do not have the same notion of existence as he does.

Following Descartes's method, Hoffman's creations blur the distinction between human and simulacrum, as both evidence rational, conscious thought. Nevertheless, Desiderio's description of the people on the pier who 'had the yawning, vacant air of those just awakened from a deep sleep and walked uncertainly, sometimes, for no reason, breaking into a stumbling run and then halting just as suddenly to stare around them with startled, empty eyes' (Carter 2010: 48) signifies the unconvincing aspects of the simulations trying to perform an authentic version of humanity. By failing to mimic all aspects of human behaviour perfectly and convincingly, some of Hoffman's images can be distinguished from "real" people using Descartes's method. That said, the fact that Hoffman's revenants are also works-in-progress and that his ability to create believably fake phenomena was often successful, particularly later on as his machines improved, means that Descartes's method of differentiating between the real and the copy could not always be relied upon. Indeed, the

reality of some "real" human beings was brought into question during the Reality War, with a baby being blamed for being 'suspiciously too real' and for having a smile that was 'too lifelike' (Carter 2010: 13).

Carter's discussion of reality in *Doctor Hoffman* also conforms to Descartes's argument in the *Meditations* that there are, in Moriarty's words, 'degrees of reality' (Moriarty 2008: xxx). In this text Descartes argues that there are three types of idea: 'some seem to me to be innate, others adventitious, others produced by myself' (Descartes 2008: 27). He says that 'what a thing is, what truth is, [and] what thought is' are innate ideas (Descartes 2008: 27); as Cottingham adds, 'the first class includes the idea we have of ourselves as thinking things, the idea of God, and basic mathematical concepts (like that of triangularity)' (Cottingham 1988: 70). Adventitious ideas correspond to sense data, 'existing outside myself', while his third category consists of 'sirens, hippogriffs, and suchlike creatures [which] are inventions of my own imagination' (Descartes 2008: 27). In *Doctor Hoffman*, the title character blurs the distinction between Descartes's three levels, as the residents of the city cannot distinguish between adventitious ideas (real people and objects) and the apparitions. As I go on to discuss, even the innate idea of the self is questioned by Desiderio. By describing a 'persistent hallucination' as 'one of the third order of forms who might presently invade us, the order of angels, speaking lions and winged horses, the miraculous revenants for whom the city sometimes seemed hushed in expectation' (Carter 2010: 22-23), I would argue that Desiderio discusses the simulations in line with Descartes's third category, particularly because Desiderio lists 'winged horses' and Descartes includes 'hippogriffs' in this section. While for Descartes, Desiderio's 'hallucination' corresponds to the lowest degree of reality, Descartes also states that if ideas 'are considered purely in themselves, and if I do not connect them with anything outside themselves, they cannot, strictly speaking, be false' (Descartes 2008: 27). He argues that 'whether I am imagining a goat or a chimera, it is no less true that I am imagining one than that I am imagining the other', and that error only arises in 'judging that the ideas that are in me are similar to or in accordance with some things existing outside me' (Descartes 2008: 27).

While Desiderio's account suggests that he can differentiate between the three levels of reality, this is not absolute, as his uncertainty suggests that he has committed the error of not being able to distinguish between the second and third levels, a mistake which is more common amongst the other residents, according to Desiderio's claim that he was more aware of the onset of the Reality War than others. Nevertheless, Doctor Hoffman is blurring the distinctions between these; one of his 'main principles' is, as Desiderio later notes, that

'everything it is possible to imagine can also exist' (Carter 2010: 110), leading to an inability to distinguish between the adventitious and the imagined.

The 'feverish delirium' (Carter 2010: 13) caused by the Reality War corresponds to the doubt Descartes discusses in his *Discourse* before he reaches the certainty provided by the Cogito. The instability and 'deep whirlpool' of doubt that Descartes talks about (Descartes 2008: 17) is pinpointed by Desiderio, who acknowledges the 'deep-seated anxiety' caused by the modification of reality (Carter 2010: 15) and notes that 'those of us who retained some notion of what was real and what was not – felt the vertigo of those teetering on the edge of a magic precipice' (Carter 2010: 17). But, as well as questioning what's real and what's not, Desiderio also doubts whether his memories are accurate and whether he actually exists. In the novel's closing chapter, for instance, Desiderio claims that the Cannibal Chief 'was real enough because I killed him', resulting in a 'twinge of doubt' when Hoffman chillingly asks him: 'what kind of proof is that?' (Carter 2010: 253). While Carter's 1962 poem 'Piss off, Descartes' leaves no doubt surrounding the severity of Carter's condemnation of this thinker, in *Doctor Hoffman* Carter situates the reader in a Cartesian 'whirlpool' of doubt as the reliability of the narrator's account is brought into question when Desiderio doubts his own actions. While Descartes establishes the certainty of his own existence early on in the *Discourse*, while living with the centaurs during the penultimate chapter Desiderio questions whether he exists: 'my own conviction that I was a man named Desiderio, born in a certain city, the child of a certain mother, lover of a certain woman, began to waver. If I was a man, what was a man?' (Carter 2010: 225). This doubt is contrasted by the certainty that prevails in the worlds of both the River People and the centaurs; the River People lack 'a precise equivalent for the verb "to be", so the kernel was struck straight out of the Cartesian nut and one was left only with the naked, unarguable fact of existence' (Carter 2010: 78), and the centaurs similarly have 'no vocabulary to express doubts' (Carter 2010: 208). The restoration of order at the end of the novel – achieved by Desiderio killing Doctor Hoffman and destroying his machines – suggests that Desiderio's doubt has been cured, although Desiderio's 'regret' that everything will be 'absolutely predictable' from now on (Carter 2010: 264) raises the question of whether Descartes's insistence on certainty is preferable to doubt.

In *Doctor Hoffman*, therefore, Carter replicates Descartes's autobiographical reflections on knowledge and his existence in both the *Discourse* and *Meditations*, mimicking the whirlpool of doubt that Descartes experienced until the establishment of the Cogito. The narrator of Carter's novel is living in a world of actualised desire and is named after desire,

resulting in, as the 'I desire therefore I am' version of the Cogito suggests, the role of rational thought being questioned, leading Desiderio to doubt his own existence at the height of the Reality War. Like Descartes, Desiderio assesses his knowledge, and assigns Doctor Hoffman's revenants to the third, lowest order of reality that Descartes identifies in the *Meditations* – they are inventions, and thus do not actually exist in the world external to his mind. Carter's attack on Descartes's Cogito and his broader theory of knowledge and existence was initially sparked ten years earlier in her poem 'Piss off, Descartes', where the moment of orgasm is put forward as one example of when the traditional Cogito is found wanting, an example she returns to in *Doctor Hoffman.* Nevertheless, *Doctor Hoffman* concludes with Desiderio opting for an ordered world of reason rather than a world populated by the illusions created by the desire machines; Desiderio says that 'reason was stamped into me as if it were a chromosome, even if I loved the high priestess of passion' (Carter 2010: 232), identifying reason as an innate idea. Desiderio's desires can still be accessed in his dreams though, as the novel ends with Desiderio closing his eyes and the final line 'unbidden, she comes' (Carter 2010: 265) shows that Desiderio's desire for Albertina has not died with the end of the war and indicates that there is not a complete opposition between reason and desire. Carter's engagement with the empiricist John Locke also focuses on a questioning of innate ideas, as Locke's theory of knowledge is built on a rejection of innate knowledge and the subsequent argument that knowledge is learnt from experience instead. I now turn to Locke's impact on Carter's work, particularly focusing on where knowledge comes from and how this influences Carter's discussion of origins – the origins of a person's identity, particularly in relation to gender, as well as the origins of a country.

Locke: Furniture, Blank Slates, and America

Following on from Descartes, Carter's initial reading of Locke's *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* in 1963 shows a continued interest in where knowledge comes from and how identities and countries are constructed. Acknowledging the *Essay* as her source, she writes that 'this [i.e. the theory of innate knowledge][8] being once received, it eased from the lazy the pains of search and stopped the inquiry of the doubtful concerning all that was once styled innate' (Locke 2008: 52; Carter 1962-63 Journal MS88899/1/88: unpaginated), voicing Locke's criticism of accepting the notion of innate knowledge without further question, saying it was a '*short and easy*' assumption to come to (Locke 2008: 52 – original emphasis).

[8] The insert '[i.e. the theory of innate knowledge]' is Carter's.

She goes on to note Locke's argument that 'when we nicely reflect upon it, we shall find that general ideas are fictions and contrivances of the mind, that carry difficulty with them, and do not so easily offer themselves as we are apt to imagine' (Locke 2008: 384; Carter 1962-63 Journal MS88899/1/88: unpaginated), which similarly challenges innatism. She also copies into this journal Locke's claim that 'where all is but a dream, reasoning and arguments are of no use, truth and knowledge nothing' (Locke 2008: 342; Carter 1962-63 Journal MS88899/1/88: unpaginated). Each of these three quotations is worded slightly differently to Locke's *Essay*;[9] Carter referred to a different, unspecified edition of the *Essay* to the one I cite, although it is a possibility that she mistakenly copied the references down. As these minor changes are stylistic and do not affect Locke's argument, I would argue that the difference is not deliberate, in contrast to Carter's conscious rewriting of Descartes.

According to her journals, her reading of Locke then subsided until 1976, when she writes: '*Epigraph* for "*New Eve*" – "... in the beginning all the World was *America*:" Two treatises of Government, John Locke' (Carter 1973 Journal MS88899/1/95: unpaginated – original emphasis), showing her reading of another Lockean text. She makes no further notes on Locke here, but goes on to include Ronald L. Meek's *Social Science and the Ignoble Savage* (1976) in a reading list for *Nights at the Circus*, a book which examines American Indians in relation to the representation of the natural state in line with Locke (Carter 1973 Journal MS88899/1/95: unpaginated). Apart from these research notes, and, as I have already mentioned, including Locke, as well as Descartes, Hume, and others, in a 'to read' list for *Doctor Hoffman* (Carter undated Journal MS88899/1/110: 186) – suggesting that she intended to return to Locke's *Essay* and/or familiarise herself with other Lockean works in the early 1970s – Carter's notes on Locke in her research journals and diaries are sparse. This does not mean that Locke is an insignificant or peripheral intertext for Carter. Rather, I argue that Carter engages with Locke's ideas in a range of her works, starting with *Shadow Dance* and ending with the posthumously published 'The Ghost Ships', and that Locke shapes a number of works in-between, such as *Nights at the Circus* and – more notably – *New Eve*. This list is by no means exhaustive, but these texts demonstrate how Locke's influence spans Carter's career and illuminates the key areas of her interaction with him – the origins of a (gendered) identity, and the origins of a country.

[9] The quotations in Phemister's 2008 edition, based on P. H. Nidditch's 1975 edition are, in the order Carter references them: 'this being once received, it eased the lazy from the pains of search, and stopp'd the enquiry of the doubtful, concerning all that was once stiled innate'; 'when we nicely reflect upon them, we shall find, that general *Ideas* are Fictions and Contrivances of the Mind, that carry difficulty with them, and do not so easily offer themselves, as we are apt to imagine'; and, 'Where All is but Dream, Reasoning and Arguments are of no use, Truth and Knowledge nothing'.

Unsurprisingly, criticism on Carter and Locke to date has predominantly focused on *New Eve*, the novel which opens with an epigraph from Locke's *Two Treatises of Government* – more specifically, *The Second Treatise of Government*. While Catrin Gersdorf, Linden Peach and Heather L. Johnson correctly identify the source of the Lockean epigraph,[10] Joseph Bristow and Trev Lynn Broughton mistakenly say that Carter's early epigraphs 'range from Jean-Luc Godard's *Alphaville* (1965) to John Locke's *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1690)' (Bristow and Broughton 1997: 9). While the statement about Godard is accurate in relation to *Heroes and Villains*, their second claim indicates a misleading error within Carter criticism – it is worth pointing out that although Carter attributes the epigraph of *New Eve* to Locke, she does not specify its source in the novel. Locke is not the main focus for any of the aforementioned critics, but Gersdorf's discussion of America in *New Eve* recognises that the Lockean epigraph refers to 'the assumption of pre-civilizatory, "natural" forms of social existence which are embodied in and by pre-contact America' (Gersdorf 2001: 41), a reading which I develop further by going beyond Carter's epigraphic citation of Locke to discuss the portrayal of America in this novel as well as in 'The Ghost Ships' and her article 'That Arizona Home' (1977). An examination of Carter's notes on the founding of America – made while she was researching and writing *New Eve* – reinforce my argument.

What is more, I argue that Locke's *Essay* is a crucial intertext for Carter's depiction of America in these two texts as well as for her discussion of identity in *New Eve*, *Shadow Dance* and *Nights at the Circus*, particularly Locke's 'claim that the mind at birth is a *tabula rasa*, a blank slate, upon which ideas are imprinted as the mind encounters the external world and reflects upon its own activities' (Phemister 2008: xii). Locke argues that knowledge is 'not innate, but acquired: It being about those first, which are imprinted by external Things, with which Infants have earliest to do, and which make the most frequent Impressions on their Senses' (Locke 2008: 23), and goes on to imagine 'the Mind to be, as we say, white Paper, void of all Characters, without any *Ideas*' (Locke 2008: 54 – original emphasis). Thus, both the Lockean epigraph from *The Second Treatise* – 'in the beginning all the world was *America*' (Locke 1988: 301 – original emphasis) – and his image of the blank slate, demonstrate Locke's discussion of the "untouched", whether that encompasses virgin territory or the purity of a pre-knowledge mind. Carter, too, is fascinated with origins and beginnings, an oft-noted aspect of her work. Susan M. Squier, for instance, argues with

[10] Johnson says that the epigraph is from Locke's *Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent and End of Civil Government* (Johnson 1997: 168), which is the subtitle to his *Second Treatise*.

reference to the Lockean epigraph, that 'Carter urges us to interrogate "the beginning", whether we construct it biologically (as the moment of fertilization, the origin of sexual difference) or politically (as the moment of the social contract)' (Squier 1995: 125). Both the desert and the ocean in *New Eve* have been discussed in these terms, with Gersdorf saying that the desert 'is a landscape whose topography and climate seem to support its transference into the imagination as an ideal *tabula rasa*, a place that sponsors ideas of new social and cultural beginnings' (Gersdorf 2001: 49) and Lawrence Phillips arguing that Carter's depiction of the ocean could 'represent something of a blank canvas, a *tabula rasa*' (Phillips 2012: 100). While Gersdorf does not tie this reference to Locke's *Essay* and discuss this intertext in more detail, Phillips acknowledges Locke and briefly signals his relevance to arguments of essentialism versus constructivism:

> Locke's formulation itself has a problematic provenance originating with the same Greeks (Aristotle rather than Plato this time) and influencing Freud, but it lies at the foundation of twentieth-century arguments that "blood", or, rather, gender, or ethnicity, or class does not determine character – behaviour is learnt. (Phillips 2012: 100)

Since Phillips's main focus is not Locke, he does not discuss Locke in further detail. I would argue, however, that Locke's concept of a blank slate, as well as his related images of 'white paper' and the mind as an unfurnished room, underpin Carter's discussion of beginnings, her imagining of the mind, and her presentation of identity, throughout her *oeuvre*. When it comes to her depiction of America in *New Eve* and 'The Ghost Ships', Carter blends her reading of Locke's *Second Treatise* and his *Essay* together, portraying America as a blank slate, as white paper.

In line with his notion of the mind being a blank slate, Locke compares the mind to an empty room in the *Essay* and raises the question 'how comes it to be furnished?' (Locke 2008: 54). This metaphor recurs throughout the *Essay*, with Locke saying that 'the Senses at first let in particular *Ideas*, and furnish the yet empty Cabinet' (Locke 2008: 23 – original emphasis) and stating that it is 'by degrees he comes to be furnished with them [Ideas]' (Locke 2008: 56). Carter recycles this furniture metaphor in both her debut narrative *Shadow Dance* and her penultimate novel *Nights at the Circus*. In the former, Honeybuzzard's new partner Emily is described as having a 'mind [...] like a large, clean, well-lit room in which there was little furniture but that little of the most solid, bulky and hand-crafted kind' (Carter 1995: 97). Locke's image is further actualised when Emily disposes of some furnishings –

representing friends and family members – in order to fit Honeybuzzard into her cerebral space:

> her mind, at that time, was occupied by a large sofa or divan, which was Honeybuzzard; to make room for this new, sizeable and heavy possession, she had shifted out all her other emotional furniture – love for parents, home, the friends of home – and was content, in exchange, simply to be occupied by this present love. (Carter 1995: 97)

In this sense, emotions and family connections manifest into material items of furniture. Emily's father, for instance, is an 'enormous wardrobe' whereas Honeybuzzard is 'more pleasing, or, perhaps, more in need of a good home' (Carter 1995: 97). Furthermore, when Emily has sex with Morris, Honeybuzzard's friend and colleague, Emily is said to be 'rearranging the cumbersome furniture of her mind' (Carter 1995: 148). Carter's use of this Lockean imagery literalises internal mental processes and, in line with Locke's emphasis on learning from experience, suggests that knowledge is a continual process that undergoes changes, as the mind redecorates and rethinks its contents when the validity of knowledge is assessed.

In *Nights at the Circus*, though, the images of the blank slate and of furnishing a room are used to heighten the emasculatory depiction of Walser, the journalist hired to interview Fevvers, the winged protagonist. Walser is described as being 'like a handsome house that has been let, furnished. There were scarcely any of those little, what you might call *personal* touches to his personality' (Carter 2006c: 6-7 – original emphasis). Thus, the Lockean simile of the furnished room elucidates Walser's youth, inexperience, and lack of personality, and parodies his role as a journalist – someone who interrogates and does not accept the validity of any evidence without scrutinising it – by suggesting that his understanding, or furniture, is naively provided by an external source without further question. As well as debunking theories of innate knowledge on the basis that there is not universal consent as to what knowledge constitutes, and because children and 'ideots' do not demonstrate awareness of 'naturally imprinted' knowledge (Locke 2008: 18), Locke criticises proponents of innatism for being idle and accepting this theory because it is an easy solution, saying, as Carter notes, that 'it eased the lazy from the pains of search' (Locke 2008: 52). He condemns 'Followers' for believing that 'Principles must not be questioned' and for 'taking them [innatist doctrines] upon trust, without farther examination' (Locke 2008: 52). Thus, comparing Walser to a rented, furnished house, has damaging repercussions for his capabilities as a journalist, building on the reading that, as Peach says, 'the male voice is emasculated' in *Nights at the Circus* (Peach 2009: 136).

Walser's career as a journalist is further degraded when, in disguise, he follows Fevvers to Russia and joins the circus. He is employed as a clown, a profession which is synonymous with defeat: as Buffo the Great says, 'there is no element of the *voluntary* in clowning. Often, d'you see, we take to clowning when all else fails' (Carter 2006c: 137 – original emphasis). Walser's role as a clown also lends itself to a Lockean discussion of knowledge and identity. Buffo highlights that the white make-up, a visible signifier of a blank slate, removes and erases a previously successful career and identity, saying that 'when Walser first put on his make-up, he looked in the mirror and did not recognise himself' (Carter 2006c: 119). Walser goes on to conform to expectations of failure, as breaking his arm prevents him from working as a journalist and a clown simultaneously; 'his disguise disguises – nothing. He is no longer a journalist masquerading as a clown; willy-nilly, force of circumstance has turned him into a *real* clown' (Carter 2006c: 169 – original emphasis), mirroring Buffo's claim that without make-up he is 'nobody at all [...] An absence. A vacancy' (Carter 2006c: 142). Moreover, following a train accident whilst journeying across Siberia, Walser suffers amnesia and is described as a 'perfect blank' (Carter 2006c: 262). Initially, his blank slate is merely inscribed with memories of performing as a chicken in a clown routine, as he constantly repeats the phrase 'cock-a-doodle-dooski!' (Carter 2006c: 263). While recovering, however, Walser becomes the muse of a Shaman and is 'condemned to a permanent state of sanctified delirium' (Carter 2006c: 301).

Following Locke's empiricist argument, Walser gains knowledge by experience, but 'his gradual acquisition of the Shaman's language set up a conflict within him' because he spoke in a 'remembered English' (Carter 2006c: 308). The Shaman interprets Walser's memories, so that, in Lockean terms, 'now he was tenanted at last, even if that interior tenant was insubstantial as a phantom and sometimes disappeared for days at a time' (Carter 2006c: 309). Thus, using Locke's blank slate and property-furnishing imagery, Carter questions how knowledge is acquired and how identity is constructed in *Nights at the Circus*, using the professions of journalism and clowning to think about the foundations of Walser's identity. The blank slate imagined by Locke is aligned with Walser's role as a clown, and then more literally depicted when he has amnesia, and is inscribed with both his memories and new experiences. As Walser's blank slate is *re*inscribed/*re*furnished – rather than written on or furnished for the first time – the memory of being a chicken is not innate, but an experience he recalls.

This idea of Walser being a blank slate and having his previous experiences erased, and how this impacts on his identity, is also discussed in *New Eve*, where the construction of

gender is Carter's primary concern. This novel is retrospectively narrated by Eve(lyn) and follows his/her journey from London to New York and across the States to California. While the protagonist begins the journey as a male – Evelyn – in the American desert he encounters an Earth Goddess called Mother who turns him into a female – Eve – against his/her will. The sex change and Mother's attempt to alter Eve(lyn)'s gendered mind-set allow Carter to examine the social construction of gender, and to interrogate, in Lockean terms, how gendered behaviour is learnt. As well as physically changing Eve(lyn)'s sexed body, Mother makes him/her undergo 'psycho-surgery' (Carter 2009b: 65) in order to re-programme his/her gender, although Eve(lyn) realises that 'the psycho-programming had not been entirely successful' when s/he sees his/her Playboy-inspired reflection and 'the cock in my head, still, twitched at the sight of myself' (Carter 2009b: 71). In Chapter Seven, upon leaving the womb-like town of Beulah where the surgery (both physical and psychological) took place, and being left to his/her own devices, Eve(lyn) claims:

> I know nothing. I am a tabula erasa, a blank sheet of paper, an unhatched egg. I have not yet become a woman, although I possess a woman's shape. Not a woman, no; both more and less than a real woman [...] Eve remains wilfully in the state of innocence that precedes the fall. (Carter 2009b: 79)

Locke's argument that the mind is a blank slate at birth which is inscribed by experiences is central to Carter's depiction of Eve(lyn) here. In a slight twist to the idea of a *tabula rasa*, though, Eve(lyn) is a 'tabula erasa'; s/he is not a blank slate in the conventional sense, as his/her previous identity and knowledge has been erased. This builds upon the earlier remark that 'Eve was a creature without memory; she was an amnesiac, a stranger in the world as she was in her own body – but it wasn't that she'd forgotten everything, no. Rather, she had nothing to remember' (Carter 2009b: 74), where the emphasis on memory and the suffering of amnesia link him/her to Walser in *Nights at the Circus*. Carter's allusion to 'a blank sheet of paper' adds to the Lockean reference, as Locke compares the mind to 'white Paper' (Locke 2008: 54). In line with Locke's discussion of how the white paper is written on (or how the mind as an empty room is furnished), Carter, too, suggests that Eve(lyn) will not be a blank slate – or an erased slate – for long, with inscription being imminent; s/he is an 'unhatched egg' waiting to hatch. The reference to a prelapsarian Eve – Eve 'in the state of innocence that precedes the fall' – encapsulates the temporality of this state, emphasising the inevitability that the fall will happen, that the white sheet of paper will be written on. Building on the Edenic reference, the implication is that this 'fall' will have

damaging repercussions, with experience compromising the purity of the 'tabula erasa', bringing 'the state of innocence' to an end.

Thus, Carter's Lockean depiction of Eve(lyn) functions as a contribution to rationalism versus empiricism debates, and, by dismissing ideas of innatism and arguing that gender is a social construct, she champions the latter (Locke's "camp") rather than the former. Discussions of Carter's rejection of essentialism and portrayal of gender performativity are prominent in Carter criticism, particularly in relation to *New Eve*, with Day, for instance, claiming that this novel 'is a fictional exploration of the anti-essentialist notion that "our flesh arrives to us out of history" [Carter 2009: 9], the notion that the categories and characteristics of the masculine and the feminine are not absolutely founded' (Day 1998: 107). Building on this argument, I would argue that Carter's engagement with Lockean empiricism is central to her critique of innate, essentialist theories of gender, and, subsequently, of innatist arguments more broadly. The structure of *New Eve* and Carter's allusion to Locke's images of the blank slate and white paper at the beginning of Chapter Seven add to her discussion about the construction of identity. While Locke talks about the mind being a blank slate at birth, Carter uses this Lockean imagery in line with Eve(lyn)'s rebirth – upon leaving Beulah, 'a simulacrum of the womb' (Carter 2009b: 49) – but before her/his encounter with Zero, 'the first man I [Eve(lyn)] met when I became a woman' (Carter 2009b: 83). Thus, the explicit Locke references structurally coincide with the moment of (re)birth before experiences outside the womb inevitably (re)inscribe the tabula (e)rasa.

As well as using Locke's idea of a 'blank slate' to interrogate how identities are constructed, Carter also uses this concept to discuss the origins of a country or society, both in terms of the potential for new beginnings and in relation to the colonisation of previously uncharted land. In *Nights at the Circus*, for instance, Walser's amnesia and erased identity is mirrored by the Siberian backdrop: 'like the landscape, he was a perfect blank' (Carter 2006c: 262). This snowy setting, depicted as an 'unimaginable and deserted vastness', 'unnaturally white', and a 'pre-Adamite world' (Carter 2006c: 231-234) is the location for another new beginning: that of the female escapees of the Panopticon prison. This group aims to 'found a primitive Utopia in the vastness round them, where none might find them', and in relation to Locke, regards the white landscape as 'a blank sheet of fresh paper on which they could inscribe whatever future they wished' (Carter 2006c: 256-257). While Paulina Palmer argues that this 'image evokes connotations of prelapsarian (and pre-patriarchal) existence' (Palmer 1987: 200), Fevvers's foster mother Lizzie is cynical of their goal to establish a solely female community, saying: 'what'll they do with the boy babies? Feed 'em to the polar

bears? To the *female* polar bears?' (Carter 2006c: 284 – original emphasis). Building on Sarah Gamble's claim that 'whatever moments of utopia this text [*Nights at the Circus*] achieves are precarious and speculative' (Gamble 1997: 162), I would argue that Lizzie is the mouthpiece for Carter's sceptical portrayal of Locke's *tabula rasa*, as she highlights the inevitable temporality of an all-female world. Thus, while the blank slate has potential *per se*, the possibility for a new beginning is tainted by its transience.

Geographically, Carter's concern with origins is mostly targeted at America, which is the focus of the rest of this section. While I mainly concentrate on *New Eve*, a novel set in America and opening with the epigraph from the *Second Treatise* 'in the beginning all the world was *America*' (original emphasis), discussions of 'The Ghost Ships' as well as Carter's article 'That Arizona Home' – written in the same year as the publication of *New Eve* – inform my analysis as well, as these texts also portray America using references or allusions to Locke. For instance, similarly to her depiction of the potential of the snowy Siberian expanse in *Nights at the Circus*, in 'The Ghost Ships' Carter compares the pre-colonised American landscape to a 'blank page' awaiting inscription, saying that the 'newcomers' – the Puritanical colonisers – 'had no more than scribbled their signatures on the blank page of the continent that was, as it lay under the snow, no whiter nor more pure than their intentions', adding that 'they plan to write more largely; they plan to inscribe thereon the name of God' (Carter 2006h: 376). The emphasis Carter places on purity here highlights that the Puritans have violated the American soil, a contamination exacerbated by the Lockean 'white paper' metaphor which is being written on by the Puritans, compromising the purity of the Puritans' endeavour to colonise Massachusetts Bay, in which the short story is set.

Carter's discussion of American origins ties her reading of Locke's *Essay* and his *Second Treatise* together, with America being synonymous with ideas of an Edenic state of nature and depicted as a fertile blank slate awaiting colonisation. In the *Second Treatise*, Locke portrays America as a vast, productive landscape, arguing that:

> there cannot be a clearer demonstration of any thing, than several Nations of the *Americans* are of this, who are rich in Land, and poor in all the Comforts of Life; whom Nature having furnished as liberally as any other people, with the materials of Plenty, *i.e.* a fruitful Soil, apt to produce in abundance, what might serve for food, rayment [sic], and delight. (Locke 1988: 296-297 – original emphasis)

As Meek observes – in a book that Carter consulted in 1976, the year it was first published (Carter 1973 Journal MS88899/1/95: unpaginated) – Locke is not alone in this view. Meek notes – in a chapter called 'In the beginning all the World was *America*' – that a number of

seventeenth- and eighteenth-century thinkers felt that studying 'the way of life of the American Indians could help to illuminate certain aspects of the problem of the development of man and society [and] [...] on the condition of mankind in the "first" or "earliest" period of its development' (Meek 1976: 37 – original emphasis). Likewise, the argument that America is an abundance of arable land is not peculiar to Locke; Christopher Columbus for instance, remarked that '*since the land is so fertile, it is desirable to sow of all kinds as much as possible*' (Columbus in Major 1870: 81 – original emphasis). As Gersdorf comments, 'the first reports from the shores of the new-found land commented on its fertility, the cornucopian availability of edible plants and animals, and the abundance of precious metals' (Gersdorf 2001: 42). Thus, America is portrayed as a "paradise", as an ideal setting for a new start for colonisers: 'the New World was clearly seen as a second chance, a clean slate' (Campbell 1988: 209). As signalled by the novel's epigraph, in *New Eve* Carter sets out to deconstruct the notion of America as an Edenic landscape that provides a beginning or "blank slate", questioning its fertility as well as its opportunities for new arrivals such as Eve(lyn). With reference to Carter's unpublished manuscripts, I would argue that the Lockean epigraph encapsulates her broader engagement with these ideas.

The depiction of America in *New Eve* is based on Carter's journey across the States, a trip that also inspired 'That Arizona Home'. As Carter told Lisa Appignanesi:

> the vision of the United States [in *New Eve*] [...] was based on a Greyhound bus trip I took with my then husband in the summer of 1969, when one really did feel that it couldn't hang on much longer, when the war had been brought home. The feeling of New York there is only very slightly exaggerated. (Carter to Appignanesi 1987: unpaginated)

The America Carter portrays in *New Eve* is futuristic and apocalyptic. For instance, the 'New World' (Carter 2009b: 33) is introduced via Eve(lyn)'s narration of his/her arrival in New York City, which is described as 'a lurid, Gothic darkness' in which rats and beggars dominate the 'rank, disordered streets' (Carter 2009b: 6; 8). This is in sharp contrast to Eve(lyn)'s anticipation of a 'clean, hard, bright city where towers reared to the sky in a paradigm of technological aspiration' (Carter 2009b: 6), based on the portrayal of the metropolis in films. Eve(lyn) moves to New York to work at a university, and had 'been hooked on a particular dream, all manner of old movies ran through my head when I first heard I'd got the job there' (Carter 2009b: 6). The job does not come to fruition, though, as the university is blown up. The hope that America provides a new start for Eve(lyn) – and European, Old World arrivals more broadly – is therefore diminished in line with his/her

ideal of the American dream; 'nothing in my experience had prepared me for the city' (Carter 2009b: 6). Thus, from the initial portrayal of America in the novel, a contrast is set up between the America Locke envisages in the *Second Treatise* and the America Eve(lyn) – and Carter – perceive.

The same distinction is voiced in 'That Arizona Home' where Carter similarly recalls 'riding the Greyhound bus through Arizona', a state described as 'a most desolate region' (Carter 1998h: 275). Carter's account of this barren landscape focuses on 'an Indian child chucking stones at a wrecked Chevvy', a child who, for Carter, encompasses 'the vanishing American himself' (Carter 1998h: 275). While in Rousseauian terms Carter highlights the 'myth of the Noble Red Man' applied to American Indian tribes (Carter 1998h: 276), her discussion is also informed by her reading of Hobbes as well as of Locke's *Two Treatises*, as she recycles the epigraph to *New Eve*. She states:

> During the Enlightenment, the red man was enlightenment itself. John Locke opined: "In the beginning, all the World was America." The Indian was Adam rediscovered, an Adam who had not eaten the forbidden fruit, and so retained not the naïvety of a child of nature, but innocence in the form of an intuitive sense of truth and justice, innocence as a lack of corruption. The red man's sane and democratic social institutions were, for Locke, a positive disproof of Hobbes. Adam; but not yet the old Adam. That comes later, with Billy Two Legs. (Carter 1998h: 278)

Thus, Carter situates a pre-civilised America – embodied by the American Indian child – in a time before the Fall, comparing the child to Adam before he was tempted by Eve. Like in *New Eve*, Carter's view of America contrasts the Edenic Lockean sentiment, as the America Carter travels through is disintegrating and a long way removed from its innocent origins, illustrating, contra Locke, that 'most of the world is America no longer' (Dunn 2003: 45).

Carter's unpublished plans for *New Eve* indicate that at one stage she planned to open the novel by setting up America as an Edenic terrain, which she does explicitly in 'That Arizona Home', and by depicting the native American Indians naively living in this paradise, building on Locke's idea of American Indians living in a plentiful state of nature. In a journal called 'Hermaphrodite notes' that she started in early 1973,[11] she makes the note 'use for beginning – some of the American material' (Carter undated Journal MS88899/1/109: 6), and goes on to signal that at one stage she envisaged the following section to be at the beginning of the novel:

[11] 'The Great Hermaphrodite' was a working title for *New Eve*. This journal is undated in the British Library catalogue, but a few pages in the date 'Feb 1973' is written. Of course, the contents of the notebook confirm that it was written in the early-mid 1970s.

> The earliest description of the North American coast is that of Giovanni da Verrazano, who was sent out by Francis I, King of France. Verrazano reached N. America somewhere near North Carolina in the spring of 1524, 32 years after Columbus. The sailors inhaled sweet perfumes as they drew near land; in those days, when the American forests were full of flowers, the whole Atlantic shore sent fragrance far out to sea on a land breeze. He probably arrived in time for the magnolias; each spring, the wilderness blossomed. Drayton: "the luscious smell of that delicious land".[12] Verrazano and his crew were the first white men to see Manhattan; the Indians, "wearing the feathers of birds of various colours", swarmed down to greet them, without fear, without hostility. (Carter undated Journal MS88899/1/109: 8)

While omitted from the published text and partly in note form, this planned addition demonstrates Carter's research on American origins, particularly of accounts of the utopian 'blank slate', illuminating the abundantly fertile American landscape which Carter deconstructs in her apocalyptic depiction of urban New York in the published version of the novel. Her use of the clause 'in those days' to describe the previous pre-contact plentitude of the American soil hints that this fruitfulness has waned, and no longer characterises the American land. Carter's journal from early 1977 provides more evidence that Carter was thinking about colonising the Americas in these terms. She writes that the 'Conquest of America = return to the Earthly Paradise' and notes that 'Columbus believed that the fresh water currents he encountered in the Gulf of Paria[13] originated in the four rivers of the Garden of Eden' (Carter 1977 Journal MS88899/1/96: unpaginated), explicitly aligning the Americas with the Book of Genesis. Thus, Carter's reference to Locke at the beginning of the novel encapsulates the discussions about abundant American origins to which Carter refers in the plans for the novel – Columbus, Verrazano, and Michael Drayton – and goes on to dissect.[14]

In the published text of *New Eve* Carter deconstructs the idea that America is a fertile Eden. While Zero is impotent, Mother has a 'double tier of breasts' (Carter 2009b: 62) and personifies 'self-fulfilling fertility' (Carter 2009b: 56). This hyperbolic representation of procreativity extends to her womb-like construction of Beulah which is located beneath the desert – a signifier of aridity and sterility. In Beulah, Eve(lyn):

> felt the dull pressure of the desert, of the mountains beyond the desert, of the vast prairies, the grazing cattle, the corn; I felt upon me the whole heaviness of

[12] The reference to Drayton corresponds to Michael Drayton's 1606 'Ode to the Virginian Voyage'.
[13] The Gulf of Paria lies between the island of Trinidad and the east coast of Venezuela.
[14] I discuss Carter's depiction of America in more detail in my paper '"This is a New Country, Full of Hope...": Angela Carter and "Amerikan" Exceptionalism', published in *Contemporary Women's Writing*. See Yeandle 2014.

> that entire continent with its cities and its coinage, its mines, its foundries, its wars and its mythologies. (Carter 2009b: 49)

Here, Eve(lyn) refers to natural, primitive forms of fecundity and survival, 'the grazing cattle, the corn', in a territory beyond the borders of the desert, and contrasts this with America's constructed civilisations and industries, and the artificialities of myth and economic exchange. Thus, 'by placing her Amazon society in the desert' Gersdorf argues, 'Carter designates a resistant potential to a landscape whose *ecology* does not cater to fantasies of fertility and abundance' and 'formulate[s] a literary critique of America by referring back to the very concepts that framed its mythology: nature and gender' (Gersdorf 2001: 51 – emphasis mine). Gersdorf does not emphasise, however, that Carter's satirical portrayal of Beulah depicts alternative ideologies of procreation and fertility. Although the natural, ecological landscape does not present these qualities, in the domain of Beulah, which embodies 'a complicated mix of mythology and technology' (Carter 2009b: 44), natural forms of procreation are substituted by artificial means of insemination. Likewise, synthetic food serves as a replacement for organic produce. Mother, 'a great scientist' (Carter 2009b: 46) and earth-goddess, rejects nature; she is self-constructed, and as Eve(lyn) remarks, Beulah 'is a triumph of science and hardly anything about it is natural' (Carter 2009b: 47). This illustrates, in relation to Locke, an opposition between a pre-civilised, naturally fertile America and a technological and manufactured environment, and exaggerates the distance between Carter's depiction of a disintegrating America of the future from the plentiful, prelapsarian past that Locke – and Old World colonisers – imagined could be reinstated.

Carter's reading of Locke, therefore, is central to broader discussions of identity throughout her *oeuvre*, with his images of furnished rooms and blank slates in his *Essay* influencing her depiction of Emily's family and sexual relations in *Shadow Dance*, and providing a foundation for her discussion of Walser's role as a journalist and later as a clown in *Nights at the Circus*, and for thinking about how his knowledge was rebuilt after his memory was erased. These ideas, as well as the 'white paper' concept, are especially pertinent in *New Eve*, where the construction of Eve(lyn)'s gender is portrayed in relation to Locke's notion of a blank slate, feeding into Carter's rejection of innate, essentialist theories of gender. Carter also recycles Locke's image of a *tabula rasa* in relation to new beginnings, but does so ironically, in order to question the intentions of those inscribing the blank slate, as illustrated by the snowy landscapes portrayed in *Nights at the Circus* and 'The Ghost Ships'. When it comes to her portrayal of America, though, Locke's *Second Treatise* is a crucial intertext, as it encapsulates Carter's wider reading of the origins of America in relation to

accounts of its abundance and its association with notions of paradise. In 'That Arizona Home' and, to a greater extent, *New Eve*, Carter seeks to deconstruct these ideals, setting up a contrast between the arguments epitomised by the Lockean epigraph 'in the beginning all the world was *America*' (original emphasis) and the America Carter explored in 1969, which inspired her article 'That Arizona Home' and her portrayal of New York in her 1977 novel. Carter's engagement with empiricist thinkers, however, goes beyond her reading of Locke, extending to Hume as well; the rest of this chapter is dedicated to discussing Hume's impact on Carter's work, particularly the two latter instalments of the Bristol trilogy – *Several Perceptions* and *Love*.

Hume: Causation and Identity

In line with her reading of Descartes and Locke, Carter's initial engagement with the Scottish empiricist David Hume dates to 1963, when she made a note of a lengthy quotation from Hume's *A Treatise of Human Nature*. She writes:

> Wherein consists the difference betwixt believing and disbelieving any proposition? The answer is easy with regard to propositions that are proved by intuition or demonstration. In that case, the person[,] who assents[,] not only conceives the ideas according to the proposition, but [also] is necessarily determined to conceive them in that particular manner, either immediately[,] or by the interposition of other ideas. Whatever is absurd is unintelligible; nor is it possible for the imagination to conceive anything contrary to a demonstration. But as[,] in reasonings from causation, and concerning matters of fact, this absolute necessity cannot take place, and the imagination is free to conceive both sides of the question, I still ask, ["]Wherein consists the difference[15] betwixt incredulity and belief? Since[,] in both cases the conception of the idea is equally possible and requisite["].[16] (Carter 1962-63 Journal MS88899/1/88: unpaginated; Hume 2009: 83)

Building on her Cartesian and Lockean research, therefore, Carter's reading of Hume's *Treatise* demonstrates her interest in knowledge, dwelling on when facts can be accepted without further question – with 'propositions [...] proved by intuition or demonstration' – and when they cannot, as with 'reasonings from causation'. This quotation is preceded by Carter's claim 'I am shattered by Hume; he is tremendous', and just underneath it she has written 'Hume has completely shattered me' (Carter 1962-63 Journal MS88899/1/88: unpaginated). This sentiment is reiterated at the end of the notebook where Carter has listed

[15] Hume spells 'deference' (Hume 2009: 83).
[16] The square brackets represent occasions where the unspecified edition Carter used and the edition I use differ.

the books she has read; alongside the Hume entry, she notes that 'Hume was a tremendous mind' (Carter 1962-63 Journal MS88899/1/88: unpaginated).

According to her research journals, Carter returned to Hume's *Treatise* in 1966-67, at the time when she was planning and writing *Several Perceptions* and researching *Heroes and Villains*. On this occasion she makes a note of another quotation from Hume's *Treatise*, the last sentence of which (italicised below) she used as an epigraph for *Several Perceptions*, a sentence which also inspired this novel's title:

> mankind... (is)...[17] nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement. Our eyes cannot turn in their sockets without varying our perceptions. Our thought is still more variable than our sight; and all our other senses and faculties contribute to this change; nor is there any single power of the soul, which remains unalterably the same, perhaps for one moment. *The mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively make their appearance; pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations.* (Carter 1966-68 Journal MS88899/1/91: unpaginated; Hume 2009: 194 – emphasis mine)

With the exception of mentioning an intention to (re)read Hume as research for *Doctor Hoffman* and claiming that she did not do so (Carter undated Journal MS88899/1/110: 186), and making a note of Hume's claim that 'time[,] as it exists[,] must be composed of indivisible [fragments]' (Hume 2009: 37) as part of her research on 'Memory' in 1979 (Carter 1977 Journal MS88899/1/96: unpaginated),[18] the two lengthy quotations cited above represent the extent of Carter's notes on Hume.

A few conclusions can be drawn from this initial overview of Carter's reading of Hume. To begin with, while Carter's engagement with philosophers is usually satirical and condemnatory, as illustrated by most of the chapters in this thesis, she is uncharacteristically accepting – indeed approving – of Hume; she endorses his work, and calls him 'tremendous' twice. The fact that Carter actually gives a supplementary personal opinion of Hume is in itself unusual, as Carter's philosophical research is predominantly objective, consisting mainly of lists of quotations, and on the rare occasions where her judgement is provided, it is generally of a derogatory nature; for instance, in the 1962-63 journal once again, she calls John Stuart Mill a 'woolly liberal' (Carter 1962-63 Journal MS88899/1/88: unpaginated). Despite her appreciation of Hume, though, Carter's notes on him in her journals are sporadic and are not particularly extensive, contrasting with her research on other philosophers where

[17] Carter's ellipsis.

[18] Carter writes 'time as it exists must be composed of indivisible fragments' whereas Hume's words are 'time, as it exists, must be composed of indivisible moments'.

her notes are much more voluminous, especially in relation to Hobbes and, as I discuss in the next chapter, Wittgenstein. Nevertheless, to reiterate my contextualisation of Carter's reading of Locke in the previous section, this does not mean that Hume is a trivial thinker to discuss in relation to Carter: the fact that he inspired the title and epigraph of *Several Perceptions* testifies otherwise.

While limited in contrast to her notes on other thinkers, her notes on Hume indicate that his ideas of knowledge, identity, and causation made a particular impact on Carter in the 1960s, ideas which, I go on to argue, are central to *Several Perceptions* as well as the third instalment of the Bristol trilogy, *Love*. To date, though, the minimal criticism on Carter and Hume has not gone beyond Carter's Humean epigraph to *Several Perceptions*, briefly recognising how the quotation corresponds to the novel's thematic interests. Lee, for instance, notes that 'the epigraph to the novel, taken from David Hume, raises the connection between the novel's performative imagery and its discontinuous structure' (Lee 1997: 32). Marc O'Day and Peach, amongst others, make the same observation (O'Day 2007: 60; Peach 2009: 51). Peach has paid the most attention to the relevance of Hume for Carter so far. He says that 'the emphasis of the critical discussion' in *Several Perceptions* 'falls on the significance for the novel of David Hume's concept of the mind as a kind of theatre and upon the importance of the influence of Shakespeare's last plays' (Peach 2009: 15). He goes on to say of the central character of the narrative, Joseph, that his 'state of consciousness is directly associated with Hume's concept of the mind' (Peach 2009: 47), and that 'the party which closes the novel is more than just a carnivalesque conclusion. It returns us to the David Hume epigraph and the notion of the theatricality of the mind' (Peach 2009: 51). Alongside other critics including Lee, O'Day, and Gamble (2009), Peach also highlights the fact that the context of the Vietnam War is central to *Several Perceptions*, which he also links to Hume, saying that 'the Vietnam War became a "theatre", [...] mirroring the theatre of the mind described in the novel's epigraph' (Peach 2009: 48).

This repetitious analysis, whilst highlighting Hume's importance for Carter, fails to delve into Hume's significance beyond the terminology of the epigraph, suggesting that Hume's impact on Carter's work is limited. In contrast, I provide a broader discussion of Hume's impact on *Several Perceptions*, arguing that Hume's theory of the mind and identity – signalled by the epigraph and Carter's extended notes on this aspect of Hume's *Treatise* in her 1966-67 journal – is just one part of Carter's interaction with Hume. I would argue that the epigraph, which Carter attributes to Hume without citing its source, acts as a signpost, directing the reader to consider Hume's relevance to the novel as a whole: as Carter says, she

'expect[s] people to look things up' (Carter to Kenyon 1992: 26). Hume's work on causation – the relationship between cause and effect – is central to *Several Perceptions* as well, which Carter explicitly draws attention to: after surviving a suicide attempt, Joseph believed 'he had contravened the laws of cause and effect, as the philosopher Hume suggested was possible' (Carter 1970: 21). Carter's interest in the uncertainty surrounding causation that Hume discusses is demonstrated by her initial notes on Hume, which include his argument that 'in reasonings from causation, and concerning matters of fact, this absolute necessity cannot take place, and the imagination is free to conceive both sides of the question' (Carter 1962-63 Journal MS88899/1/88: unpaginated; Hume 2009: 83).

As well as discussing Hume's work on identity and his conception of the mind, therefore, I examine Carter's depiction of causal relations in *Several Perceptions*, and argue that Carter experiments with Hume's theory of causality in this novel and comes to the same conclusion as him by fracturing the relationship between cause and effect. I argue that the same concern infuses *Love*, where notions of cause and effect are once again ruptured. Peach has hinted that Hume's influence on *Several Perceptions* spills over into *Love*, claiming that 'the park itself [in *Love*] seems like a metaphor for a more tumultuous version of the "theatre of the mind" described in the epigraph to *Several Perceptions*' (Peach 2009: 57). However, he once again restricts his argument to the epigraph, and does not consider other aspects of Hume's work, such as his theory of causation. Causation is, in fact, more central to Hume's later work, the *Enquiries*, published as three books between 1748 and 1757, particularly the first book, the *Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding*. In L. A. Selby-Bigge's words, 'the Enquiries are an easy book and the Treatise a very hard one'; 'the Treatise was ill-proportioned, incoherent, ill-expressed' whilst Hume 'gives us elegance, lucidity and proportion' in the *Enquiries* (Selby-Bigge 1975: x). Based on the accessibility of the *Enquiries* and the fact that Carter's knowledge is, according to her research notes, based on his *Treatise*, I refer to both texts in my discussion in order to gain a clearer understanding of Hume. I will begin by briefly outlining Hume's theory of causality.

Hume argues that a knowledge of cause and effect is gained from experience and is based on memory, saying that 'as the power, by which one object produces another, is never discoverable merely from their idea, it is evident cause and effect are relations, of which we receive information from experience, and not from any abstract reasoning or reflection' (Hume 2009: 65). Thus, causation is not known *a priori* (by rational thought) but is acquired *a posteriori* (from empirical evidence and experience). Hume uses a range of examples to illustrate this argument, one of which is related to the movement of billiard balls. He states:

> we fancy, that were we brought on a sudden into this world, we could at first have inferred that one Billiard-ball would communicate motion to another upon impulse; and that we needed not to have waited for the event, in order to pronounce with certainty concerning it. Such is the influence of custom. (Hume 1975: 28)

In other words, the knowledge that one billiard ball striking another would cause the second to move is based on having seen this kind of behaviour before rather than an innate understanding of the laws of causation; thus, 'any search for the idea of causation in the billiard balls themselves proves hopeless' (Johnson 1995: 128). Hume proposes that the link between cause and effect is arbitrary, and wonders where a supposed "knowledge" of an etiological connection comes from.

He goes on to argue that it is the 'constant conjunction'[19] of cause and effect that leads us to believe that there is a 'necessary connexion [sic]' between them (Hume 2009: 78). For instance, because the presence of a flame and the sensation of heat are conjoined in past experience, 'we call the one cause and the other effect, and infer the existence of the one from that of the other' (Hume 2009: 78). We learn that they are connected using our senses, but, as Hume notes, when 'we reason concerning them, there is only one [either the cause or effect] perceived or remembered, and the other is supplied in conformity to our past experience' (Hume 2009: 78). The notion of custom, or habit, is therefore central to Hume's understanding of causation; 'all inferences from experience [...] are effects of custom, not of reasoning' (Hume 1975: 43). Thus, as Johnson notes, 'our beliefs about the cause-effect relation cannot constitute knowledge but only opinion' (Johnson 1995: 135). This theory distinguishes Hume from his predecessors, such as Locke and Berkeley, whom he criticises for accepting the 'general maxim in philosophy, that *whatever begins to exist, must have a cause of existence*' without further question, asking 'why a cause is always necessary', and arguing that causation 'is commonly taken for granted in all reasonings, without any proof given or demanded' (Hume 2009: 71 – original emphasis).

As discussed in the previous chapter, the relationship between cause and effect – and the usefulness of understanding causality – is questioned in *Heroes and Villains* (1969), where Carter parodies the need to carry out an autopsy on a rabbit because the knowledge of the cause of death is not useful in the post-apocalyptic context – it is not used to prolong the lives of the Professors. This disconnection between cause and effect, however, is at the heart

[19] For Johnson, 'what Hume really means by the term "constant conjunction" is the regular repetition of a conjunction' (Johnson 1995: 154).

of both *Several Perceptions* and *Love*, the novels that sandwich *Heroes and Villains* and are my focus here. While Hume positions stable, readily accepted notions of causation as 'myth' (Ayer 1980: 17), Carter, like Hume, demythologises this idea – she is, in her oft-cited words, 'in the demythologising business' (Carter 1998b: 38). As well as being linked by the Bristol setting, the 'Bristol Trilogy' novels – a term coined by O'Day in 1994 (O'Day 2007: 44), but Carter also retrospectively referred to *Shadow Dance*, *Several Perceptions*, and *Love* as her '3 Bristol novels' (Carter 1969-70 Journal MS88899/1/93: unpaginated) – have similar plot structures, narrative styles, and counter-culture characters (O'Day 2007: 44). These three novels are also, as Gamble notes, 'characterized by a disorientating sense of discontinuity' (Gamble 2006: 47). In this sense, as Lorna Sage argues, the three novels resemble a 'flicker book' (Sage 1992b: 169), with Gamble similarly arguing that *Love* is 'a rapidly moving jumble of randomly selected images that never quite cohere into a unified whole capable of either yielding "meaning" or drawing to a satisfactory conclusion' (Gamble 2009: 98).

Gamble has discussed this aspect of the Bristol trilogy novels in relation to the film director Jean-Luc Godard's influence on Carter, particularly focusing on his use of the 'jump cut' technique which, as Gamble notes, 'Godard pioneered' in his debut film *Breathless*, released in 1960 (Gamble 2006: 46). The jump cut was created when 'Godard simply edited out those sections of a scene that were boring to him, and spliced together the remaining sections of the scene without the use of dissolves, wipes, or other traditional transitional devices' (Dixon 1997: 16). In Gamble's words, 'the result [is] that the action proceeds in a jerky, discontinuous fashion' (Gamble 2009: 69). Thus, as Susan Sontag notes, Godard 'rejects causality' (Sontag 1967: 199), and the same can be said for Carter. O'Day, for instance, remarks that 'actions and interactions are not linked by cause and effect in linear or public time but happen within some other time' in *Several Perceptions* (O'Day 2007: 63), while Lee argues that 'cause and effect, one of the staples of realism, is given short shrift in this novel' (Lee 1997: 32). I would argue that Godard's influence is just one component of Carter's broader engagement with notions of causality, and that her reading of Hume, and use of a Humean epigraph for *Several Perceptions*, mean that Hume also qualifies as a central intertext when it comes to discussions of causality in the Bristol trilogy, especially as Carter cites Hume's theory of causation and its disruption of established, unquestioned beliefs of cause and effect in the novel. While Joseph's failed suicide is a key part of the novel to discuss in relation to Hume's theory, the disconnection between cause and effect permeates both *Several Perceptions* and *Love*.

Joseph has 'several scrapbooks in which he had cut out and pasted facts' (Carter 1970: 15). He does this as part of his search for stability, believing that they 'might help to shore up the crumbling dome of the world' (Carter 1970: 3). As well as being a fact-collector, Joseph has studied logic: he owns 'a textbook on logic' (Carter 1970: 15) and can 'still construct a truth table, an elementary procedure in the study of logic' (Carter 1970: 4). Carter hints at the fact that the textbook and his ability to construct a truth table are remnants of Joseph's time at university, as he had a 'period of University life' but 'threw it [his education] away' (Carter 1970: 4). Carter's plans for *Several Perceptions* reinforce this argument, as she writes that Joseph 'flunked out of a philosophy course, kept on Freudianly misspelling Kant' (Carter 1965-66 Journal MS88899/1/90: 72). Joseph's reference to Hume's theory of causation when he survives his suicide attempt suggests that he studied Hume as part of his philosophy degree. However, his predilection towards facts, truth, and logic means that he consciously tries to seek out the cause of an effect; this is part of his need for order, provided by an unquestionable relationship between cause and effect. For instance, when Joseph closes his eyes while children are playing on the Down near to where Sunny – a seemingly homeless beggar – is playing an invisible violin, he is disturbed by 'a terrible storm and clamour of shouting and abuse' (Carter 1970: 8). Joseph, following Hume's discussion of the role of custom and experience in the knowledge of causality, automatically comes to the conclusion that 'the children's ball *must have* hit Sunny. It was already too late to tell whether this had happened accidentally or on purpose but, however it occurred, it knocked off his rarely-doffed cap' (Carter 1970: 8 – emphasis mine). Carter's disjointed narrative technique means that the reader cannot know for certain whether Joseph's inference is correct, but, following Hume's argument that either the cause or effect is 'perceived or remembered' while 'the other is supplied in conformity to our past experience' (Hume 2009: 78), he formulates a cause to explain the effect.

Joseph's fixation on facts is put to use at the end of the first chapter, when, relying on his knowledge of the properties of carbon monoxide, he attempts suicide. He is aware that 'coal gas in its present form is lethal because of the carbon monoxide it contains' and states that normally 'the blood absorbs oxygen to form oxyhaemoglobin but in the presence of carbon monoxide it will ignore the oxygen completely to form carboxy-haemoglobin' (Carter 1970: 19). Thus, his suicide attempt is founded upon unchanging rules of causality, the unquestionable effect that carbon monoxide will cause. His survival is the catalyst for considering the possibility that cause and effect do not have to be necessarily connected: 'somehow, he thought, he had contravened the laws of cause and effect, as the philosopher

Hume suggested was possible; he had blindly stumbled upon a formula that annihilated causation and now anything was possible' (Carter 1970: 21). This disconnection of cause and effect leads to a state of flux – 'he had formed a random pattern, just as he fell after the explosion, a chance formation which he could not read' (Carter 1970: 30) – a haphazardness that characterises the rest of the novel.

The effect this fluidity has on interpreting morality and the motive, or cause, of an attack is epitomised by the scene when Joseph goes to the bar with Viv, and Viv's mother, Mrs Boulder. Before Joseph goes to the toilet 'the bar was bleak but peaceful' but when he returns, 'everything was changed' (Carter 1970: 51). What follows is referred to by Gamble as 'a chaotic jigsaw of events which do not connect, and are incapable of explanation or comprehension', which can be understood, she argues, as a 'translation into a literary context of a cinematographic method pioneered by Godard' – the jump cut (Gamble 2009: 69). A girl has, for an unknown reason, thrown a glass at Joseph's friend Kay, but the girl is blaming her behaviour on Mrs Boulder, at whom, it seems, she aimed the glass: 'you started it so I threw a glass at you' (Carter 1970: 52). A boy with a pink tie whom the girl was holding hands with before Joseph went to the toilet tries to attack Kay, and the girl throws another glass at Kay, but what sparked this chaos is unclear. The disconnected depiction of these events is interrupted by the observation that 'there was a jagged atmosphere in the bar; things were happening without a sequence, there was no flow or pattern to events. Causation was still awry. Violence seemed suspended in the air, about to happen' (Carter 1970: 52). The scene at the bar is therefore regarded as a direct result of causation being somehow annihilated by Joseph's suicide attempt and subsequent survival, an annihilation that Joseph discusses in relation to Hume's theory. The disruption the disconnection between cause and effect creates draws attention to the security an unquestioned belief in causal relations provides, suggesting a reason as to why philosophers before Hume did not question their knowledge of causality – it provides a stable foundation for our understanding of the world.

The laws of causation are questioned once again at the Christmas Eve party at the end of the novel. Joseph's neighbour Anne, for instance, who previously suffered from a limp, is cured by Kay, who diagnoses her as having a 'hysterical paralysis' (Carter 1970: 145). Another revelation is the discovery that Sunny is not homeless, as he has lived in Kay's mother's basement for forty years. Thus, Carter challenges the assumptions made by the reader according to custom and causation. For instance, until this point Sunny is assumed to be homeless because of his status as a beggar, and Anne's limp is thought to have been caused by a physical disability or an accident. Thus, the carnivalesque atmosphere of the

party has optimistic implications, with Lee saying that 'anything seems possible' (Lee 1997: 32) and Gamble claiming that the party is a time 'during which dreams come true' (Gamble 2009: 73), a reading which suggests that a Humean-inspired escape from the laws of cause and effect has liberating outcomes. On the other hand, as both of these critics – amongst others – point out, there is also a suggestion that normality will resume after the party. Gamble observes that the final party is held in a room that 'was entirely covered in pink tinted looking-glass from floor to ceiling', and that 'the perspectives of the room, arbitrarily distorted by the mirror duplicated itself and seemed to chat and dance with its own reflection and this wall of mirror also reflected the windows and the trees and darkness outside, so the crowd appeared hemmed in on all sides by dangerous night' (Carter 1970: 129). Despite the rose-tinted glass, as Gamble reflects, this image of restriction implies 'the inability of the counterculture to change the world' (Gamble 2009: 75). Likewise, Lee cites Carter's comment in her interview with Sage that 'the carnival has to stop. The whole point [...] is that things went on as they did before, after it stopped' (Carter to Sage 1992: 188; Lee 1997: 34). In Humean terms, the implication is that the contravention of the laws of causation cannot be permanent. Despite the positive effects of this suspension, in terms of the events at the party, Carter's conclusion suggests that escaping etiological norms is not a long-term possibility. While, like Hume, Carter upholds the idea that a cause is not always necessary, and illustrates that the relationship between cause and effect is not the secure, universal truth that it is assumed to be, she implies that the connection between cause and effect is an essential adhesive for societal existence; that is why many of Hume's predecessors took their "knowledge" of causality for granted.

Carter puts forward a similar discussion of causality in *Love*; although she does not name Hume in this text, her references to causation signal that he is a key influence for this novel as well. Similarly to the fragmented depiction of cause and effect in the bar scene in *Several Perceptions*, there is a corresponding sequence in a park in *Love*, where 'the remorseless logic of unreason where all vision is deranged, all action uncoordinated and all responses beyond prediction [...] dominated Annabel', the novel's female protagonist (Carter 2006b: 99). Annabel and Joseph have a lot in common, as both attempt suicide, although Annabel's third attempt (that the reader is aware of) is successful, and both suffer from a mental illness. What's more, like Joseph, Annabel questions the stable relationship between cause and effect, and in homage to Hume, shows that a knowledge of causal relations is based on custom and experience. The importance of expectations is illustrated by the novel's

opening scene, where Annabel walks through the park and is troubled by the simultaneous presence of the sun and moon:

> as she waited for the sun to set, she had ample time to refresh and embellish her initial terror and was finally seized with the conviction that this night, of all nights, it would never disappear at all but lie stranded for ever above the horizon so she would have to stay nailed to the hillside. (Carter 2006b: 4)

In the *Enquiry*, Hume similarly uses the sun as an example of how our expectations of cause and effect are learnt according to custom, with the sun rising and falling on a daily basis, saying that the suggestion that '*the sun will not rise to-morrow* is no less intelligible a proposition, and implies no more contradiction, than the affirmation, *that it will rise*' (Hume 1975: 25-26 – original emphasis). While Annabel contemplates the idea of the sun not setting and Hume talks about it not rising, Annabel's troubling conviction mirrors Hume's example as it signifies the disjointed presentation of causality in the novel, and represents Carter's treatment of time in the narrative. Events and interactions involving Annabel, her husband Lee, and her brother-in-law Buzz – that take centre stage in the narrative – are presented in a random, fragmentary order; the novel rejects causation as well as a chronological sequence.

Bearing in mind Carter's explicit reference to Hume's theory of causation in *Several Perceptions*, I would argue that her questioning of our knowledge of the movement of celestial bodies in *Love* stems from her reading of Hume's *Enquiry*. In line with Hume, Carter's use of the day-to-day example of the sun rising and falling emphasises how assumptions of cause and effect regulate our lives, and are seen as stable, indisputable facts, "facts" that both Carter and Hume question, and which Carter in particular disrupts, demonstrating the implications of severing causes and effects that are taken for granted. The fact that Carter presents this possibility through the lens of Annabel's psychosis emphasises the extent to which an irrefutable understanding of causality is ingrained in our knowledge of the world, and illustrates how a wavering notion of causal relations would impair our understanding of what is accepted as "reality".

Carter's interest in causality is not only discussed in relation to Annabel though, as causal relationships are also examined *vis-à-vis* Lee. One example of this is Carter's portrayal of his 'chronic eye infection' which "causes" his eyes to water 'under bright lights, weariness or strain' (Carter 2006b: 21); he therefore "cries" without an emotional stimulus. What's particularly fascinating about Carter's depiction of this disorder is that the cause of his tears is uncertain when there is an emotional stimulus involved. For example, Lee sits with Annabel looking at a photograph of him and Buzz with their aunt, and while Lee is looking at

the picture, Annabel 'removed a tear' from his cheek, 'but he did not want her to think he was really crying' (Carter 2006b: 25). He subsequently justifies this behaviour saying that it is a symptom of his eye disease – 'that's no authentic tear, love: my eyes, they water easily' (Carter 2006b: 25). Carter's narrative interjection questions Lee's explanation:

> In fact, this tear both was and was not authentic. His eye disease rendered his tears ambivalent. But, since he had the simple heart of one who boos the villain, when, as he often did, he found he was crying, he usually became sad. Whether his tears were the cause or the effect of a grief or if this grief, when it was experienced, would define itself to him as a reaction to some arbitrary stimulus such as the picture of the dead woman whom he had loved or as a reflection on common mortality – these were questions he had not yet chosen or chosen to need to ask himself. (Carter 2006b: 25)

In Humean terms, in line with Joseph's failed suicide attempt, Carter uses Lee's eye infection as a tool to sever the link between cause and effect. Whether Lee's eye complaint causes tears, which then cause his sadness, or if the stimulus of the photograph causes sadness, resulting in tears, is uncertain. Nevertheless, Lee does not consider the possibility that there is not a cause. The obscurity relating to the depiction of causality, in this instance, raises questions relating to reality, reliability, and appearance.

Like Joseph, Lee is constantly searching for causal connections, and tries to establish what links the different stages of his life so far. As well as the photo of him with his aunt and Buzz, he has a picture of him in school and one of him and Annabel together. On looking at these photographs, Lee:

> could find no causal connection between his three photographed faces. The infant, the child and the adolescent or young man whose face was still so new, unused and incomplete seemed to represent three finite and disconnected states. Looking in the mirror, he saw the face of a stranger to any of them with features which had been filtered through his wife's eyes and subjected to so many modifications in the process that it was no longer his own. There seemed no connecting logic between the various states of his life, as if each had been attained, not by organic growth but by a kind of convulsive leap from condition to condition. (Carter 2006b: 26)

This reference to Lee's appearance being 'filtered through his wife's eyes' and repeatedly modified concerns Annabel's art-work of Lee – 'over the years, she drew and painted him again and again in so many different disguises that at last he had to go to another woman to find out the true likeness of his face' (Carter 2006b: 24). The paintings do not 'have any continuity except for the constant romanticism of the imagery' (Carter 2006b: 34), resulting in Lee's fractured identity; he sees 'no causal connection' linking the trio of images together,

regarding them as 'represent[ing] three finite and disconnected states'. Thus, instability and incoherence take over when causality is lost or over-ridden.

Lee's disjointed view of his own identity also reflects Hume's discussion of the self that Carter cites in the epigraph to *Several Perceptions*. Hume's theory of personal identity, in line with his view of causation, challenges his predecessors by refusing to take established notions of what constitutes a 'self' for granted, resulting in a disorienting view of our own existence. He says that 'there are some philosophers who imagine we are every moment intimately conscious of what we call our SELF', who believe 'that we feel its existence and its continuance in existence; and are certain, beyond the evidence of a demonstration, both of its perfect identity and simplicity' (Hume 2009: 192 – original capitalisation). Hume refuses to readily accept this argument, pointing out that 'there is no impression constant and invariable' of the self, although identity is expected to be 'invariably the same' (Hume 2009: 193), and provides examples of when a stable identity is attributed to phenomena that grow, transform and fluctuate: an oak that grows from a seed into a large tree, or a river that flows. Likewise, 'an infant becomes a man-, and is sometimes fat, sometimes lean, without any change in his identity' (Hume 2009: 197). Hume explains that since 'the understanding never observes any real connexion among objects, and that even the union of cause and effect, when strictly examined, resolves itself into a customary association of ideas' it thus 'evidently follows, that identity is nothing really belonging to these different perceptions, and uniting them together; but is merely a quality, which we attribute to them, because of the union of their ideas in the imagination, when we reflect upon them' (Hume 2009: 198).

On this basis, a memory 'of this succession of perceptions' is regarded 'as the source of personal identity' (Hume 2009: 200). In *Love*, Lee's search for a 'causal connection between his three photographed faces' fails because there is 'no connecting logic between the various states of his life' – him as a child, adolescent, and young man, and his reflection in the mirror – demonstrating Hume's argument that although the self is supposed to be stable, it is mutable. Lee's suggestion that each stage of his life had been reached 'not by organic growth but by a kind of convulsive leap from condition to condition' corresponds to Hume's claim that personal identity is formed by uniting memories of different stages of life, and portrays Hume's examples of the difficulties faced in attributing a stable identity to things that grow and change. The problem Lee faces is that he cannot identify what unites the three pictures and his current self.

As indicated by the epigraph – 'The mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively make their appearance; pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle in an

infinite variety of postures and situations' – Hume's notion of a shifting personal identity is also a central concern in *Several Perceptions*. Joseph's 'curiously disembodied state of mind' (Carter 1970: 2) and the constant interjections about his sense of identity give Carter a platform to discuss Hume's theory of the self, particularly in relation to two analogies he uses – the theatre and the bundle. While Carter cites the theatre metaphor in the epigraph, she makes a note of the bundle image in her 1966-67 research notes: 'mankind... (is)... nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement' (Carter 1966-68 Journal MS88899/1/91: unpaginated; Hume 2009: 194). Hume utilises these two images to illustrate his theory of self-identity, but soon dismisses the bundle metaphor. The bundle analogy implies that 'individual minds are distinguished from each other by being different bundles of perceptions', that 'individual perceptions are distinct existences, independent of each other', which presupposes that 'something must bundle them together' (Johnson 1995: 291). Hume's inclination towards the image of the mind as 'a kind of theatre' rejects the idea that there is an external agent that binds these perceptions together. He says:

> the comparison of the theatre must not mislead us. They are the successive perceptions only, that constitute the mind; nor have we the most distant notion of the place, where these scenes are represented, or of the materials, of which it is composed. (Hume 2009: 194)

In other words, there is no theatre – 'the only things that exist are the actors or perceptions themselves' (Johnson 1995: 291). In *Several Perceptions*, Carter examines both of Hume's metaphors, and reaches the same conclusion as Hume, but while she ultimately upholds the theatre metaphor, she tweaks it to suit her requirements. Thus, although Carter's acceptance of Hume distinguishes him from the parodical portrayal of philosophers that characterises much of this thesis, this does not mean he escapes scrutiny.

Like Lee, Joseph struggles with the idea of having a united sense of self. While Lee's search for wholeness is discussed in relation to photographs and mirrors, in *Several Perceptions* mirrors and dreams form the basis of Carter's engagement with Hume's theory of personal identity. For instance, Joseph has a dream where he is being chased by a murderer who turns out to be himself, and he 'woke up and broke his mirror so it would never tell the truth again, if it had ever told the truth before' (Carter 1970: 3). After a similar dream of a maniac pursuing him with a knife, but 'the maniac's face was his own, himself' (Carter 1970: 5), Joseph speculates about his personal identity:

> Joseph was always surprised, in dreams as in the mirror before he broke it, to see his wary, sallow, ill-looking ferociously private face; was the mirror

> deceiving him or was he, in fact, dreaming about some other person and not himself at all, some comparative stranger from whom he had rented this secret face out of the Jacobean drama, Flaminco or De Flores, ambiguous villains. Yet his actual physical self, his flesh and bone, often seemed to him no more than an arbitrary piece of theorizing, a random collection of impulses hurtling through a void. Or else eyes without a face, eyes with behind them only a screaming tangle of raw nerves. (Carter 1970: 5)

Here, Carter is alluding to Hume's bundle metaphor, the image of humanity being 'nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions' (Hume 2009: 194), although she discusses this idea in relation to Joseph's 'physical self, his flesh and bone', rather than solely in relation to his mind, whereas Hume 'equates personal identity with the identity of the mind, and defines this without any reference to the body' (Ayer 1980: 51). Nevertheless, the bundle or 'random collection' metaphor presumes that an exterior force is whimsically forming Joseph's physical self – that there is an external agent – an idea that Hume later repudiates. Before his failed suicide attempt, then, Joseph is identified with Hume's bundle metaphor, although his independent, individual mind (and body) is disordered and disembodied, or, as Carter says, 'arbitrary' and 'random'.

As well as experiencing the suspension of the laws of cause and effect after surviving his suicide attempt, his survival also marks a shift in relation to Hume's images: Joseph is now associated with the second of Hume's metaphors, the theatrical analogy used for the epigraph. When Joseph and Kay go to the zoo to free the badger, Joseph feels a 'complicated mixture of envy, resentment and distaste' for Kay, and Carter depicts his internal conflict in relation to Hume's theatrical image of the mind:

> These thoughts flashed on to various screens in small sideshows of his mind but the main theatre was so busy with the escape itself, the actual penetration of the cage, he had not time to remonstrate with Kay for choosing this moment to attempt a pass. (Carter 1970: 58)

Carter's expansion of Hume's metaphor beyond a single stage to having a 'main theatre' as well as a number of 'small sideshows' fruitfully illustrates Hume's argument that a succession of perceptions, or a plethora of images at the same time, can 'pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations' (Hume 2009: 194). Different actors or perceptions can perform simultaneously in Joseph's mind, adding to the state of flux that results from contravening the norms of causation. The explosion has not removed the theatre, or the mind, that 'performs the same function the bundle does in the first metaphor' (Johnson 1995: 291), but has multiplied the amount of performance arenas where

perceptions can appear, augmenting the potential for Joseph's self-identity to be fractured. This is, therefore, an amendment, rather than a correction of Hume, on Carter's part. Although Hume says that it is 'the successive perceptions only, that constitute the mind' and argues that a theatre does not contain them, Carter's allusion to sideshows conforms to Hume's claim that a 'notion of the place, where these scenes are represented, or of the materials, of which it is composed' is unknown (Hume 2009: 194).

Carter's interaction with this metaphor is also apparent when Joseph wonders how 'he appear[s] inside the round theatre of Viv's skull? Did his fragmented actions appear whole and all-of-a-piece to Viv, like any other performance of life might appear?' (Carter 1970: 81), questions surrounding the lack of unity of Joseph's self-identity and Viv's perception of this. But the speculation also illuminates Hume's discussion of how a constant identity is given to things that change, such as a tree, river, or person, and his claim that 'we feign the continued existence of the perceptions of our senses, to remove the interruption: and run into the notion of a soul, and self, and substance, to disguise the variation' (Hume 2009: 195). The idea that Joseph seems 'whole' to Viv, in the same way as 'any other performance of life might appear' exemplifies the subconscious endeavour to attribute a coherent and consistent identity to the self. Carter's image of the theatre here also signals how the use of the term 'theatre' can be, as Hume says, misleading. Although Joseph's concern surrounds how he as an actor is perceived by Viv, by attributing a 'round theatre' to Viv's skull, Joseph is allocating an identity to Viv. A. J. Ayer criticises Hume on this basis, noting that 'a point which oddly escapes Hume's sceptical notice is that one attributes identity to persons other than oneself, and that these attributions depend upon the identification of their bodies' (Ayer 1980: 53-54). Similarly, Joseph's own identity is fractured, while he unquestioningly attributes a whole sense of self to Viv.

Hume's theatrical portrayal of the self and the mind remains pertinent for the Christmas Eve party at the end of the novel, held in Kay's mother's 'dilapidated mansion' (Carter 1970: 127). Kay's mother 'lived in her theatrical past' and has turned her home 'into a set for the major starring role never offered to her in the actual theatre' (Carter 1970: 127). As Peach says, this 'returns us to the David Hume epigraph and the notion of the theatricality of the mind' (Peach 2009: 51). Building on Peach's reading, in this theatrical setting, in line with Hume's metaphor, 'several perceptions successively make their appearance', as, due to the mirrored walls, as the guests 'moved about, they seemed fragments in a giant kaleidoscope kept continually on the turn' (Carter 1970: 126). Carter's kaleidoscope image is similar to her depiction of the mind as a main theatre with several peripheral sideshows: a

kaleidoscope shows *several perceptions* simultaneously, and depicts a pattern that rotates and continually changes, suggesting that all of the perceptions presented by Carter in the party lack reality and stability, a notion that further fragments causality. Alongside the elimination of cause and effect, the theatrical, kaleidoscopic portrayal of self-identity adds to Carter's portrayal of an unstable, disjointed world, although the implication of the carnivalesque atmosphere is that this disorder is temporary, suggesting that order will soon resume.

Several Perceptions and *Love*, therefore, demonstrate Hume's disconnection of cause and effect while also voicing Hume's fragmentary theory of personal identity, challenging why we attribute stable notions of identity to people and phenomena that change and/or grow. Paired with Carter's use of Godard's jump cut technique, her Humean depiction of causation and the self creates an ephemeral 'floating world' (Carter 1970: 128) for the reader of the Bristol trilogy. The fact that order is reinstated at the end of *Several Perceptions* suggests that the laws of causation can only be lifted temporarily, showing how essential and foundational normal causal relations are. Thus, in line with Hume, Carter illustrates how and why secure notions of causality are assumed, depended upon, and, as Hume says, 'commonly taken for granted' (Hume 2009: 71) – they enable order and stability – while also suggesting that causation is not the secure, universal truth that it is assumed to be by challenging the foundation of our knowledge of the relationship between causes and effects. This questioning of the certainty of our knowledge characterises Carter's engagement with each of the philosophers discussed in this chapter – Descartes, Locke, and Hume. Carter raises questions about the knowledge of our existence, discusses whether knowledge is innate or acquired through experience, particularly in relation to gender, and contemplates how the relationship between cause and effect is understood, and how we attribute a stable identity to ourselves. In the next chapter I develop these ideas in relation to Carter's engagement with Ludwig Wittgenstein and Gilbert Ryle in *Doctor Hoffman*, discussing limits of knowledge, the role of language in knowledge, and definitions of reality.

Chapter Four – Wittgenstein and Ryle: Names, Signposts, and Currency in *Doctor Hoffman*

> I don't know my way about.
> (Wittgenstein 1967: 49e)

> The Doctor has liberated the streets from the tyranny of directions.
> (Carter 2010: 31)

> If I am an abortionist, your master is a forger. He has passed off upon us an entire currency of counterfeit phenomena.
> (Carter 2010: 36)

Angela Carter's *The Infernal Desire Machines of Doctor Hoffman* (1972) opens with three epigraphs,[1] one of which is a parenthetical quotation from Ludwig Wittgenstein's (1889-1951) *Philosophical Investigations* (published posthumously in 1953): '(remember that we sometimes demand definitions for the sake not of the content, but of their form: Our requirement is an architectural one: the definition is a kind of ornamental coping that supports nothing)' (Wittgenstein 1967: 85e – original parenthesis).[2] On this basis, Carter's interaction with Wittgenstein has been recognised by some critics. Maria-Ana Tupan (2009: 154), Suzanne Hall, and Annjeanette Wiese, for instance, acknowledge Carter's Wittgensteinian epigraph, while Hall and Wiese briefly discuss the relevance of the epigraph in relation to the theme of language, specifically names and definitions, in *Doctor Hoffman* (Hall 1991: 113-115; Wiese 2008: 179). This represents the criticism on *Doctor Hoffman* and Wittgenstein to date. While I acknowledge that *Doctor Hoffman* is a rigorously intertextual novel, to the extent that Joseph Bristow and Trev Lynn Broughton say that 'the allusiveness of her [Carter's] writing was so broad that one can only commiserate with the task facing future annotators' of this – and her other – texts (Bristow and Broughton 1997: 9), in this chapter I argue that Wittgenstein, a near contemporary of Carter, is one of the most important influences for this novel. Not only is this text littered with ideas and concepts Wittgenstein discusses in *Philosophical Investigations*, but it illustrates Carter's reading of Wittgenstein's earlier work, the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (published in German in 1921, in English in

[1] The other epigraphs are a French quotation attributed to Robert Desnos, a French surrealist poet: 'les lois de nos désirs sont les dés sans loisir', literally translated as 'the laws of our desires are the dice without leisure', and a quotation from Alfred Jarry's *Exploits and Opinions of Doctor Faustrall Pataphysician*: 'imagine the perplexity of a man outside time and space, who has lost his watch, his measuring rod and his tuning fork'.

[2] In G. E. M. Anscombe's translation, the quotation is slightly different: '(remember that we sometimes demand definitions for the sake not of their content, but of their form: Our requirement is an architectural one; the definition a kind of ornamental coping that supports nothing)' (Wittgenstein 1967: 85e).

1922), as well as her secondary research on Wittgenstein's philosophy, as Carter integrates quotations from Max Black's *A Companion to Wittgenstein's Tractatus* (1964) and Justus Hartnack's *Wittgenstein and Modern Philosophy* (translated by Maurice Cranston, 1965) into the novel. Thus, I argue that the limited criticism on Carter and Wittgenstein to date is disproportionate to Wittgenstein's tremendous impact on *Doctor Hoffman.*

Quantitatively, Wittgenstein is one of the most important philosophers for Carter, if not *the* most, with Sade's work being a close second, as discussed in the next chapter.[3] In the 1969-72 journal (MS88899/1/93),[4] as well as in other notebooks from these years (MS88899/1/80, MS88899/1/110, MS88899/1/111),[5] there are over six thousand words of quotations and notes about Wittgenstein's works. These are from two primary sources – the *Tractatus* and *Philosophical Investigations*[6] – as well as secondary discussions of his philosophy, particularly Hartnack's *Wittgenstein and Modern Philosophy* and Black's *Companion.* Carter even uses a quotation from Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* as the epigraph to her 1969-72 journal – 'a dog cannot be a hypocrite, but neither can he be sincere' – suggesting that he could, in fact, be the *most* important intertext for this period (Wittgenstein 1967: 229e; Carter 1969-70 Journal MS88999/1/93: unpaginated). The quantitative volume of Carter's Wittgenstein-related research – justifying his inclusion in this thesis – also includes a single quotation from Wittgenstein's *Notebooks* (1914-16). Carter capitalises this quotation and writes it with double-lined spacing – 'DON'T WORRY ABOUT WHAT YOU HAVE ALREADY WRITTEN; JUST KEEP ON BEGINNING TO THINK AFRESH AS IF NOTHING AT ALL HAD HAPPENED YET' – suggesting that she is using it as a note of encouragement (Wittgenstein 1969: 30e; Carter 1969-70 Journal MS88999/1/93: unpaginated). Black cites this quotation from the *Notebooks* at the beginning of his *Companion* (Black 1964: 2); since Carter writes only one quotation from the *Notebooks* in her research journals, it is plausible that Carter came across it in this secondary source. On this basis, I predominantly limit my discussion of Carter and Wittgenstein to her engagement

[3] Of course, on the basis that these thinkers are writing footnotes to Plato's philosophy, one could argue that Plato is the most important.

[4] In the British Library catalogue the date for this notebook is 1969-70, although the contents span 1969-72.

[5] These three journals are undated in the British Library catalogue, although MS88899/1/80 has the subtitle 'Japan 1'; the other two journals contain plans for *Doctor Hoffman.*

[6] Carter used D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness's translation of the *Tractatus* and G. E. M. Anscombe's translation of *Philosophical Investigations* (Carter 1969-70 Journal MS88899/1/93: unpaginated), both of which I use in this thesis. She also mentions a 'New translation by James Strachey, London, 1954' which I cannot find, complicating which translation was in fact used (Carter 1969-70 Journal MS88899/1/93: unpaginated). This does not effect my discussion.

with the *Tractatus* and *Philosophical Investigations*, as well as to her reading of secondary criticism on Wittgenstein.

Wittgenstein's work was therefore particularly pertinent for Carter during her time in Japan, but this does not mean that Carter did not engage with Wittgenstein's ideas before this time. As I highlight later on, the emphasis on logic in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* is relevant to *Several Perceptions* (1968), but Carter also references Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* in *Heroes and Villains* (1969), saying 'if the lion could speak, we would not understand it' (Carter 1972: 123). In G. E. M. Anscombe's translation of *Philosophical Investigations* that Carter mentions in the 1969-72 journal (Carter 1969-70 Journal MS88899/1/93: unpaginated), however, Donally's Wittgensteinian words are translated 'if a lion could talk, we could not understand him' (Wittgenstein 1967: 223e), suggesting that Carter may not have taken these words from this specific source, or that she has rewritten Wittgenstein's words, in line with her rewriting of Descartes. This unattributed citation of Wittgenstein in *Heroes and Villains* is puzzlingly anomalous, as her plans and journal notes demonstrate little evidence to suggest that Carter read Wittgenstein before 1969, apart from in a list of texts written in 1968 which *mentions* reading Hartnack's *Wittgenstein and Modern Philosophy* (Carter 1968-69 Journal MS88899/1/92: unpaginated). She makes no notes from this text in this journal, so the mention could merely indicate an *intention* to read Hartnack.

However, Gilbert Ryle's (1900-76) text *The Concept of Mind* (1949) is listed in the 1968-69 journal as well (Carter 1968-69 Journal MS88899/1/92: unpaginated), and while it is difficult to determine the exact order of Carter's research (and trust Carter's portrayal of this), the 1969-72 journal suggests that she read Ryle before Wittgenstein (Carter 1969-70 Journal MS88899/1/93: unpaginated). Her reading of Hartnack – which seems to begin with his section on Ryle that Carter makes notes on (Hartnack 1965: 90-103; Carter 1969-70 Journal MS88999/1/93: unpaginated) – was presumably the catalyst for her vastly comprehensive research on Wittgenstein's philosophy from 1969-72, and her subsequent return to Hartnack's text as further reading on Wittgenstein (rather than Ryle). This method of consulting secondary material first is problematic, but is also the approach Carter used *vis-à-vis* Hobbes, reading Watkins's *Hobbes's System of Ideas* before *Leviathan*. As his inclusion in *Wittgenstein and Modern Philosophy* indicates, though, Ryle was influenced by Wittgenstein, and he was also a key intertext for Carter while she was in Japan. During this time, Carter made notes on Ryle's *The Concept of Mind* as well as his *Dilemmas*, the latter of which documents his series of Tarner Lectures at the University of Cambridge in 1953. While her notes on Ryle are much less extensive that her research on Wittgenstein, one of his arguments

in the *Dilemmas*, I will go on to argue, is central to *Doctor Hoffman*. Ryle's impact on this novel has, to date, been overlooked by Carter critics.

In this chapter, therefore, I provide the first in-depth analysis of Carter's interaction with Wittgenstein, and also argue that Ryle is a key influence on Carter. I restrict my discussion to *Doctor Hoffman* and Carter's reflections on her time in Japan, a period when Wittgenstein and Ryle's impact on her was especially rife, although I acknowledge that they did not just influence her in Japan. As Jenny Fabian (undated) notes, in 'The Lady of the House of Love', a short story in *The Bloody Chamber* collection (1979), Carter uses the phrase 'ghost in a machine' (Carter 2006g: 202) which is central to Ryle's *The Concept of Mind*. In this text Ryle aims to refute notions of Cartesian dualism, which he calls 'the dogma of the Ghost in the Machine' (Ryle 1990: 17). Carter's engagement with Wittgenstein and Ryle – two of her contemporaries – in *Doctor Hoffman* demonstrates the range of her philosophical reading, both in general and as research for her 'rigorously philosophical' novel (Smith 2010: xii); she researched and was inspired by contemporary thinkers, as well as ancient philosophers like Plato, and a number of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century thinkers who make up the bulk of this thesis. My discussion of Wittgenstein outweighs my analysis of Ryle's impact, reflecting the quantitative influence they each had on *Doctor Hoffman*.

Wittgenstein and Navigation

What is particularly striking about Carter's Japanese research journals is her recurrent use of Wittgenstein's claim that 'a philosophical problem has the form: "I don't know my way about"' (Wittgenstein 1967: 49e). This phrase features as a refrain in Carter's notes, and is used in reference to navigating her new surroundings, both literally in terms of the geographical environment, but also linguistically and culturally. In a folder of journals in the archive undated but labelled 'Japan 1', there are a number of drafts which relate to Carter's experience in urban Japan in these terms. For instance, in 'Fictions Written in a Certain City: THE ENTIRE CITY', she discusses a metropolis where 'none of the streets have names so that if Wittgenstein is right and "A philosophical problem has the form, "I don't know my way about,"" then the city itself is a philosophical problem. Yes. I think one could call this city a philosophical problem in itself' (Carter undated 'Fictions Written in a Certain City: THE ENTIRE CITY' in Journal MS88899/1/80: 6). Similarly, in 'Fictions Written in a Certain City: Victims of Circumstance' she wonders, 'what is real and what is not, the ecstasy in the mirror; or the coffee-cup on the table', and continues, 'if I am to properly evaluate my experience, I need to know such things. A philosophical problem has the form:

"I don't know my way about"' (Carter undated 'Fictions Written in a Certain City: Victims of Circumstance' in Journal MS88899/1/80: 6). This recurring motif surfaces in *another* piece in this folder – 'Fictions Written in a Certain City: The Grammar of Existence' – where Carter states:

> if a philosophical problem has the form, "I don't know my way about", then one could say Japan is a country that contains no philosophical problems for, here, such a condition of existential confusion is the prerogative only of very few intellectuals and they would, perhaps, phrase it differently. (Carter undated ('Fictions Written in a Certain City: The Grammar of Existence' in Journal MS88899/1/80: 4-5)

Thus, while Carter suggests that urban Japan poses philosophical problems in terms of navigation, she also highlights that Japan is a privileged, 'classically male-dominated society' (Carter to Appignanesi 1987: unpaginated), and draws attention to the androcentric status of philosophy in Japan. In doing so, she argues that only an elite minority of Japanese citizens would have the privilege of experiencing Wittgenstein's 'I don't know my way about' problem. As an outsider, Carter can recognise this imbalance as well as reflect on not knowing her way about.

Carter's use of this refrain reflects her geographical disorientation as well as the linguistic and cultural differences that Japan poses. In 'My Maugham Award' (1970) she highlights the difficulties of learning the Japanese language saying that it 'poses – or, rather, annihilates – many problems for the European', and compares learning the language to 'having to turn my head inside out' (Carter 1998l: 204). Criticism on language and Carter's Japanese experience are usually discussed through the lens of Roland Barthes (1915-80), specifically his *Empire of Signs* (1970), which he wrote in Japan, a country he and Carter visited at the same time. Charlotte Crofts, for instance, says that 'it is at the point of language that Barthes' and Carter's experiences in Japan most closely coincide' (Crofts 2006: 97), while Lorna Sage notes that 'the coincidence between Barthes's Japan and Carter's is striking' (Sage 2007: 27). My archival research, however, illustrates that Wittgenstein is a key intertext to discuss in this context as well. Wittgenstein's claim that 'a philosophical problem has the form: "I don't know my way about"' (Wittgenstein 1967: 49e) relates to his aim in his later philosophy 'to shew [sic] the fly the way out of the fly-bottle' (Wittgenstein 1967: 103e) – to clarify philosophical concepts and provide direction to minimise confusion and disorientation.

But Wittgenstein also uses the concept of not knowing 'my way about' in relation to language, as Carter notes; for Wittgenstein, 'language is a labyrinth of paths. You approach

from *one* side and know your way about; you approach the same place from another side and no longer know your way about' (Wittgenstein 1967: 82e – original emphasis; Carter 1969-70 Journal MS88999/1/93: unpaginated). The 'I don't know my way about' idea therefore ricochets throughout Wittgenstein's text, and corresponds to linguistic understanding and the need to clarify terms to grasp philosophical ideas. By latching onto this refrain and repeatedly recycling it in her research journals, Carter mirrors Wittgenstein, expressing her need to literally navigate Japan as well as to understand a new language, while also drawing attention to philosophical differences between Japan and the UK. As I noted in the previous chapter *vis-à-vis* Descartes, Carter states that Japan:

> is a great country for appearances and it is often hard to tell what is real and what is not. (And, as generations of Zen oracles have pointed out, it doesn't matter much, anyway. Well, of course, it matters to a European, burdened with 2,500 years of logic, one plus one equalling two etc. etc. etc. [...]). (Carter undated 1969-74 'Tokyo' in Journal MS88899/1/81: 2)

In *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein discusses the link between a language and the culture that speaks it, and uses the term 'language-game' to illustrate how diverse languages can be. He says that defining 'games' solely in relation to one aspect of them such as board games, and stating that 'a game consists in moving objects about on a surface according to certain rules' is correct, but *only* as a definition of board games: 'you can make your definition correct by expressly restricting it to those games' (Wittgenstein 1967: 3e) – by clarifying that it is a definition of board games. As Wittgenstein notes, games can also include 'card-games, ball-games, Olympic games' (Wittgenstein 1967: 31e), games that you play alone, like solitaire (Wittgenstein 1967: 90e), or games that 'we play and – make up the rules as we go along' (Wittgenstein 1967: 39e). Lacking an all-encompassing definition, he says that the similarities between games can be characterised as 'family resemblances' (Wittgenstein 1967: 32e). As Carter notes via her reading of Hartnack, 'all members of the class of "game" have instead of a common defining property what Wittgenstein calls a "*family resemblance*"' (Hartnack 1965: 59 – original emphasis; Carter 1969-70 Journal MS88899/1/93: unpaginated).

Building on the game analogy, Wittgenstein also talks about the custom of following rules in language (and life), and obeying the rules of the language-game someone is participating in. Such customs do not just govern language, but also oversee the 'form of life': as Wittgenstein states, and Carter notes, 'to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life' (Wittgenstein 1967: 8e; Carter 1969-70 Journal MS88899/1/93: unpaginated). A 'form of life' is, in A. C. Grayling's words, 'the underlying consensus of linguistic and non-

linguistic behaviour, assumptions, practices, traditions, and natural propensities which humans, as social beings, share with one another, and which is therefore presupposed in the language they use' (Grayling 1988: 84) – it is what constitutes a culture. The rules of a language and societal customs – the form of life – are blindly obeyed, Wittgenstein argues (Wittgenstein 1967: 85e), due to training and practice. He says that 'a rule stands there like a sign-post' (Wittgenstein 1967: 39e) guiding the follower in the correct direction. Rules, like signposts, do not govern or enforce people to adhere to them; rather, they indicate the right path, and it is customary to conform to this advice; 'a person goes by a sign-post only in so far as there exists a regular use of sign-posts, a custom' (Wittgenstein 1967: 80e).

Wittgenstein's discussion of not knowing 'my way about' and of being expected to follow the signposts – customs – of the society you are in is relevant to Carter's acclimatisation to Japanese culture. Carter cannot 'obey the rule[s] *blindly*' (Wittgenstein 1967: 85e – original emphasis) as she is new to the Japanese form of life. This is a literal, linguistic, and cultural problem for Carter. She says that 'none of the streets have names' leading her to say that 'the city itself is a philosophical problem' because it means she does not 'know my way about' (Carter undated 'Fictions Written in a Certain City: THE ENTIRE CITY' in Journal MS88899/1/80: 6). In *Doctor Hoffman*, the novel Carter wrote in Japan, she portrays the results of the Reality War initiated by the title character in these terms, showing the havoc Doctor Hoffman creates in the unspecified South American city that provides the training-ground for his reality-modifying experiments. The Minister of Determination, the Doctor's opponent, is concerned that there are 'no directions left' and that the Doctor has 'taken away all the signposts', signifying the disruption the Doctor has caused to the previously stable city, in the Minister's opinion (Carter 2010: 31-32). Doctor Hoffman's ambassador, however, views this freedom from the established order more radically, arguing that 'the Doctor has liberated the streets from the tyranny of directions' and that the residents can now 'go anywhere they please' (Carter 2010: 31). Thus, to the Minister's dismay, Doctor Hoffman is obliterating the customs of the city in literal Wittgensteinian terms: by taking away the signposts – the rules. The Doctor's representative acknowledges that signposts enable order and uphold a society's customs – agreeing with Wittgenstein in this respect – but regards the rules/signposts to be restraining, and celebrates the chaos the Doctor has caused by taking away the signposts – the rules – that provide a solid foundation for a form of life.

Doctor Hoffman's disruption of the 'vast repository of time' that the city encapsulates (Carter 2010: 12) is also depicted in reference to Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations.*

As Carter notes in her research journal, Wittgenstein compares language to 'an ancient city: a maze of little streets and squares, of old and new houses, and of houses with additions from various periods; and this surrounded by a multitude of new boroughs with straight regular streets and uniform houses' (Wittgenstein 1967: 8e; Carter 1969-70 Journal MS88899/1/93: unpaginated). This metaphor is reworded in *Doctor Hoffman*, as the Doctor fractures the streets of the city, which:

> preserve the past in haphazard layers, so this alley is old while the avenue that runs beside it is newly built but nevertheless has been built over the deep-down, dead-in-the-ground relics of the older, perhaps the original, huddle of alleys which germinated the entire quarter. (Carter 2010: 12)

The inhabitants, therefore, do not know their way about, and encapsulate the 'philosophical problem' that Wittgenstein discusses in this situation (Wittgenstein 1967: 49e), which Carter recycles in relation to acclimatising to the Japanese culture and language, the Japanese form of life. Carter voices this concern in interview with Ronald Bell in relation to writing a novel about the Japanese, in an answer which, I argue, has Wittgenstein's idea of a 'form of life' in mind. She says, 'if you're writing a naturalistic novel of people of a different culture and these people are going to be main characters, then there are whole areas of their experience that one can never touch' (Carter to Bell 1973: 33). This argument embodies Wittgenstein's notion that 'you cannot claim fully to understand a society, or an aspect or part of a society, or a group knitted together by certain rules of interpersonal conduct, unless you actually get into that system' (Quinton to Magee 1978: 113).

This web of traditions and customs – that are inseparable from a culture's language – that Carter experiences in Japan are also reflected in her depiction of the River People in *Doctor Hoffman*, whose speech 'posed philosophical as well as linguistic problems' (Carter 2010: 78). The absence of an adequate distinction between the universal and the particular and lack of 'a precise equivalent for the verb "to be"' has a cultural impact, influencing the River People's view of their surroundings and their existence; as Desiderio, the narrator, notes, 'this had a profound effect on their societization' (Carter 2010: 78). Desiderio takes a while to adjust to this culture, and judges, after some deliberation, 'that this meandering *formalization of life* they offered me was worth the trouble of the risky ritual of induction into it' (Carter 2010: 97 – emphasis mine). Similarly, reacclimatising to "normality" – his previous form of life – poses some difficulty, as his 'tongue tripped on the standard speech' (Carter 2010: 107).

Thus, Wittgenstein's 'sign-post' imagery and his discussion of the rules and customs that guide existence in each 'form of life' is pertinent for Carter's time in Japan and her writing from this period. It is used to encapsulate the chaos induced by Doctor Hoffman's simulations, as well as to portray her sense of loss in Japan, mirrored by Desiderio's experience with the River People. This reading challenges Chiharu Yoshioka's discussion of the River People. Yoshioka argues that 'as language defines societization and vice versa, they [the River People] lack the notion of self and the community spirit reigns among them', and says that 'these traits are inspired by and taken from Lévi-Strauss's works' (Yoshioka 2001: 97). While I agree that Claude Lévi-Strauss is an important intertext in relation to Carter's depiction of the River People, I would argue that Wittgenstein's impact also needs to be accounted for, especially as, like Lévi-Strauss, he was – based on Carter's voluminous notes on him in her research journals – a key influence for her at this time.

The chaos Doctor Hoffman causes and the repercussions it has for a city's culture is also depicted via a literalisation of another of Wittgenstein's images in *Philosophical Investigations*: when he tries to imagine paintings that contradict reality. As Carter notes (Carter 1969-70 Journal MS88899/1/93: unpaginated), Wittgenstein argues that:

> closely associated things, things which we *have* associated, seem to fit one another. But what is this seeming to fit? How is their seeming to fit manifested? Perhaps like this: we cannot imagine the man who had this name, this face, this handwriting, not to have produced *these* works, but perhaps quite different ones instead (those of another great man). We cannot imagine it. Do we try? –
>
> Here is a possibility: I hear that someone is painting a picture "Beethoven writing the ninth symphony." I could easily imagine the kind of thing such a picture would shew [sic] us. But suppose someone wanted to represent what Goethe would have looked like writing the ninth symphony? Here I could imagine nothing that would not be embarrassing and ridiculous. (Wittgenstein 1967: 183e – original emphasis)

This humorous example is actualised in Carter's depiction of Doctor Hoffman's castle, but using different illustrations to Wittgenstein's Goethe-Beethoven collision. Desiderio examines 'forgotten masterpieces' on Hoffman's walls, but when he 'read the titles engraved on metal plaques at the bottom of each frame, I saw they depicted such scenes as "Leon Trotsky Composing the Eroica Symphony"' (Carter 2010: 235); the allusion to Beethoven's Third Symphony 'Eroica' exacerbates the relevance of Wittgenstein's example. In other reproductions, 'Van Gogh was shown writing "Wuthering Heights" in the parlour of Haworth Parsonage, with bandaged ear, all complete' and Milton is depicted 'blindly executing divine frescos upon the walls of the Sistine Chapel', to Desiderio's 'bewilderment' (Carter 2010: 236). Thus, Desiderio fits Wittgenstein's argument that such pieces would be 'ridiculous' to

imagine (Wittgenstein 1967: 183e), despite the fact that he comes face-to-face with these paintings that juxtapose canonical works. The Doctor's daughter Albertina, however, believes that when her 'father rewrites the history books, these are some of the things that everyone will suddenly perceive to have always been true' (Carter 2010: 236), thus posing a threat to the culture's history as well as to intellectual property. On this basis, Desiderio ensures that Doctor Hoffman cannot complete this enterprise. Carter, therefore, adopts this Wittgensteinian imagery to demonstrate the chaos the Doctor has caused as well as to illustrate the potential he has to create further destruction, exaggerating the power of Doctor Hoffman's imagination and endeavour.

Definitions in *Philosophical Investigations* and *Doctor Hoffman*

One of the main concerns of *Philosophical Investigations* is the process of learning a language, particularly in relation to knowing how names apply to objects and how words are defined. Wittgenstein begins by condemning St Augustine's ostensive account of language learning, which contends that language is acquired by a teacher pointing at objects and saying what they are: 'when they (my elders) named some object, and accordingly moved towards something, I saw this and I grasped that the thing was called by the sound they uttered when they meant to point it out' (Augustine in Wittgenstein 1967: 2e). For Wittgenstein, this is an 'over-simple conception' (Wittgenstein 1967: 4e), and as I will discuss in more detail, by refuting Augustine's argument, Wittgenstein is also repudiating the theory he put forward in his earlier work, the *Tractatus*; as he says in the Preface to *Philosophical Investigations*: 'I have been forced to recognize grave mistakes in what I wrote in that first book' (Wittgenstein 1967: viii). While in the *Tractatus*, as Carter notes via Hartnack, 'a word is meaningful if, and only if, it is a name' (Hartnack 1965: 56-57; Carter 1969-70 Journal MS88999/1/93: unpaginated), in *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein regards naming to be just one function of language. He uses the analogy of language as a tool-box containing a range of tools with different uses to illustrate this, saying that 'the functions of words are as diverse as the functions of these objects' (Wittgenstein 1967: 6e) – naming therefore corresponds to one tool in the box. As Carter notes in her summary of Hartnack's discussion of the distinction between Wittgenstein's early and late work, in *Philosophical Investigations*, in contrast to the *Tractatus*, 'language can serve many different purposes – describing, commanding, asking, appointing etc., as well as naming' (Hartnack 1965: 87; Carter 1969-70 Journal MS88999/1/93: unpaginated). As the arguments Wittgenstein puts forward in the *Tractatus* and *Philosophical Investigations* are conflicting, I make a distinction between "early

Wittgenstein" (his views in the *Tractatus*) and "late Wittgenstein" (his views in *Philosophical Investigations*) in this chapter.

As demonstrated by Wittgenstein's discussion of the multifarious nature of "games", in *Philosophical Investigations* Wittgenstein suggests that some words do not have singular definitions and can instead be better understood in relation to the notion of 'family resemblances' (Wittgenstein 1967: 32e). He suggests that languages, like games, display 'a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail' (Wittgenstein 1967: 32e). He uses the "game" example to 'illustrate the crucial point that there *need* not be a definition for every word' (Schroeder 2006: 141 – original emphasis) and urges the reader to avoid assuming that 'there *must* be something common, or they would not be called "games"' (Wittgenstein 1967: 31e – original emphasis). As he continues:

> *look and see* whether there is anything common to all. –For if you look at them you will not see something that is common to *all*, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that. To repeat: don't think, but look! (Wittgenstein 1967: 31e – original emphasis)

In Severin Schroeder's words, while 'a correct definition *may* in the end be found; Wittgenstein merely warns us not to insist that it *must* be found. We should at any rate be prepared for the possibility that concepts may not be held together by a set of defining features' (Schroeder 2006: 141 – original emphasis).

As signalled by the epigraph – '(remember that we sometimes demand definitions for the sake not of the content, but of their form: Our requirement is an architectural one: the definition is a kind of ornamental coping that supports nothing)' (Wittgenstein 1967: 85e) – Carter is engaging with these ideas in *Doctor Hoffman*. In *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein argues that definitions provide linguistic scaffolding but questions why this 'architectural' support is needed as it 'supports nothing'. For Desiderio, definitions are fundamental to his survival strategy and help him to remain unsusceptible to the Hoffman effect: 'why was I immune? Because, out of my discontent, I made my own definitions and these definitions happened to correspond to those that happened to be true' (Carter 2010: 5). Definitions are therefore essential scaffolding for Desiderio, contra Wittgenstein. Desiderio's need for definitions also illustrates his need for stability at a time when definitions of reality, time, and identity are in flux. Thus, while Wittgenstein encourages a freedom from the need for strict, rigid definitions, Doctor Hoffman and his associates work in the realm of the 'unleashed unconscious' (Carter 2010: 252) where 'only change is invariable' (Carter 2010:

109). By striving for definitions, Desiderio is searching for architectural support in an attempt to resist the state of mutability caused by Doctor Hoffman. Desiderio sees himself as 'one of the invisible struts of reason which had helped to prop it [the city] up for so long', and goes on to say that it seemed 'inevitable it [the city] would soon collapse' (Carter 2010: 40); he therefore identifies himself as scaffolding, something holding the city together, because he is defining his own world.

The futility of Desiderio's search for all-encompassing, durable definitions is reinforced when Albertina ventriloquises the late Wittgenstein in Desiderio's dreams, urging him to recognise that rigid definitions do not always exist. While Wittgenstein exhorts 'don't think, but look!' (Wittgenstein 1967: 31e) as part of his plea to make the reader consider that some words and concepts are best understood via the notion of similarities or 'family resemblances' and do not have absolute definitions, Albertina writes 'DON'T THINK, LOOK' on Desiderio's windowpane (Carter 2010: 22 – original capitalisation). The capitalisation of this message, as well as the omission of the conjunction 'but', emphasise the imperative and convey a sense of urgency: Desiderio is being compelled to recognise that definitions are not all-inclusive and is encouraged to '*look and see*' (Wittgenstein 1967: 31e – original emphasis) the similarities and differences between the "real" and "fake" phenomena, and thus to redefine reality. Carter also makes a note of the aphorism 'don't think, but look!' in her research journal (Carter 1969-70 Journal MS88899/1/93: unpaginated), but this time writes it verbatim. The 'DON'T THINK, LOOK' warning, as well as the advice 'WHEN YOU BEGIN TO THINK, YOU LOSE THE POINT' (Carter 2010: 22 – original capitalisation) also challenge rational thought and emphasise the role of sense experience. Desiderio is 'haunted' by Albertina's messages and considers that 'she was qualitatively different from the comic apparition purporting to be my mother' (Carter 2010: 22), illustrating the turmoil caused by Doctor Hoffman's modification of reality, and therefore of definitions; the fact that Carter portrays Wittgenstein's argument that some words cannot be categorically defined in the context of a Reality War demonstrates the structure that definitions provide and the chaotic implications of Wittgenstein's challenge to rational thought and interrogation of the assumption that all words can be defined. Carter is collapsing the scaffolding that unquestioned, rigid definitions provide.

Via his scrutiny of Augustine's theory of language learning, Wittgenstein pays particular attention to the process of naming. Augustine argues that language is learnt using ostensive definitions – consisting in 'the teacher's pointing to the objects, directing the child's attention to them, and at the same time uttering a word' (Wittgenstein 1967: 4e).

Wittgenstein notes, however, that if language learning is described as ostensive – learnt by pointing – that advocates of this argument are 'thinking primarily of nouns like "table", "chair", "bread", and of people's names' (Wittgenstein 1967: 2e). As *Philosophical Investigations* progresses, Wittgenstein queries how names for sensations and feelings are learnt, using "pain" as his main example; Carter makes extensive notes on this in her research journals (Carter 1969-70 Journal MS88899/1/93: unpaginated).[7] Wittgenstein says that when a child experiences pain and cries, 'adults talk to him and teach him exclamations and, later, sentences. They teach the child new pain-behaviour' (Wittgenstein 1967: 89e; Carter 1969-70 Journal MS88899/1/93: unpaginated). Thus, adults teach children how to articulate their pain while they cannot feel the pain, or know that the child is experiencing pain: 'only I can know whether I am really in pain; another person can only surmise it' (Wittgenstein 1967: 89e; Carter 1969-70 Journal MS88899/1/93: unpaginated). The fact that knowledge of someone else's pain is based on their external pain-behaviour (cries, groans, or grimaces, for instance) means, Wittgenstein argues, that their pain can be doubted: 'it makes sense to say about other people that they doubt whether I am in pain, but not to say it about myself' (Wittgenstein 1967: 89e).

A person's experience of their own pain, then, cannot be questioned. Wittgenstein goes on to discuss the problems of teaching someone the word "pain" in more detail, possibly by inflicting pain on a person and saying, 'see, that's what pain is!' (Wittgenstein 1967: 99e; Carter 1969-70 Journal MS88899/1/93: unpaginated). Wittgenstein argues that 'it would be impossible to teach a child the use of the word tooth-ache' if we exhibited 'no outward signs of pain' – no pain-behaviour (Wittgenstein 1967: 92e). If this child 'named his pain' and coined a term to discuss this pain sensation (Wittgenstein 1967: 92e), the child would have difficulty explaining its meaning, because the experience of pain is subjective and private: 'if one has to imagine someone else's pain on the model of one's own, this is none too easy a thing to do: for I have to imagine pain which I *do not feel* on the model of the pain which I *do feel*' (Wittgenstein 1967: 101e – original emphasis; Carter 1969-70 Journal MS88899/1/93: unpaginated).

Wittgenstein's discussion of pain, therefore, which encompasses his argument about private sensations and experiences more generally, exemplifies his concern about public versus private language – of using names to categorise experiences or perceptions (such as

[7] Carter makes lengthy notes on paragraphs 244, 245, 246, 249, 272, 282, 284, 288, 293, 302, 312 and 313 of *Philosophical Investigations* (Wittgenstein 1967: 89e-104e), which all discuss the notion of "pain" (Carter 1969-70 Journal MS88899/1/93: unpaginated).

pain), and the uncertainty as to whether your definition conforms to other people's definitions. He is discussing qualia – subjective experiences – and particularly focuses on pain and colour; how one person's idea of red could be someone else's definition of orange or pink, for instance, and how the terms we have for colours (and pains) are based on what we have been taught, when the teacher cannot be certain that the student is perceiving the same colour (or pain). As Marie McGinn notes, 'the act of private definition [...] tells us nothing about whether the speaker has understood the concept' as 'what matters for mastery of our concept of pain is an ability to use the relevant expression in accordance with our ordinary practice' (McGinn 1997: 138). Wittgenstein makes a distinction between objects pointed to with fingers and objects pointed to in the imagination; while pains and colours can be pointed out in pictures using fingers, Wittgenstein argues that 'our grasp of the meaning of the word "pain" involves us in a different sort of "exhibiting", a sort that is not done with the finger but "with the imagination"' (McGinn 1997: 136). For Wittgenstein, as Carter notes, it would 'be possible – though unverifiable – that one section of mankind had one sensation of red and another section another' – an example that could be applied to pain and private sensations and perceptions more broadly (Wittgenstein 1967: 95e; Carter 1969-70 Journal MS88899/1/93: unpaginated). He illustrates that samples are needed in order to learn by ostensive definitions, and explains that the use and context of the word "pain", for instance, is vital for gaining understanding. In order to challenge 'the original dichotomy drawn between private and public exhibitions of pain' (Savicky 2011: 683), Wittgenstein imagines that 'the surfaces of the things around us (stones, plants, etc.) have patches and regions which produce pain in our skin when we touch them' (Wittgenstein 1967: 104e). 'In this case', Wittgenstein suggests, 'we should speak of pain-patches on the leaf of a particular plant just as at present we speak of red patches' so that, 'I can exhibit pain, as I exhibit red, and as I exhibit straight and crooked and trees and stones' (Wittgenstein 1967: 104e).

Carter's reading of Wittgenstein's work on qualia and the problems of naming concepts related to colour and pain is central to *Doctor Hoffman*, where the title character blurs the distinction between private and public experiences by actualising desires. When Desiderio and Albertina are 'lost in nebulous time' (Carter 2010: 196) in the penultimate chapter of the novel, for instance, where their surroundings are emanations of their desires, they 'soon learned to identify the grey-green shrubs we called "pain trees" because of the invisible patches scattered over their leaves and bark that stung us when we touched them and left great areas of scarlet inflammation on our skins' (Carter 2010: 201). Wittgenstein's imagination of a leaf with 'pain-patches' is therefore used to convey the disturbance Doctor

Hoffman's experimentation has caused, illustrating the consequences of Wittgenstein's challenge to established notions of private and public.

At the same time, though, Wittgenstein's discussion of the subjectivity of naming pain, colours, and so on, stems from the uncertainty of knowing whether the name matches the perception or feeling, and the possibility that people have different definitions of ideas of "red" or of experiencing "toothache", for instance. Abolishing the distinction between public and private does not result in stability or certainty in the world of *Doctor Hoffman* – quite the opposite. At this point in the narrative, Doctor Hoffman has lost control of his samples, but he states, in line with Wittgenstein's claim that 'I can exhibit pain, as I exhibit red, and as I exhibit straight and crooked and trees and stones' (Wittgenstein 1967: 104e), that:

> once the samples are selected, interpreted, painted, cast and articulated, I can exhibit pain as positively as I can exhibit red. I show love in the same way that I show straight. I demonstrate fear just as precisely as I exemplify crooked. And ecstasy and tree and despair and stone, all exhibited in the same fashion. I can make you perceive ideas with your senses because I do not acknowledge any essential difference in the phenomenological bases of the two modes of thought. (Carter 2010: 245)

As well as demonstrating the extent to which *Doctor Hoffman* was inspired by Wittgenstein's work, Carter's literalisation of Wittgenstein's ideas suggests she is envisaging the chaotic implications of being able to 'exhibit' sensations like pain and perceptions of colour in the same way as concrete objects like trees and stones, and what happens when objects that are normally pointed to in the imagination – such as pain – can be physically pointed at with fingers. Doctor Hoffman blurs ideas and senses, and does 'not acknowledge any essential difference in the phenomenological bases of the two modes of thought' (Carter 2010: 245).

Carter also engages with Wittgenstein's work on naming pains via her depiction of the Lithuanian Count in *Doctor Hoffman*. For instance, the Count tells his valet Lafleur that 'I feel no pain. Only anguish. Unless anguish is the name of my pain. I wish I could learn to name my pain' (Carter 2010: 173). Thus, the Count experiences pain but cannot name it, and is unsure whether "anguish" is the appropriate term to define his pain, conforming to Wittgenstein's discussion of the difficulties of learning names for pains. Later, while being boiled alive by his double, the African cannibal chief, the Count exclaims with 'pure joy': 'Lafleur! I am in pain! I've learned to name my pain! Lafleur –' (Carter 2010: 192). The ability to name his pain enables the Count to rise 'up out of the cauldron in an upward surging leap, as of a fully liberated man', but the Count dies at this point (Carter 2010: 192). *Vis-à-vis* Wittgenstein, the Count exhibits no pain-behaviour; he experiences joy at being

able to name his pain, and 'endured in perfect silence' beforehand (Carter 2010: 192). What is more, his death prevents him from actually naming his pain, which means that his definition of his pain remains private rather than public. A concern for naming is also central to the Minister's attempt to defend the city from Doctor Hoffman, which is inspired by Wittgenstein's earlier work the *Tractatus*, an aspect of *Doctor Hoffman* to which I now turn.

Names, Verifications, and Tautologies in the *Tractatus* and *Doctor Hoffman*

In *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein sets out to refute the argument he put forward in the *Tractatus*, where 'a name means an object. The object is its meaning' (Wittgenstein 1974: 12); every object has a name, so names and objects go hand-in-hand, and if something does not have a name, it does not exist. Thus, the main argument in the *Tractatus* is that the limits of language and thought are the same: what can be said can be thought, and what cannot be said cannot be thought. As Carter notes, Wittgenstein claims that '*the limits of my language* mean the limits of my world' (Wittgenstein 1974: 56 – original emphasis; Carter 1969-70 Journal MS88999/1/93: unpaginated). In a letter to Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) – a philosopher and logician who influenced Wittgenstein's early work and taught Wittgenstein at the University of Cambridge – Wittgenstein asserts that 'the main point [of the *Tractatus*] is the theory of what can be expressed by propositions – i.e. by language – (and, which comes to the same thing, what can be *thought*) and what can not be expressed by propositions, but only shown; which, I believe, is the cardinal problem of philosophy' (Wittgenstein in Grayling 1988: 14 – original emphasis). In the Preface, Wittgenstein makes his objective in the *Tractatus* clear: 'the aim of the book is to draw a limit to thought, or rather – not to thought, but to the expression of thoughts' (Wittgenstein 1974: 3). Due to an inability to get outside thought (and language), 'it will therefore only be in language that the limit can be drawn, and what lies on the other side of the limit will simply be non-sense' (Wittgenstein 1974: 3).

In *Doctor Hoffman*, Carter engages with and disrupts the Tractatan idea that there is a limit to what can be thought and therefore expressed and a distinction between the thinkable and the unthinkable via her depiction of the Minister's retaliation against Doctor Hoffman. The Minister's 'work consisted essentially in setting a limit to thought' (Carter 2010: 17) and building 'intellectual walls' to keep Doctor Hoffman's images out (Carter 2010: 231), mirroring Wittgenstein's aim in the *Tractatus* to 'draw a limit to thought' (Wittgenstein 1974: 3). Carter integrates her reading of Hartnack's *Wittgenstein and Modern Philosophy* into this part of her discussion, reinforcing the extent of Wittgenstein's influence on this novel. For

instance, Hartnack examines Wittgenstein's claim that 'if I am to know an object, though I need not know its external properties, I must know all its internal properties' (Wittgenstein 1974: 6), and says, as Carter notes, 'a property is internal if it is unthinkable that its object should not possess it' (Wittgenstein 1974: 27; Carter 1969-70 Journal MS88899/1/93: unpaginated). While Hartnack goes on to accept this, saying that it is unthinkable for a pencil not to have dimensions or to be in a place, he suggests that Wittgenstein's criterion lacks precision, 'for the borderline between the thinkable and the unthinkable is obscure and controversial' (Hartnack 1965: 18). Likewise, Desiderio claims that the Doctor is 'proliferating his weaponry of images along the obscure and controversial borderline between the thinkable and the unthinkable' (Carter 2010: 17). The chaos Doctor Hoffman has caused is therefore depicted using an inverted quotation from Hartnack's discussion of the *Tractatus* in *Wittgenstein and Modern Philosophy.*

While Carter inverts these words in *Doctor Hoffman*, her research notes suggest that she wanted to do something with this idea *before* she envisaged the concept of this novel. Her initial plans for *Doctor Hoffman* date to 1970, with the working title 'An Inventory of Imaginary Cities', and they plot the opposition between the Doctor and the Minister of Determination (Carter 1969-70 Journal MS88899/1/93: unpaginated). Plans for another text, 'The Stroboscope – love story', pre-date these by a year, but the ideas for this story are transferred to *Doctor Hoffman* (Carter 1969-70 Journal MS88899/1/93: unpaginated). The notes for 'The Stroboscope' contain the Hartnack quotation – 'the borderline between the thinkable and the unthinkable is obscure and controversial' – while also discussing 'an Ainu-like tribe, living on the sea shore, whose language does not include the words "yes" and "no", but only "perhaps"' (Carter 1969-70 Journal MS88899/1/93: unpaginated). The Ainu are an indigenous Japanese society, and as these plans imply, are part of the inspiration for the River People and related tribes in *Doctor Hoffman*, one of which, as I discussed in Cartesian terms in the previous chapter, 'had a dialect which contained no words for "yes" or "no," only a word for "maybe"' (Carter 2010: 75). A language that has 'innumerable words expressing exquisitely different shades of meaning for "perhaps" and "maybe"' (Carter undated Journal MS88899/1/110: 1-3) also disrupts Wittgenstein's rigidly dualistic view of language and the world, which 'restric[ts] reality to two alternatives: yes or no' (Wittgenstein 1974: 21). The fact that an indigenous Japanese society, the Ainu, inspired the River People, which Carter also discusses in relation to Wittgenstein via her reading of Hartnack, also reinforces the influence Japan had on *Doctor Hoffman* and the impact Wittgenstein had on Carter at this time.

The Minister of Determination is therefore a version of the early Wittgenstein: for the Minister, there is a limit between the thinkable and the unthinkable, and the Doctor transgresses this boundary, to the Minister's distress. He compares the Doctor's 'synthetic reconstructions' (Carter 2010: 12) to 'a virus which causes a cancer of the mind, so that the cells of the imagination run wild' (Carter 2010: 17). Nevertheless, Doctor Hoffman's modification of reality *does* fall inside the boundary of Wittgenstein's limit of thought (and language). Wittgenstein says that 'what is thinkable is possible too', on the basis that 'thought', like language, 'can never be of anything illogical' (Wittgenstein 1974: 11). Hartnack explains this argument, saying that a 'possible fact' means 'something that is *logically possible*' (Hartnack 1965: 17 – original emphasis); for instance, 'it is "possible" that a deformed cat may have five legs [...] although I have never seen a cat with five legs, I do not rule out the possibility that such a cat exists' (Hartnack 1965: 17-18). Similarly, one of Doctor Hoffman's main principles is that 'everything it is possible to imagine can also exist' (Carter 2010: 110), and during the Reality War, as Desiderio notes in his Introduction, 'everything that could possibly exist, did so' (Carter 2010: 3).

It is the 'logically possible' clause that Doctor Hoffman has failed to meet, or amended the definition of; he is 'waging a massive campaign against human reason' (Carter 2010: 3), but Desiderio recognises that 'some things were necessarily impossible' (Carter 2010: 5). More specifically, Doctor Hoffman revolts against Wittgenstein's notion that 'we are quite unable to imagine spatial objects outside space or temporal objects outside time' (Wittgenstein 1974: 6). Carter's 'Workpoints' for *Doctor Hoffman* include this idea that 'it is "unthinkable" that something having extension should not be in space, or something with a history not be in time' (Carter undated Journal MS88899/1/110: 147), which is in fact an unattributed quotation from Max Black's *Companion* (Black 1964: 49).[8] In another journal, this quotation from Black's *Companion* (once again without reference to Black) is attributed to Doctor Hoffman in line with his wish 'to free mankind from the tyranny of a single present' (Carter 1969-70 Journal MS88899/1/93: unpaginated).[9] Doctor Hoffman has 'modified the nature of reality' (Carter 2010: 11) to the extent that he has 'made great cracks in the hitherto immutable surface of the time and space equation' (Carter 2010: 12), making it

[8] Max Black's words include a definition of 'unthinkable' as 'logically impossible' in brackets, which Carter omits: 'it is "unthinkable" (= logically impossible) that something having extension should not be in space - or something with a history should not be in time' (Black 1964: 49).

[9] Carter writes: 'Hoffman wishes to free mankind from the tyranny of a single present; he says: "it is "unthinkable" that something having extension in space, or something with a history not be in time. It is possible for anything which can be imagined to exist"' (Carter 1969-70 Journal MS88899/1/93: unpaginated).

"thinkable" or "logically possible" for existence 'outside the formal rules of time and place' (Carter 2010: 196), contra Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*.

This redefinition of the thinkable poses problems for language, in line with Wittgenstein's claim in the *Tractatus* that the limits of thought and language are the same. The fact that 'everything that could possibly exist, did so' has caused, as Desiderio states, 'a complexity so rich it can hardly be expressed in language' (Carter 2010: 3). In order to combat this complexity, believing that the Doctor works 'in that shadowy land between the thinkable and the thing thought of', the Minister 'decided he could only keep a strict control of his actualities by adjusting their names to agree with them perfectly' (Carter 2010: 230). The importance of names for the Minister is key, as names are the only meaningful part of language for the early Wittgenstein. As Hartnack states, 'what does not exist cannot very well be named. To name is to name *something*, and when there is no "something", there is nothing to name' (Hartnack 1965: 9 – original emphasis). Naming is therefore the Minister's solution to defeating Doctor Hoffman in the Reality War, with the hope that anything unnamed, and therefore unreal, will be eradicated.

I would argue that the Minister's counterattack is heavily inspired by Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* and the influence this early work had on the movement of Logical Positivism. In the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein argues that 'language has a unique discoverable essence, a single underlying logic' (Grayling 1988: 67), a universal structure that can be discovered by philosophical analysis. This conforms to Russell's notion of logical atomism, 'the view that you can get down in theory, if not in practice, to ultimate simples, out of which the world is built' (Russell 1956: 270). In Wittgenstein's early work, the 'ultimate simples' or 'atoms of language' (Schroeder 2006: 40) are names, which correspond to objects, 'the ultimate constituents of the world' (Grayling 1988: 29); both the world and language have a foundational structure. For Wittgenstein, 'in a proposition a name is the representative of an object' (Wittgenstein 1974: 13). If names are aligned with objects, then the range of possible constructions of names into sentences or propositions corresponds to the potential arrangements of objects; 'a state of affairs (a state of things) is a combination of objects (things)' (Wittgenstein 1974: 5), and each possible state of affairs corresponds to an elementary proposition, 'a concatenation, of names' (Wittgenstein 1974: 30). Wittgenstein's early work postulates that 'the world is the totality of facts' and that 'what is the case – a fact – is the existence of states of affairs' (Wittgenstein 1974: 5). While language and the world mirror each other and the world is assembled of facts, 'the totality of propositions is language' (Wittgenstein 1974: 19). For a proposition about the world to be true, it is

necessary for the independent elementary propositions that form the proposition to be true as well.

In order to establish the limit of language and thought there needs to be an assessment of the elementary propositions: 'if all true elementary propositions are given, the result is a complete description of the world. The world is completely described by giving all elementary propositions, and adding which of them are true and which false' (Wittgenstein 1974: 31). As David Pears notes, 'these elementary propositions serve as a point of origin, from which the philosopher, using a logical formula, can calculate the limits of any possible language' (Pears 1971: 49). Like Russell, Wittgenstein uses truth tables to determine which elementary propositions are true and false, using the letters 't' and 'f' respectively to depict the truth-possibility of each elementary proposition. Thus, in order for the proposition 'p&q' to be true, the individual elementary propositions of 'p' and 'q' need to be true; the 'truth-possibilities of elementary propositions are the conditions of the truth and falsity of propositions' (Wittgenstein 1974: 32). This example highlights that 'it is essential for Wittgenstein's conception of propositions as pictures of reality that propositions should be *determinate* in truth-value' (Grayling 1988: 38 – original emphasis); for Wittgenstein, 'a proposition must restric[t] reality to two alternatives' (Wittgenstein 1974: 21) so there is 'no question of a partial or fuzzy correspondence between propositions and facts' (Grayling 1988: 38). In *Several Perceptions*, Joseph, the former philosophy student, owns 'a textbook on logic' and 'could still construct a truth table, an elementary procedure in the study of logic' (Carter 1970: 15; 4). This suggests that Carter was familiar with the concept of truth tables at this time, but there is no evidence in her research notes to show that Carter read or had specifically researched Wittgenstein (or Russell) before Japan.

These types of propositions, assessed in terms of truth or falsity, are factual propositions, but this 'is only one of the three kinds of truth-function' (Pears 1971: 80). For Wittgenstein, there are 'two extreme cases' (Wittgenstein 1974: 34) of propositions that do not function in this manner. One of these is a tautology, which is necessarily and 'unconditionally true', and the other is a contradiction, which 'is true on no condition' (Wittgenstein 1974: 34). Tautologies and contradictions 'lack sense' but are not 'nonsensical' (Wittgenstein 1974: 34) according to Wittgenstein – 'the propositions of logic say nothing' (Wittgenstein 1974: 59). Wittgenstein's parenthetical example of this type of proposition is that 'I know nothing about the weather when I know that it is either raining or not raining' (Wittgenstein 1974: 34). This leads Wittgenstein to compare tautologies, factual propositions, and contradictions, and to argue that 'a tautology's truth is certain, a proposition's possible, a

contradiction's impossible' (Wittgenstein 1974: 35) and, as Carter notes, to suggest that the 'certain, possible, impossible' gradation indicates 'the scale that we need in the theory of probability' (Wittgenstein 1974: 35; Carter undated Journal MS88899/1/110: 110).

This search for truth and the distinction between factual propositions, contradictions, and tautologies is central to Logical Positivism, a movement that 'the *Tractatus* exerted a very powerful influence on' (Searle in Magee 1978: 190). Logical Positivism began in the 1920s in Vienna 'by a group of philosophers, scientists and mathematicians who gave themselves the name of the Vienna Circle' including Moritz Schlick, Rudolf Carnap, and Otto Neurath (Ayer 1959: 3), and, later, A. J. Ayer. In line with Wittgenstein's 'theory of probability', the Vienna Circle adopted the Principle of Verification, 'one of the key tenets of Logical Positivism' (Hartnack 1965: 37). This means that in order for something to have meaning it has to be verified, or *verifiable*. As Schlick, the leader of the Vienna Circle, says, 'the Meaning of a Proposition is the Method of its Verification' (Schlick 1932: 311). Whilst 'what the relationship of Wittgenstein was to the famous "verification principle" [...] has often been a subject of curiosity' (Malcolm 1958: 65), Wittgenstein's argument that 'to understand a proposition means to know what is the case if it is true' (Wittgenstein 1974: 21) is the 'nearest [...] [he] comes to a "principle of verifiability"' (Black 1964: 171). As Carter notes in line with her reading of Black's *Companion* to the *Tractatus*, for Wittgenstein 'a tautology is seen to be true because it makes no demand[s][10] upon the world (requires no verification), being so constructed that it will be "satisfied" no matter what is the case' (Black 1964: 16; Carter 1969-70 Journal MS88999/1/93: unpaginated). The Logical Positivists also distinguish between formal propositions (tautologies and contradictions), and factual/empirical propositions – the propositions in need of verification – claiming 'that any statement that wasn't either a formal statement (a statement in logic or mathematics), or empirically testable, was nonsensical' (Ayer in Magee 1978: 119). Thus, 'empirical propositions are the only ones that Logical Positivism regards as genuine' because, as Hartnack notes, 'they are the only kind that can be verified' (Hartnack 1965: 38).

In line with the *Tractatus* and the Logical Positivists, the Minister of Determination is naming phenomena on the basis that only "real" objects can be named, and adopts a verification principle: he is creating a list of 'possible distinct forms' which 'could be counted, organized into a conceptual framework and so form a kind of check list for the

[10] Carter adds the 's' in demand (Carter 1969-70 Journal MS88999/1/93: unpaginated).

verification of all phenomena' (Carter 2010: 20). With the belief that 'if the name is right, you see the light' (Carter 2010: 231), the Minister:

> brought in a team of logical positivists from the School of Philosophy in the National University and set them to the task of fixing all the phenomena compiled by his computers in the solid concrete of a set of names that absolutely agreed with them. (Carter 2010: 231)

While Carter explicitly nods to the relevance of the Logical Positivists in *Doctor Hoffman*, a closer reading of the novel shows that the Minister's verification principle is inspired by Carter's reading of the *Tractatus* and Black's *Companion* to this text. The Minister's belief 'that the city – which he took as a microcosm of the universe – contained a finite set of objects and a finite set of their combinations and therefore a list could be made of all possible distinct forms which were logically viable' which could then be 'counted' to 'form a kind of check list for the verification of all phenomena' (Carter 2010: 20), is a quotation followed by a re-wording of Black's commentary. As Black notes, 'certainly in a universe containing a finite set of objects and a finite set of their combinations, a list could be made of distinct logical forms, which might then be counted' (Black 1964: 206). The Minister's verification principle also corresponds to the probability scale discussed in the *Tractatus*; objects are 'given a possibility rating' and are then assessed in terms of probability (Carter 2010: 20). Carter's plans for *Doctor Hoffman* confirm that the Minister has Wittgenstein's early work in mind here. Under the subheading 'The Minister of Determination' is the following quotation from the *Tractatus*: 'certain, possible, impossible: here we have the first indication of the scale that we need in the theory of probability' (Wittgenstein 1974: 35; Carter undated Journal MS88899/1/110: 110).

The extensive research behind the Minister's naming strategy is illuminated by Carter's plans, and while Carter's notes on naming go beyond Wittgenstein, her unpublished work does indicate that Wittgenstein is at least *a* key, if not *the* key, intertext for this concern. For instance, the Minister's programme 'the Rectification of Names' and Doctor Hoffman's 'Principle of Unwrought Simplicity' (Carter 2010: 230; 242) also demonstrate Carter's extensive reading of Chinese philosophical thought, for which her primary source was Fung Yu-lan's *The History of Chinese Philosophy Volume I: The Period of the Philosophers*, translated by Derk Bodde. This is particularly evident in the MS88899/1/93 journal but also in MS88899/1/110 and MS88899/1/111, the three manuscripts which are also saturated with Wittgensteinian research (Carter 1969-70 Journal MS88899/1/93: unpaginated; Carter undated Journal MS88899/1/110: 68; Carter undated Journal MS88899/1/111: unpaginated).

The Rectification of Names is central to Confucian thought; 'according to Confucius', says Chung-ying Cheng, it 'is the basis of the establishment of social harmony and political order' (Cheng 1991: 221). Similarly, for the Minister of Determination, 'once the names were right, he thought perfect order and hence perfect government on his own Confucian terms would follow automatically' (Carter 2010: 231). The Principle of Unwrought Simplicity is also associated with names, but refers to the Taoist concept of a nameless, natural world. Thus, in *Doctor Hoffman*, as in Carter's unpublished journals, the doctrines of Chinese philosophy, particularly Confucian and Taoist thought, are blended with her reading of Wittgenstein and her discussion of Logical Positivism: the Minister of Determination hires 'a team of logical positivists' in order to achieve the Confucian ideal of 'perfect order' and 'perfect government' (Carter 2010: 231). As a discussion of Chinese philosophy is beyond the scope of this thesis, I do not examine Carter's interaction with Confucianism or Taoism, the 'two main arms of Chinese philosophy' (Mickle 2001: 11), here. The plans for *Doctor Hoffman* also contain naming-related quotations from *Philosophical Investigations*. These include: 'the essence of speech is the composition of names' (Wittgenstein 1967: 21e; Carter 1969-70 Journal MS88899/1/93: unpaginated) and, in relation to the Minister: 'when we forget which colour [e.g. red][11] this is the name of, it loses its meaning for us' (Wittgenstein 1967: 28e; Carter Journal 1969-70 MS88899/1/93: unpaginated; Carter undated Journal MS88899/1/111: unpaginated).

The Minister's obsession with naming is the subject of parody in *Doctor Hoffman*, as the Doctor and his associates mock the Minister's method of defence and his belief that naming would lead to stability and the re-establishment of reason. The Minister's counterattack reflects Wittgenstein's Tractatan argument that only phenomena that exist can be named. The Doctor's ambassador, for instance, refers to the Minister's naming system as an 'electronic harem' and calls the Determination Police 'mechanical prostitutes', while the Minister is their 'madame' (Carter 2010: 35-36). The ambassador also ridicules the Minister's methodology for being reductive and restrictive, saying that the names are 'a series of straitjackets' and 'inexpressibly boring labels' (Carter 2010: 35). Carter's plans for the confrontation between the Minister and the Doctor's ambassador reinforce the satirical depiction of naming, as the ambassador tells the Minister that 'The Dr calls you the Second Adam' because, as Albertina replies, 'of your passion for naming' (Carter undated Journal MS88899/1/111: unpaginated). This allusion simultaneously parodies the Minister's

[11] Carter includes 'e.g. red' in brackets in her notes in both of these journals (Carter 1969-70 Journal MS88899/1/93: unpaginated; Carter undated Journal MS88899/1/111: unpaginated).

association with early Wittgenstein, for whom 'a name means an object' (Wittgenstein 1974: 12).

Ironically, Carter's critique of the Minister's 'passion for naming' is filtered through Wittgenstein's argument against his earlier work in *Philosophical Investigations*. There is an interlocutor in this later text 'defending the early philosophy' (Kitching 2003: 13), and Carter's plans for *Doctor Hoffman* depict the Minister justifying the need for names by ventriloquising the views of early Wittgenstein that are voiced – and *refuted* – in the later *Philosophical Investigations*. Her notes underneath the subheading 'Minister's tape-recorded speech to city' contain the words of the interlocutor in *Philosophical Investigations* that illustrate Wittgenstein's argument in the *Tractatus*: 'what the names in language signify must be indestructible;[12] for it must be possible to describe the state of affairs in which everything destructible is destroyed' (Wittgenstein 1967: 27e; Carter undated Journal MS88899/1/111: unpaginated). Carter writes the rest of this interjection in another journal – 'and this description will contain words; and what corresponds to these cannot then be destroyed, for otherwise the words would have no meaning' (Wittgenstein 1967: 27e; Carter 1969-70 Journal MS88899/1/93: unpaginated). In *Philosophical Investigations*, on the other hand, Wittgenstein highlights the distinction between names and objects using the example that when a person dies their name does not lose meaning; 'he is destructible, and his name does not lose its meaning when the bearer is destroyed' (Wittgenstein 1967: 27e). The Minister, however, does not recognise Wittgenstein's example in his later philosophy that a name can exist without an object or bearer corresponding to it, believing that by establishing indelible names he will create an indestructible city and annihilate Doctor Hoffman's images. Thus, Carter depicts the Minister as a proponent of Wittgenstein's arguments in the *Tractatus* and of the related movement of Logical Positivism – he is 'setting a limit to thought' using names (Carter 2010: 17). In doing so, Carter parodies Wittgenstein's Tractatan view that names correspond to objects and his argument that objects that have names cannot be destroyed, as illustrated by the example in *Philosophical Investigations* that if someone dies their name does not suddenly lose its meaning, thus challenging the Minister's philosophy and naming strategy.

The Minister's need for verification – and his method of verification – is parodied in *Doctor Hoffman*; while the Minister 'was the most rational man in the world, he was only a witch-doctor in the present state of things' (Carter 2010: 20-21). As part of his aim to

[12] Carter spells 'indestructable' (Carter undated Journal MS88899/1/111: unpaginated).

establish what is real, the Minister operates a 'trial by fire' in Reality Testing Laboratory C, and if something 'emerged alive from the incineration room, it was obviously unreal and, if he had been reduced to a handful of ash, he had been authentic' (Carter 2010: 18). Thus, this verification test works, but ironically eradicates the real. Moreover, the weaponry created by the Minister and the Determination Police, particularly the Determining Radar Apparatus that 'annihilated the offending non-substance' with a laser, quickly becomes obsolete when the Doctor's army 'restructured their own prototype molecule' in order to escape the radar (Carter 2010: 18-19). The Doctor also uses decoys, reinforcing the redundancy of the Minister's ammunition. In line with the Logical Positivists and Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*, the Minister focuses on verifying the possible – he gives objects a 'possibility rating' (Carter 2010: 20). This is because only empirical data can be verified; the certain and the impossible – tautologies and contradictions – are formal propositions which are necessarily the case, so do not need to be evaluated.

The Minister's belief that there is 'a finite set of objects and a finite set of their combinations and [that] therefore a list could be made of all possible distinct forms which were logically viable' (Carter 2010: 20) – which, as already noted, is a quotation from and re-wording of Black's *Companion* to the *Tractatus* – stems from Wittgenstein's argument in his early work. In the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein argues that objects are combined in arrangements – or states of affairs – just as names join together to form elementary propositions. He claims that 'the totality of existing states of affairs is the world' (Wittgenstein 1974: 8), while also contending that '*if* all true elementary propositions are given, the result is a complete description of the world' (Wittgenstein 1974: 31 – emphasis mine). For both Wittgenstein and the Minister, the world is not just a list of objects; rather, it is a list of the possible states of affairs – arrangements – they can be positioned in. As Roger M. White states, 'you do not specify the world by giving an inventory of the objects it contains. To know what the world is like, you have to know how things are arranged' (White 2006: 30). The Minister's endeavour to create such a list, referred to by Black as a '*universal chronicle*' (Black 1964: 30 – original emphasis), relates to his desire to define the limits of thought. While Wittgenstein says 'suppose that I am given *all* elementary propositions: then I can simply ask what propositions I can construct out of them. And there I have *all* propositions, and *that* fixes their limits' (Wittgenstein 1974: 36 – original emphasis), the same applies to assembling a list of objects in all possible states of affairs; nothing can sensibly exist beyond this boundary.

Nevertheless, Wittgenstein does not explicitly say that there is a finite number of objects, while the Minister firmly believes that this is the case. In Sir Anthony Kenny's

words, 'Wittgenstein treats it as an open question whether the world is finite' (Kenny 2006: 73). Wittgenstein's discussion of creating a complete list of objects in all possible states of affairs is hypothetical, with 'if' and 'suppose' prefixing the idea (Wittgenstein 1974: 31; 36). Carter's quotation from Black's text about the 'finite set of objects' (Carter 2010: 20) was also conditional, as Black states that 'a list *could* be made' (Black 1964: 206 – emphasis mine), but this was said in relation to Wittgenstein's claim that 'logical forms are *without* number' (Wittgenstein 1974: 30 – original emphasis). Wittgenstein also notes that 'it is nonsensical to speak of the *total number of objects*' (Wittgenstein 1974: 29 – original emphasis), and suggests that there might be an infinite number of objects. He remarks, for instance, that 'even if the world is infinitely complex, so that every fact consists of infinitely many states of affairs and every state of affairs is composed of infinitely many objects, there would still have to be objects and states of affairs' (Wittgenstein 1974: 30). Critics similarly highlight reservations about the possibility of compiling such an inventory. Black, for instance, says it 'depends upon the plausibility of the idea that a *list* of things, no matter how inclusive and accurate, *leaves something out*' (Black 1964: 30 – original emphasis), while Grayling talks about the idea conditionally, saying '*if* we had a complete inventory' (Grayling 1988: 35 – emphasis mine). The Minister of Determination firmly believes that there is a 'finite set of objects', but the sentence that immediately precedes this quotation from Black suggests that this is his downfall; Desiderio says that the Minister 'was the most ascetic of logicians but, if he had a fatal flaw, it was his touch of scholasticism' (Carter 2010: 19-20), before introducing the foundations of the Minister's verification principle. Thus, the Minister's rigidly circumscribed view of the world in which 'objects are what is unalterable' (Wittgenstein 1974: 8) is parodied in the context of Doctor Hoffman's theory that 'only change is invariable' (Carter 2010: 109). The Minister's work on compiling a list, inspired by the *Tractatus* and Black's reading of this text, is therefore futile in its impossibility – something that both Wittgenstein and Black acknowledge.

Another of the Minister's downfalls, according to Desiderio, is that he 'rejected the transcendental' – Desiderio says that a repudiation of metaphysical ideas means that the Minister 'had clipped his own wings' (Carter 2010: 25). The Minister's claim that 'metaphysics are no concern of mine' (Carter 2010: 34) aligns him with the Logical Positivists, but *not* as a proponent of the *Tractatus*, as this is where the arguments of Wittgenstein's early work and the movement of Logical Positivism differ. In the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein puts metaphysical ideas such as religion and morality beyond the boundary of what can be spoken about because of a lack of factual discourse about such concepts, saying

'what we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence', acknowledging the existence of metaphysical ideas; 'there are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They *make themselves manifest.* They are what is mystical' (Wittgenstein 1974: 73-74 – original emphasis). But the Logical Positivists, for whom verification is dependent on the senses, have a deprecatory view of metaphysical concepts and 'any suggestion that there might be a world beyond the ordinary world of science and common sense, the world revealed to us by our senses' (Ayer in Magee 1978: 119); they argue that 'religion and morality are nonsense' (Pears 1971: 35). This makes the association between Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* and the philosophy of the Vienna Circle problematic. As Grayling notes, 'most of the Positivists were scornful of religion, regarding it as primitive superstition, whereas Wittgenstein throughout his life retained the deepest respect for it' (Grayling 1988: 60). Ayer reinforces this argument saying that within the Vienna Circle, some members found this aspect of the *Tractatus* 'disquieting' (Ayer 1959: 5). The Minister's repudiation of the transcendental suggests that, like the Logical Positivists, he believes that only objects perceived by the senses can be verified or are verifiable, and draws attention to the tension between the Vienna Circle and Wittgenstein's early work.

As 'the most ascetic of logicians' (Carter 2010: 19), the Minister admires the order provided by unquestionable facts, and while he strives to determine the truth-status of possible facts as part of his verification principle, in her plans Carter suggests that the Minister is creating tautologies – propositions that are 'unconditionally true' and thus do not need verifying (Wittgenstein 1974: 34). Her plans portray Doctor Hoffman accusing the Minister of:

> making a tautologous city where everything is true because it makes no demands upon the world and everybody will always be satisfied, no matter what the circumstances, since all sentences will be constructed on the model of: "Either it is raining or it is not raining" and so offer absolutely unequivocal alternatives that nobody can quarrel with. (Carter undated Journal MS88899/1/111: unpaginated)

Here, the Doctor uses Wittgenstein's 'raining' example (Wittgenstein 1974: 34) to allude to the habitual order that the Minister's model offers. His words demonstrate Carter's reading of Black's *Companion*, bearing a strong resemblance to the previously noted quotation that Carter makes a note of: 'a tautology is seen to be true because it makes no demand upon the world (requires no verification), being so constructed that it will be "satisfied" no matter what is the case' (Black 1964: 16; Carter 1969-70 Journal MS88999/1/93: unpaginated). Likewise, under the heading in her plans 'Tests for Determining Reality Status', Carter has the

subheading 'truth tables' under which is a quotation from Black's *Companion* about tautologies, where he notes that 'since the last line of the truth-table for a tautology consists of an unbroken series of *T*'s, the tautology is "unconditionally true" [...] i.e. does not have a sense depending in any way upon the actual condition of the universe' (Black 1964: 245; Carter undated Journal MS88899/1/110: 94). What's more, her 'Workpoints' contain a Tractatan quotation that reinforces the relevance of this idea for her depiction of the Minister: 'a tautology leaves open to reality the whole – the infinite whole – of logical space: a contradiction fills the whole of logical space leaving no point of it for reality. Thus neither of them can determine reality in any way' (Wittgenstein 1974: 35; Carter undated Journal MS88899/1/110: 147).

While the Minister's verification principle excludes tautologies and focuses on establishing and verifying the truth-possibilities of empirical propositions, it is suggested that the Minister is comforted by the stability provided by certainties in the midst of the chaos created by Doctor Hoffman. While the Minister is contented, as the Doctor's words imply, the satisfaction provided by tautologies is underwhelming, especially when contrasted with the mutable world of Doctor Hoffman, which, in contrast to Wittgenstein's dualistic view in the *Tractatus*, 'is not an either/or world' (Carter 2010: 245). This stasis is acknowledged by Desiderio at the end of the novel, when he recognises with 'regret' that following the Doctor's death 'all changes would henceforth be, as they had been before, absolutely predictable' (Carter 2010: 264). Carter makes a note of a quotation from Black's discussion of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* that, I argue, sums up Desiderio's reaction: 'in logic there is nothing to be expected and nothing to cause disappointment or produce gratification' (Black 1964: 330; Carter 1969-70 Journal MS88999/1/93: unpaginated). Given the choice between 'a night of perfect ecstasy' and a 'lifetime's contentment', Desiderio chooses the latter, although he retrospectively notes that 'it is not even as though I have been contented' (Carter 2010: 247). Rather, as a result of Desiderio's actions, the rest of the community is 'relatively contented' (Carter 2010: 247).

Thus, Carter's portrayal of the Minister in *Doctor Hoffman* is based on and inspired by her reading of the *Tractatus* and her secondary research on this text, and particularly focuses on questioning Wittgenstein's aim to 'draw a limit to thought', more specifically, 'to the expression of thoughts' (Wittgenstein 1974: 3). As well as parodying the Minister's 'passion for naming' (Carter undated Journal MS88899/1/111: unpaginated), his need for verification is also the subject of satire, challenging the *Tractatus* as well as the related movement of Logical Positivism. The fact that – in her plans – Carter depicts the Minister as

voicing the early Wittgenstein's views that are put forward and rejected in *Philosophical Investigations* adds to her parody of the *Tractatus*'s argument and reinforces the Minister's limitations. The Minister is not the only opponent to interact with the philosophy of the *Tractatus* though, as the Doctor is also familiar with this text. I now turn to the Doctor's experimentation and his influences, and argue that the *Tractatus* and Ryle's *Dilemmas* are key intertexts for understanding the Doctor's work.

The Doctor, Logical Atomism, and 'Ryle's law' (Carter 1969-70 Journal MS88999/1/93: unpaginated)

The peep-show proprietor's words regarding his former pupil's work illustrate that Carter's research on the *Tractatus* is central to her depiction of the Doctor:

> I am not necessarily connected with him [Doctor Hoffman] [...] there are no such things as necessary connections. Necessary connections are fabulous beasts. Like the unicorn. Nevertheless, since things occasionally *do* come together in various mutable combinations, you might say that the Doctor and I have made a random intersection. (Carter 2010: 108 – original emphasis)

While recalling Hume's disjointed theory of causality discussed in the previous chapter, and adding to Hume's influence upon Carter's work – she did at least intend to re-read Hume as research for *Doctor Hoffman* (Carter undated Journal MS88899/1/110: 186) – on closer inspection this actually corresponds to Carter's reading of Black's Tractatan *Companion*. As Black states, and Carter notes in her plans, 'objects are not linked by necessary connexions, but only contingently *come together* in various mutable combinations' (Black 1964: 43 – original emphasis; Carter undated Journal MS88899/1/110: 182). In another journal of the same period, Carter also demonstrates the importance of Hume for Wittgenstein, once again via her reading of Black. She makes a note of Black's remark that 'Wittgenstein's description of "belief in the causal nexus" as "superstition" [...] is quite in the spirit of Hume' (Black 1964: 243; Carter 1969-70 Journal MS88899/1/93: unpaginated).

The relevance of the *Tractatus* for the Doctor goes much deeper than this, engaging with Wittgenstein's text itself as well as Russell's theory of logical atomism that underpins it. Regarding the *Tractatus*, as Carter notes in her plans for *Doctor Hoffman*, Wittgenstein claims that 'if a god creates a world in which certain propositions are true, then by that very act he also creates a world in which all the propositions that follow from them come true. And similarly he could not create a world in which the proposition "*p*" was true without creating all its objects' (Wittgenstein 1974: 38; Carter undated Journal MS88899/1/110: 67).

Carter's plans reveal that this is the foundational principle for Doctor Hoffman's 'synthetically authentic phenomena' which are fuelled by eroto-energy – the energy released during sexual activity (Carter 2010: 248). Mirroring Wittgenstein's words, the Doctor has 'created a world in which a certain proposition is true – that is, everything obeys the power of desire. Suspicious though I am of causation, nevertheless, all the propositions that follow from this initial proposition are per. se. valid until naming' (Carter undated Journal MS88899/1/111: unpaginated). As the Doctor hints, the disconnection between language and the world poses problems for the enduring validity of this proposition. During the war, naming phenomena created by eroto-energy allowed the Minister to control them, a task that, as Albertina notes, 'ironically enough [...] was made all the easier because of the flexibility of identity produced in the state of nebulous time' (Carter 2010: 231). But post-war, when the Minister no longer has to defend the city from Doctor Hoffman's infiltrating images, 'everybody is relatively contented because they do not know how to name their desires so the desires do not exist, in accordance with the Minister's theory' (Carter 2010: 247-248); as I have already argued, this part of the Minister's argument stems from Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*.

In particular, the Doctor is engaging with Wittgenstein's 'version of logical atomism' (Schroeder 2006: 40) which was inspired by Russell, and putting Russell's theory into practice. Ideas of atomism are all 'variations of a similar idea: that the basic constituents of the universe are atoms' (Sandywell 2011: 158). The oft-quoted explanation of logical atomism is Russell's claim that 'you can get down in theory, if not in practice, to ultimate simples, out of which the world is built, and those simples have a kind of reality not belonging to anything else' (Russell 1956: 270). Carter includes this quotation in the plans for *Doctor Hoffman* in relation to the contents of Hoffman's laboratory notes at the end of the novel (Carter undated Journal MS88899/1/110: 26). The published novel does not reproduce this verbatim, but the Doctor's notion that, as Albertina says, 'in theory, one can reduce everything to a series of ultimate simples' (Carter 2010: 242) highlights the importance of Russell's doctrine that the early Wittgenstein adopts. Albertina continues to say – closely mirroring Russell's words – that 'the world is built from these simples' and that 'these simples have a kind of reality that does not belong to anything else' (Carter 2010: 243). Doctor Hoffman agrees with the notion of an underlying structure, but *intends* to put the theory of logical atomism into practice in order to deconstruct the world into its basic constituents and rebuild a new cosmos, taking Russell's notion that the simples have a different 'kind of reality' to a new level. Once perfected, the theory will be named Hoffman's

Principle of Unwrought Simplicity, and will theoretically 'reduce everything in the world to the non-created bases from which the world is built. And then he will take the world apart and make a new world' (Carter 2010: 242). For the Doctor, however, 'the ultimate simplicity [...] is Love. That is to say, Desire' (Carter 2010: 243), and the key, limitless source for the Doctor's reality-modifying enterprise is eroto-energy, which fuels his machinery.

Ironically, by adopting an albeit skewed notion of logical atomism and 'ultimate simples', the Doctor prevents the Minister from being able to *permanently* eradicate his simulations. In line with the early Wittgenstein, the Minister favours indestructible names/objects, but Hoffman's 'synthetically authentic phenomena' also fulfil this criterion. As the ambassador tells the Minister:

> you cannot destroy our imagery; you may annihilate the appearances but the asymmetric essence can neither be created nor destroyed – only changed. And if you disintegrate the images with your lasers and your infra red rays, they only revert to their constituent parts and soon come together again in another form which you yourself have rendered even more arbitrary by your interference. (Carter 2010: 36)

Thus, Doctor Hoffman's imagery bears a resemblance to elementary propositions and states of affairs in the *Tractatus*, which are made up of combinations of names or objects that are indestructible. The phenomena disintegrate into their constituent parts when attacked by the Minister, causing them to reform into a new arrangement. The Doctor's atomistic theory is voiced explicitly in relation to the samples, which are the 'symbolic constituents of representations of the basic constituents of the universe. If they are properly arranged, all the possible situations in the world and every possible mutation of those situations can be represented' (Carter 2010: 109). Desiderio recognises the similarity this bears to the Minister's naming strategy, saying 'like the Minister's computer bank?' (Carter 2010: 109) but the peep-show proprietor rejects this. The proprietor does say, however, that 'ironically enough, your Minister seeks the same final analysis my former pupil made long ago. But then the Doctor transcended it' (Carter 2010: 109), once again highlighting the Minister's rejection of metaphysics, in line with the Logical Positivists. So like the Minister, whose work, in line with Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*, 'consisted essentially in setting a limit to thought' (Carter 2010: 17) on the basis that only "real" objects can be named, the Doctor's methodology is founded on ideas of logical atomism, the theory that underpins the *Tractatus* and Russell's earlier work. This ironically makes the Doctor's phenomena ineradicable as the 'simples' reform if separated, and sparks a redefinition of reality in accordance with the *Tractatus* by conforming to Wittgenstein's view that 'what is thinkable is possible too'

(Wittgenstein 1974: 11). The Doctor rewrites the laws of logic, and has an alternate view of what 'ultimate simples' are; for the Doctor the basic constituents are formed out of desire and eroto-energy, while for the Minister, the atoms are the corresponding names and objects. The Reality War can therefore be seen as a battle between opposing interpretations of the *Tractatus* – those of the Doctor and the Minister – as both are influenced by, and base their battle tactics on, this text.

Ryle's *Dilemmas* provides another key for understanding Doctor Hoffman's philosophy, and, in line with the *Tractatus*, the Doctor and the Minister have oppositional views on this. Ryle was a prolific contributor to journals such as *Mind* (which he also edited from 1947-71) and the supplementary volume of the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, but Carter's research on Ryle is restricted to his first two book-length studies for which he is best known – *The Concept of Mind* and *Dilemmas* – and began with her reading Hartnack's *Wittgenstein and Modern Philosophy*. Carter made just over one thousand words of notes on *The Concept of Mind*, focusing mainly on 'The Systematic Elusiveness of "I"' subheading that concludes his chapter on 'Self-knowledge' (Ryle 1990: 186-189) and his chapter 'Imagination' (Ryle 1990: 232-263), both of which coincide with the prevalent themes of *Doctor Hoffman* (Carter 1969-70 Journal MS88999/1/93: unpaginated). Although the majority of Carter's notes on Ryle correspond to *The Concept of Mind*, she also consulted Ryle's *Dilemmas*; in total, she made just over 300 words of notes on this text in the MS88899/1/93 and MS88899/1/111 journals, although the notes in the latter duplicate the material in the former.

While the quantity of notes on *Dilemmas* is therefore minimal in contrast to her reading of *The Concept of Mind* – let alone her Wittgensteinian research – an example from the 'Perception' chapter in *Dilemmas* is fundamental to *Doctor Hoffman*, and is referred to as 'Ryle's law' in two of her research journals (Carter 1969-70 Journal MS88999/1/93: unpaginated; Carter undated Journal MS88899/1/111: unpaginated). This is Ryle's discussion of counterfeit money:

> A country which had no coinage would offer no scope to counterfeiters. There would be nothing for them to manufacture or pass counterfeits of. They could, if they wished, manufacture and give away decorated discs of brass or lead, which the public might be pleased to get. But these would not be false coins. There can be false coins only where there are coins made of the proper materials by the proper authorities.
>
> In a country where there is a coinage, false coins can be manufactured and passed; and the counterfeiting might be so efficient that an ordinary citizen, unable to tell which were false and which were genuine coins, might become suspicious of the genuineness of any particular coin that he received. But

> however general his suspicions might be, there remains one proposition which he cannot entertain, the proposition, namely, that it is possible that all coins are counterfeits. For there must be an answer to the question "Counterfeits of what?". (Ryle 1960: 94-95)

Carter makes a note of the opening sentence of this extract, as well as of the whole second paragraph, in her journals (Carter 1969-70 Journal MS88999/1/93: unpaginated).

'Ryle's law' therefore corresponds to Ryle's argument that in order for counterfeit currency to exist, there has to be genuine money for it to imitate; he points out that counterfeit money has the potential to blur the distinction between the "real" and the copy, leading to all currency – whether genuine or counterfeit – to be treated suspiciously. Ryle uses this example to challenge what he calls 'the sweeping conclusion that we can never find out anything for certain by using our eyes, ears and noses' (Ryle 1960: 94). He admits that while the senses may sometimes be deceived, this does not mean that 'what is sometimes fraudulent may be always fraudulent' (Ryle 1960: 94). Thus, he refutes the 'quite general argument from the notorious limitations and fallibilities of our senses to the impossibility of our getting to know anything at all by looking, listening and touching' (Ryle 1960: 94) by equating this view with the belief that the fake could exist without the real; while counterfeit money leads to the authenticity of all currency to be questioned, some of the coins are nevertheless genuine. However, there is always the possibility that counterfeit money was initially based on real money, and that the genuine money was then destroyed, which would lead to the existence of counterfeit currency *without* real money, a possibility raised, as I go on to note, in *Doctor Hoffman*.

This example informs a key aspect of Doctor Hoffman's philosophy: his colleague Mendoza's notion of 'synthetic authenticity', which is the idea that 'if a thing were sufficiently artificial, it became absolutely equivalent to the genuine' (Carter 2010: 117). Doctor Hoffman tells Desiderio that his 'transmitters [...] have been beaming [...] synthetically authentic phenomena' on the unspecified South American city (Carter 2010: 248), phenomena that, in line with Ryle's discussion of counterfeit money, blur the distinction between the genuine and the artificial. Desiderio's account of 'a riot which began when a man snatched a baby from a perambulator and dashed it to the ground because he complained that its smile was "too lifelike"' and discussion of the 'feverish delirium' that the Reality War caused (Carter 2010: 13) illustrates the chaotic repercussions of the Doctor's synthetically authentic counterfeit phenomena. This literalises Ryle's argument that an 'ordinary citizen, unable to tell which were false and which were genuine coins, might

become suspicious of the genuineness of any particular coin that he received' (Ryle 1960: 94; Carter 1969-70 Journal MS88999/1/93: unpaginated). Carter's plans for *Doctor Hoffman* demonstrate that she has Ryle's work in mind here, as under the heading 'Hoffman's version of Mendoza's Theory of Synthetic Authenticity' she writes: 'If a thing is sufficiently artificial, it achieves a quality of the genuine as soon as the question, "Of what is it a counterfeit?" arises' (Carter 1969-70 Journal MS88999/1/93: unpaginated). Thus, the Hoffman effect successfully obscures – even erases – the distinction between the real and the fake. In Ryle's terms, Hoffman believes that the difference between the counterfeit and the genuine is redundant if the artificial product achieves 'synthethic authenticity': the counterfeit can become equivalent to the genuine.

In the published novel, however, Carter alludes to Ryle's influence in the conversation between the Minister and the Doctor's ambassador. Upon being accused of being an 'abortionist' who 'murder[s] the imagination in the womb', the Minister replies: 'somebody must impose restraint. If I am an abortionist, your master is a forger. He has passed off upon us an entire currency of counterfeit phenomena' (Carter 2010: 36). The Minister's argument that the Doctor has forged 'an entire currency' ironically suggests that he fails to recognise the crux of Ryle's argument – that the counterfeit cannot exist without the real. This is a possibility, though, as the Minister's weapons and 'technological devices' (Carter 2010: 18) can – to begin with, at least – distinguish between the genuine and the counterfeit, but then incinerate the real, which would eventually lead to 'an entire currency of counterfeit phenomena'. This would be the result of the Minister's flawed method of defence rather than the Doctor's forgery, thus adding to Carter's satirical portrayal of the Minister's counterattack. This reading is supported by Carter's plans for the novel, where she imagines Desiderio being told – supposedly by the Doctor – that:

> your Minister has adopted what I shall call Ryle's law – that is, "A country which had no coinage would offer no scope for counterfeiters." He is saying, in effect: "I will do away with the problem of counterfeiters! I will abolish currency!" Where nobody desires anything, how can desire exist? (Carter 1969-70 Journal MS88899/1/93: unpaginated)[13]

[13] The same material is apparent in MS88899/1/111, titled 'Debates and misc (for Dr. Hoffman)'. Here, under the heading 'Mendoza's theory of synthetic authenticity,' Carter notes that: 'a. if a thing is sufficiently artificial, it achieves a quality of the genuine; b. for then arises the question, "of what is it a counterfeit?" The Minister is adopting Ryle's law: "A country which had no coinage would offer no space for counterfeiters;" where nobody desires anything, how can desire exist?' (Carter undated Journal MS88899/1/111: unpaginated).

Thus, while the Doctor's notion of 'synthetic authenticity' stems from Ryle's example of counterfeit money and leads to a conflation of the genuine and the fake, the Minister's response to this chaos is to abolish all phenomena, as he eradicates the real as well as the counterfeit. The Minister is therefore guilty of believing that 'what is sometimes fraudulent may be always fraudulent' (Ryle 1960: 94), the argument that Ryle is challenging.

Similarly to Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* then, both the Minister and the Doctor are depicted in relation to the example of counterfeit money put forward in Ryle's *Dilemmas*, but the two adversaries have oppositional views towards 'Ryle's law'. On the one hand, Doctor Hoffman's (and Mendoza's) notion of 'synthetic authenticity' is based on Ryle's argument that in order for counterfeit money to be used it has to be indistinguishable from genuine currency. The Minister, on the other hand – like the citizens of the South American city more generally – finds this inability to differentiate between the real and the artificial disconcerting, and seeks to abolish all currency – real and fake – as the result. Nevertheless, in line with Carter's engagement with Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* and *Philosophical Investigations* in *Doctor Hoffman*, Carter's interaction with Ryle exacerbates the chaos the Hoffman effect has generated. In this respect, Wittgenstein and Ryle are two key influences on *Doctor Hoffman*, providing the philosophical foundations for Carter's portrayal of the Reality War. However, while Wittgenstein puts morality beyond the border of what can be spoken about, saying that it is something 'that cannot be put into words' (Wittgenstein 1974: 73), and the Logical Positivists claim that morality, like religion, is 'nonsense' (Pears 1971: 35), moral philosophy is a central concern in Carter's work. I turn to this topic in the next, final, chapter of this thesis.

Chapter Five – Kant, Sade, and Moral Philosophy: Duties and Perversions

> I mean by morality what kind of things are we alive for? What should human beings *do* with themselves? And simple ethical concepts like "right", "wrong", "truth", and "justice".
> (Carter to Bell 1973: 36 – original emphasis)

> DO RIGHT BECAUSE IT IS RIGHT.
> (Carter 2006b: 9 – original capitalisation)

> Anyone with a serious int[erest]. in sex and pol[itics]. is led, sooner or later, to Sade – libertarian because his desires run counter to the law – the exercise of his sexuality turned him into a crim[inal]. [therefore] he questioned [the] nature of law itself and found it wanting.
> (Carter 1972 Journal MS88899/1/101: unpaginated)

Unlike Angela Carter's reading of many of the philosophers and philosophical movements discussed in the previous chapters, her broad interest in morality – what is right and wrong, good and bad, just and unjust – spans her career. This is unusual, as most of her philosophical research is discrete and conforms to her reading for a specific novel or to a particular era. In this chapter I argue that moral philosophy is central to Carter's philosophical research and thinking, and maintain that this interest is prevalent throughout much of her writing. I track Carter's reading and engagement with ideas of morality chronologically, pinpointing what Carter read and when as well as how her understanding of morality developed and changed its focus throughout her writing. Carter's novels as well as her research journals and private notes are used to illustrate her interaction with moral philosophy – her 'attempt to achieve a systematic understanding of the nature of morality and what it requires of us' (Rachels 1999: 1). I begin by discussing Carter's early work in relation to Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), predominantly focusing on the Bristol trilogy. I will then turn to how this aspect of Carter's writing changed later on, mainly concentrating on Carter's expansive reading of the Marquis de Sade's (1740-1814) *oeuvre*, and how this plays out in *The Sadeian Woman: An Exercise in Cultural History* (1979),[1] *The Infernal Desire Machines of Doctor Hoffman* (1972), as well as in her unpublished notes and plans. I argue that a discussion of Sade provides Carter with the opportunity to engage with the philosophical ideas she had previously researched, such as Plato's ideal Republic, and Thomas Hobbes's and Jean-Jacques Rousseau's notion of a state of nature.

[1] Also published with the subtitle 'And the Ideology of Pornography'.

Carter, Morality, and the 1960s: The Bristol Trilogy and Kantian Ethics

The novels that comprise the Bristol trilogy – *Shadow Dance* (1966), *Several Perceptions* (1968), and *Love* (written in 1969, published in 1971) – are regarded as a *trilogy* due to the similarities between the three texts. Carter recognises this connection, referring to them as her '3 Bristol novels' (Carter 1969-70 Journal MS88899/1/93: unpaginated). Marc O'Day, who coined the label 'The Bristol Trilogy', does so on the basis of the resemblances between characters, plot structures, narrative style, and themes relating to the 1960s culture that characterise the three novels (O'Day 2007: 44). In Chapter Three I argued that an interest in causality – in relation to both David Hume and Jean-Luc Godard – also connects the trilogy, and noted that the fragmented depiction of events in these novels and the disjunction between cause and effect has an impact on morality: it prevents the reader from understanding the motive for an act, and from interpreting the consequences on this basis. In this section, I advance this argument and postulate that an interest in moral philosophy also permeates the trilogy. To date, this aspect of Carter's work – in relation to the Bristol trilogy as well as Carter's later publications – has not been given a sustained analysis despite her explicitly stating that morality is a key concern for two of the three texts in the Bristol trilogy. Carter told Les Bedford, for instance, that *Shadow Dance* is 'a very black moral thriller' and says she envisages *Love* as a 'specifically moral book' (Carter to Bedford 1977: unpaginated). By examining these claims, and arguing that the same concern is evident in *Several Perceptions*, I provide the first in-depth discussion of Carter's concerns about moral dilemmas as reflected in these three novels.

Carter's research journals and retrospective discussions about the Bristol trilogy novels demonstrate that Carter pursued research in the area of moral philosophy from as early as 1962 and maintained this interest throughout her career, and also reinforce my claim that Carter viewed *Shadow Dance*, *Several Perceptions* and *Love* as "moral" novels. In her 1962-63 journal Carter notes that she read A. C. Ewing's *Ethics* (1953), which is part of the 'Teach Yourself Books' series. She reflects that 'I still find it all dreadfully hard. And this is a do-it-yourself Ethics kit' (Carter 1962-63 Journal MS88899/1/88: unpaginated). As well as introducing the notions of ethics and morality, Ewing's DIY book explores ideas of happiness, duty, and "good", concepts which Carter grapples with in the Bristol trilogy and beyond that I discuss in this chapter.

In the same journal, Carter notes that she read John Stuart Mill's *Utilitarianism* (1861), a key text for understanding moral philosophy (Carter 1962-63 Journal

MS88899/1/88: unpaginated). In this text Mill discusses the theory of "utilitarianism" which was first explicitly articulated by his godfather Jeremy Bentham in *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* (1789), but initially proposed by Hume. Utilitarianism is characterised by utility and happiness – 'actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness' – with happiness being defined as 'intended pleasure and the absence of pain' (Mill 2001: 7). Utilitarianism is also defined by Bentham in terms of the 'Greatest Happiness Principle' – a good act provides the greatest good for the greatest number of people. Bentham's morality in particular is hedonistic, where good acts give pleasure and bad acts correspond to pain: 'Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, *pain* and *pleasure*. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do' (Bentham 1823: 1 – original emphasis). As Mill notes, 'according to the greatest happiness principle [...] the ultimate end, with reference to and for the sake of which all other things are desirable – whether we are considering our own good or that of other people – is an existence exempt as far as possible from pain, and as rich as possible in enjoyments' (Mill 2001: 12). Carter does not reflect on Mill's text much here, merely giving the verdict that Mill is a 'woolly liberal' (Carter 1962-63 Journal MS88899/1/88: unpaginated). Her reading of Mill and Ewing illustrates Carter's emerging interest in morality and attempt to understand ethical dilemmas – she finds Ewing 'dreadfully hard' (Carter 1962-63 Journal MS88899/1/88: unpaginated) but, as I will go on to illustrate, perseveres with this area of philosophy. Her utilitarian research and consideration of pleasure certainly provides a foundation for Carter's early discussions of morality, but this aspect of moral philosophy is more relevant, I argue, for examining *The Sadeian Woman*, which I analyse later in this chapter.

If utilitarianism is primarily important for discussing Carter's later work, what moral theories are central to Carter's earlier novels, particularly the Bristol trilogy? The answer to this lies in Carter's understanding of Kant. Carter explicitly signals the importance of this philosopher in *Love* when Lee recollects his mother's 'spectacular psychosis' on Empire Day in primary school, when she runs naked through the playground (Carter 2006b: 10). Lee recalls that the children spelt out the school motto with letters hung around their necks – the motto being the 'Kantian imperative: DO RIGHT BECAUSE IT IS RIGHT' (Carter 2006b: 9 – original capitalisation). This encapsulates the essence of Kant's theory of morality – for Kant, acts are absolutely right or wrong, and it is a *categorical imperative* to do the right thing – a *duty*. Thus, an act is good or bad in itself, regardless of consequences. As Kant says in *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals* (1785), 'a good will is not good because of what

it effects or accomplishes – because of its fitness for attaining some proposed end: it is good through its willing alone – that is, good in itself' (Kant 2002: 26). Duty is the guiding force of morality for Kant, which he defines as '*the necessity to act out of reverence for the law*', and specifies that 'an action done from duty has to set aside altogether the influence of inclination, and along with inclination every object of the will' (Kant 2002: 31-32 – original emphasis). And how do we know what our duties are? For Kant, it is common sense: it takes 'no far-reaching ingenuity' and 'it might even be surmised in advance that acquaintance with what every man is obliged to do, and so also to know, will be the affair of every man, even the most ordinary' (Kant 2002: 34-35).

Such duties are derived from the Categorical Imperative, which is 'a principle that every rational person must accept' (Rachels 1999: 124), 'the ultimate moral norm' (Sullivan 1994: 28). This law dictates that 'I ought never to act except in such a way *that I can also will that my maxim should become a universal law*' (Kant 2002: 33 – original emphasis); thus, an act is 'morally permissible' if it follows a rule, and if you are willing for that rule to be universally applied (Rachels 1999: 124). Kant says that 'all imperatives are expressed by an "*ought*"' and makes a distinction between two types of imperatives; they 'command either *hypothetically* or *categorically*' (Kant 2002: 43-44 – original emphasis). A categorical imperative depicts 'an action as objectively necessary in itself apart from its relation to a further end [...] [is] good *in itself* and therefore as necessary, in virtue of its principle [...] [and] accords with reason' (Kant 2002: 44 – original emphasis). Such duties are, therefore, objective, absolute, and universally understood. Hypothetical imperatives, on the other hand, 'declare a possible action to be practically necessary as a means to the attainment of something else that one wills (or that one may will) [...] good solely as a means to *something else*' (Kant 2002: 43-44 – original emphasis). While categorical imperatives guide moral actions and absolutely dictate what you ought to do, hypothetical imperatives advise what you ought to do to achieve something that is desired. For instance, "if you want a doctorate on Angela Carter, you ought to read all of her work" is a hypothetical imperative, as it advises what you should do to reach your desired goal rather than what you morally have to do.

In interview with Bedford, Carter states that an analysis of what is right and wrong is central to *Love*, and does so in Kantian terms. She mentions Lee's 'moral problems' and claims:

> I did intend it [*Love*] to be a very specifically moral book. I think that's one of the things that's so depressing about it, because the husband, Lee, is in an

> absolutely cleft stick. He wants to be good, and therefore he has to stay with this madwoman and look after her, which means nourishing her psychosis. The best thing for everybody would be if he left her, but he can't do that because that would be wrong. (Carter to Bedford 1977: unpaginated)

Lee's rigid moral system has created a moral dilemma in the form of how to cope with his wife, Annabel's, madness. Carter's portrayal of a fixed code of morals poses a challenge to Kant, by raising the question as to what Lee's duty is – is his duty to stay with his wife? Or is his duty to ensure his wife's wellbeing, which could only be achieved by them separating? Carter's plans for this novel add another dimension to this, specifying that she envisaged Lee's moral dilemma being that of *murder*, as he does not prevent Annabel from committing suicide. Carter writes that Lee (initially called Chris) is:

> the last moral man left alive. He is simple, sensual, beautiful and charming; he is led into manslaughter, illegal intercourse with a minor, theft and taking the moral response [sic] for his wife's death ("I killed her by allowing her to choose to die") by following an absolute moral imperative i.e. being morally involved with the actions of others. (Carter 1968-69 Journal MS88899/1/92: unpaginated)

The repetitious use of 'moral' reinforces that an analysis of this subject is one of Carter's primary aims in *Love*. She goes on to say that 'stylistically' *Love* is to be composed of 'moral sequences', with one of these being 'the theory of assassination' (Carter 1968-69 Journal MS88899/1/92: unpaginated). Once again, though, absolute Kantian ethics are the main focus, in light of Lee/Chris obeying the 'absolute moral imperative', reinforcing the claim that he is in an 'absolutely cleft stick'. It is therefore the rigidity of ideas of right and wrong – embodied by Kant – that Carter targets here. Embedded in her plans for *Love*, moreover, is some of Carter's Kantian research, as she notes that 'Kant divided imperatives into' two categories and discusses the sub-divisions of Kant's system as well, although she does not provide the source material for this:

a. Categorical imperatives (which prescribe morally necessary actions)
b. Hypothetical imperatives (which prescribe actions as practically necessary means to some end)

Hypothetical imperatives are again sub-divided:

a. problematic hypothetical imperatives – which prescribe means to a possible end
b. assertoric hypothetical imperatives – which prescribe means to an actual end. (Carter 1968-69 Journal MS88899/1/92: unpaginated)

Thus, Carter's discussion of morality is based on the twofold meaning of "right": "right" as an opposite to wrong, in an absolute moral system; and doing this "right" because

it is a moral duty. In both *Love* and her unpublished plans she discusses these ideas through the lens of what Kant 'prescribe[s]'. While, according to Carter's notes, her *reading* of Kant began in 1968-69 and is part of her plans for *Love*, I argue that Carter is grappling with the same ideas in *Shadow Dance* and *Several Perceptions*. While Carter's Kantian research could have led to her discussions of absolute morals and the notion of obligation, another possibility is that she approached Kant *because* of her interest in these concepts (as evidenced in *Shadow Dance* and *Several Perceptions*). However, I would argue that Carter was at least *familiar* with Kant's ideas before writing *Shadow Dance* for two reasons. Firstly, Ewing's *Ethics*, which seems to be the first text on morality that Carter consulted, introduces the notion of "right" saying that 'the two main ethical concepts are expressed respectively by the words "good" and "ought" (or "duty")' and says that both of these terms – but "good" in particular – 'are very far from unambiguous' (Ewing 1953: 5). He also has a chapter called 'Duty for Duty's Sake' which is dedicated to Kant (Ewing 1953: 51-64). Secondly, Carter's plans for *Several Perceptions* allude to Kant, as Carter notes that Joseph 'flunked out of a philosophy course, kept on Freudianly misspelling Kant' (Carter 1965-66 Journal MS88899/1/90: 72). While this mention is a pun on Kant's name rather than a discussion of his theory of morality, when considered alongside Carter's consideration of morals in the published version of *Several Perceptions*, I would argue that Carter evidences her familiarity with Kant's ideas here.

In order to effectively make this argument, I discuss the novels of the Bristol trilogy in reverse chronological order, as this effectively highlights the resemblances between the three novels in relation to the theme of morality. To date, Carter's interaction with Kant, her portrayal of the rigid system of morality he upholds, and the notion of "duty", have not been critically discussed; although Chiharu Yoshioka (2001) discusses Kant, she does so in relation to the Enlightenment, without considering Carter's engagement with his ethics.

Love: A Gate, a Toad, and Conflicting Duties

Most criticism on *Love* has focused on Annabel, paying particular attention to her madness, as well as to her status as an object of desire under the male gaze in relation to art.[2] For a consideration of morality, however, Lee needs to be in the spotlight. His education has instilled the Kantian motto 'do right because it is right', which acts as his moral compass and

[2] Sue Roe's 'The Disorder of *Love*: Angela Carter's Surrealist Collage' and Katie Garner's 'Blending the Pre-Raphaelite with the Surreal in Angela Carter's *Shadow Dance* (1966) and *Love* (1971)' are two examples of this (Roe 2007 and Garner 2012).

reappears throughout the novel when Lee faces uncertainty as to where his duty lies. He repeats it, for instance, in relation to his adulterous relationship with Carolyn (Carter 2006b: 39); to question his duties towards Annabel (Carter 2006b: 61); and to justify Annabel's rejection of him: 'if one should do right because it is right, why should she have been forced to simulate a life-likeness that did not satisfy her?' (Carter 2006b: 109). The moral code that Lee's school instils conforms to the absolute system advanced by Kant, who 'believed that morality is a matter of following absolute rules – rules that admit no exceptions, that must be followed come what may' (Rachels 1999: 122).

In general, a disruption of binary systems is a central concern of Carter's and is a dominant theme in critical discussions of Carter's work, particularly in relation to gender. As Susan M. Squier notes, in relation to Carter and other contemporary authors, 'the dominant feature of postmodernism is its challenge to the master narratives of Western metaphysics and philosophy, with their bases in binary oppositions: mind/body; male/female, self/other; first world/third world; human/non-human' (Squier 1995: 119). To these examples, I would add that a disruption of Kant's moral system is one of Carter's aims in her early work.[3] In *Love*, I argue that Lee ventriloquises Carter's attempt to rebuke and fracture Kant's dualistic moral universe where acts are categorically right or wrong, good or bad, with no room for fluidity or ambiguity, using Lee's turbulent marriage to Annabel as an example of when the concepts of "right" or "duty" are not clear-cut. Carter uses a gate as a symbol of Kant's fixed moral system, which metaphorically disrupts the Kantian binary division. The presence of a severed toad and Lee's puritanical upbringing reinforce Carter's discussion of morality in terms of a conflict between desires and duties, and between incompatible obligations.

Carter opens *Love* with dualistic imagery. Walking through a park, Annabel notices that 'both sun and moon gave forth an equal brilliance so the heavens contained two contrary states at once' (Carter 2006b: 2). In her Preface Audrey Niffenegger applies this imagery to couples in the novel, saying 'things that shouldn't be together, are' (Niffenegger 2006: vi), problematising how dualisms function in the novel. Moreover, the park has gates, which 'were never either open or closed. They hung always a little ajar' (Carter 2006b: 2). Both the sky and the gate depict a binary division, posing options of night or day and open or closed respectively. But Carter destabilises the fixity of these states, bringing the two celestial bodies together, and portraying the gate as perennially avoiding the states of being open or closed. The gate in particular features as a symbol for questions of morality in the novel,

[3] *Heroes and Villains* similarly discusses moral duties, but in relation to murder. Mrs Green advocates that it is Jewel's duty to kill his brother to ease his suffering: 'it is your duty; he is your responsibility' (Carter 1972: 35).

more specifically challenging Kant's ethical system and the difficulties Lee has conforming to a fixed moral code. Carter later refers to them as 'amoral gates' because they question fixed categories; they 'neither permitted nor denied access' and 'negated a moral problem by declaring it improperly phrased' (Carter 2006b: 108). The gates function as a metaphor for Lee's moral beliefs; he is schooled to abide by Kantian ethics but proceeds to interrogate how applicable Kant's system is in practice. When he has an affair with his philosophy tutor's wife, for instance – taking 'a certain pleasure in coupling with the wife of a man who taught him ethics' (Carter 2006b: 18) – Lee questions the potential future of their relationship, and wants a categorical answer: 'at this time, he did not appreciate shades of meaning. He thought a door must either be open or closed' (Carter 2006b: 21). Thus, in line with Kant's notion of morality, for Lee there should be only two alternatives; morality constitutes a binary division rather than a continuum. The clause 'at this time' indicates that a change is on the horizon, a change that permits more flexibility and suggests a refusal – or at least a challenge – to Kant's fixed system. The fact that Lee has a philosophy tutor also implies that Lee's Kantian-based moral upbringing is lacking, as he is consulting someone else, and the only details provided about the nature of the tutor's work is that he is teaching Lee *ethics*.

Thus, if, as Roe argues, '*Love* presents the world as Annabel sees it: a messy collage of the imaginary and the real' (Roe 2007: 82), it also portrays the moral universe encountered by Lee and his attempt to establish what "right" and "duty" constitute: '"Do right because it is right," thought Lee but the motto was no help at all since it only implied the question of the nature of the right' (Carter 2006b: 39). Lee grapples with the 'question of the nature of the right' in relation to his duties to Annabel, his extra-marital affairs, and the morality of stealing. After marrying Annabel due to pressure from her parents, 'Lee found it more difficult than usual, for he remembered that a door can be only open or closed and he had made some formal promises, before witnesses, that he ought not to sleep with any other woman again until the end of his natural life which meant, perhaps, another forty years. Unless Annabel died' (Carter 2006b: 38). Lee's duty is therefore informed by the marital vows; the use of 'ought' – central to Kantian imperatives – dictates the boundaries of Lee's moral behaviour where there are only two alternatives, as 'a door can be only open or closed'. Lee highlights a desperation to escape his duties by imagining Annabel's death as the only form of release, which suggests that Annabel's suicide at the end of the novel poses a deliverance from duties that Lee could not otherwise evade. Despite realising that Annabel was 'unbalanced' before they married, 'his puritanism demanded he should be publicly responsible for her' (Carter 2006b: 29). Thus, his strict moral upbringing, ruled by Kantian

ethics, encourages him to carry out his duty of care; Annabel is 'a thing that needed to be loved' (Carter 2006b: 23), although he realises that 'he was overcome with conflicting apprehensions' (Carter 2006b: 29).

The idea of incompatible duties is one of the primary challenges to Kant's system, and is a criticism that Carter contributes to in *Love* via her depiction of Lee's moral dilemma. Kant asserts that lying is categorically wrong in a number of works, but most explicitly in 'On a Supposed Right to Lie because of Philanthropic Concerns' (1797) where he states 'to be truthful (honest) in all declarations is [...] a sacred and unconditional commanding law of reason that admits of no expediency whatsoever' (Kant 1994: 164). In this essay he imagines that the targeted victim of a murderer has taken refuge with him and that the murderer knocks on the door inquiring as to the whereabouts of the victim, and Kant argues it would be wrong to lie to the murderer, although, like lying, murder is also wrong. Using this as his prime example, Rachels says that 'the principal argument against absolute moral rules has to do with the possibility of conflict cases' (Rachels 1999: 128). Likewise, Ewing uses this example, saying that 'when this happens we must admit an exception to at least one of the laws' which means that 'the laws cannot both be universal' (Ewing 1953: 60). While Lee acknowledges the conflicting duties he has as a husband – whether it is better to love or leave Annabel – he also wonders what his duty would have been if Carolyn had kept the child he fathered rather than had an abortion. When Carolyn asks him what he would have done in this hypothetical situation, he says 'I might have moved in with you, that might have been my duty. On the other hand, I might have jumped into the river to escape my conflicting obligations' (Carter 2006b: 87). Lee regards both alternatives – staying with Annabel or living with Carolyn and being a father to the child – as "right", illuminating a flaw in Kant's system, as only one of these duties could be fulfilled if this circumstance arose. Lee also tries to justify his relationship with Carolyn in a way that means he is not shirking his duties towards Annabel, as he 'deluded himself that, since he was not emotionally involved with the girl, Carolyn, he was not, significantly, unfaithful to his wife' (Carter 2006b: 38), making a distinction between physical intimacy and emotional involvement.

Lee's analysis of what constitutes "right" and what duties are is also discussed in relation to stealing. Lee is 'horrified' to discover that Annabel is a thief, because she does not need to steal due to her wealth (Carter 2006b: 27). He 'had always regarded thievery as the legitimate province only of the poor' and 'thought it morally proper the poor should steal as much as they could' (Carter 2006b: 27). On the same note, he thought 'it was the duty of the rich (the hub of the wheel) to purchase as much as they were able' (Carter 2006b: 27). Thus,

as well as drawing out the shortcomings of Kant's absolute moral code, Lee illustrates a lack of conformity to Kant's moral system. He does not regard stealing as absolutely wrong (or right), but instead bases his moral judgment on other factors, such as wealth, and the related factor of whether stealing is needed for basic survival or to 'keep the wheel of the economy in motion' (Carter 2006b: 27).

Lee's morality is frequently described as 'puritanical', as it is both rigorous – following his Kantian upbringing as well as his aunt's ethical beliefs – and void of pleasure and indulgence. Lee is shackled by the 'puritanical fervour of his childhood' (Carter 2006b: 61) and 'the final modification of his puritanism' is that he thinks he should be content if he has both food and shelter (Carter 2006b: 71). Kant's ethical system is rational and innate – 'all moral concepts have their seat and origin in reason completely *a priori*, and indeed in the most ordinary human reason' (Kant 2002: 41) – and he claims that duties are 'in no way based on feelings, impulses, and inclinations' (Kant 2002: 62). Thus, 'obligations bind independent of our desires; they are not based in desire but in *reason*' (Driver 2006: unpaginated – original emphasis). The conflict between desires and duties is discussed in *Love* in the form of a toad, a toad analysed by the biologist Lazzaro Spallanzani (1729-99). Immediately after Lee describes Annabel as 'some kind of inexorable angel, directing him to where his duty lay' and repeating the mantra 'do right because it is right' (Carter 2006b: 61), Carter uses Spallanzani's toad to symbolise Lee's predicament. As part of an experiment:

> Spallanzani cut off the legs of a male toad in the midst of its copulation but the dying animal did not relax the blind grasp to which nature drove it. Spallanzani therefore concluded: "The persistence of the toad is due less to his obtuseness of feeling than to the vehemence of his passion". (Carter 2006b: 61)

Carter goes on to compare Lee to the toad:

> Like Spallanzani's toad, Lee was not insensitive to his situation but the stern puritanical fervour of his childhood condemned him, now, to abandon himself to the proliferating fantasies of the pale girl whose arms clasped as tight around his neck as if she were drowning. (Carter 2006b: 61)

This simile illustrates Carter's engagement with Kant's emphasis on duties and the elimination of desires. Lee's duty to Annabel overrides a desire, or need, for happiness; his duty for Annabel takes precedence over his own wellbeing, and care for himself. While 'he might have guessed her history would be brief and tragic for she had always worn the blind face of those who will die young and so do not need to see much of life', Lee recognises, in explicitly Kantian terms, that 'the moral imperative, to love her, proved stronger than his perceptions and his natural desire for happiness persuaded him, at first, that his intuitive

forebodings were unjustified' (Carter 2006b: 61). Thus, his Kantian education and related puritanical upbringing cause Lee to prioritise Annabel's happiness over his own, but as he investigates his moral code and consequent unhappiness, he decides to prioritise desires over duties, overturning the Kantian system, as he 'concluded, at last, that he might have to stop loving Annabel in order to keep intact what few fragments of himself he could save' (Carter 2006b: 80). An abidance to Kantian ethics – following absolute rights and duties – has therefore fractured Lee's identity, and Lee realises that the solution is to reject Kant's system.

As well as a 'moral imperative' to love Annabel that Lee eventually dismisses, Lee believes 'it was a moral imperative to be happy as a king' (Carter 2006b: 71). He uses this belief 'to hold himself together' when at the point of 'disintegrating' (Carter 2006b: 71). For Lee, 'this was the final modification of his puritanism, that if he had enough to eat and a roof over his head, he knew he ought to be content even if the king he always thought of in connection with the smiling couplet he repeated to himself every morning was Mad King Ludwig of Bavaria' (Carter 2006b: 71-72). Lee fulfils this basic requirement for happiness – in the form of being content and having food and shelter – but goes on to reject his puritanical beliefs by repudiating this stern definition of happiness. When he temporarily forgets about Annabel, he realises 'he was happy without even trying to be so' and learns that his belief that 'happiness was a quality which resided in its possessor and bore no relation to his environment [...] was difficult, if not impossible, to work out in practice' (Carter 2006b: 80). There is more to happiness, Lee reflects, than food and shelter, and Annabel's presence compromises Lee's happiness. Lee therefore inverts the Kantian system of duties over desires, which he previously conformed to. For instance, as a teenager Lee planned to go 'to Cuba to fight for Castro' with Buzz, but only reached Southampton, and he recollects that 'their aunt was furious but gratified. The act was principally the expression of a sentimentality so pure it became his greatest virtue, in one sense, since his sentimentality often, when he grew up, made him act against his desires' (Carter 2006b: 14).

I would argue that as Lee gets older and has more duties to fulfil, these obligations, or 'moral imperative[s]' (Carter 2006b: 61 and 71) conflict with his desires, and Lee ignores the latter in favour of the former. As a child and young teenager Lee's sentimentality was 'pure' and uncompromised by duties. Lee's moral code, therefore, is not innately guided by reason as Kant argues, and neither does it completely ignore feelings. However, in adulthood, Lee tries to conform to the Kantian emphasis on duties and remembers 'how simple he had once found it to act without thought and pay attention only to his immediate impulses and gratifications' (Carter 2006b: 79-80). Later in life, the duties take precedence, although Lee's

situation highlights how duties can conflict, while also blurring the fixed binary system of morality that Kant asserts, and drawing attention to the impact an ignorance of desires causes by aligning his situation to that of Spallanzani's legless toad. The gate, therefore, remains ajar, a symbol returned to at the end of the novel (Carter 2006b: 108) that embodies Carter's rejection of Kantian ideals.

Several Perceptions and *Shadow Dance*: A Badger, a Murder, and Suicide

Although Carter does not mention Kant in the other two Bristol trilogy novels, *Several Perceptions* and *Shadow Dance*, I would argue that the moral ideas she engages with in *Love* with reference to Kant are discussed in the previous two instalments. The protagonist of *Several Perceptions*, Joseph, has an obsession with facts and moral truths. He keeps scrapbooks in which 'he had cut out and pasted facts' and searches for facts to 'help to shore up the crumbling dome of the world' (Carter 1970: 15; 3). Truths are therefore seen as stabilisers; as something that keeps the world intact. Joseph ponders over the "right" thing to do in a range of situations, including liberating a badger from a zoo, retrieving a stolen cap, giving away kittens, and murder. The fact that Carter envisages Joseph as a failed philosophy student who 'kept on Freudianly misspelling Kant' (Carter 1965-66 Journal MS88899/1/90: 72) indicates her conscious engagement with moral philosophy in this novel. As discussed in the previous chapter, Joseph relies on truth tables, which dualistically determine whether propositions are true or false; similarly to Kant's moral system, therefore, Joseph's moral code conforms to a binary division. While Joseph's ex-girlfriend Charlotte 'composed endless essays concerning Jane Austen's moral universe', Joseph threw away his education; he 'voluntarily selected shit, old men dying, pus and, worse of all, most dreaded of encounters, the sweet, blue gangrene. None of which featured in Jane Austen's moral universe nor could be stylized as a truth table, alas' (Carter 1970: 4). While this illustrates that not everything can be depicted in a truth table, the 'alas' represents Joseph's reliance on establishing the truth or falsity of facts and events.

While *Several Perceptions* discusses binaries and moral dilemmas, Carter's debut novel *Shadow Dance* is 'a very black moral thriller' (Carter to Bedford 1977: unpaginated) that examines duties and guilt, particularly in relation to Morris's analysis of the morality of his acts and the dilemma he faces in relation to Honeybuzzard's attack on Ghislaine. Morris dwells upon his immortal words to Honey about Ghislaine – 'take her and teach her a lesson' (Carter 1995: 37); Honey's subsequent scarring of Ghislaine's face and then her murder; and

the consequences of his actions upon the wider community, particularly the suicide of Henry Glass's wife and the death of her unborn child. Morris considers his failings in Kantian terms, focusing on his rejection of duties: 'I should have taken her [Ghislaine] home. I should. It was my duty' (Carter 1995: 65). The novel investigates Morris's moral dilemma by questioning his obligations, and highlighting the moral differences between Morris and Honeybuzzard, as, unlike Morris, Honey 'has no heart, he has a computer in his breast' (Carter 1995: 86). As Sarah Gamble notes, the protagonist in *Several Perceptions* 'plays almost exactly the same role in the text as that allocated to Morris' (Gamble 1997: 57). I would argue that a Kantian discussion of morality is a characteristic of both Joseph and Morris as well as Lee; Joseph deliberates over what is absolutely "right" and Morris reflects on the consequences of not carrying out a duty, while Lee dwells on both of these issues.

Joseph's obsession with morality conforms to Kantian ethics in that it is rigid, as symbolised by his books of facts. Anne Blossom, Joseph's neighbour, for example, is also defined as being as 'stiff and stern as a moral precept' (Carter 1970: 123). Although Joseph's morality is absolute – either right or wrong – it is not universal; Joseph establishes his own moral definitions. Thus, while he adheres to one aspect of Kantian thought, he evades another. One example of this is Joseph's theory of murder: both suicide and homicide. For Kant, murder is categorically wrong, and he specifies that this applies to someone contemplating 'taking his own life' as well: that a system that is meant to prolong life 'should actually destroy life would contradict itself and consequently could not subsist as a system of nature [...] and is therefore entirely opposed to the supreme principle of all duty' (Kant 2002: 51). Joseph attempts suicide, showing an opposition to Kant, but he also postulates that homicide is not wrong, and can in some circumstances be justified, strengthening the difference between Joseph and Kant's moral beliefs. Joseph tells Anne that killing a baby because one does not like it smiling can be acceptable because 'you would be making your own terms' (Carter 1970: 124). Joseph similarly advocates the assassination of politicians and world leaders, making the distinction 'I'm all for shooting politicians [...] it's murder I can't stomach' (Carter 1970: 63). Thus, Joseph establishes his own, albeit controversial and unconventional, moral definitions, but he has difficulty determining a definition for one concern. His cat has two litters each year and Joseph gives the kittens to the pet shop to sell once they are weaned; 'he had not been able to define his moral standpoint on whether or not to keep the kittens and could not afford to feed them all, anyway' (Carter 1970: 17). This pinpoints a moral dilemma in Kantian terms, as this situation poses conflicting duties:

keeping the kittens with their mother versus being able to financially afford looking after them.

A key part of Joseph's ethical system is consent – something is right only if it has been authorised, and is considered to be wrong otherwise. While at first glance this seems morally sound, through Joseph, Carter draws out some problematic implications of such a philosophy. For instance, 'that some strange girl [Anne] saved his life without asking her permission, appalled Joseph' (Carter 1970: 31). Joseph's establishment of his own terms and own decisions and ultimate act of attempted suicide are, in his view, ruined by Anne, as he did not want to be saved. He reiterates this point in relation to St. Francis saving a leper, where St. Francis mirrors Anne's previous rescue of Joseph, and Joseph's identification with the leper echoes his response to being saved without giving consent:

> I bet those lepers hated St Francis [...] fancy having a perfect stranger come up and kiss you just 'cos you've got a skin infection, just to show off what a big heart he had, you never hear the leper's side of the story. What if a leper out of the blue had jumped up and kissed St Francis, I bet St Francis would have been ever so affronted. What a pig. (Carter 1970: 78)

While Anne is referred to as 'strange', the term 'stranger' is used in relation to the moral offender in this context as well, and Joseph emphasises the importance of consent when it comes to doing the "right" thing.

Nevertheless, when Joseph sets the badger free from the zoo, the idea of gaining the badger's consent is no longer a consideration, as he interprets the badger's ceaseless cage-circling as it searches for an escape to be madness caused by the enclosure: it 'had apparently gone out of its mind' (Carter 1970: 6). He frees the badger – believing this act to be 'the most important thing in the world' (Carter 1970: 54), thus setting an elevated level of importance on this ethical concern and blowing the dilemma out of proportion – but deliberates over whether he and his associate Kay acted in the "right" manner. While Kay raises concerns about the badger being killed – either by starvation or by being run over – Joseph sets a precedence on the animal's emancipation: 'whatever happens to it, at least it is free' (Carter 1970: 60). Joseph interprets Kay's sigh as voicing his uncertainty about whether 'they had done the right thing', leading Joseph toward a moral dilemma, acknowledging that it would be 'ironic' for the badger to be killed upon its liberation, making him feel 'empty, unsure' (Carter 1970: 60). Joseph later comes to the vague decision that 'perhaps Kay was right and we should not have let out the badger, that perhaps the badger was no longer fit for the outside world where people like you [Anne] thought he would bite' (Carter 1970: 124). Although Joseph regards ideas of right and wrong to be categorical and absolute rather than

on a continuum and relative – he focuses on 'the right thing' – he has not conclusively decided what the appropriate moral act is; he has not set his own terms on this yet. By focusing on the potential consequences of an act rather than the act in itself, Carter voices a resistance towards Kantian ethics and hints that a utilitarian discussion of morality – the anticipated results – also have a role. Carter suggests that a consideration of whether freeing the badger has a positive outcome (liberation) or negative outcome (death) also needs to be part of the moral decision.

While on this occasion Joseph acted without establishing the consequences, in other circumstances Joseph uses the avoidance tactic instead; his act is to do nothing. When a dog steals Sunny the beggar's cap, for instance, and Joseph steps forward to retrieve it and the dog runs away, Joseph, 'faced with a simple moral situation, dodged it, as he knew, to his shame, he would' (Carter 1970: 9). Joseph goes on to reflect that 'he was not going to perform this simple act of comfort for an old man because a miserable anger filled him with weary boredom' (Carter 1970: 9). Here, Joseph recognises the consequences of his potential action – comfort – rather than considering whether it is his duty to act in this way, or contemplating whether the act is good *per se*, once again showing an opposition to Kantian ethics, although he does not act at all. The novel ends by withholding details about another of Joseph's actions: giving away kittens. His cat has had another litter of five kittens, but the novel does not reveal whether Joseph keeps them this time, or gives them away again. A shift in Joseph's moral system, however, is implied towards the end of the narrative, as the protagonist declares, 'I'm going to throw away my book of facts' (Carter 1970: 140). This intention suggests that Joseph is turning away from stable ideas and the rigid notions of what is right and wrong according to Kant, and moving towards a more fluid moral philosophy. While he had already dismissed Kantian ideals of universal morality and acts being good or bad *per se*, the novel ends by rejecting an absolute system of right and wrong as well, thus enabling a total repudiation of Kantian ethics. As Joseph had previously relied on facts to provide stability, the implication is that either he no longer requires such stability, or that the eradication of facts means that an unstable world is on the horizon; the 'crumbling dome' is no longer being held up (Carter 1970: 3).

In *Shadow Dance*, on the other hand, the moral focus is on Morris's guilt which he experiences when he retrospectively evaluates his actions, or neglected actions, and ponders how things would be better if he had carried out his duties. Carter repetitively discusses obligations in the novel, evidencing an interest in deontological ethics – the role of duties in morality – a key part of Kant's philosophy. For instance, Morris considers that 'he thought he

ought, in decency, to burn up all the pictures' of Ghislaine naked (Carter 1995: 17); Edna wonders 'if she "ought to tell" Oscar's wife' (Carter 1995: 47) about Oscar's attempt at sexual infidelity with her; and Morris says that 'Honeybuzzard slipped like a slim, blond porpoise through potential nets of obligation and affection' (Carter 1995: 34), and thus does not base his acts on a sense of duty. While notions of duty predominantly haunt Morris, his wife Edna also acts out of obligation; she goes to see Ghislaine in hospital, saying 'I thought I ought to' (Carter 1995: 95). Edna explicitly aligns morality with religion, unlike any of the other characters in the Bristol trilogy, saying she wants to care for Ghislaine because it 'is what Christians call charity' (Carter 1995: 52) – it is, in essence, absolutely the "right" thing to do according to Christian morals. (I return to the role of religion when I discuss Sade later in this chapter).

Although Morris feels guilty for not carrying out what he considers to be his duty, the fact that this is retrospective and that he thinks he did the "wrong" thing based on the consequences experienced by women – Ghislaine and Henry Glass's unnamed wife – suggest that, contra Kant, Morris does not regard acts to be right or wrong in themselves; rather, morality is determined by consequences. The turmoil that Morris experiences because of his 'guilty fear' (Carter 1995: 39) that Honeybuzzard's attack on Ghislaine and the related suicide of Henry Glass's wife are his fault begins with Morris reflecting on his own moral failings before considering the consequences for others. He tells himself 'I'm not responsible for what Honey did' (Carter 1995: 37) but cannot override the guilt he feels. The novel traces Morris's moral unrest, from coming to terms with Honey's attack on Ghislaine, believing that he is in some part responsible for Honey's actions because he told Honey to teach Ghislaine a lesson, to regretting his response, to seeing the scarred Ghislaine and acknowledging that he could have prevented Mrs Glass's suicide by taking Ghislaine home. Because Mrs Glass's understanding of English was poor, she misunderstood what happened to Ghislaine, and believed that her husband had scarred Ghislaine and killed herself on this basis, ending the life of her unborn baby as well. Morris reflects:

> if only he had taken the girl home, as he had afterwards thought he *ought to do*, and snugged her up safe so that she would never have gone, despairing, to Henry Glass. In the dimension where things were done that *ought to be* done, vast, silent Mrs Glass was at that very minute stirring the supper soup. (Carter 1995: 84 – emphasis mine)

While this highlights Morris's sense of moral duty and a neglect of what he 'ought' to have done, Morris, like Joseph and Lee after him, does not strictly follow a Kantian system of ethics. Morris does not think that he should have taken Ghislaine home because this was a

categorical imperative – absolutely and universally the right thing to do. Rather, based on the arguably unpredictable consequences of not taking Ghislaine home – Mrs Glass's suicide and the impact on Henry Glass – Morris regrets not carrying out what he retrospectively believes to have been his obligation. His imagining of an alternative moral universe in which Mrs Glass is carrying out a domestic role similarly indicates that Morris is focused on consequences rather than actions themselves.

That said, at the end of the novel Morris feels that he has a duty to look after Honey, despite discovering that Honey has brutally killed Ghislaine and knowing that Emily is pregnant with 'a murderer's baby' (Carter 1995: 179). Emily wants to call the police to report Honey's crime saying 'we must get things straight. It is only right. For my baby's sake', but Morris 'cannot betray' Honey (Carter 1995: 180-181). Morris prioritises his duty to his friend over the consequences of giving Honey free reign in the public domain by not contacting the police, although the novel ends without revealing whether Morris later regrets this decision, as the repercussions are not disclosed. Thus, similarly to *Love*, the protagonists in *Shadow Dance* and *Several Perceptions* face moral dilemmas – Joseph does not know what to do with his kittens and avoids simple moral situations like retrieving a beggar's stolen cap, while Morris experiences 'warring forces' pulling him in opposite directions (Carter 1995: 181) when it comes to deciding what to do about Honey at the end of the novel, and is in turmoil about not taking Ghislaine home as this could have saved two lives – Mrs Glass's and her child's. Thus, while Joseph is an armchair moral philosopher and has no sense of proportion when it comes to moral dilemmas, as he treats all issues – from murder, to a cap being stolen, to freeing a badger – with the same clinical detachment, Morris is concerned with more important ethical questions, such as murder, abuse, and suicide, and is characterised by guilt for "letting" these happen, and for deliberating over where his duties lie.

Like Lee, then, both Joseph and Morris's moral philosophies challenge Kantian ethics, although not as explicitly. Morris, in resemblance to Lee, dwells on the notion of duty, although Morris considers the implications of not following duties for other people, while Lee comes to prioritise his own happiness over his obligation to Annabel. The three protagonists are tormented by moral dilemmas and interrogate what the "right" thing to do is, although a rigid moral binary system is more explicitly evidenced by Joseph and Lee, especially the latter. In these three novels, then, male characters voice Carter's interest in moral issues and are tortured by the range of ethical dilemmas they face, illustrating Carter's position as a 'male impersonator' (Carter 1998b: 38) in her early work. What is more, between the three leading male characters in the Bristol trilogy, Carter disrupts the four main

intertwined elements of Kant's categorical imperative that characterise his ethical system. Firstly, she challenges an absolute system of morality via her depiction of Joseph's rejection of facts and the ajar gate in *Love*. She also overturns the concept that morality is universal using Lee's experience of conflicting duties and Joseph's need to establish his own moral terms. Morality is shown to be subjective rather than objective, contra Kant, as the consequences of actions are also considered, particularly by Joseph and Morris. Finally, Carter interrogates deontology – the role of duties. She demonstrates that where one's duties lie is not common sense, as Kant asserts, showing that duties can clash, and provides examples of where two opposing duties cannot be fulfilled, suggesting, via her depiction of Lee and Annabel, that "duty" and "good" or "right" do not always go hand in hand. In sum, in the Bristol trilogy as a whole, Carter denigrates Kantian thought. She explicating signals Kant's influence in *Love*, and challenges the components of his moral system in *Shadow Dance* and *Several Perceptions*, such as absolute ethical ideas or the role of duty. She may have had Kant in mind for the first two instalments, particularly in light of her allusion to Joseph's Freudian slip when it comes to spelling Kant's name, and her reading of Ewing's *Ethics*; if not, she is engaging with the same ideas as Kant before researching his ethics.

Carter and Sadeian Morality: *The Sadeian Woman* and *Doctor Hoffman*

Carter's interest in morality, however, is not restricted to the 1960s. On the contrary, Carter discusses this theme in many of her interviews of the 1970s and 80s, and frequently cites an indebtedness to the infamous Marquis de Sade when talking about this topic. In interview with John Haffenden in 1985, for instance, she states that 'the novel has a moral function' if the definition of "moral" refers to 'the way people behave' rather than to 'private morality', the latter of which Carter says is 'no concern of mine' (Carter to Haffenden 1985: 96). She goes on to specify that 'the moral function should not be hortatory in any way – telling people how to behave. I would see it as a moral compunction to explicate and to find out about things. I suppose I would regard curiosity as a moral function' (Carter to Haffenden 1985: 96). In this discussion, Carter reveals a lot about her authorial intentions. She considers that novels have a 'moral function' that allows them to portray behaviour and analyse acts or theories, and while this can advise readers, she chastises the idea of authors taking on pedagogical or dictatorial roles in their fiction. Instead, 'curiosity' is the 'moral function' that she upholds – exposing the truth, and demythologising ideologies. She similarly talks about morality in an interview with Ronald Bell, telling him that she uses the term '"morality" in the widest sense' to mean: 'what kind of things are we alive for? What should human beings

do with themselves? And simple ethical concepts like "right", "wrong", "truth", and "justice"' (Carter to Bell 1973: 36 – original emphasis).

These broad ideas resurface in other interviews, as well as in Carter's writing. She told Helen Cagney Watts, for example, that she is 'very interested in justice; you can do more with legislation than people seem to believe' (Carter to Cagney Watts 1985: 163). This concern is particularly concentrated on gender inequalities – how justice differs between men and women, and how definitions of right and wrong vary according to sex – explicitly noting that 'feminism and socialism are indivisable [sic]' (Carter to Cagney Watts 1985: 163). These discussions relate to Carter's extensive reading of Sade. She recognises that her and Sade 'operate in the same area of European obsessions, like sex and death and politics, and religion' (Carter to Bedford 1977: unpaginated), and claims that she 'was initially, of course, very, very sympathetic to Sade, because of his complete, his proselytizing and vigorous atheism, which I still think is the most honourable course a human person can take in the face of religion' (Carter to Appignanesi 1987: unpaginated).

While religion comprises one theme that Carter and Sade both discuss and agree upon, they have many other shared interests, with one of these being criminality and deviance, particularly in relation to sex. In her journals Carter notes that 'anyone with a serious int[erest]. in sex and pol[itics]. is led, sooner or later, to Sade', implying that this inspired her reading of him (Carter 1972 Journal MS88899/1/101: unpaginated).[4] She continues to explain, reinforcing the link between her and Sade, that 'because his desires run counter to the law – the exercise of his sexuality turned him into a crim[inal]. [therefore] he questioned [the] nature of law itself and found it wanting – I grew up being told pre-mar[ital]. sex [...] was a moral crime' (Carter 1972 Journal MS88899/1/101: unpaginated). Like Sade, Carter interrogates how social norms, laws, and religion, determine morality, and says, in relation to Sade, 'what I would really like to do if I had the intellectual energy would be a book about the morality of cruelty' (Carter to Sage 1977: 57).

In her Introduction to *Wayward Girls and Wicked Women* (1986), Carter talks about how definitions of morality are informed by sex. She claims:

> on the whole, morality as regards woman has nothing to do with ethics; it means sexual morality and nothing but sexual morality. To be a wayward girl usually has something to do with pre-marital sex; to be a wicked woman has something to do with adultery. This means it is far easier for a woman to lead a blameless

[4] The contents of this journal contradict the date on the library catalogue system of 1972, as most of the content breaches 1971 and 1972, but she also discusses John Maynard's 1984 text *Charlotte Brontë and Sexuality*, making the journal impossible to accurately date.

> life than it is for a man; all she has to do is to avoid sexual intercourse like the plague. What hypocrisy! (Carter 1986: x)

Immoral behaviour for women corresponds to sexual deviance, breaking the established norms of sexuality – sex before marriage, or sexual infidelity. The double standard Carter hints at is that such behaviour is acceptable for men. She does not, however, talk about the inequalities for women without discussing the implications for men too – she says that this system makes being considered moral 'easier' for women. Nevertheless, she notes that women do not have the same opportunities as men to commit crimes, and to be considered immoral in this legal sense: 'very few of the women in these stories are guilty of criminal acts', she notes, 'although all of them have spirit and one or two of them, to my mind, are, or have the potential to be, *really* evil' (Carter 1986: ix – original emphasis). Carter pinpoints some commendable aspects of Sade's literature in this respect, as he rebels against societal definitions of "good" women and puts forward pro-abortion arguments, which Carter considers to be central to equal rights for women. As she told Sage:

> Sade's ideas about women, when he's not being mad and ironic and satirical, are very progressive for the time, and indeed are still quite progressive. He did think it was awful to hang women for procuring abortions, which they did at the time – inconceivably wicked, almost as wicked as getting pregnant... But he could understand that sometimes that happened to them in an involuntary fashion, and they needed an abortion. (Carter to Sage 1977: 57)

As, in Simone de Beauvoir's words, 'a great moralist' (Beauvoir 1990: 40), Sade also rejects a universal notion of morality, putting forward a theory of cultural relativism instead, which argues that 'there is no such thing as universal truth in ethics; there are only the various cultural codes, and nothing more' (Rachels 1999: 22). Timo Airaksinen discusses the extensive comparative anthropology that Sade undertakes to illustrate this point, saying he does this 'in a bewildering manner' (Airaksinen 1995: 12). As her refusal to accept Kant's system of absolute, universal, objective morality implies, Carter's writing has this in common with Sade, too, as she told Haffenden:

> in my work I keep on saying, in what I think is the nicest way, that women are people too, and that everything is relative – you see the world differently from different places. You cannot make any statements which are universally true, especially perhaps in the context of Britain. Everything is determined by different circumstances, and the circumstances of women are different from those of men. (Carter to Haffenden 1984: 38)

While I have not discussed Sade's writing in any detail so far, suffice to say that this overview establishes the main, overlapping themes of Carter's discussions about morality: the

role of religion; legislation, criminality and deviance; gender differences; and relativism – and how these topics demonstrate that Carter shares some common ground with Sade. This section argues that in *The Sadeian Woman*, as well as the Sadeian novel *Doctor Hoffman*, Carter interrogates these moral concerns that continued to preoccupy her after her 'decade-long argument' with Sade in the 1970s (Simpson 2006: xi). Moreover, she analyses sadism – a term named after Sade that refers to gaining pleasure from 'inflicting unwanted pain and humiliation on the helpless' – illustrating her curiosity and desire to explicate what she calls the 'morality of the pervert' (Carter 1972 Journal MS88899/1/101: unpaginated), particularly in relation to utilitarian or hedonistic notions of pleasure and pain, where the two feelings are distinct rather than overlapping. To date, Carter's interaction with Sade has not been read in this light, with critical discussions focusing on Sade the pornographer rather than Sade the (moral) philosopher, although I go on to unpick this crude distinction and show that his pornography and philosophy are intertwined. In this light, I now turn to situating Sade in this philosophical context and placing my analysis of Carter and Sade within the wider body of criticism on this topic.

Criticism on Carter pinpoints Sade as one of the most important and consistent intertexts for her writing, with Mary Russo saying he is 'perhaps the most striking influence throughout Carter's work' (Russo 2000: 138) and Rebecca Munford claiming that 'the Marquis de Sade is perhaps the most significant – and certainly the most notorious – of Carter's literary influences' (Munford 2013: 14). Carter's own words support this interpretation, as she says, upon being asked about her interest in sexuality and power, that 'it has been my reading of the Marquis de Sade that has probably had more impact; it is the text on sexuality and power, especially his investigation of how certain sorts of human contact destroy particular types of power relations' (Carter to Cagney Watts 1985: 162). I agree with this assessment, for the same reason as Munford: 'Carter's unpublished reading journals and notebooks are similarly shot through with commentary on and translated lines from Sade's work' (Munford 2013: 14). As evidenced by her unpublished notes, Sade was arguably *the* most influential writer for Carter, with her reading of Sade consistently reappearing in her journals from 1970 onwards, and displaying a vast knowledge of Sade, including his novels, criticism on his writing, and biographies of the infamous figure. Her initial reading of Sade dates to 1970 and her discovery of his writing in Japan. According to her notes, Carter began thinking about writing an essay on Sade in 1971, making the note 'Title for de Sade thesis: "De Sade – the culmination of the enlightenment"' (Carter 1969-70 Journal MS88899/1/93: unpaginated). As well as illustrating that Carter had what turned out to be *The Sadeian*

Woman in mind for at least eight years, this provisional title suggests that Carter's research on Sade was intended to be more than a thesis on pornography and power: it was to be about knowledge and thinking – Sade as an enlightenment philosopher – instead, or as well. While Carter includes Sade's *Oeuvres Complètes* in the bibliography for *The Sadeian Woman*, a sixteen-volume edition, she also cites the English Grove Press editions of *Justine, Philosophy in the Bedroom, & Other Writings*; *Juliette*; and *The Hundred and Twenty Days at Sodom*: I use Grove Press translations of the first two texts, and while I do not discuss the same copy of *The One Hundred and Twenty Days*, I use an Arrow Books publication from the same translators: Austryn Wainhouse and Richard Seaver.[5]

Carter describes her Sadeian project as gargantuan, telling Bedford that she 'must have done something awful in a previous life to have embarked on this impossible task. It's like emptying the sea with a cup with a hole in it' (Carter to Bedford 1977: unpaginated). Having undertaken research on Sade, I can empathise with this. Not only are Sade's works voluminous, with *Juliette* (1797), for instance, having just under 1,200 pages, but they are erratic – for Airaksinen, 'the viability of his ethics is questionable, since it is so inconsistent' (Airaksinen 1995: 148) – and tiresome: 'the political and philosophical speeches are insufferably repetitive and inordinately long [in *Juliette*], even by the standard of de Sade's earlier books' (Thomas 1993: 289). Sade's biography is vague and often speculative; his 'facts are fiction' (Airaksinen 1995: 44), adding to this difficulty. Moreover, some of his texts were banned, and some novels have a number of versions, such as *Justine*, a text that Sade also disowned on the basis of it being 'too immoral' (Sade in Seaver and Wainhouse 1965: 449). Other works, such as *The One Hundred and Twenty Days* (1785), are incomplete. Nevertheless, Carter persisted with her 'impossible task', to, I argue, explicate Sade's moral philosophy in broad terms, discussing concepts of right and wrong in line with the justice system and prevailing religious codes.

Carter's time in Japan is characterised by wide-ranging Sadeian research. In terms of his fiction, she read *Juliette* and *The One Hundred and Twenty Days*, particularly focusing on the variety of tortures detailed in the latter (Carter 1969-70 Journal MS88899/1/93: unpaginated). She also consulted Sade's essay 'Reflections on the Novel'[6] (1800): the journals suggests that her first encounter with this text was second-hand, citing Gilbert Lèly's biography on Sade rather than the essay itself (Carter 1969-70 Journal MS88899/1/93:

[5] The title has a different translation to the one Carter provides, however: *The One Hundred and Twenty Days of Sodom*. Some of the translations Carter uses are not the same in the Grove Press editions I consult by the same translators.

[6] This piece is sometimes referred to as 'Essay on the Novel'.

unpaginated; Lély 1961: 407), although she does go on to quote from this piece directly (Carter 1969-70 Journal MS88899/1/93: unpaginated; Sade 1990: 107). Throughout the rest of this decade and beyond, Carter's Sadeian research accelerated, including most of his published work. In 1972-73 she read *Philosophy in the Bedroom* (1795), particularly focusing on 'Yet Another Effort, Frenchmen, If You Would Become Republicans', a philosophical pamphlet which is part of the fifth dialogue (Carter 1972 Journal MS88899/1/94: 197; Carter 1973 Journal MS88899/1/95: unpaginated). She also read *Justine* (1791) in the 1970s; there are three versions of Justine's life, but it is this version that I, like Carter, discuss. Throughout this decade, though, Carter kept returning to *Juliette*, the Sadeian text to which she seems most attracted. Her 1973-76 journal is punctuated with notes on this novel, particularly in the years 1973-74 (Carter 1973 Journal MS88899/1/95: unpaginated), and the same can be said for the 1977-79 notepad, where some quotations from *Juliette* comprise plans for her 1984 novel *Nights at the Circus* (Carter 1977 Journal MS88899/1/96: unpaginated).

Tellingly, Carter also anticipated using an extract from *Juliette* for an epigraph for *Adele*, a novel she started planning in the late 1980s/early 1990s: 'For *Adele*: quotation for title page - "Looking at Etna one day, with its breast vomiting forth flames, I wanted to be this famous volcano"' (Carter 1989-91 Journal MS88899/1/99: unpaginated). This plan provides an insight into Carter's interests towards the end of her life, and hints at what the novel after *Wise Children* (1991) may have been like. This imagery, as Ronald Hayman notes, suggests that 'orgasms are volcanic eruptions' (Hayman 2003: 204), and a monk called Jérome identifies with the climactic connotations. This implies that sexual desire was a planned theme for *Adele*, and raises the question: to whom does this epigraph refer? Does Carter envisage Adele speaking these words, and thus ventriloquising the words of one of Sade's (male) monks? Susannah Clapp's brief discussion of Carter's synopsis for this novel suggests that Carter's reimagining of Adele, Jane Eyre's stepdaughter, mirrors Sade's Juliette, who gets pleasure from seeing others suffer, and seduces and commits incest with her father: 'Adele was going to fall in love with a schoolteacher, seduce her own father and watch her mother being guillotined' (Clapp 2006: unpaginated). A detailed discussion of *Adele* is not my concern here; I just wish to note that the epigraph reinforces Sade's ongoing influence on Carter, and more precisely, Carter's enduring interest in *Juliette* and its eponymous heroine.

Carter also expanded her reading of secondary sources on Sade in the 1970s, making notes on Pierre Klossowski's *Sade My Neighbour* (first published in French in 1947) and Jacques Lacan's essay 'Kant avec Sade' (1963) in 1972-73 (Carter 1972 Journal

MS88899/1/94: 108 and 124) as well as Jean Paulhan's 'The Marquis de Sade and His Accomplice' and 'Sade' by Maurice Blanchot in 1973-74 (Carter 1973 Journal MS88899/1/95: unpaginated), both of which are collected in the same volume as *Justine* and *Philosophy in the Bedroom.* In 1973 she also read Beauvoir's 'Must we Burn Sade?', but indicates that these notes are part of her plans for *Nights at the Circus* rather than *The Sadeian Woman*, as they fall under 'Manifesto for Year One' headings (Carter 1973 Journal MS88899/1/95: unpaginated). Later, in 1977-78, Carter consulted Roland Barthes's *Sade, Fourier, Loyola* (Carter 1977 Journal MS88899/1/96: unpaginated), Richard Miller's 1977 translation according to the bibliography of *The Sadeian Woman* (Carter 2009: 179). Sade is the intertext, therefore, that Carter dedicates the most research to, in terms of both the breadth of her secondary reading as well as the two decade time span that Sade overshadows.

Carter's engagement with Sade is by no means an original discussion to have, with most monographs on Carter having a chapter or sub-section dedicated to *The Sadeian Woman*, and numerous journal articles and book chapters discuss this topic. It is not my intention to list these here; instead, I summarise the main threads that critics have concentrated on to date and situate the new angle of my work within this context. To begin with, Sade's impact on Carter's fiction is frequently noted and discussed, mainly in relation to *The Bloody Chamber* (1979) and *Doctor Hoffman*, but also for *The Passion of New Eve* (1977) and *Nights at the Circus.* As Carter wrote or worked on these novels or short stories at the same time as researching *The Sadeian Woman*, this is not surprising. In relation to the fairy tales in *The Bloody Chamber*, Carter told Bedford, 'I did a version of "Bluebeard" a few weeks ago which did actually manage to get in most of de Sade, which pleased me' (Carter to Bedford 1977: unpaginated), although the title story to which Carter refers here is not the only one in this collection to '[meld] fairy tale and pornography in a deliberately provocative exercise' (Gamble 2008: 23).[7] It is similarly well-noted that Tristessa's full name in *New Eve* – Tristessa de St. Ange – corresponds to the name of the instructor in *Philosophy in the Bedroom*, Madame de Saint-Ange,[8] and that the 'double drag' wedding between Tristessa and Zero (Carter 2009b: 129) mirrors a similar scene that Juliette and Noirceuil conduct in

[7] For more discussions on Sade and *The Bloody Chamber* see: Duncker 1984, Sheets 1998, Makinen 2000, Simpson 2006, Sage 2007, and Atwood 2007.
[8] See (Schmidt 1989: 64).

Juliette (Sade 1968: 1175), a 'gross parody of marriage' that Carter explicitly scrutinises in *The Sadeian Woman* (Carter 2009: 113).[9]

Munford, however, argues that 'Sadeian allusions [...] have a peculiarly powerful presence in *The Infernal Desire Machines of Doctor Hoffman*' (Munford 2013: 46). The body of criticism on this influence is quite substantial, on the whole discussing the figure of the Count in relation to Sade and the space of The House of Anonymity in Sadeian terms.[10] It is well-documented that the citation written on a piece of paper in Albertina's pocket is from Sade's *oeuvre*, particularly as Carter states that it is a 'quotation from de Sade' (Carter 2010: 111). More specifically, the words 'my passions, concentrated on a single point, resemble the rays of a sun assembled by a magnifying glass; they immediately set fire to whatever object they find in their way' (Carter 2010: 111) are taken from *Juliette* (Sade 1968: 186).[11] Likewise, the fact that Doctor Hoffman's castle that Desiderio sees in the peep-show and describes as having 'as many torture chambers as the Château of Silling' (Carter 2010: 45) is a reference to the location of *The One Hundred and Twenty Days* has been noted by many critics.

The figure of the Count is repeatedly said to characterise Sade, with Peach, for example, saying that 'the Count and his servant, Lafleur, are modelled on the Marquis de Sade and his valet, Latour' (Peach 2009: 97). Lafleur is also the name of a servant in *Philosophy in the Bedroom*, but there is another more nuanced dimension to this relationship which has to date been unacknowledged. Sade has a notorious reputation, but one scandal for which there is supporting evidence is that of the Marseilles Affair, labelled the 'affair of the poisoned sweets' by Geoffrey Gorer (Gorer 1964: 31); Carter includes a brief synopsis of this incident in her Polemical Preface to *The Sadeian Woman* (Carter 2009: 34). Sade and Latour had an orgy with four girls, and gave them sweets soaked in cantharides with the intention of causing flatulence; they also whipped the girls and voiced a desire to sodomise them, although whether this occurred is unknown as sodomy was an offence punishable by death at the time in France.[12] The significance of this event is that during the sexual activity Sade 'chose to be addressed as La Fleur, and called Latour Monsieur le Marquis' (Gorer 1964: 31);

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[9] For more on *New Eve* and *The Sadeian Woman* see Makinen 1997, who argues that both texts 'deliberately critique what was the dominant Anglo-American feminist dichotomy of male aggressors and female victims' (Makinen 1997: 150).

[10] As well as Munford and Peach, Robinson (1991) discusses *Doctor Hoffman* and Sade in detail.

[11] In the Grove Press translation the quotation is: 'concentrated upon a single point, my passions are like the sun's rays a magnifying lens collects into focus: they straightway cinder the object in their path'. The translation Carter opts for is different, but not her own, as other critics like Beauvoir have the same translation as Carter (Beauvoir 1990: 30).

[12] For more detail about this scandal see Lély 1961: 116-121, or Gorer 1964: 31-32.

Lély similarly notes this, but his account is slightly different, saying 'Latour addressed [Sade] as *Lafleur*' (Lély 1961: 119 – original emphasis). Thus, Carter naming the Count's valet Lafleur in *Doctor Hoffman* is not just an alliterative nod to Sade's manservant Latour; in fact, this shows that she is engaging with the complexities of Sade and Latour's relationship and evidencing her vast reading of Sadeian criticism and biographies. The fluidity of identities that Sade and Latour demonstrate – and Carter's allusion to this by naming the valet Lafleur – feeds into the wider theme of unstable identities that dominates discussions of *Doctor Hoffman*; Desiderio's name and identity undergo a series of changes, and Albertina appears in a number of ruses, one being Lafleur, whom the Count caresses (Carter 2010: 143). As a starting point, this insight illustrates Carter's perceptive reading of Sade and her application of this research in relation to wider themes – the rest of this chapter furthers this argument.

As this overview demonstrates, criticism on Carter and Sade, almost without exception, focuses on Sade as a pornographer: *The Sadeian Woman* is, according to Lindsey Tucker, a 'full-length study on pornography' (Tucker 1998: 2). This polemic engendered controversy and conflicting opinions, but I acknowledge rather than evaluate these arguments here.[13] As well as focusing on how Sade's work as a pornographer is apparent in Carter's fiction, discussions often focus on Sade's (and Carter's) depiction of mother-daughter relationships; Meaney, Jouve, and Munford (2013) are a few examples of this. Indeed, Carter acknowledges this as *a* key theme in Sade's work – 'not one of his central platforms, but one of his sideshows is the animosity and antagonism between mothers and daughters, daughters and mothers' (Carter to Appignanesi 1987: unpaginated). Likewise, I agree that this is a 'sideshow' – as evidenced by Carter's synopsis of her rewriting of *Jane Eyre* – and argue that morality, defined in Carter's broad terms, is 'one of his central platforms' that Carter also explicates. Carter's discussion of Sade in *The Sadeian Woman* flags up that morality and philosophy are central to his writing. She portrays Sade as a potential 'moral pornographer' (Carter 2009: 22) and highlights the inseparability of his philosophy and pornography saying that he is a 'philosophical pornographer' (Carter 2009: 64). Carter explicitly situates her argument in the context of Sade as a moral thinker, noting Sade's intellectual proficiency. In this light, Gorer's words about Sade could quite easily be mistaken for a description of Carter's erudition:

> when dealing with a thinker so widely read, so eclectic and at the same time so original as de Sade it is difficult to speak of masters or predecessors. The number of authors he quotes is prodigious, ranging through all classical and

[13] See Dworkin 1981, Keenan 2000, and Rubinson 2000, as just three examples.

> modern literature from Rousseau and Hobbes to the Bible, from Herodotus and the Christian Fathers to the travels of Captain Cook, Thomas More and the Encyclopedists. (Gorer 1964: 84)

Carter hints at Sade's erudition – referring the reader to Lély's biography for a more comprehensive account – saying that Sade's library included 'the complete works of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Princess of Cleves*, *Don Quixote* and the 1785 edition of Voltaire in eighty-nine volumes' (Carter 2009: 40). She goes on to argue that 'it is of this world of reason that Sade produces a critique in the guise of a pornographic vision', saying that his picaresque fiction provides a 'moral critique of his own youth' (Carter 2009: 40). Carter therefore situates Sade as an enlightenment thinker in her Polemical Preface, mirroring Airaksinen's later argument that 'Sade is actually a philosopher in disguise' (Airaksinen 1995: 5). This places philosophy/morality as Sade's primary concern, a concern masked by erotic action; his 'aims are philosophical' while his 'technique is literary' (Airaksinen 1995: 44).

In this sense, Carter acknowledges that Sade's pornography contains a philosophical doctrine, a moral tenet. While the impact of Sade's work on women is a primary concern for Carter – how definitions of good and bad or right and wrong are related to sex – it is limiting to read *The Sadeian Woman* in this light alone. Carter takes 'the wealth of philosophically pornographic material about women that Sade provides' as her '*starting point*', saying that the essay is 'an exercise of the lateral imagination' (Carter 2009: 42 – emphasis mine). Thus, she is raising broader questions about pleasure, crime, deviance, the law, societal norms, vices and virtues, moral relativity versus absolute ethics, religion, nature, myth, and the 'morality of the pervert' (Carter 1972 Journal MS88899/1/101: unpaginated). While previous criticism on Carter and Sade – with the recent exception of Munford's *Decadent Daughters and Monstrous Mothers: Angela Carter and European Gothic* (2013) – does not directly engage with or cite Sade's novels, restricting themselves to Carter's interpretation, I discuss Carter's interaction with Sade by analysing her work – mainly *The Sadeian Woman* and *Doctor Hoffman* – with reference to Sade's writing itself.

To use Carter's 'emptying the sea with a cup with a hole in it' image, there are several potential avenues to explore in the context of Sade as a moral philosopher, and many of these paths, or holes, have to be sealed. As this is the first full-length discussion of Sade in a philosophical context, I have decided to keep the same holes open as Carter, and to explore the same territory as her, doing so through the moral philosophical lens rather than a pornographic one. Thus, I examine the scenes that Carter concentrates the most on in *The*

Sadeian Woman and *Doctor Hoffman*, as well as in her journals. These are: the band of thieves in *Justine*; Justine's time at the Saint Mary-in-the-Wood Benedictine monastery, which Carter calls 'the novel's largest set-piece' (Carter 2009: 48); Juliette's initiation into the Sodality of the Friends of Crime; the encounter with the cannibal giant Minski in *Juliette*; and the political pamphlet included in the fifth dialogue in *Philosophy in the Bedroom*, 'Yet Another Effort, Frenchmen'. These 'set-piece[s]' discuss overlapping themes including: the morality of stealing and the role of wealth and class; the importance of following nature's laws and natural inclinations rather than a country's artificial justice system; moral relativity; crime in relation to vice and virtue; religion and morality; hedonistic pleasure-seeking (demonstrating a return to utilitarian principles that she began to think about in the early 1960s); and the importance of rationality, thus encompassing the broad 'simple ethical concepts like "right", "wrong", "truth", and "justice"' that Carter expounds (Carter to Bell 1973: 36). Sade's *oeuvre* – characterised by its repetitiveness – repeatedly elucidates these issues, so while I acknowledge that I am only scratching the surface by focusing on a select number of Sadeian scenes, thematically I cover many of Sade and Carter's primary preoccupations. I examine most of these episodes and concerns in relation to *The Sadeian Woman*; the character of Minski in *Juliette* is discussed more in the context of *Doctor Hoffman*, as I argue that both the Count and the Chief in this novel – the 'twins' – are based on him.

To start with, it is worth clarifying the terms 'libertine' and 'pervert', both of which apply to Sade, and both of which position him as a philosopher. A libertine is defined as someone 'who leads an immoral life and is mainly interested in sexual pleasure', and is 'a freethinker especially in religious matters' (Merriam-Webster), who does not follow conventions or moral norms. While previous criticism has focused mainly on the sexual element of this mind-set, libertinage is a philosophy – a philosophy that promotes a freedom from dominant systems, whether these codes are religious, legal, or related to moral expectations. As Seaver and Wainhouse note, the term 'libertine' 'derives from the Latin *liber*: "free" – an exceptional man of exceptional penchants, passions, and ideas' (Seaver and Wainhouse 1965: xiv) – although Sade does not restrict libertinage to males. Sade wanted to be free from the constructs of the law, religion, and consequently morality, and be free to act upon his sexual desires without being punished, in the form of imprisonment or death. As he asserts, 'I am a libertine, but I am neither *a criminal* nor *a murderer*' (Sade's 1781 letter to Madame de Sade in Seaver and Wainhouse 1965: xiv – original emphasis). Nevertheless, Sade did not have the liberty to act as he desired and was imprisoned or institutionalised for

much of his adult life, providing the catalyst for his writing "career" – 'societies do not cater to strange tastes; they condemn them' (Seaver and Wainhouse 1965: xv). When given the option to regain his freedom on the condition that he would suppress his desires and restrain his sexual activity, he refused, writing to his wife to say:

> if then, as you tell me, they are willing to restore my liberty if I am willing to pay for it by sacrifice of my principles or my tastes, we may bid one another an eternal adieu, for rather than part with those, I would sacrifice a thousand lives and a thousand liberties, if I had them. (Sade 1965c: ix)

Sade wrote most of his work in prison, where, ironically, he had the opportunity to express his libertine philosophy and critique the restrictions of legal systems, religions, and moral norms – although his writing was banned for some time, it is now freely available, meaning that in many ways prison gave Sade the freedom to circulate his ideas for centuries to come. While much of his writing is categorised as pornographic fiction, this, as Carter notes, provides a guise for his philosophical tenets. In this light, Sade proclaims, 'I myself am a philosopher; everyone acquainted with me will certify that I consider philosophy my profession and my glory' (Sade 1965d: 153), although admittedly he says this in the same piece in which he claims he did not write *Justine*. Thus, the term 'pervert' that is frequently linked to Sade does not just refer to his "abnormal" or "unacceptable" sexual tastes – labelled as such according to the intertwined legal, religious, and moral systems; it encapsulates his perversion of the current French legal system, Christianity, and the related moral expectations. It encompasses his deviance, whether sexual, philosophical, moral, or legal. Carter interprets Sade's libertinage in this way, talking about the 'morality of the pervert' and noting that 'he questioned [the] nature of law itself and found it wanting'; she pinpoints 'the tension [...] between my freedom and your freedom – if my suffering = your pleasure' (Carter 1972 Journal MS88899/1/101: unpaginated).

One aspect of the law that Sade repeatedly attacks is that it is artificial rather than natural. Sade uses this fact to justify his perverted behaviour. He questions the cultural relativity of the law and morality to highlight that his acts or desires would not be deemed illegal in other countries, and therefore cannot be universally wrong. There is no shortage of libertine characters who put forward this argument. In *Justine*, Dubois, one of the thieves, notes that 'what is called crime in France ceases to be crime two hundred leagues away, that there is no act really considered criminal everywhere upon earth' (Sade 1965b: 696), and the writer of 'Yet Another Effort, Frenchmen' says 'if we traverse the world we will find incest everywhere established' before listing countries where incest is not only legal, but 'smiled upon' (Sade 1965: 324), and citing where murder is accepted and praised (Sade 1965: 333-

335). This is a main feature of Minski's speech in *Juliette* as well, who expounds the relativity of justice, saying of the terms 'just' and 'unjust' that, 'similar to concepts of virtue and vice, they are purely local and geographical' (Sade 1968: 605).

Rather than abiding by the country's legal system, Sade's libertines worship nature and natural laws instead, with his libertine characters proclaiming again and again that if their desires and inclinations exist, they are natural, and therefore should be acted upon. The monk Dom Clément – Sade's libertines are often clergy members or figures of justice, like judges or ministers – from Saint Mary-in-the-Wood, for instance, tells Justine:

> Will it never be understood that there is no variety of taste, however bizarre, however outlandish, however criminal it may be supposed, which does not derive directly from and depend upon the kind of organization we have individually received from Nature? (Sade 1965b: 599)

Likewise, in 'Yet Another Effort, Frenchmen', a 'simple philosopher' is exhorted to 'introduce these new pupils to the inscrutable but wonderful sublimities of Nature' (Sade 1965: 304), and in *Juliette* members of the Sodality of the Friends of Crime consider themselves to be 'above the law because the law is of mortal and artificial contrivance, whereas the Sodality, natural in its origin and obediences, heeds and respects Nature only' (Sade 1968: 418).

As well as being called upon to justify supposedly criminal desires – incest, sodomy, and rape – nature is appealed to to vindicate theft and murder, on the basis that 'no inclinations or tastes can exist in us save the ones we have from Nature' and 'in every instance, what she inspires must be respected by men' (Sade 1965: 326). Dubois advocates stealing because 'Nature has caused us all to be equals born' – this justifies robbing the wealthy, as 'the callousness of the Rich legitimates the bad conduct of the Poor' (Sade 1965b: 481). Carter discusses this aspect of Sadeian philosophy in Kantian terms, saying that 'theft represents the morality of the outlaw' and 'is a moral imperative' central to the 'principle of human equality' gained by wealth redistribution (Carter 2009: 95). Sade's libertines defend murder, too, saying it is merely 'a little organized matter disorganized' in *Juliette* – the molecules that make up a human being are seen as being recycled, 'tossed back into the crucible of Nature who, re-employing the selfsame materials, will cast them into something else': on this basis, Juliette professes, 'where is the wrong in murder?' (Sade 1968: 415). Nature is also cited as having the potential to liberate women's sexual desires – a point that Carter explicitly makes – introducing Sade 'with an exhilarating burst of rhetoric' (Carter 2009: 42) from 'Yet Another Effort, Frenchmen' where the writer champions 'houses

intended for women's libertinage' (Sade 1965: 322) and calls for women to openly talk about their sexual appetite:

> Charming sex, you will be free: just as men do, you shall enjoy all the pleasures that Nature makes your duty, do not withold [sic] yourselves from one. Must the more divine half of mankind be kept in chains by the others? Ah, break those bonds: nature wills it. (Carter 2009: 42)[14]

The Sadeian Woman and Carter's unpublished Sadeian research demonstrate an engagement with Sade's discussion of nature, law, and criminality. Like Sade, Carter highlights the constructedness of social norms, saying for instance that her '"femininity" was created, by means outside my control, and palmed off on me as the real thing' (Carter 1998b: 38). Carter's ongoing deconstruction of essentialist notions of gender – played out most explicitly in *New Eve* – illustrates a rejection of natural or biological explanations in favour of a constructivist stance. The fact that norms and expectations are manufactured does not make them easier to escape; for Carter, 'La Dubois gladly gives Justine up to the law, which is as arbitrary and despotic as any of her other masters' (Carter 2009: 52).

Carter's discussion of these overlapping topics is not confined to gender, though. She interrogates Sade's distinction between natural law and the justice system, and finds that although Sade repeatedly calls for the abolition of the current laws and for them to be replaced by a republican government and the restoration of the natural state, his libertine philosophy in fact *needs* a legal justice system in order to subsist. In a discussion about Sadeian brothels and libertine establishments, she says that 'the Sadeian paradise [...] is a place of exile from the world, a place of imaginary liberty where the ritual perversions of the libertines contain no element of a taboo freely broken but come to dominate their lives, like the rigid rituals of the Catholic church' (Carter 2009: 95). She goes on to note that 'it is like the freedom of the outlaw, which only exists in relation to the law itself' (Carter 2009: 95). Here Carter exposes one of the many contradictions in Sade's writing. By comparing Sadeian 'paradise' to Catholicism, she parodies Sade's devout atheism, for which he is renowned. Carter similarly deconstructs Sade's status as a leader of libertarianism, saying that the libertine institutions he envisions only provide an 'imaginary liberty'. They are not free from the law; instead, Sade's houses of libertinage invert the law, demanding "taboo" activities as

[14] My edition has a different translation: 'O charming sex, you will be free: as do men, you will enjoy all the pleasures of which Nature makes a duty, from not one will you be withheld. Must the diviner half of humankind be laden with irons by the other? Ah, break those irons; Nature wills it' (Sade 1965: 322-323).

though they are legal requirements – such acts 'dominate', are 'ritual', and followed 'rigid[ly]'.

Sade's libertine philosophy therefore 'only exists in relation to the law', relying upon the illegality and immorality of its desires – the prohibition of rape, incest, sodomy, murder and so on – in order to exist. If such crimes were decriminalised, as Sade calls for in 'Yet Another Effort, Frenchmen', saying that they would be 'moral crimes' and 'of total inconsequence' in a republican government where natural laws would rule (Sade 1965: 314-315), the paradoxical implication is that they would no longer be pleasurable for Sadeian libertines. As, in Sade's philosophy, nature does not prohibit these acts, the legal system is a necessity to Sadeian libertinage, and is a foundation for Sadeian pleasures – without the laws, the 'morality of the pervert' that Sade upholds would evaporate: 'Sadean heroes need normative structures in order to create excitement by destroying them; but since such elements are absent from nature, they must invent barriers and pretend that they are real' (Airaksinen 1995: 161).

By representing Sade's version of paradise as an inverted mirror image of the outside world, Carter undermines the 'morality of the pervert', blurring Sade's portrayal of "right" and "wrong" and extinguishing the foundations of his philosophy. Like Airaksinen, Carter – writing two decades earlier – exposes the inconsistencies of Sade's way of thinking. Perversity is, in Airaksinen's words, 'a deliberate will to do what is wrong, knowing that it is wrong' (Airaksinen 1995: 27), and libertines 'need truth, right, and good – but only to breach values' (Airaksinen 1995: 161). Being "wrong" – whether illegal or immoral, or both – is a prerequisite for pleasure. Carter points out that:

> if the evidence of Sade's ingrained puritanism is that he believes sex in itself to be a crime, and associates its expression with violent crime, the libertine's entire pleasure is the cerebral, not sensual one, of knowing he is engaging in forbidden activity. It is the presence of his accomplices, all engaged on the same project, that convinces him he commits a crime. (Carter 2009: 172)

Sade's acts have to be criminal in order for the intellect to be stimulated, and for Sade to experience pleasure. But Sade does not think perversions exist: 'the Sadeian libertine is proudly conscious of such activities as "perversions", even as he strenuously denies the actual concept of perversion; that to eat shit and screw corpses and dogs are not the pastimes of the common man is part of his pride in doing so himself' (Carter 2009: 172). Sade, therefore, wants to pervert sexual norms and societal laws while also arguing that perversions and criminal behaviour should not exist, asserting that 'universal laws' are a 'palpable absurdity'

as 'it is a terrible injustice to require that men of unlike character all be ruled by the same law' (Sade 1965: 310) because of innate individual differences and thus varying desires. While Carter broadcasts Sade's contradictory views, she is in some ways embarking on the same project as Sade, striving to breakdown myths, or 'false universals' which overshadow and constrain individuality: 'any glimpse of a real man or a real woman is absent from these representations of the archetypal male and female' (Carter 2009: 6). Carter thus draws out the complexities of Blanchot's succinct argument that in the Sadeian mentality, 'if crime is the spirit of Nature, there is no crime against Nature and, consequently, there is no crime possible' (Blanchot 1965: 63).

Carter also attacks Sade's theory of natural justice. She does this by examining Minski's thesis in light of Rousseau's conception of nature in the *Second Discourse* – a text discussed in Chapter Two in relation to survival in *Heroes and Villains* – and depicting Juliette and Justine in terms of a conflict between Rousseau *and Hobbes*. I would argue therefore that Sade's extensive philosophical reading, particularly on social contract theory, reawakens Carter's interest in this phenomenon. For Minski, it is 'sheer nonsense' that 'there is a kind of natural justice man has always and everywhere adhered to' (Sade 1968: 605). In her notes from 1973-74 Carter unpicks Minski's argument on the basis that it is 'conducted via an appeal to nature' (Carter 1973 Journal MS88899/1/95: unpaginated); like the rest of Sade's libertines, Minski adheres to nature's laws and believes that 'horrors' should be committed 'cheerfully and serenely, in the knowledge that our delights answer Nature's aims' (Sade 1968: 608). I provide Carter's full discussion of this, in order to do justice to her argument:

> Sade succumbs to the same fallacy as Rousseau, although he approaches it from the other end – the fallacy is, that Man is Natural c.f. Minski's attack on the notion of natural justice (Juliette p. 606)
>
> This demolition of the idea of "natural justice" ("If he is of little strength, he will always, automatically, belong to the natural-justice camp") is conducted via an appeal to nature – ("take Nature for your guide when you shape your laws, only in this way will you avoid error") Is Nature just? Of course not, says Minski. Nature always protects the powerful; and man is not guilty when he imitates Nature.
>
> Minski goes on to preach a doctrine of savage individualism (we must compose our own justice, "tailored to fit our personal needs.") And there's nothing wrong with that. But the demolition of Montesquieu's "eternal, immutable" justice is tilting at windmills; *of course* justice is a social fiction. In fact, I realise Sade says so: "justice depends purely upon the human conventions, the character, the temperament, the national moral codes of a country" [Sade 1968: 606-607]. Now, *this* is the defence of justice – the only valid one; Sade justifies injustice by appealing to a natural injustice which is just as much a

> piece of mystification, an invention, as natural justice. (Carter 1973 Journal MS88899/1/95: unpaginated – original emphasis)[15]

Sade's inconsistent portrayal of nature that Carter lays bare here has been noted by a number of Sadeian scholars. Gorer, for instance, notes that 'in place of the God he could not respect, de Sade enthroned Nature as the prime mover of the universe; but this Nature is not a consistent conception; in the fifteen years covered by his most important writings the idea undergoes constant modifications' (Gorer 1964: 97). By accusing Sade of falling into the trap of believing that 'Man is Natural', Carter demonstrates that she is discussing Sade in light of her previous research on Rousseau and Hobbes. For Carter, both natural injustice and natural justice are inventions, as she highlights that nature itself is a myth, and does not doubt the fact that "justice" is a construction, a 'social fiction'. By deconstructing the notion of natural laws, Carter demolishes the foundations of Sadeian philosophy and morality – the idea that if an act is permitted by nature it is justifiable. Carter argues that natural injustice – social inequality – is also unnatural, going against Minski's justification that 'unjust acts' are 'indispensable to the maintenance of universal harmony' (Sade 1968: 607-608) and Rousseau's argument that 'Man is Natural'.

The 'savage individualism' that Carter pinpoints, however, is discussed in *The Sadeian Woman* in Hobbesian terms as well. Self-preservation is central to Hobbes's social contract, without which, Hobbes claims, 'the life of man, [is] solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short' (Hobbes 1996: 84). Thus, the Hobbesian state of nature is synonymous with cruelty, as I discussed in Chapter Two. Carter argues that 'Juliette stands for the good old virtues of self-reliance and self-help; "looking after Number One"' (Carter 2009: 116), positioning her as successfully navigating the state of nature that Sade wants to reclaim. Carter also states that Juliette's 'satiric function' is to show that 'the prosperity of crime depends on the fiscal morality of a market-place red in tooth and claw' (Carter 2009: 116). As a lucrative business-woman, Juliette shows that a 'savage individualism' – a philosophy that Carter says there is 'nothing wrong with' (Carter 1973 Journal MS88899/1/95: unpaginated) – can have its benefits. Unlike Justine, Juliette 'acts according to the precepts and also the practice of a man's world and so she does not suffer' (Carter 2009: 90), and 'is rewarded because she undermines the notion of justice on which the law is allegedly based', whereas 'the innocent Justine is punished by a law she believes is just' (Carter 2009: 118).

[15] All the quotations Carter uses here are on page 606 of *Juliette* – as Carter notes – with one exception, which I have detailed in square brackets.

Carter portrays Justine's failings and Juliette's successes through the lens of an – albeit extreme – Rousseau and Hobbes binary distinction. Justine is:

> trusting, endlessly trusting, ruled by ingenuousness, candour and guilelessness, a heroine out of Jean-Jacques Rousseau; she possesses all the limpid innocence he admired in children and savages yet when she offers this innocence to others as shyly as if she were offering a bunch of flowers, it is trampled in the mud. She is a selfless heroine of Rousseau in the egocentric and cruel world of Hobbes. (Carter 2009: 53)

The implication is that Juliette is a cruel Hobbesian heroine *in* a Hobbesian world. Juliette's success therefore boils down to what Klossowski calls her 'morality of apathy' (Klossowski 1992: 37); 'she is rationality personified' and 'will never obey the fallacious promptings of her heart', meaning that, for Carter, she 'remains a model for women, *in some ways*' (Carter 2009: 90 – emphasis mine). An evasion of virtue, social norms and laws, and a strict abidance to vice and criminality lead to Juliette's success. Sade portrays her problematic hedonistic pleasure-worshipping as the catalyst for this: 'if [...] it is sweet to refuse to do good, it must be heavenly to do evil' (Sade 1968: 411).

Carter's portrayal of the Count and the Chief in *Doctor Hoffman* enables her to discuss these Sadeian ideas about nature, natural justice, desires, and Sade's contradictions in a fictional format, particularly in relation to Minski. I am not the first to contend that Minski, the cannibal giant, made an impact on this novel. Munford has recently argued that the Count's 'oration could be lifted directly from the pages of Sade's work (and bears a particular resemblance to the cannibal giant Minski's narrative in *Juliette*)' (Munford 2013: 52), and she goes on to claim that 'the Bestial Room is especially reminiscent of the interior architecture of Minski's formidable Gothic castle' (Munford 2013: 53). I agree that the Count's speech resembles Sade's writing, particularly his depiction of Minski, but argue that this is more explicit and a lot more complex than Munford suggests, with quotations from *Juliette* littering this part of the novel. Here, Carter puts Minski's theories of nature under scrutiny, and parodies Sadeian speeches, focusing on their egoism and contradictions. She also deliberately portrays the Count as a mixture of Sade and Minski, blurring biographical information about the philosophical author and the imagined cannibal. The Count's 'twin' (Carter 2010: 148), the cannibalistic African chief, is based on Minski, demonstrating Carter's engagement with Sade and her interest in ideas of the natural state, as well as a more nuanced depiction of the doubling of the Chief and the Count, as both characters are blatantly portrayed with Minski in mind. The Bestial Room is not the only location that recalls Minski's domain. The Chief's cave is 'an arcade of human skeletons' and he sits on 'a throne

of bones' that rolls on 'wheels made of skulls' (Carter 2010: 186-187); Minski's castle hall 'was decorated, littered with skeletons; there were benches fashioned of human bones and wherever one trod it was upon skulls' (Sade 1968: 579).

Let us start with the Count. Like many Sadeian libertines, the Count takes pleasure from natural disasters, and, in a complete inversion of Bentham's 'Greatest Happiness Principle', the more people killed by such events, and the more gruesome their deaths, the greater the pleasure. In *Juliette* for instance, Durand the sorceress congratulates herself on knowing she 'can send the plague roaring abroad, poison streams and wells, propagate epidemics, contaminate the air of provinces', amongst numerous other horrific acts (Sade 1968: 540). Likewise, the Count says that 'my medium is destruction; and my inspiration is nature' (Carter 2010: 146) and encourages Lafleur to 'do as I do; salute nature when she offers us another *coup de théâtre*!' (Carter 2010: 141), envisaging nature as a stage where acts are performed in order to be watched and admired. He is a 'connoisseur of catastrophe' and 'a demon for a cataclysm' and regards the idea of 'little children [being] dashed to smithereens by bounding boulders' as 'a spectacle!' (Carter 2010: 142). A favourite production of the Count's is witnessing 'the eruption of Vesuvius when thousands were coffined alive in molten lava' (Carter 2010: 142), while Sade's libertines, particularly Juliette and Minski have, as Carter notes in relation to Juliette, 'a passion for volcanoes' because they encapsulate 'the strength and indifference of nature' (Carter 2009: 108).

But Carter's Sadeian portrayal of the Count goes much deeper than an appetite for large-scale tragedies, particularly of the volcanic variety. Through the Count, Carter parodies Sade's contradictory theories and hyperbolically depicts his libertine egoism, a charge frequently issued toward Sade and his libertine characters. Blanchot notes that his 'philosophy is one of self-interest, of absolute egoism', as pleasures are worshipped, no matter how they affect others (Blanchot 1965: 40). The lengthy, repetitive, inconsistent speeches that his characters give evidence this. In *Doctor Hoffman*, Desiderio criticises the Count on these terms:

> it was impossible to converse with him for he had no interest in anyone but himself and he offered his companion only a series of monologues of varying lengths, which often apparently contradicted themselves but always, in a spiral-line fashion, remained true to his infernal egoism. (Carter 2010: 144)

The Count's lack of interest for others and incoherent harangues typify Sadeian sermons; like the Count, Sade's libertines are guilty of using 'the word "I", so often' (Carter 2010: 144). In

this sense, Carter emerges as a Sadeian critic in *Doctor Hoffman* as well as *The Sadeian Woman*, mocking the main features of Sade's philosophy.

Carter's status as a Sadeian critic is enhanced by her representation of the Count as a hybrid of Sade and Minksi, as the Count blurs the biographies of the two. In his prolonged life story, the Count says that after visiting Asia, he:

> visited Europe where, as a reward for my villainies, I was condemned to burn at the stake in Spain, to hang by the neck in England and to break upon the wheel in a singularly inhospitable France, where, sentenced to death *in absentia* by the judiciary of Provence, my body was executed in effigy in the town square of Aix. (Carter 2010: 147)

This account mirrors Minski's similarly detailed and drawn-out personal history. After touring Asia and North America to discover savage atrocities to mimic, Minski sailed 'east, to your Europe [where] I brought back penchants so dangerous that they condemned me to the stake in Spain, to be broken on the wheel in France, hanged in England' (Sade 1968: 579). While the punishments that the Count is given and the places where they are carried out match Minski's experiences, demonstrating that Desiderio has encountered a reincarnation of Minski on his travels, the embellishments that Carter adds augment the extent to which the Count is a Sadeian creation. The Count's description of France as 'inhospitable', for instance, chimes with Minski's lengthy speech on the 'virtue of hospitality' (Sade 1968: 592) which ridicules the notion of hospitality on the basis of its relative norms. Part of the Count's biography, however, corresponds to Sade himself rather than to Minski: the Count was 'sentenced to death *in absentia* by the judiciary of Provence [...] executed in effigy in the town square of Aix' (Carter 2010: 147), but Sade and his valet Latour, were, as Carter notes in *The Sadeian Woman*, 'burned in effigy at Aix-en-Provence' (Carter 2009: 34).

Carter's direct engagement with *Juliette* highlights her heightened critique of Sadeian philosophy in terms of nature's didactic role and the contradictions within his changing theory of nature, demonstrating her parody of Sadeian egoism. Moreover, I would argue that as the Count's death sentence aligns with Sade's life and his castigation corresponds to Minski's imagined autobiography, blurring Sade and his giant character, Carter is engaging with the hazy distinction between Sade and his writing, between the limited facts and his indeterminable fiction. There is a 'complete disproportion between the severity of the sentence and the alleged crime', and, as Gorer goes on to suggest in line with Sade's beliefs, 'the actual charge was merely an excuse, the real reason for his condemnation being political writings' (Gorer 1964: 32-33); Sade was imprisoned for his imaginary crimes rather than for atrocities he actually committed. By merging facts about Sade's life – that he was burned in

effigy – with the varying punishments the fictional Minski received while journeying through Europe, Carter's depiction of the Count contributes to the lack of distinction between Sade's real offences and those of his libertine characters, and to his continuing notorious reputation. Carter's portrayal of Minski, therefore, does more than bear 'a particular resemblance' to this section of *Juliette* (Munford 2013: 52).

Her representation of the Count's 'double', the African chief, in the following chapter of *Doctor Hoffman* is also indebted to Minski, adding another dimension to Carter's engagement with Sade. The Chief, like Minski and the Count, worships nature; he praises the natural state in cruel, Hobbesian terms. The Chief welcomes the Count to Africa, referred to as 'the regions of the noble children of the sun' (Carter 2010: 187); Minski uses the same words in reference to his encounter with African people – 'those noble children of the sun' – who regard women as 'a domestic animal Nature gives us for the double purpose of satisfying our needs and our desires' (Sade 1968: 580). Moreover, Minski says that on this continent he 'observed man in his constitutionally vicious, instinctively cruel, and studiously ferocious form, and as such he pleased me, as such he seemed to me in closer harmony with Nature' (Sade 1968: 580), encapsulating the reasons why Sade idolises nature – it justifies his perverse desires by suggesting they are natural. The Chief pays homage to Africa in almost identical terms: 'in these regions, you may observe Man in his constitutionally vicious, instinctively evil and studiously ferocious form – in a word, in the closest possible harmony with the natural world' (Carter 2010: 190). The Chief also praises natural forces for their stability, aligning nature with the absolute and social norms with relativity. 'Ocean, forest, mountain, weather', he says, 'are the inflexible institutions of that world of unquestionable reality which is so far removed from the social institutions which make up our own world that we men must always, whatever our difference, conspire to ignore them' (Carter 2010: 190).

This emphasis on nature and striving for 'universal harmony' (Sade 1968: 608) reinforces the doubling between the Count and the Chief, as both characters voice the same aspect of Sade's mutable theory of nature. The state of nature described by the Chief and Minski is Hobbesian rather than Rousseauian; the Chief claims that his native African country's habits are 'barbarous' and cannibalistic, and that 'not one of those delightful children who seem, each one, to have stepped straight off the pen of Jean-Jacques Rousseau but has not' (Carter 2010: 187-188). The implication is that while writing *Doctor Hoffman*, Carter was thinking about Sade in relation to her previous research on the natural state, particularly Rousseau, although her Rousseau-inspired critique of Minski's argument against natural justice follows a year or two later in her 1973-74 journal notes. The fact that *Juliette*'s

influence permeates the picaresque *Doctor Hoffman* is further illuminated by Albertina's disguised movement between the chapters. While Carter claims that 'it was reading Sade that set me off writing in the picaresque mode' (Carter to Appignanesi 1987: unpaginated), Albertina keeps a quotation from *Juliette* in her pocket and appears throughout the novel in a range of guises, symbolising the relevance of this novel throughout *Doctor Hoffman*, and more widely, throughout Carter's research journals where *Juliette* has a prolific presence.

A true Sadeian libertine, the Count 'ride[s] the whirlwind of my desires'; he is governed by passions, pleasure-seeking, and his search for pain – 'I am always haunted by a pain I cannot feel [...] I am nostalgic for the homely sensation of pain' (Carter 2010: 144-145), a point I discussed *vis-à-vis* Wittgenstein in the preceding chapter. In Sadeian terms, this means that while Sade's libertine philosophy can broadly be labelled as hedonistic, recalling the relevance of Carter's utilitarian research, as it is primarily guided by pleasure – a Statute of the Sodality that Juliette joins stipulates that 'the sole divinity it recognizes is pleasure; to pleasure it sacrifices everything' (Sade 1968: 419) – the term 'hedonistic' does not straightforwardly apply to Sadeian libertines. The libertines get pleasure from both inflicting and receiving pain, leading Airaksinen to question 'can we call it hedonism?' (Airaksinen 1995: 11) and say that Sade's 'worshipping of pain is a parody of hedonistic ethics' (Airaksinen 1995: 103). Carter's discussion of this skewed moral system in which pleasure is the guiding force, even if a pleasurable act kills hundreds of people, is mainly focused on Sade's portrayal of virtue and vice, characterised respectively by Justine and Juliette who 'mutually reflect and complement one another, like a pair of mirrors' (Carter 2009: 89). As Carter notes, Madame de Saint-Ange in *Philosophy in the Bedroom*, for instance, argues that 'virtue, vice, all are confounded in the grave', dismissing the Christian idea of an afterlife determined by "good" or "bad" behaviour (Sade 1965: 226; Carter 1973 Journal MS88899/1/95: unpaginated).

For Sade, though, vice and virtue are innate, but Carter does not forgive Sade for putting forward this argument. Carter's discussion of vice and virtue concentrates on the opening of *Juliette*, where, on her thirteenth birthday, the heroine is indoctrinated into a convent and educated by a libertine nun called Madame Delbène, although Carter's argument relates to Sade's broader portrayal of vice (and therefore virtue). Sade sees perversity and vice as innate, something to which one is 'drawn thither by Nature' (Sade 1968: 11), with 'all moral effects' being 'related to physical causes' (Sade 1968: 15). Sade's philosophy repeatedly maintains that the flow of 'neural fluids', behaviour of atoms, and the 'species or quantity of the nitrous particles contained in the foods making up our diet', as some

examples, 'moves a person to crime or to virtue' (Sade 1968: 15). Biological causes, and 'a natural propensity for vice' is, as Carter notes, 'essential to Sadeian psychology' (Carter 2009: 93). While Sade sees virtue and vice as absolutely distinct states, he also repeatedly claims, as we have seen, that there is no such thing as an absolute notion of morality. Delbène, too, voices this argument: 'the human conscience [...] is not at all times and everywhere the same, but rather almost always the direct product of a given society's manners and of a particular climate and geography' (Sade 1968: 9). Carter, of course, seizes on this inconsistency:

> This straitjacket psychology relates his fiction directly to the black and white ethical world of fairy tale and fable; it is in conflict with his frequently expounded general theory of moral relativity, that good and evil are not the same thing at all times and in all places. So his characters represent moral absolutes in a world where no moral absolutes exist. This is the major contradiction inherent in his fiction, which he never resolves. (Carter 2009: 93)

By emphasising Sade's contradictory theories and his arguments on cultural relativity and infernal desires in *Doctor Hoffman*, as reinforced by the picaresque mode of the novel which introduces a range of civilisations and pre-civilised communities with different laws and expectations, Carter engages with these ideas in both a fictional and non-fictional mode. For instance, Desiderio discusses the River People's customs in terms of marriage rituals and the young age at which they find marriage acceptable, contrasting this to his own social norms.

Thus, while Carter labels Sade as a 'moral pornographer' (Carter 2009: 22) and numerous critics have argued that this term in fact applies to Carter, too, with Gamble saying that Carter emerges as 'the real moral pornographer' (Gamble 1997: 103), the same applies to Carter's argument that Sade is a 'philosophical pornographer' (Carter 2009: 64), or more specifically, a moral philosopher disguised as a pornographer. In *Doctor Hoffman*, *The Sadeian Woman* and her unpublished research notes on Sade, Carter philosophises about the same, broad moral topics as Sade. She dissects his incompatible theory of nature, flags up the inconsistencies of saying virtue and vice are both absolutely innate and culturally relative, and interrogates the necessity of the law in order for him to take pleasure out of his criminal perversions and deviant sexual appetite, particularly by portraying his Edenic houses of libertinage as religious institutions that behave as if "taboo" behaviour is the law. As well as engaging with Sade's theory of natural justice through the lens of Rousseauian theory, and analysing Juliette in terms of Hobbes's depiction of the state of nature where self-preservation is paramount, she also discusses Sadeian paradise – particularly the Sodality in *Juliette* – in Platonic terms. She says, 'like all Utopias, its literary and political origin is the

Republic of Plato, which the Sodality curiously resembles in its inflexibility and elitism', but demonstrates a closer analysis of the Sodality as a successor of Plato's *Republic* by noting that, 'unlike Plato, however, Sade allows a token handful of artists to enter this sacrosanct domain' (Carter 2009: 104-105). This argument overlooks the fact that Plato does not banish all artists, but in fact censors what kinds of artists are allowed. Carter also points out that 'the Sodality is divided into three classes: the libertines; their victims; and their servants, the cooks, harem keepers, torturers and nurses' (Carter 2009: 104), but she does not explicitly link this to Plato's *Republic*, where there are also three classes, with the lowest level consisting of Workers, like Sade's Sodality.

Carter's discussion of Sade therefore draws upon her broader philosophical research, with *The Sadeian Woman* constituting, in many ways, a culmination of her previous philosophical enterprises. As well as evaluating Sade in relation to Platonic ideas of utopian societies and divisions, her engagement with the disguised philosopher demonstrates a continued analysis of the universality versus relativity of social, and therefore moral norms, which she previously questioned *vis-à-vis* Kant, and an interrogation of Sadeian concepts of the state of nature and natural justice in Rousseauian and Hobbesian terms. Sade also provides Carter with a platform for discussing the related issues of crime, legislation, and religion, allowing her to develop ideas on what she calls 'the morality of the pervert'. She draws out the irony that the law that Sade rebels against in fact provides the bedrock for his deviant sexual appetite; without the prohibition of the acts his libertines take pleasure from, they would no longer be pleasurable, as criminality and pleasure go hand-in-hand. Carter's Sadeian polemic normalises Sade's pornographic philosophy, depicting his Edenic houses of libertinage as alternative societies with pseudo-religious behaviours – taboo acts are law, and should be worshipped accordingly – thus curtailing its perversions. Sade is, therefore, the epicentre of Carter's philosophical interest and research, acting as a springboard for broad discussions of morality in terms of 'simple ethical concepts like "right", "wrong", "truth", and "justice"' (Carter to Bell 1973: 36), and a well-read philosopher who encourages Carter to engage with these concepts in line with the rest of her reading on similar issues and their contemporary relevance.

Conclusion

My argument is that Angela Carter's novels – especially those of the 1960s and 1970s – are characterised by a (de)philosophising of Western thought. In the Bristol trilogy – *Shadow Dance* (1966), *Several Perceptions* (1968), and *Love* (written in 1969, published in 1971) – Carter dwells on moral dilemmas and debunks Kantian ethics; she argues that morality is not absolute or objective and portrays a moral system based on notions of duty as flawed. The latter two instalments of this trilogy also put David Hume's disorienting theories of causation and personal identity to the test, questioning where a knowledge of causal relations comes from, as well as raising questions about identity-formation. Carter's parody of the Professors in *Heroes and Villains* (1969) also challenges the usefulness of understanding causality, but the post-apocalyptic environment portrayed in this text also gives Carter a platform for imagining the sustainability of Plato's idyllic Republic in real-world circumstances, and to engage with theories of the natural state, particularly those of Thomas Hobbes and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. A deconstruction of Platonic thought – especially his discussion of different levels of reality and knowledge epitomised by his similes – also underpins *The Infernal Desire Machines of Doctor Hoffman* (1972), the novel where Carter's (de)philosophising is especially prominent; living in Japan gave Carter some distance from Western thought, allowing her to appreciate the extent to which Western civilisation is influenced by the "Master-Builders" of Western philosophy, to use John Locke's metaphor of philosophy as a building supported by foundations.

As well as being influenced by Plato, *Doctor Hoffman* is characterised by a demolition of Descartes's philosophy, a demolition that began in Carter's 1962 poem 'Piss off, Descartes' (Carter 1962-63 Journal MS88899/1/88: unpaginated), Gilbert Ryle's discussion of counterfeit money, and most notably, Carter's extensive and intensive research on Wittgenstein at this time; the novel includes quotations and allusions from two of Wittgenstein's texts – the *Tractatus* and *Philosophical Investigations* – as well as from two secondary sources: Justus Hartnack's *Wittgenstein and Modern Philosophy* and Max Black's *A Companion to Wittgenstein's Tractatus*. Quotations from the Marquis de Sade's *Juliette* also permeate *Doctor Hoffman*, particularly in relation to the Count and the African chief. Sade's discussion of nature is also examined in this novel, which parodies Sadeian egoism and highlights the overlap between Sade's "factual" biography and his fictional libertines. These ideas, as well as discussions of Sadeian morality in relation to criminality and

perversions, are also central to *The Sadeian Woman* (1979). In *The Passion of New Eve* (1977), a novel structured according to Plato's Cave simile, Carter's critique of Plato comes to the fore once again, with Carter's anti-essentialist view of gender being targeted at Plato's notion of the Forms and levels of reality. Carter also engages with John Locke's idea of the mind being a blank slate which is inscribed with experience in *New Eve*, a concept that spans Carter's career, informing her first novel *Shadow Dance* as well as her posthumously published short story 'The Ghost Ships' (1993), not forgetting her penultimate novel *Nights at the Circus* (1984). Locke's impact on Carter is at its peak in *New Eve* where Carter discusses Locke's notion of America, signalled in the novel's epigraph, as Carter imagines America as a blank slate in order to draw attention to the country's colonisation and the damaging repercussions of this.

By engaging with these thinkers, Carter raises questions relating to a number of key debates in Western philosophy: How do you define "real"? What is the state of nature like, and is it inferior to the civil state? How do you know you *know* something? What do "right" and "wrong" mean? What is more, Carter interrogates the relationship between language and the world, particularly in relation to Wittgenstein, and considers what skills and knowledge are needed to survive an apocalypse via her interaction with Hobbes and Rousseau. In doing so, Carter emerges as a (de)philosophiser. On the whole, her engagement with Western philosophy is satirical and antagonistic: Carter parodies Plato's idea of a utopian Republic, rewrites Descartes's Cogito and degrades the arguments built on this foundation, and rejects Kant's notion of an absolute system of morality; Hume is an exception to Carter's mockery, although his ideas do not escape scrutiny. As well as challenging particular philosophical arguments and theories, Carter deconstructs the androcentricity of Western philosophy, degrading Plato's status as a Master-Builder of Western philosophy to that of a 'father of lies' (Carter 1998b: 39) who has infected Western civilisation with his ideas. If Plato is a father-figure, the rest of the thinkers discussed in this thesis (as well as those beyond the parameters of my examination) are his figurative sons, and Carter bulldozes their arguments as well, destabilising the male-dominated field of Western philosophy. Carter's satirical portrayal of the male Professors in *Heroes and Villains* – discussed in Chapters One and Two *vis-à-vis* Plato, Hobbes, and Rousseau – epitomises this. This androcentricity also extends to critical discussions of these thinkers, and of philosophers more broadly. But by questioning ideas and testing theories rather than rejecting them from the off-set, Carter deconstructs and parodies Western philosophy while also philosophising on the same ideas, contributing a female perspective to this discipline: she simultaneously philosophises and dephilosophises.

While Carter's interaction with thinkers ranging from Plato to Rousseau and Hobbes, Descartes, Locke, and Hume, Kant and Sade, as well as the more contemporary Wittgenstein and Ryle, demonstrates her deconstruction of the male domination of Western thought and her discussion of ideas including existence, reality, morality, and the state of nature, Carter's (de)philosophising business has some other recurring focuses. For instance, Carter's critique of Plato's universal Forms, of Kant's absolute and universal notion of morality, and discussion of Sade's cultural relativity, illustrates her rejection of absolutes and universals more broadly. Carter told John Haffenden that 'everything is relative [...] You cannot make any statements which are universally true' (Carter to Haffenden 1984: 38), and says that she raises questions in her writing, but that 'there are no right answers'; instead, 'there is a selection of answers which could all be adequate to some degree, there are no answers which are unequivocally correct' (Carter to Haffenden 1984: 35). This ties into Carter's 'demythologising business' (Carter 1998b: 38), as she compares myths to 'false universals' (Carter 2009: 6). Building on her demythologisation of Western thought, Carter's engagement with a number of these thinkers is characterised by blurring, whether that is a conflation of binary divisions or a disruption of established ideas. For instance, Carter eliminates and blurs the distinctions between Plato's levels of reality and knowledge embodied by his Divided Line, questions the difference between the state of nature and the civil state in relation to Hobbes and Rousseau and blurs their arguments, and blurs notions of "right" and "wrong". Via her engagement with thinkers like Descartes, Locke, and Hume, she also disturbs the supposed "certainty" of ideas relating to self-identity, existence, and causation, and as the Wittgensteinian influence on *Doctor Hoffman* suggests, depicts the chaos that ensues when laws of normality collapse. Thus, key components of Carter's work that have been central to critical discussions of Carter to date – a rejection of dualistic thought, a refusal to accept universal or absolute arguments, and a disruption or demythologisation of established norms – are the defining features of Carter's philosophy, which stems from her engagement with Western thinkers.

This thesis, therefore, provides the first in-depth analysis of Carter's engagement with Western thought, and is original in its focus as well as its discussion of the contents of the Angela Carter Papers Collection. I have argued that Western philosophy has a fundamental impact on Carter's writing, with Carter's novels deconstructing the arguments of the fathers of Western thought and raising questions – philosophising – about the same ideas. While some thinkers had a profound influence on Carter for discrete periods of time and are engaged with in particular novels – Wittgenstein in Japan and *Doctor Hoffman*, Rousseau and

Hobbes in the late 1960s and *Heroes and Villains* – other philosophical figures had a more enduring impact on her, influencing a wider range of Carter's work. Plato, for instance, is a key intertext for *Heroes and Villains*, *Doctor Hoffman*, and *New Eve*, and Locke's ideas are engaged with in Carter's first work *Shadow Dance* as well as one of the last short stories she wrote, 'The Ghost Ships', not forgetting *New Eve* in between these. Moreover, Sade influenced *Doctor Hoffman* and *The Sadeian Woman*, and was anticipated to be central to *Adele*, the novel based on *Jane Eyre* that Carter began planning before she died, with Carter noting that a quotation from *Juliette* would be an epigraph of the novel (Carter 1989-91 Journal MS88899/1/99: unpaginated). I have shown that Carter's engagement with Western philosophy is much more complex than many previous discussions have suggested. As well as opening novels with quotations corresponding to Western thinkers and explicitly name-dropping key figures in this field, Carter embeds quotations from a range of philosophical texts into her novels, including primary works and, as is the case for Wittgenstein in particular, criticism on these thinkers. She also alludes to philosophical arguments, such as Ryle's discussion of counterfeit money, which have previously escaped critical attention although, as is the case with Ryle, the idea is central to *Doctor Hoffman*. The archival material that comprises the Angela Carter Papers Collection, a key source for this thesis, pays testimony to Carter's dedication to researching Western philosophy, evidencing the wealth of material on the thinkers discussed in this thesis and how she planned to engage with their ideas.

In line with Joseph Bristow and Trev Lynn Broughton's claim that 'the allusiveness of her [Carter's] writing was so broad that one can only commiserate with the task facing future annotators' of *Doctor Hoffman* (Bristow and Broughton 1997: 9), my thesis "just" focuses on ten key figures of Western philosophy, although I recognise that Carter's fascination with this area is much more expansive than this. While Carter's philosophical intertextuality is especially dense in *Doctor Hoffman*, Bristow and Broughton's sentiment applies to Carter's *oeuvre* as a whole, and, as noted in the Introduction, there are an abundance of paths to explore, an exploration that would do justice to the breadth and depth of Carter's (de)philosophising of Western thought. Thus, while I have contributed in-depth discussions of Carter's engagement with Plato, Hobbes and Rousseau, Descartes, Locke, and Hume, Wittgenstein and Ryle, and Carter's research on moral philosophy in relation to Kant and Sade, to criticism on Carter and called for a closer, more specialised examination of Carter's intertextuality in relation to the availability of the archived material, this aspect of Carter's intertextuality is ripe for future analysis. Areas for future discussion include the

thinkers I do not examine in this thesis (Aristotle, Mumford, Durkheim, de Chardin, Nietzsche, Sartre, Foucault, Horkheimer, Adorno, Benjamin, Marcuse, Hegel, Heraclitus, and Husserl, although this list is by no means exhaustive); Eastern thought, especially Chinese philosophy; as well as Carter's short stories. Other areas of Carter's engagement with the thinkers I do focus on would also benefit from further analysis, such as Plato's *Symposium*, and Sade's philosophical impact on works other than *Doctor Hoffman*. In light of the new access to the Angela Carter Papers Collection, which has altered and expanded the map of criticism on Carter, this thesis constitutes an initial expedition into Carter's engagement with Western thought, and marks the beginning of discussions on Carter's (de)philosophising business.

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